India, "in establishing our relations with the Ameer on a
more satisfactory footing will be to induce him to receive
a temporary Embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly
connected with the establishment of a permanent Mission within
his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly
directing it to some object of smaller political interest,
which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or
if need be, to create. I have, therefore, to instruct you ...
without any delay that you can reasonably avoid, to find some
occasion for sending a Mission to Kabul."
Lord Northbrook, as is well known, declined to carry out this
ingenious plan for overreaching the Ameer, and breaking the pledge
that we had given not to force English officers upon him. He resigned
almost immediately after the receipt of the despatch setting forth the
new policy, and was succeeded by Lord Lytton. It is generally assumed
that Lord Lytton came to India charged with the execution of no other
policy than that to which Lord Northbrook had declined to assent. But
this assumption is incompatible with the line of action pursued by
Lord Lytton. This much, however, is clear already. The new policy,
whatever it was, was not forced upon the British Government, either by
the alienation of the Ameer or the intrigues of Russia. They entered
upon it at a time when, by their own confession, the sky was clear.
Afghanistan was in the enjoyment of an unprecedented quiet and
prosperity; the Ameer was conducting his foreign policy in accordance
with our wishes; and the efforts of the Government of St. Petersburg
were "sincerely directed to the prevention of any movement which might
give just umbrage to the British Government." So far as India was
concerned, the condition of the country called aloud for a policy
devoted to internal reform and retrenchment. The limit of endurable
taxation had been reached; the army imperatively needed thorough
reorganization; and the people and the land were still being scourged
by famine upon famine of the most appalling character.
Now, if the English Cabinet had no designs in their frontier policy
except to establish British agents in Afghanistan, without breach of
pre-existing arrangements, and with the free concurrence of the Ameer,
it is plain that for such a policy concealment was unnecessary. Yet,
until the actual outbreak of hostilities, the negotiations with the
Ameer were kept hidden from the English Parliament and the nation.
The fact is, that in the instructions given to Lord Lytton before his
departure from England, Lord Salisbury anticipates the refusal of the
Ameer to agree to the new policy, and points out what, in that case,
is to be done:--
"11. If the language and demeanour of the Ameer be such as
to promise no satisfactory result of the negotiations thus
opened, his Highness should be distinctly reminded that he
is isolating himself at his own peril from the friendship and
protection it is his interest to seek and deserve...."
"28. The conduct of Shere Ali has more than once been
characterized by so significant a disregard of the wishes and
interests of the Government of India, that the irretrievable
alienation of his confidence in the sincerity and power of
that Government is a contingency which cannot be dismissed as
impossible. _Should such a fear be confirmed by the result
of the proposed negotiation, no time must be lost in
reconsidering, from a new point of view, the policy to be
pursued in reference to Afghanistan._"
These instructions clearly establish the following points:--They show
that the new policy, whatever it was, was expected "irretrievably"
to destroy the confidence of the Ameer "in the sincerity of the
Government;" and that, in that case, the Ameer was to be informed that
he had forfeited our friendship and protection, and a new policy was
immediately to be adopted towards Afghanistan. Here, then, we have
the first note of war. All this time there was no pressure upon the
British Government occasioned by the attitude of Russia. Our relations
with Russia were excellent. On the 5th May, 1876, Mr. Disraeli said in
the House of Commons, "_I believe, indeed, that at no time has there
been a better understanding between the Courts of St. James and St.
Petersburg than at this present moment_, and there is this good
understanding because our policy is a clear and frank policy." So
here we have the proof, that in a season of perfect calm, the Ministry
commenced a policy for the "irretrievable alienation" of the Ameer,
and sent Lord Lytton to India in order to execute it.
