What was the remedy for this state of society into which England had

fallen? The cure which seemed natural to Mr. Disraeli was to revert to

the principles of our history. Practically, the first thing to be done

was to break up the political monopoly of the Whigs, and it was

this very task that he set himself to do. I have already extracted a

passage denouncing that party in the first election address he issued.

But here, too, he had no new course to strike out. He affirmed that

both Lord Shelburne and Mr. Pitt had attempted the same work long

before. Shelburne, he said, saw in the growing middle-class a bulwark

for the throne against the Revolution families; and Pitt, still

more determined to curb the power of the patrician party, created a

plebeian aristocracy, when they baffled his first endeavours, blending

it with the old oligarchy. It has not unlikely begun to dawn upon the

reader that Mr. Disraeli, holding these views, was himself a Reformer,

of a much more comprehensive kind even than the Radicals. True, Reform

as it actually had come about in 1832, most craftily manipulated as

it then was by the Whigs to their own advantage, skilfully snatching

profit out of what ought to have been a danger to them, was not his

notion. For part of what happened then he, indeed, with his usual

courage, blamed the Duke of Wellington and his colleagues. His own

party have had from no quarter criticism so severe as that he has

given them. If Lord Beaconsfield is in favour of an aristocracy, it

is because he is for making it actually "lead." He affirms that the

Tories, by their conduct in office, precipitated a revolution which

might have been delayed for half a century, and which need never have

occurred at all in so aggravated a form. All that he could do, all

that he has ever claimed to do, by his own partial Reform measure, was

to do away with part of the ill effects of that partisan move of the

other side, and to prevent fresh ill ones from being worked in just

the same way. But there ought to be given a still broader statement

of Lord Beaconsfield's political and social doctrines, and, perhaps, I

cannot do better than make with that view the following quotation from

the preface to "Lothair." He there explains that his general aims were

these:--

"To change back the oligarchy into a generous aristocracy

round a real throne; to infuse life and vigour into the Church

as the trainer of the nation, by the revival of Convocation,

then dumb, on a wide basis, and not, as has since been done,

in the shape of a priestly faction; to establish a commercial

code on the principles successfully negotiated by Lord

Bolingbroke at Utrecht, and which, though baffled at the

time by a Whig Parliament, were subsequently and triumphantly

vindicated by his political pupil and heir, Mr. Pitt; to

govern Ireland according to the policy of Charles I., and not

of Oliver Cromwell; to emancipate the political constituencies

of 1832 from sectarian bondage and contracted sympathies; to

elevate the physical as well the moral condition of the people

by establishing that labour required regulation as much as

property; and all this rather by the use of ancient forms

and the restoration of the past than by political revolution

founded on abstract ideas."

This, he goes on to say, appeared to him at the beginning of his

career to be the course which the country required, and, he adds, that

it was one "which, practically speaking, could only with all

their faults and backslidings be undertaken and accomplished by a

reconstructed Tory party."

If I were able to find room for bringing together from Lord

Beaconsfield's books and speeches detailed passages to illustrate this

summary, it would be seen what a coherent social scheme he has always

had present to his mind. The above hints, however, must serve. Any

one who, after reading them, thinks that there is any ground for the

electioneering cry the Liberals are trying to raise, that this is a

Minister who has no domestic policy, will show more stolidity than we

hope the bulk of the electors possess. Further on I will return for a

moment to this point.

