of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The
numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian
army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle
of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states
whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But
what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at
once the preëxisting stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster
in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn
upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were
other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be
stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia
silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her
old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. It
worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit
of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and
tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present
case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in
itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing,
had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs:
but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all
parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered
to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude
which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled “artists in warlike
affairs.” So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage
stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the
Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the
left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank,
and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in
the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would
have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front,
and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were
thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians,
and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of
Peloponnesus.[126]
[126] Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην
αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν
ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἑνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχῃ
μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες.
We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and
Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the
army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their
return to Sparta.[127]
[127] Thucyd. v, 72.
Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we
may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish
caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men
immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead
of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more
important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark
of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal
allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.[128] Shortly
after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the
aid of Mantineia,—probably regretting their previous untoward
departure,—together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians.
Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians
kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their
extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late
battle,[129] and remaining themselves within their own territory,
so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations
of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they
had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence
of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had
gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun
by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold
enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of
Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to
be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the
Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the
portion of work committed to them—the fortification of the cape on
which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated—was indefatigably
prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both
Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted
to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being
for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new
fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian
territory.[130]
[128] Thucyd. i, 141.
[129] Thucyd. v, 75.
[130] Thucyd. v, 75.
So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive
benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon
manifested in the very centre of their enemy’s force, at Argos. A
material change had taken place since the battle in the political
tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an
opposition party, philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the
effect of the defeat of Mantineia had been to strengthen this party
as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders,
who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to
maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not
superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and
exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a
victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence
by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary
democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field
of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian
arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very
different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies,
they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the
Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,[131] and
doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has
been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families,
and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to
receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time
when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the
Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue
the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would
probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her
as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But
when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and
threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance
their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided
opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The
oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered
into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into
alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.[132]
[131] Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the credit
gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of
Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution,
notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: ~Οἱ
γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες~ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc.
An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over
defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the
Athenian army under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the
later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2,
15-17.
[132] Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80.
As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the
Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their
full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and
inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy
Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative
propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and
prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case
they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the
oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with
Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they
attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas
was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously
pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had
to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in
Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing
but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general
despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their
point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being
already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to
Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were
substantially as follows:—
“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as
hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii.
They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia,
whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in
Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away
from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort
recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith
evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as
well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall
restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever
place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged
to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent
to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear
themselves.[133] Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be
autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution.
If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with
mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel
against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the
Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta
shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the
allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their
own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their
allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit.
But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send
them home about their business.”[134]
[133] Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydidês is incurably corrupt,
in regard to several words of this clause; though the general
sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to
be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an
oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been
essential that the oath should be _tendered_ by one litigant
party and _taken_ by the other: perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν
λῇν (Valckenaer’s conjecture) might be preferable to εἶμεν λῇν.
To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr.
Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this
practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous
practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny,
in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, sects. 309-313,
vol. vii, pp. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant
party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to
take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of
the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and
formalities, with respect to this _jusjurandum delatum_, which
Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.
[134] Thucyd. v, 77. Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι,
αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, ~οἴκαδ’
ἀπιάλλειν~. See Dr. Arnold’s note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.
ch. xxiv. vol. iii, p. 342.
One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words,
but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and
almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text.
The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantineia; all
hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well
decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it
stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even
with rudeness, if they desired any change.
I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδείξαντας)
has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the
Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a
resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to
Argos.
Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to
Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity
little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance
upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by
substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three
confederates.
But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only
as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was
concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and
was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the
Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time
retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians
at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever.
They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly
formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia,
and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following
terms:—
“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the
Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable
satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all
complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the
other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance,
holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All
extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same
footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall
also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their
own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military
operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take
counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can
for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto
belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes
either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound
to enter upon amicable adjustment.[135] If any allied city shall
quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to
some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice
to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.”
[135] Thucyd. v, 79. Αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τᾶν
ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσου, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου
τινὸς, διακριθῆμεν.
The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the
joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to
interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a
foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were
at this time standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens, and
between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose
to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the
alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard
themselves against such necessity in this clause.