Lord Lytton entered with zest into the spirit of these singular
instructions, and set to work to "alienate" the Ameer with the utmost
vigour. He politely caused him to be informed that he (the Ameer) was
an earthen pipkin between two iron pots; that if he did not come to
a "speedy understanding" with us, the two iron pots would combine
to crush him out of existence altogether. "As matters now stand,
the British Government is able to pour an overwhelming force into
Afghanistan, which could be spread round him as a ring of iron, but if
he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed." "Our only interest
in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for
the security of our own frontier." "If we ceased to regard it as
a friendly State, there was nothing to prevent us coming to an
understanding with Russia which would wipe Afghanistan out of the map
for ever." Would any man, I ask, address these insults and menaces to
one whose friendship and confidence he was desirous to gain? It must
be plain to every reasonable person that British officers could only
then be established in Afghanistan with safety to themselves, and
utility to the British Government, when they were admitted with the
free concurrence of the Ameer and his people. A concession of this
nature, if extorted by means of menaces and insults, would be, by
that very circumstance, deprived of all value. And the fact is (as the
reader will perceive immediately) Lord Lytton was not sincere in
the propositions he made to the Ameer. He had no wish that the Ameer
should come to a "speedy understanding" with him; and as soon as he
saw that such a result was impending, he broke off all intercourse
with him. Lord Lytton charged the British Vakeel, Atta Mohammed Khan,
to convey to the Ameer Shere Ali the amenities I have just quoted
about the pipkin, the iron pots, and the rest of it. At the same time,
the Vakeel was instructed to propose a meeting at Peshawur between Sir
Lewis Pelly, as the representative of the Indian Government, and Noor
Mohammed Shah, the Minister of the Ameer. The basis of negotiations
between them was to be the admission of British officers to certain
places in the territories of the Ameer. Unless the Ameer was prepared
to concede this, as a preliminary condition, there was no good in his
sending a representative to confer with Sir Lewis Pelly. Great was the
consternation at the Court of the Ameer when our Vakeel unfolded the
message with which he was charged. They bowed before the storm; and
on December 21, 1876, Atta Mohammed Khan wrote to the Government
of India, that the Ameer, though still disliking to receive
English officers, would on account of the insistence of the British
Government, yield the point; but only after his Minister had, at
the conference, made representations of his views and stated all his
difficulties.
Behold, then, the Government of India arrived at the goal of its
desires. The Ameer consents to receive English officers if, after
hearing all his reasons, Lord Lytton remains convinced of the
expediency of that policy. But what follows? The conference is begun;
but while the discussions were still unfinished, Noor Mohammed Shah
fell sick, and died; and then what was the action of Lord Lytton? I
quote his own words:--
"At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the
conference, his Highness was sending to the Mir Akhir
instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a
fresh Envoy was already on his way from Kabul to Peshawur;
and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept
eventually all the conditions of the British Government. _The
Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy
to close the conference._"
The closing of the conference was followed by the withdrawal from
Kabul of the British agency which had been established there for more
than twenty years, and the suspension of all intercourse between us
and the Ameer.
There is but one conclusion possible from these strange proceedings.
The demands made upon the Ameer were made in the hope that he would
refuse to concede them, and so furnish the Indian Government with a
pretext for attacking him. The last thing which Lord Lytton desired
was that the Ameer should accept his demands. And, therefore, as soon
as it became apparent that Shere Ali was prepared to do this rather
than forfeit the protection and friendship of the British Government,
Lord Lytton broke up the conference, which (be it remembered) he had
himself proposed. Lord Lytton, not Shere Ali, without provocation
or ostensible cause, assumes towards Afghanistan "an attitude of
isolation and scarcely veiled hostility;" and Lord Salisbury thus
comments upon the situation (October 4, 1877):--
"In the event of the Ameer ... spontaneously manifesting
a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your
Excellency, _on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but
declined by him_, his advances should not be rejected. If,
on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude
of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British
Government ... _will be at liberty to adopt such measures for
the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-West
frontier of her Majesty's Indian dominions as the
circumstances may render expedient, without regard to
the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali or the interests of his
dynasty_."
Here, at last, we get at the veritable purpose of this tortuous
policy. As we suspected, the "terms offered to the Ameer, and
unhappily _not_ declined by him," were a mere pretence. The real
object was the "protection of the North-West frontier"--in other
words, the acquisition of a "scientific frontier"--without regard to
the wishes of the Ameer, or the interests of his dynasty. The Ameer
was to be "irretrievably alienated" by menacing his independence; and
then the "irretrievable alienation" was to be made the pretext for
carrying the menace into execution. What the "scientific frontier"
was the reader will find, if he refers to my article on "India and
Afghanistan," in the October number of this REVIEW.