Let me go at once to the fourth topic I have allotted to myself--Lord

Beaconsfield's foreign policy. This policy, I need not say, is that,

of the Cabinet as well, but I am not in this paper writing of the

other members of the Government. It is not my purpose to trace the

history of the Eastern Question, that of the Afghan War, and the Zulu

embroglio. But there is one general aspect of these matters as to

which I must offer two or three comments in addition to what has been

before said about "Imperialism." A set attempt has been made, and is

pretty certain to go on being made all the time between now and the

elections--whether they come earlier or later--and to be then finally

repeated on the hustings, to give to Lord Beaconsfield the air of a

most belligerent, not to say a bloodthirsty, Minister, who, the moment

he got into office, began to peep about the world to see where he

could pick a quarrel, and who has especially acted defiantly towards

Russia. By way of preliminary, I may ask whether his past antecedents

show him to be a statesman of this hobgoblin type? Lord Palmerston

found no more unyielding opponent of his turbulent foreign policy than

Mr. Disraeli, who always contended that the effect of it was to draw

the national attention away from home reforms. When the question of

coast fortifications was before Parliament, Mr. Disraeli was among

the first to protest against panic; he it was who spoke of "bloated

armaments;" and on countless occasions he has raised his voice for

peace and retrenchment. In 1865 he publicly declared that since he

had had to do with politics he had known only one war which was

justifiable--that waged in the Crimea. But it may be said that it is

a common artifice for men in Opposition to preach peace. Let us, then,

turn specially to the Eastern Question, and see what grounds there are

for insinuating that Lord Beaconsfield has in that case concocted a

war policy for the purpose of exciting and dazzling the country, and

keeping himself in power. In 1843--which is now some time ago--in a

debate as to the production of papers on Servia, in which Sir Robert

Peel and Lord Palmerston were the chief orators, he made a speech

which contained this passage:--"What, then, ought to be the

Ministerial policy? To maintain Turkey by diplomatic action in such a

state that she might be able to hold independently the Dardanelles."

Why, this is the literal description of what he has done now. And we

have already seen that in 1865, twenty-two years after, the one only

war he approved was that which had been fought against Russia for this

very purpose. In the early stage of the negotiations which led to that

war, his complaint was that the Government was not vigorous enough

in defending Turkey. But, in 1857, there arose another occasion for

testing whether Mr. Disraeli's feelings naturally were for peace

or war. He opposed the war with China, and in the Persian affair he

denounced the Russophobia of Lord Palmerston--the very complaint from

which, we infer, the Liberals wish him to be understood to be himself

suffering now. Or take India as a test. According to the Duke of

Argyll and others, Lord Beaconsfield has an insatiable thirst for more

territory in that part of the world. Very strangely, it was he who

most condemned the annexation of Oude, going so far as to make a

motion for a Royal Commission to be sent out to India to inquire into

the condition of the people. When the contest between the Northern and

Southern States of America broke out, no public man regretted it more

than he did, and he was unfalteringly on the side of the North.

In fact, only in one single case has Lord Beaconsfield ever shown the

slightest disposition for sacrificing peace, if need be--namely, for

the checking of Russia's portentous advance; and this has necessarily

implied the maintenance of Turkey in some degree of power. Twice in

his lifetime has the need arisen, and he has acted the second time

in just the same way that he did the first, the only difference

being that he happens now, fortunately, to be in office instead of in

Opposition.

In his first speech in the Upper House, Lord Beaconsfield said--"The

Eastern Question involves some of the elements of the distribution of

power in the world, and involves the existence of empires. I plead

for a calm statesmanlike consideration of the question." In his second

great speech in that House, he made this remark,--"The independence

and integrity of Turkey is the traditional policy not only of England

but of Europe." This is the absolute truth. It is not he who has

invented any brand-new tactics in this matter; he has simply

stood upon the old paths, and carried on the settled habits of our

statesmanship. The innovators are Mr. Gladstone and the self-styled

humanitarians, who were for substituting hysterics for national

diplomacy, and thought to solve the Eastern Question by presenting the

Turk with a carpet-bag and begging him to retire with it into Asia.