M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat.
Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle,
1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of
this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.
It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed
question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and
Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking
joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are
to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding
themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy
of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy
to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the
empire of Elis, Mantineia, or any other larger state which might
have dependencies.[136] And accordingly the Mantineians, finding
themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their
submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies,
renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering
up the hostages of these latter, according to the stipulation in
the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.[137] The Lacedæmonians do
not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed
of Lepreum,—through the Brasideian settlers planted there,—they
perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being
excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.
[136] All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced
by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed
with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of
Nikias) αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους, Thucyd. v, 19.
The last clause of this treaty guarantees αὐτοδικíαν to all,
though in language somewhat different, τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ
πάτρια δικάζεσθαι. The expression in this treaty αὐτοπόλιες is
substantially equivalent to αὐτοτελεῖς in the former.
It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydidês the very
convenient Herodotean word δωσίδικοι (Herodot. vi, 42), though
there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it
would be useful to his meaning.
[137] Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii, 81.
Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon—about
November or December, 418 B.C.—had still farther depressed the
popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen
regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as
bound together by their common military training, now saw their way
clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the
accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views,
and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta,
they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and
began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens.
Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and
Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects
of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements
concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce
his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that
quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian
princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which
constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly,
Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty;
insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step
should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.[138] In farther
pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys
were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit
Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort
recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly
by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter
were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged
it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not
only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which
gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in
the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for
the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the
Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily
shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.[139] Having no
intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the
Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they
had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before,
two years before the Peace of Nikias.[140]
[138] Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.
[139] The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian
towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the
gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious
festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the
precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his
treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.
[140] Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ~ἀνανεωσάμενοι~ τὰς
σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told
that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but
I know no truce previously between them except the general truce
for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with
Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.
The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to
the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire
to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly
what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most
desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their
plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy.
They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one
thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under
the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more
thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian
government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical
opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city
seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy,
and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint
enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to cover
the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos,
whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business
at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical
leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the
democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical
leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the
government.[141]
[141] Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι
ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ’ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον
κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνα
ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία
ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80.
This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of
the victory of Mantineia and the consummation of a train of policy
laid by Sparta, raised her ascendency in Peloponnesus to a higher and
more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in
Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose,
perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before;
accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with
her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not
merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep
down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither
enemy, nor even neutral, to counter-work her or to favor Athens,
throughout the whole peninsula.
But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last.
Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long
maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional
routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to
govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a
democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of
the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived,
and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them
suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault:
they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too
tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity.
With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all
ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens, such abuse was pretty
sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment
of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their
military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed
the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a
period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of
their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop.
After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one
day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of
the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn
from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself
of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited
woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the
ravisher while he was fast asleep:[142] a terrible revenge, which
the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled
women[143] to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to
make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as
protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts
of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.
[142] Pausanias, ii, 20, 1.
[143] See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note of
Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.
From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults
which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not
surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost
courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical
oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the
Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta,—a festival at
which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with
Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians
would make no military movement until they were finished. At this
critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after
a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom
were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the
first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta
for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move
during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after
messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their
friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march
towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already
passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends
were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people.
Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them
success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians
refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted
festival.[144]
[144] Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80.
Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of
about four months,[145] from February to June, 417 B.C., and the
chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement
excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,[146] who
were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta.
Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city,
felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they
sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable
treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been
spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled
oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after
a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of
wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down.
Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any
immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned,
none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this
moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three
months intervened before any actual force was brought together.
[145] Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight months:
but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from
the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first
establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidês does
not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.
[146] Thucyd. v, 82. ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν
Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων.
This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos,
who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as
an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding
her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls
to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might
always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case
they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force.
The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about
the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiadês brought assistance
from Athens,[147] especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom
they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested
by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had
urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls
adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half
between Argos and the sea,[148] required a long time. Moreover,
the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles
without,—a party defeated but not annihilated,—strenuously urged
the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them
a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew
near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the
oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down
to Peiræus were in course of erection.[149] Accordingly about the end
of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians
and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and
destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised.
