in a state of the direst distress; their cattle dying by hundreds,
themselves penniless and foodless; if this demand is made upon
them, he has reported that they will "simply be ruined;" but at
the exhortations of Lord Lytton he sets to work cheerfully. Neither
inclination nor effort shall be wanting in him to make the people
experience to the full the agony and the bitterness of famine. Thus
it is that a prayerful Viceroy, with the "valued assistance" of his
colleagues, provides for the "well-being of the millions committed to
his fostering care."
"I have tried," writes one despairing district officer, "to stave off
collecting, but have received peremptory orders to begin. This will
be the last straw on the back of the unfortunate zemindars.... A more
suicidal policy I cannot conceive. I have done what I could to open
the eyes of the Commissioners and the Lieutenant-Governor as to the
state of the place, but without avail. I have nothing to do but to
carry out the orders of Government, which means simply ruin." "The
exaction of the land revenue in Budaon," writes another, "and, I
believe, in other districts as well, involved a direct breach of faith
with the zemindars, which has had the very worst effect on the minds
of the native community.... The people are loud in their complaints of
the faithlessness of Government, and, to my mind, with ample reason."
But the Government of India having decreed the collection of the land
revenue, were now compelled to justify their rapacity, by pretending
that there was no famine calling for a remission. The dearth and the
frightful mortality throughout the North-West Provinces were to be
preserved as a State secret like the negotiations with Shere Ali. By
this means it was hoped that the famine would work itself out, the
dead be decently interred out of human sight, and Lord Lytton obtain
the funds for his hunting expedition without an unpatriotic opposition
becoming cognizant of the facts either in India or in England. It is a
striking illustration of the enormous space which divides us from
the people of India, that such a scheme should have been thought
practicable, but stranger still--it was very near to success. An
accident may be said to have defeated it. During all that dreary
winter famine was busy devouring its victims by thousands. At the
lowest computation more than a quarter of a million perished of actual
starvation. The number would have to be doubled if it included all
those who perished of disease, the consequence of insufficient food
and exposure to cold; for, in the desperate endeavour to keep their
cattle alive, the wretched peasantry fed them on the straw which
thatched their huts, and which provided them with bedding. The winter
was abnormally severe, and without a roof above them or bedding
beneath them, scantily clad and poorly fed, multitudes perished of
cold. The dying and the dead were strewn along the cross-country
roads. Scores of corpses were tumbled into old wells, because the
deaths were too numerous for the miserable relatives to perform the
usual funeral rites. Mothers sold their children for a single scanty
meal. Husbands flung their wives into ponds, to escape the torment
of seeing them perish by the lingering agonies of hunger. Amid
these scenes of death the Government of India kept its serenity and
cheerfulness unimpaired. The journals of the North-West were persuaded
into silence. Strict orders were given to civilians, under no
circumstances to countenance the pretence of the natives that they
were dying of hunger. One civilian, a Mr. MacMinn, unable to endure
the misery around him, opened a relief work at his own expense. He
was severely reprimanded, threatened with degradation, and ordered to
close the work immediately.
All this time, not a whisper of the tragedy that was being enacted in
the North-West Provinces had reached Calcutta. The district officials
dared not communicate to the press what they knew, and in India there
are hardly any other means of obtaining information. But in the month
of February Mr. Knight, the proprietor of the Calcutta _Statesman_,
had occasion to visit Agra. He was astonished to find all around him
the indications of an appalling misery. He began to investigate
the matter, and gradually the truth revealed itself. A quarter of a
million of British subjects had perished of hunger, pursued even to
their graves by the pitiless exactions of the Government.
Mr. Knight made known in the columns of the _Statesman_ what he
had seen, and what he had learned from others in the course of his
inquiries. The guilty consciences of those who were responsible for
this vast suffering smote them. Lord Lytton and Sir George Couper felt
that it was necessary to extinguish Mr. Knight--and that speedily. Sir
George Couper accordingly drew up a long Minute, vindicating himself
from the attacks of Mr. Knight; and this Minute was duly acknowledged
in laudatory terms by the Government of India. The Viceroy in Council
characterized the Minute as "a convincing statement of facts," and
then added that the Government of India needed no such statement to
convince it that the "Lieutenant-Governor had exercised forethought in
his arrangements, and had shown humanity in his orders throughout the
recent crisis." The mortality which Lord Lytton "deplored" with "a
deep and painful regret," in so far "as it was directly the result of
famine, was caused rather by the unwillingness of the people to leave
their homes than by any want of forethought on the part of the local
government in providing works where they might be relieved." Lord
Lytton "unhesitatingly accepted the statement of the local government
that no one who was willing to go to a relief work need have died of
famine, and it is satisfactorily shown in his Honour's Minute that the
relief wage was ample."