But it is stated that Lord Beaconsfield has defied Russia. Well, turn

to the famous Guildhall speech, which is the great article in the

indictment. It suits his critics to pick words out of it to please

them; but it also contains sentences like the following, which they

somehow overlook,--"We have nothing to gain by war. We are essentially

a non-aggressive Power." In that same speech, too, he alluded to the

Emperor of Russia's "lofty character," addressing to him words of the

highest compliment. If he added a solemn warning to that monarch as to

the extent of England's resources if she was forced into war for

the cause of public right, he still was speaking in the interests of

peace, not war. It was his bounden duty to prevent the present Czar

from falling into the mistake his father was so fatally guided into by

the Manchester school--that of thinking England would in no case draw

the sword. Construe his words how you will, they amount to no more

than this. Mr. Gladstone and his friends, by their factitious public

demonstrations, partly did away with the natural effects of that grave

intimation, and made it necessary for the Government to prove its

seriousness by bringing troops from India, and actually risking the

very war which Lord Beaconsfield had wished to avoid. But the Premier

had the courage not only of his opinions but of a true policy, and he

has had his reward. He successfully checked the sinister progress of

Russia, restored the reign of public law in Europe, and while exalting

the renown of his own country, he has pointed another empire--that

of Austria--to a new career which will benefit the world as well as

strengthen and ennoble herself. After the alliance between Germany

and Austria-Hungary was proclaimed, only one thing was left for his

Lordship's opponents to go on repeating,--namely, that he had, in

upholding Turkey, spared no thought or feeling to the victims of her

rule. In the very face of this there was the fact that he had made

England the formal protector of the inhabitants of Asia Minor, and had

demanded Cyprus as a nearer point of observation of the Turk; but

the plain obvious meaning of those arrangements has been tried to be

muddled away by misrepresenting the protectorate of Asia Minor as a

new insult to Russia. These brave humanitarians got sorely entangled

in their logic on all sides. They pleaded in one breath that England

had rashly undertaken too much responsibility for these oppressed

peoples, and in the next breath said that nothing would ever come of

it. Lord Beaconsfield has made it all clear, and in the simplest way.

It is not fully explained at the moment of our writing what is the

actual extent of the pressure put upon the Porte, nor what precise

orders were sent to our admiral, but when the recent news was first

published here the opponents of the Ministry must have felt that Lord

Beaconsfield had ordered the British Fleet to sail against them when

they heard it was instructed to steam back for the Turkish waters.

Kindly meant as it might be for those in Asia Minor, it was a very

cruel step on the part of Lord Beaconsfield towards some of his

own countrymen, for it will necessitate the altering of a good many

already prepared electioneering speeches. In the end, as we venture to

predict, it will be seen that his Lordship and his colleagues are the

true humanitarians.

But let me not lose sight of the fact that this, though a very real

plea on the part of the Government, is not the one on which they

mainly rely. They have never pretended to be knights-errant for the

righting of wrongs throughout the world. What contents them is the

humbler _rôle_ of old-fashioned English statesmanship, which seeks

first to make sure of the safety of our own empire and the promotion

of our proper interests, doing what further good it can to other

peoples incidentally in discharging the fair reasonable obligations

which may in that way arise, nor disdaining any glory that so falls

to it. But an enormous obligation of this sort was already on our

shoulders--the preservation of India. We have a strict duty to two

hundred millions of human beings in the East, and Lord Beaconsfield

and his colleagues, who appeared to be the only public men in England

who remembered this, were determined to discharge it. Anything and

everything in their policy which may at first sight seem risky

or belligerent is explained fully to every one who will keep that

pressing need before his mind. It was this which made them purchase

the Suez Canal shares, and strengthen their interference in Egypt;

it was this that made them wish for a clearer understanding with the

Ameer of Afghanistan. But so little did they go about matters with a

high hand, that they most carefully humoured France with respect to

Egypt, and at the very earliest moment that they could, they made a

treaty with a new Afghan ruler. To try to make them appear responsible

for what afterwards occurred at Cabul is the most shameless abuse of

license on the part of an Opposition which parliamentary records can

show. A Russian embassy had been installed in Cabul with no other

guarantee for its safety than the word of a friendly Ameer, and our

Envoy and his suite were sent thither under the very same guarantee.

If we were not to be most dangerously overshadowed by the Russian

example, an English embassy had to show its face in Cabul; and to say

that our rulers either in Calcutta or in London should have foreseen

the pusillanimous break-down of the Ameer and the consequent massacre

of our brave countrymen is--well, it may be better not further to try

to say what it is.