But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their
engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after
merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where
he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his
departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring
territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.[150]
[147] Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ
γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.
[148] Pausanias, ii, 36, 3.
[149] Thucyd. i, 107.
[150] Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the
Argeians _had already_ built their long walls down to the
sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους ~ᾠκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι
τῆς θαλάσσης~ (xii, 81). Thucydidês uses the participle of the
present tense—~τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα~ τείχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες,
etc.
The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared
countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical
party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual
uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent
victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand.
To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched
thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty
triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the
ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert
with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons,
whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as
hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging
march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of
Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And
again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word
for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as
the borders, they found the sacrifices—always offered previous to
leaving their own territory—so unfavorable, that they returned back
and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite
of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for
this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least
were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were
seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their
escape.[151] Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians
became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the
Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the
Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian
oligarchical exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were
again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian
army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian
reinforcement.[152]
[151] Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~μελλήσαντες~ ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν
στρατεύειν ... ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ~μέλλησιν~
τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ’
αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.
I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of
_loitering delay_, but is to be construed by the previous verb
μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126—“prospect of
action immediately impending:” compare Diodor. xii, 81.
[152] Thucyd. vi, 7.
To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against
enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to
Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended,
of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time
the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a
source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes
which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia, hopes of
supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is
remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling
between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in
an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third
party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally
renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed
on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real
truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in
fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the
Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever
in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon
which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance,
publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call
letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian
commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel,
commenced hostilities against the Athenians.[153] Yet still Sparta
and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the
Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians
to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit
devastation.[154] Nor was the license of free intercourse for
individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were
invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and
sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and
other Dorian Greeks.
[153] Thucyd. v, 115.
[154] Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate
Oratio de Pace, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the war
was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the
Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This
assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was
one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among
others, some of them more powerful. Thucydidês tells us that the
_persuasions_ of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance
with Sparta were repeated and unavailing.
Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians
probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the
intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the
Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had
made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who,
having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian
expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417
B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew
his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated
the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the
ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an
enemy.[155]
[155] Thucyd. v, 83.
Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without
any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded
to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians
with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want
of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades,
and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens,
which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among
all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as
Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region,
situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could
readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since
it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman,
Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on
the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected
to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it;
the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure
and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man
who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it
never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his
countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon
them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly
through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking
of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through
the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a
portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force
not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês,
all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with
express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis.
But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much
silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result
becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore
to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The
fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness
of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When
he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian
diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making
important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might
have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for
this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well
as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her
empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of
which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to
display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous
than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless,
and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after
the defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations
of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects
an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected
only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious
perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place
could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved.
We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign
politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of
Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be
developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought near to ruin
by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular
misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of
either.
It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do
not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising
out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês.[156] The
political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great
violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken,
and this proposition—probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since
Alkibiadês was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous—was
adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cheremês, a
speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously
supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is
named by Aristophanês as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership
of the rostrum in the Pnyx:[157] if this were true, his supposed
demagogic preëminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the
period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he
had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe
to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in
accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language
which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be
doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as
had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidês does not
name him in any of the important debates which took place at and
after the Peace of Nikias. Thucydidês only mentions him once, in 411
B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and
resident at Samos. He terms him, “one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body,
who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity
and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a
disgrace to the city.”[158] This sentence of Thucydidês is really the
only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his
case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as
if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was
at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators
who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no
particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general
character given by Thucydidês.
[156] Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p.
360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring
of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.
His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called
Andokidês against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems
to accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p.
494, _seq._).
The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I
feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two
generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My
reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous
notes, nor do I think that Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix is successful
in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech.
See my preceding vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6, note.
[157] Aristophan. Pac. 680.
[158] Thucyd. viii, 73. ~Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν~ Ἀθηναίων,
μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος
φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to
Androtion (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot.)—ὠστρακισμένον διὰ φαυλότητα.
Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch,
Alkibiadês, c. 13; Ælian. V. H. xii, 43; Theopompus, Fragm. 102,
103, ed. Didot.
At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a
vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between
Nikias and Alkibiadês, about twenty-four years had elapsed since
a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been
that of Periklês and Thucydidês son of Melêsius, the latter of whom
was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had
become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for
ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover, there
was now full confidence in the numerous dikasteries as competent to
deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus abating the necessity
as conceived in men’s minds, not less than the real necessity, for
such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things,
altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised
to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not
know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an
abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At
a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the friends of Alkibiadês
probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting
a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The
vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place,
the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred to let
the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating
the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally
pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was
always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any
citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, the
two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs, or
hetæries, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax also,
united to turn the vote against some one else: and they fixed upon
a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.[159] By thus
concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him
to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary banishment. But
such a result was in no one’s contemplation when the vote was decreed
to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping
their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by
every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross
abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidês himself
distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully
deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could
treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the
ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was,
even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and
this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of
it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier
days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual
usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry
between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough
to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês
had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that
the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary
antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.
[159] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11.
Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the
coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but
between Phæax and Alkibiadês.
The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all
three.
It was in the beginning of summer (416 B.C.) that the Athenians
undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos,
one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not
already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient
colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of
lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been
in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had
they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her
any ground of complaint,[160] until she landed and attacked them
in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt,
sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and
Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian,
twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from
the allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These
officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent
envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to
become a subject-ally of Athens.
[160] Thucyd. iii, 91.
It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in
governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for
peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present
occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted
the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive
council. Of this conversation Thucydidês professes to give a detailed
and elaborate account, at surprising length, considering his general
brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many
replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no
one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue
carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every
reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far
larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report,
than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For
this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have
had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different
persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four
Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part.
Now as all the Melian population were slain immediately after the
capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through
whose report Thucydidês could possibly have heard what really passed.
That he did hear either from or through them the general character of
what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing
that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of
debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we
must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.
The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the
mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in
which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians
to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of
justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will
not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian
empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth
injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he
listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though
colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done
Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable
under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that
justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal
compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows,
and the weak submitting to it.[161] To this the Melians reply,
that—omitting all appeal to justice, and speaking only of what was
expedient—they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break
down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity
and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with
some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a
case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of
Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be
awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others.—“We
are not afraid of _that_ (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire
should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who
deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is
not undertaken against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether
subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This
is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you
that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we
are now speaking with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under
our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the
mutual benefit of both of us.”—“Cannot you leave us alone, and let
us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor
of Sparta?” said the Melians.—“No (is the reply); your friendship
does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of
our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will
give a demonstration of our power.”—“But do your subjects really
take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of
connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of
whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted
from you and been reconquered?”—“They do: for they think that both
one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and
that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power
and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not
only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the
whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too,
while we are lords of the sea.”—“But surely that very circumstance is
in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for
if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert
them into enemies.”—“We are in little fear of continental cities,
who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but
only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you,
or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which
it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy
are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves
into peril.”—“We know well (said the Melians, after some other
observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend
against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we
trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from
the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice;
and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be
made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from
very shame to aid us.”—“We too (replied the Athenians) think that we
shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For
we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which
men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves.
What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see
to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of
necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This
is the principle on which we now proceed,—not having been the first
either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established
and likely to continue for ever,—and knowing well too that you or
others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations
from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining
deaf to your call, we congratulate you indeed on your innocent
simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness.
For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in
regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at
their behavior towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by
many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most
conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable,
and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state
of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations
of safety.”
[161] In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy,
I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by
the English government in 1807, together with the language used
by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject.