This eulogy on Sir George Couper and all his doings was published on
May 2, 1878, after Mr. Knight had begun publishing his revelations in
the _Statesman_. It is to be noted that neither Sir George Couper nor
the Government of India denies that the famine has been sore in the
land and the mortality excessive. But on February 28--two months
previously, and before Mr. Knight had commenced his inconvenient
disclosures--Sir George Couper reported to the Government of India
that "it may be questioned whether it will not be found hereafter
that the comparative immunity from cholera and fever which, owing
apparently to the drought, the Provinces have enjoyed during the past
year, will not compensate for the losses caused by insufficient food
and clothing, and _make the mortality generally little, if at all,
higher than in ordinary years_." At the time when this letter was
written, the official mortuary returns showed that the mortality in
the North-West was seven and eight times in excess of what it was
in ordinary years. There can, therefore, be no question that the
confession of that "terrible mortality" which Lord Lytton so deeply
"deplored," was wrung from Sir George Couper by the publication of Mr.
Knight's letters. But for them, the official record would have stated
that the "mortality was little, if at all, higher than in ordinary
years." This record is sufficient proof that no adequate arrangements
were made to meet a calamity which, according to Sir George Couper,
did not exist--at least, not until Mr. Knight insisted that it did. At
the same time, it will be as well to give the proof of this in detail,
in order to show what the Government of India is capable of saying.
In one of his letters to the _Statesman_, Mr. Knight averred that
there were "no relief works worthy of the name till about January
20, and no works sufficient for the people's need till the middle of
February." Sir George Couper replies to this charge as follows:--"The
reports already submitted to the Government are, I think, amply
sufficient to acquit me of this charge.... In October, Colonel Fraser
was again deputed to visit the head-quarters of each division, and, in
consultation with the district officers, settle what works should be
undertaken to give employment to the poor when the inevitable pressure
began." Here Sir George Couper affirms that so far back as October
he had foreseen the "inevitable pressure," and made all the necessary
arrangements. Nevertheless we find him, so late as November 23,
reporting as follows to the Government of India:--
"_Although the danger of widespread famine ... has happily
passed away_, it is a matter of extreme importance that
well-considered projects for great public works should be
ready in case of future necessity.... _Very few projects of
this character have been completed for these provinces_,
and the Lieutenant-Governor thinks no time should be lost in
preparing them.... There can be no doubt that the want of such
projects would have been felt as a most serious difficulty
by this Government if relief works on a large scale had been
necessary in the present season."
Thus, we find that up to the close of November no large relief works
had been sanctioned, because the "danger of widespread famine had
happily passed away." Allowing for official delays, this would make
the date when "relief works worthy of the name" were opened tally with
the time stated by Mr. Knight--namely, January 20. What, again, Sir
George Couper could mean by reporting on November 23, that "danger
of widespread famine has happily passed away," is perplexing, for on
November 26, or just three days subsequently, he writes as follows:--
"It appears to his Honour that the Government of India fail to
realize the extent of the damage caused _by the unparalleled
failure of the rain this year_.... The rain did not come until
6th October, by which time _the greater part of the crops was
irretrievably ruined_.... It is a mistake to suppose that the
autumn crop has escaped in the greater part of the Benares
and Allahabad divisions, and in the south-eastern districts of
Oudh.... _The rice crops_, which are largely grown in most
of the districts in these divisions, _have almost entirely
perished_, and of other crops, the area sown is much less than
usual."
On October 11 Sir George Couper reported that if the land revenues
was exacted the village communities would be ruined. On November 26 he
reported that the crops had been "irretrievably ruined." Nevertheless,
on November 23, he reported that no large relief works had been
sanctioned because "the danger of widespread famine had passed away."
It follows, from this last report, that for whatever other purpose
Colonel Fraser may have been deputed to visit the head-quarters
of each division, it was not to make satisfactory provision for a
widespread famine. No. As Sir George Couper was well aware at the time
he penned his reply to Mr. Knight, the object of Colonel Fraser's tour
was precisely the opposite of this. These were the instructions he was
charged to enjoin upon civil officers and executive engineers:--
"_Please discourage relief works in every possible way._ It
may be, however, that when agricultural operations are over,
some of the people may want work. This, however, except on
works for which there is budget provision, should only be
given if the collector is satisfied that without it the people
would actually starve. _Mere distress is not a sufficient
reason for opening a relief work._ And if a relief work be
started, task-work should be rigorously exacted, _and the
people put on the barest subsistence wage_; so that we may
be satisfied that if any other kind of work were procurable
elsewhere, they would resort to it."