Our own interests, I repeat, were jeopardized in every quarter where

the present Government has stirred hand or foot. That is its broad

justification. But I must certainly go a step farther than this. The

present Ministry assuredly would not be satisfied with an acquittal on

the Liberal arraignment; nor is that the verdict which the public has

given. The British people find this Government guilty of having won

for it and for themselves much honour. When Lord Beaconsfield saw that

in any event he was committed to a contest with Russia for the defence

of English interests, he had the courage and the wit to determine that

the issue of it should be the better for the world. It is for this

noble superfluity of skilful statesmanship, this Imperial scope given

to England's ruling, that Europe has thanked him, and the bulk of this

nation applauded him. By-and-by, he will reap still further credit,

for besides checking Russia he will eventually coerce the Turk. That

further obligation naturally arose out of the course he took, and he

added it to his proper task of safeguarding our own interests, just

as impartially as he did the other aim of arresting the Muscovite.

I shall not push this reasoning further: it seems to me sufficiently

triumphant as it stands. If Lord Beaconsfield has upheld the Turk, it

was because it was necessary, not because he admired him. But there

is another remark, coming much nearer home, that I wish to make before

concluding this section.

The foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield has brought to him and to his

party much renown; but it has brought them nothing else. That

there has been the need for it is for the Conservatives a positive

misfortune. It has nearly entirely put aside the domestic legislation

on which they reckoned for at once redressing some grievances of their

own, and for satisfying the town populations who their true friends

were. Let it not be forgotten that it was on this very claim of having

a domestic policy that the Conservatives appealed to the people at the

last election. Their opponents, who now make a pretence of measures of

this kind being lacking, then denounced it loudly enough as a "policy

of sewage." But Lord Beaconsfield's rivals have tried hard to make

it seem that he sought out, or even invented, these hazardous events

abroad which put aside his home policy. The very attempt impugns the

common sense of the general public. A sort of pretext might have been

found for insinuating such a notion if Lord Beaconsfield had been

nearing the end of expending his Parliamentary majority by carrying

party measures. But to suppose that a Minister attaining power in

the triumphant way he did would wish to be plunged straightway into

foreign entanglements, is to imagine him stricken with idiocy.

Lord Beaconsfield had had far too much experience to make such a

preposterous mistake. He knew at the beginning, as he knows now, that

neither Minister nor party has much to gain in any way of permanent

power or confirmed home advantage from foreign policies, however

successful they may turn out to be. Foreign dangers are half-forgotten

as soon as they are past. Directly, these occurrences abroad will be

but memories; splendid ones they must ever remain: but they will have

against them, in the eyes of the unthinking, the drawback of

having necessarily, to some extent, disordered the finances. Lord

Beaconsfield's rivals are sure to make the most of that fact on the

hustings, as he well knew beforehand they would do; and, to balance

its effect, he will have nothing on which to rely but the patriotic

recollection of his country. Should everything go for the best, no

_prestige_ which these foreign successes can give him and his party

will place him more solidly in power than he found himself at the

beginning of this Parliament; yet it will only be at the opening of

the next that he will be able to push forward the home policy intended

for the present Parliament. Apart from a heightening of fortunate

reputation, won through much risk, his own party will scarcely have

gained a shred of fair legislative or administrative advantage from

six years' splendid possession of overwhelming power.

It does not seem needful to waste space in speaking of the Zulu war.

Even the Liberals are beginning to be silent on the subject. The

affair was forced upon the Government, not sought for by them, and it

has ended successfully.