The threat, however, for reasons I shall state presently, could not
be carried into execution at once. The negotiations at Peshawur were
carefully concealed from the knowledge of the public. Neither in India
nor in England was it known that the British agency was withdrawn from
Kabul. The _Pioneer_--the official journal in India--was instructed
to inform its readers that the Ameer was animated with feelings of
the utmost cordiality towards us; and Lord Lytton made a speech in the
Council Chamber expounding his frontier policy. He glanced first at
the policy of his predecessors. His sensitive spirit was much
grieved by its apathetic character. It seemed to him "atheistic," and
"inhuman," and "inconsistent with our high duties to God and man as
the greatest civilizing Power." Then, warming with his subject, he set
forth his own idea of a frontier policy in the following grandiloquent
fashion:--
"I consider that the safest and strongest frontier India
can possibly possess would be a belt of independent frontier
States, throughout which the British name is honoured and
trusted; within which British subjects are welcomed and
respected, because they are subjects of a Government known to
be unselfish as it is powerful, and resolute as it is humane;
by which our advice is followed without suspicion, and _our
word relied on without misgiving_, because the first has been
justified by good results, and _the second never quibbled away
by timorous sub-intents or tricky saving clauses_--a belt of
States, in short, whose chiefs and populations should have
every interest, and every desire, to co-operate with our own
officers in preserving the peace of the frontier, developing
the resources of their own territories, augmenting the wealth
of their own treasuries, and vindicating in the eyes of the
Eastern and Western world their title to an independence, of
which we are ourselves the chief well-wishers and supporters."
It is hardly credible that the same man who gave expression to these
magnificent sentiments had just caused the Ameer to be informed that
he did not regard the promises made to Shere Ali, by Lords Northbrook
and Mayo, as binding upon the Government of India, because they were
"verbal." "His Excellency the Viceroy," said Sir Lewis Pelly to the
Ameer's Envoy, "instructs me to inform your Excellency plainly, that
the British Government neither recognizes, nor has recognized, the
obligation of these promises." And the official journal called upon
India to rejoice, because one result of the conference had been the
cancelling of these "verbal promises and engagements," which the
Government had found "very embarrassing."
It is plain from the foregoing that Shere Ali was a doomed man long
before the appearance of a Russian Mission in his capital. We did not
declare war at once, simply because we were then in danger of a war
with Russia in Bulgaria. And the Government were still possessed
of sufficient prudence not to attempt an invasion of Afghanistan
simultaneously with a campaign on the Balkans. But the sore was
carefully kept open by "our attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled
hostility;" and if the Russian Embassy had not appeared in Kabul,
some other pretext for war would indubitably have been found. The
Government of India--or rather Lord Lytton--affected to be greatly
alarmed at the advent of this Russian Mission, but his subsequent
proceedings show that he seized upon the incident with greediness
as enabling him to carry out his long-meditated project for the
destruction of an old and faithful ally. A single fact will suffice to
prove this. What I have already related shows that, up to this time,
the Ameer Shere Ali had given us no cause of quarrel whatever. He had
been desirous, against the dictates of his own judgment, to agree
to what was asked of him rather than forfeit the friendship of the
English Government. The estrangement between him and ourselves was
the result of our policy--not his. Lord Lytton was solely and wholly
responsible for it. The Russian Embassy, as Lord Lytton knew perfectly
well, was due to no overtures made by Shere Ali to the Russians in
Central Asia, but to the silly exhibition of seven thousand Sepoys
at Malta, by means of which we had recently earned the ridicule of
Europe. Moreover, as the Treaty of Berlin was an accomplished fact
before the Russians had appeared in Kabul, their arrival there was
a matter of comparatively trifling significance. How, then, did Lord
Lytton act? He organized a Mission under the command of Sir Neville
Chamberlain to proceed to Kabul; and at the same time directed our
Vakeel, Gulam Hussein Khan, to go before it to Kabul, and obtain the
permission of the Ameer for its entrance to his territories. So far
there is nothing to object to, but mark what follows.
While yet Sir Neville Chamberlain with his Mission was at Peshawur,
Gulam Hussein Khan, from Kabul, reported to Sir Neville as
follows:--"If Mission will await Ameer's permission, everything will
be arranged, God willing, in the best manner, and no room will be left
for complaint in the future.... Further, that if Mission starts on
18th, without waiting for the Ameer's permission, there would be no
hope left for the renewal of friendship or communication."
These reports were received by Sir Neville Chamberlain on 19th
September, and on the same day the Viceroy ordered the Mission to
attempt to force its way through the Khyber Pass. All Europe knows
the sequel. The Afghan officer in charge of the fort at Ali Musjid
declined to let the Mission pass; but, while obeying his orders
firmly, behaved, as Major Cavagnari reported, "in a most courteous
manner, and very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and
myself." And then was telegraphed home the shameless fiction that he
had threatened to fire on Major Cavagnari, and that the majesty of the
Empire had been insulted.