We read as follows in M. Thiers’s Histoire du Consulat et de
l’Empire:—
“L’agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C’étoit M. Jackson
qui avait été autrefois chargé d’affaires en France, avant
l’arrivée de Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu’on n’avoit pas pû
y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu’il manifestoit en toute
occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il allégua de prétendues
stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit,
(disoit on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d’une coalition
contre l’Angleterre: il donna comme raison d’agir la necessité
où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions
pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund
ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François: et en conséquence
il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu’on livrât à l’armée
Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande de Sund, le
port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même—promettant de
garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit
remis en possession de ce qu’on alloit lui enlever, dès que
le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne
perdroit rien, que l’on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires
et en amis—que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce
qu’elles consommeroient.—Et avec quoi, répondit le prince
indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérions
à cette infame proposition?—Le prince continuant, et opposant
à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui
n’avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit
toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le
surprendre—_M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par
une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre,
qu’il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus
fort quand on étoit le plus foible_. Le prince congédia l’agent
Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu’il alloit
se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince
et de citoyen Danois.” (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de
l’Empire, tome viii, livre xxviii, p. 190.)
After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the
Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider
the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a
certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the
following words: “We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of
Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which
has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an
effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which
the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from
men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may
be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and
that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may
be mutually acceptable.”—“Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone
seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts
before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your
own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all
upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with
your all, you will come to ruin.”
The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation,
distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was
constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both
by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The
town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of
that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded
them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an
additional detachment, under Philokratês. At length the provisions
within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the
Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at
discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of
military age and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the
proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydidês does not say;
but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadês[162] was strenuous
in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently
sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as kleruchs, or
out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.[163]
[162] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the
statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokidês against
Alkibiadês found current in respect to the conduct of the latter
(sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of
it.
[163] Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον
πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the
island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9):
some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared.
Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mêlos from the
beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most
inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian
history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such
wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war
placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror,
and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in
Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the
same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange.
But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws
of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they
done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the
island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the
expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain
was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the
whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens.
Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this
small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless,
it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in
after times as among the first of her misdeeds.
To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest—easy to effect,
though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also
strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a
thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate
Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition,
superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions
of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with
still more fatal predominance.
Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked
in the dialogue set forth by Thucydidês. I have already stated that
this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except
as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out
into deductions and illustrations,[164] thus dramatizing the given
situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put
into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers,
as Dionysius of Halikarnassus[165] long ago remarked; intimating his
suspicion that Thucydidês had so set out the case for the purpose
of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever
may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the
arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even
with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are
more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false
pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an
amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called
_sophistry_, where their purpose needs it.[166] Now the language of
the envoy at Mêlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating
the immorality of the class or profession—falsely called a
school—named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for
a sort of audacious frankness; a disdain not merely of sophistry,
in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse
as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if
“_The good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and
they should keep who can_,” had been first discovered and openly
promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value
of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word—putting
aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called
sophists at Athens—is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive
justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon
this “good old plan” as much as he pleases, but without avowing
it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some
imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb)
speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mêlos speaks in a manner
totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the
modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as
Dionysius has observed.
[164] Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol.
iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348.
[165] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucydid. c. 37-42, pp. 906-920,
Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de
Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk.
[166] Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πραότατα τῶν
ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδιὰς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας. To
the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.
As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in
Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they
have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day,
to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory
in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors
who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas
reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which
had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves,
as matter of pride and glory:[167] and when we come to the times of
Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest
reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus
founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples
to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mêlos: but
that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy
of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification,
looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous
invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a
civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to
furnish some justification,—a good plea, if he can,—a false plea, or
sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies
the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the
civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in
Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of
barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy
more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra.
He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect
truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency
as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty
years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her
allies, without any payment of their own.
[167] Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the
Akanthians, v, 86 ~ἴσχυος δικαιώσει~, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, etc.
So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic
fragment,—Μήλου Ἅλωσις (The Capture of Melos),—if we may parody the
title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus “The Capture of Miletus.”
And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydidês will
suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and
tragical effect. The capture of Mêlos comes immediately before the
great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon
three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course
of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort
of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to
ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to
recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its
effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main,
declining,—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration,—until
her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidês,
just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress,
makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in
its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this
dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mêlos. It will be recollected that
Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxês into
Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses
his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and
superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the
courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the
overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral
contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse
following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to
the Greek mind. And Thucydidês—having before him an act of great
injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at
this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for
once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and
confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his
own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of
the Athenian envoy,—still less, those of the Athenian public,—least
of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian
sophists.