In accordance with the letter and spirit of these instructions the
famine-stricken multitudes were literally starved off such scanty
works as were open. The "barest subsistence wage" was fined down,
smaller and smaller, until the people abandoned the works in despair,
and returned to their villages to die. Nay, in some places, the
public works which had been duly sanctioned in the yearly budget were
transformed into relief works; and the labourers upon them, instead of
being paid at the ordinary market rates, were reduced to the "barest
subsistence wage, task-work being rigorously exacted." A beneficent
but economical Government took advantage of the dire extremity to
which its subjects were reduced to reap this unexpected profit out of
their miseries. None the less, "the Viceroy in Council unhesitatingly
accepts the statement of the local government, that no one who was
willing to go to a relief work need have died of famine."
The License Tax.
The foregoing is an illustration of the manner in which an Imperial
Viceroy secures "the progressive well-being of the multitudes
committed to his fostering care." I purpose now to illustrate the
manner in which the same Imperial functionary deals with the finances
"committed to his fostering care." The position of "isolation and
scarcely veiled hostility" which, without any provocation, Lord Lytton
had assumed towards the Ameer of Afghanistan rendered a war against
that sovereign a mere question of time and opportunity. Meanwhile,
funds were necessary for its prosecution in addition to those which
had been obtained from the starving population of the North-West.
Accordingly, in his Budget statement for 1878-79, Sir John Strachey
announced that the Indian Government had arrived at the conclusion
that they ought to regard famines as normal occurrences for which
provision should be made in the budgets of each year. Famine
expenditure could not be estimated at a smaller sum than a million
and a half annually. This sum he now proposed to raise by means of a
License Tax on trades and dealings, to be levied throughout India, and
which, it was estimated, would yield £700,000. The remainder of the
sum required was to be obtained by a tax on the agricultural classes
in Northern India and Bengal alone. The peculiar incidence of these
taxes was justified on the ground that the classes taxed were the same
classes which, in periods of famine, had to be supported by the State.
It was therefore only just that they should provide the fund which was
to insure them against famine. This money was in fact a sum raised
for a special purpose, at the expense of certain classes, for whose
benefit it was to be exclusively applied. This was acknowledged by
Lord Lytton with his usual superabundance of emphasis:--
"_The sole justification_ for the increased taxation which has
just been imposed upon the people of India, for the purpose
of insuring this Empire against the worst calamities of future
famine ... is the pledge we have given that a sum not less
than a million and a half sterling, which exceeds the amount
of the additional contributions obtained from the people
for this purpose, shall be annually applied to it. We have
explained to the people of this country that the additional
revenue raised by the new taxes is required, not for luxuries,
but the necessities of the State; not for general purposes,
but for the construction of a particular class of public
works; and we have pledged ourselves not to spend one rupee of
the special resources, thus created, upon works of a different
character.... The pledges which my financial colleague was
authorized to give, on behalf of the Government, were explicit
and full as regards these points.... _For these reasons, it is
all the more binding on the honour of the Government to redeem
to the uttermost, without evasion or delay, those pledges, for
the adequate redemption of which the people of India have,
and can have, no other guarantee than the good faith of their
rulers._"
The ink which recorded this solemn pledge was hardly dry before it had
been broken. The predetermined war with Shere Ali began in the wanton
manner I have told, and the question of cost was mentioned in the
Houses of Parliament. The British Imperialist glories in war when the
chances are all in his favour, but he has an invincible objection to
paying the costs of such transactions. And they are costly. It was
therefore very necessary so to arrange matters, that while the
glory of hunting an ally to death should be appropriated by British
Imperialism, the expenses of the chase should be defrayed by India.
Accordingly, towards the end of November, Lord Cranbrook informed the
House of Lords that India was in possession of a surplus more than
sufficient to defray the costs of the war:--
"I am bound to say, that _after looking very carefully into
the financial condition of India_, I believe it will not
be necessary, at least in the initial steps, to call on the
revenues of England. I am in possession of facts which, I
think, would convince your Lordships that, _without unduly
pressing on the resources of India_, there will be no
necessity to call on the English revenues--at least during the
present financial year. It was announced by my noble friend in
another place the other night that, _including the £1,500,000
of new taxes_, the surplus of Indian revenue will amount to
£2,136,000."