If I now ask what have been the causes of Lord Beaconsfield's

unexampled individual success, the remarks must at first seem to

narrow to mere personal ones. There has, in truth, been more than one

reason for the present Premier's triumphs. First of all, I might

state the matter so generally as to say that for half a century he has

managed to keep himself the most thoroughly interesting personage

in England. Neither Mr. Disraeli nor Lord Beaconsfield has ever been

dull, which is the one only sufficient explanation of failure

wherever it happens. But such a statement of the matter as this is too

comprehensive and wants particularizing. I may add, then, that no one

has shown so much pluck as he has, and that is a quality which in the

end tells with the British public beyond all others. For one starting

with his disadvantage of race to dream in those days of a political

career was most courageous, but so soon as it began to be seen that he

would triumph over all obstacles, his very difficulties turned to his

advantage. He soon commanded everybody's sympathies except those

of injured partisans on the other side. Not that it was sympathy he

begged for; it was admiration he extorted. Especially has he by means

of his writings had the generous feeling of youth in his favour,

generation after generation. They can never remain untouched by

the spectacle of a successful fight against circumstances. But Lord

Beaconsfield has not owed all to dash and daring. His industry has

been equal to his pluck. If he had only been a politician that would

have had to be said; and so it again would if he had only been known

as the writer of his works. Put both the careers together and nobody

else has shown such fertility of brain. His marvellous intellect has

never tired. The versatility, too, has been marvellous: a novelist and

a diplomatist, a poet and a Chancellor of the Exchequer, a satirist

and a successful leader of Opposition. For fifty years, in one or

other of these characters, and often in several of them at once, his

wit has never ceased blazing, save when he himself, the only one who

ever tired of its play--except, indeed, those hit by it--has chosen

to smother it in silence; but it was always ready to flash forth upon

occasion, and is as bright to-day as ever.

But, to come yet closer to the heart of the secret of Lord

Beaconsfield's success, his faithful devotion to the great historic

party he allied himself with has been equal to his courage, to his

industry, and to his abilities. No politician can make an individual

career; he has to find his success in the prosperity of his followers.

The loyalty which Lord Beaconsfield has shown to his party and the

ungrudging recognition they have paid to him has half-redeemed the

hardness of our coarse partisan politics. Some Liberals have had the

want of wit, without our going so far as to say the lack of capability

of feeling, to express surprise at the faithful respect shown to Lord

Beaconsfield by his present colleagues. That Lord Beaconsfield has a

personal charm must be admitted, for he has turned every one who was

ever brought into any degree of nearness with him into a friend, as

well as a colleague. Those who like may believe that he has done it

by the use of magic philtres; less credulous people will, perhaps,

content themselves with thinking that his spell has been simply that

of strength of character, superior experience, and a non-despotic

manner. One thing is very patent. This chief of a Cabinet who is said

to have imprinted everywhere his own individuality on the Ministerial

policy, has never practised the slightest interference with his

subordinates. It is not he who has been charged with an uncontrollable

wish to be the representative of all the Ministry in his own person.

Just as he could show patience when a leader of Opposition, he has

been able to be silent when a Minister. However, it has been rather

insinuated that he became preternaturally active in the Cabinet

Councils--there standing forth a wizard, and cast all his colleagues

into a clairvoyant slumber. Strange to say, they remained in the same

comatose condition afterwards in both Houses, never waking up though

speaking and passing measures. Two members of his Government, however,

have broken away--Lords Derby and Carnarvon have escaped from the

magician's cell; but they have divulged nothing as to any necromantic

violence worked on them. No, Lord Beaconsfield's fair and reasonable

ascendency has been more honestly won. But his marvellous friendships

have not been the only softening touches in his career. All England

felt a strange thrilling about the heart on the morning when it

heard that Mr. Disraeli's wife was henceforth to be the Viscountess

Beaconsfield. It was a domestic idyll suddenly disclosed in the centre

of British politics. A man who can make his own hearth the scene of

romance, convert all who know him well into true friends, and win

all the young people of a nation, must be something more than a

self-seeker.

Still, though these things might explain Lord Beaconsfield being so

interesting, something else has yet to be added to account for the

overwhelming importance which he has attained in the last period of

his career. Not even the success of his party could have given him

that unless the policy which secured this prosperity had obtained,

also, the exalting of the nation.

It is this which is his final boast; he has uplifted higher the fame

of England, and by doing that has made his own renown the greater.

Once more, it was achieved in the simplest way. He invented nothing,

strained at nothing, but only boldly carried on the traditionary

English policy, at a moment when his opponents were willing to forget

it; and in merely proving equal to the opportunity, and daring to make

Britain act worthily of her history, he has changed by her means the

destiny of the Western World. Not only his own countrymen, but Europe

and nations more distant still, to-day hail him as the greatest of

modern English statesmen. That is a title and dignity somewhat higher

than an Earldom, and it is under that larger style that those who

wish to do Lord Beaconsfield full honour will have to allude to him

hereafter in the national annals.

These are some of the reasons why we honour and follow him.

A TORY.

II.--WHY WE DISBELIEVE IN HIM.

The Contemporary Review, Volume 36, December 1879 · 第 17 / 22 段