A fortnight later the "facts" of which Lord Cranbrook professed to
be in possession were discovered not to be facts, and the surplus was
reduced by Mr. Stanhope to a million and a half--in other words, to
exactly the sum which Lord Lytton had solemnly pledged his honour to
apply to no purpose except that of insuring India against the
ravages of famine. On the most elastic system of interpretation, the
acquisition of a fictitious "scientific frontier" cannot be made to
appear as a fulfilment of this pledge. However, on the faith of the
surplus thus created by Lord Cranbrook and Mr. Stanhope, Parliament
voted that the expenses of the Afghan war should be charged upon
India. Mr. Stanhope said,--" The surplus being of the amount he had
mentioned, it must be perfectly obvious that the Indian Government
could pay the whole cost of the war during the present year, without
adding a shilling to the taxation or the debt of the country."
The intention here is sufficiently obvious. Lord Cranbrook and Mr.
Stanhope were quite prepared to disregard the pledges given to
the people of India, and apply the Famine Insurance Fund to an
illegitimate purpose. They had all the will to do this, but their
desires were frustrated by the fact that there was no such fund in
existence. It had already been spent and disappeared. Lord Lytton thus
calmly announces its extinction in the Budget resolution of March,
1879:--
"The insurance provided against future famines has virtually
ceased to exist, and the difficulties in the way of fiscal
and commercial and administrative reform have been greatly
aggravated. Nor can it be in any way assumed that the
evil will not continue and go on increasing. Under such
circumstances, it is extremely difficult to follow any settled
financial policy; for the Government cannot even approximately
tell what income will be required to meet the necessary
expenditure of the State.... For the present the
Governor-General in Council thinks it wise to abstain from
imposing any fresh burdens on the country, and to accept the
temporary loss of the surplus by which it was hoped that an
insurance against famine had been provided."
That is, that the Government of India having "pledged itself not
to spend one rupee of these special resources," except "for the
construction of a particular class of public works"--having declared
that "the sole justification for the increased taxation" is that it
should be devoted to a particular end--no sooner gets the money into
its possession than it expends the entire sum on something else,
and then "thinks it wise" not to discuss the matter any further. The
Government is very sorry; it really wanted to make an Insurance Fund
against famine; but it finds that it "cannot even approximately tell
what income will be required to meet the necessary expenditure of the
State." Under such circumstances the Government finds it extremely
difficult to follow "any settled financial policy," except that of
spending every shilling which it can get possession of. Thus it is
that an Imperial Government "redeems to the uttermost" the honour of
the British nation, and strengthens the confidence of India in "the
good faith of her rulers."
The Cotton Duties.
I come, lastly, to the action of the Indian Government in respect to
the Cotton Duties. It is, I fancy, generally supposed in England that
the duty on imported cotton was designedly protective--_i.e._, that
it had from the beginning been imposed with the intention of favouring
the Indian manufacturer at the expense of Manchester. This is a
mistake. The duty was imposed at a time when there were no Indian
manufactures to compete with those from England, simply as a source
of revenue. In India there is a great difficulty in so arranging the
incidence of taxation that the well-to-do classes shall contribute
their proper share to the necessities of the State. A light duty
on imported cotton--as being the universally used material for
dress--enabled the Government to reach these classes in a manner that
was effective without being burdensome. Even now that mills are at
work in India, by far the larger part of these duties had nothing
protective in their character, because there is in India no
manufacture of the finer sorts of cotton. Whether, however, the duty
was or was not protective in its character, both the Indian Government
and the House of Commons had repeatedly given pledges that the duty
should not be repealed until the Indian finances were in a position
to justify the loss of revenue thereby occasioned. Lord Lytton, who
throughout his viceroyalty has made a point in all important matters
of making a confession of political faith exactly the opposite of his
subsequent political action, expressed himself on the subject of the
Cotton Duties with his usual copiousness. In reply to an address from
the Calcutta Trades' Association, shortly after his arrival in India,
he said:--
"I think that no one responsible for the financial
administration of this Empire would at present venture to
make the smallest reduction in any of its limited sources of
income. Let me, however, take this opportunity of assuring you
that, so far as I am aware, the abolition or reduction of
the Cotton Duties, at the cost of adding one sixpence to the
taxation of this country, has never been advocated, or even
contemplated by her Majesty's Secretary of State for India....
It is due to myself, and the confidence you express in my
character, that I should also assure you, on my own behalf,
that nothing will ever induce me to tax the people of India
for any exclusive benefit to their English fellow-subjects."
A short time previously he had told the Bombay Chamber of Commerce
that "he was of opinion that, with the exception of about forty
thousand pounds sterling, the duties were not protective, because
Manchester had no Indian competitors in finer manufactures. He thought
the £800,000 collected yearly as duty, on finer fabrics, a fair item
of revenue. With regard to the duty on coarse goods, he thought it
protective, because Bombay mills competed with Manchester; but he
did not see how it could be abolished, because it would lead to
irregularities in order to evade duty."