It is hard to write with calmness when one has to speak of actions
like these. It is, I trust, impossible for any Englishman to read of
them without the keenest shame and remorse. What, however, we have
to consider at present is their effect upon the native mind. There is
not, we may be certain, a single native Court throughout India where
they have not been discussed again and again; and there is but one
conclusion which could be drawn from them. It is, that despite of all
we may say, we allow neither pledges, promises, nor treaties to stand
in our way, if we imagine that they are in opposition to the material
interests of the moment. There is not a native prince in India but
will have seen the fate of his descendants in the doom which has
fallen upon the unhappy Shere Ali. It is a fate which no loyalty can
avert--which no treaties are powerful enough to ward off. Shere Ali
was loyal; Shere Ali was fenced about by treaty upon treaty: he and
his father had been our friends and faithful allies for more than
forty years; but none the less, the English Government no sooner
coveted his territory than they determined upon his destruction. For
eighteen months was that Government engaged in secretly weaving the
toils around its victim, and when at last it struck, it struck with a
calumny upon its lips.
Think, again, of the anger and the bitterness awakened by this war
in the hearts of our Moslem subjects. A few months previously, the
English Government had made appeal to their sympathies on the ground
that it was upholding the integrity and independence of the Sultan's
dominions. They now saw this very Government engaged in the unprovoked
invasion of an independent Muhammadan State. They made no concealment
of their feelings; and when Major Cavagnari and his companions were
murdered at Kabul, the Moslems of Upper India openly expressed their
satisfaction. It is not too much to say, that if Sir Salar Jung had
not been ruling in Hyderabad, the outbreak at Kabul would have been
instantly followed by a similar outbreak in the Deccan. Sir Richard
Temple, writing from Hyderabad in 1867, thus describes the state of
feeling existing there:--
"This hostility" (_i.e._, to the English Government) "is even
stronger in the Muhammadan priesthood; with them it literally
burns with an undying flame; from what I know of Delhi in
1857-58, from what I am authentically informed of in respect
to Hyderabad at that time, I believe that not more fiercely
does the tiger hunger for his prey, than does the Mussulman
fanatìc throughout India thirst for the blood of the white
infidel."
Lord Lytton's treatment of Shere Ali has been, as it were, the pouring
of oil upon this "undying flame." Henceforth, it will burn more
fiercely than ever.
The Famine in the North-West Provinces.
I shall next proceed to show the manner in which Lord Lytton's
internal administration of India was affected by his policy beyond the
frontier. As every one knows, there have been, of late years, a
series of terrible famines in different parts of India. The desolating
effects of these famines last for many years after the actual dearth
has terminated. Not only has the cattle been swept away, together with
millions of the agricultural population, but those who survive are
without capital and without physical strength. The consequence is that
large tracts of naturally productive land fall out of cultivation, and
remain so for considerable periods of time. There are, moreover, no
poor-laws in India for the relief of the starving and the destitute.
The administration of State relief, therefore, during such seasons
of calamity, is a matter of imperative necessity. In keeping its
agriculturists alive, the State is simply providing for its own
solvency. It sacrifices for this purpose a portion of the wealth it
derives from the land, in order to save the remainder. A combat with
famine is to the State in India an act as much demanded by obvious
expediency, as in the interests of humanity. This relief is afforded
partly by remissions of revenue throughout the stricken districts, and
partly by the opening of public works where the starving and destitute
may find food and employment. In the winter of 1877-78 a terrible
famine fell upon the North-West Provinces. The cultivated land in
these provinces is mainly under two descriptions of crops--the rain
crops, and the cold weather crops. The rain crops are sown towards the
end of June, or shortly after the rains have set in, and are reaped in
October and November. From these crops the people obtain the food
on which they are to subsist during the winter. In 1877 there was
an almost total failure of rain in the North-West Provinces, and the
Lieutenant-Governor--Sir George Couper--reported that the "greater
part of the crops was irretrievably ruined by a scorching west
wind that blew for three weeks." The long and severe winter of the
North-West had to be faced by a population destitute of food. Sir
George Couper reports as follows to the Government of India on the
11th October, 1877:--
"The Lieutenant-Governor is well aware of the straits to which
the Government of India is put at the present time for money,
and it is with the utmost reluctance that he makes a report
which must temporarily add to their burdens. _But he sees no
other course to adopt._ If the village communities which form
the great mass of our revenue payers be pressed now, they will
_simply be ruined_.... Cattle are reported to be dying or sold
to the butchers in hundreds, in consequence of the want of
fodder, and this will add very materially to the agricultural
distress and difficulties if they are called on at once to
meet their State obligations."
In making this appeal for a remission of revenue, Sir George Couper
was asking for no more than what had been granted by every English
Government since British rule was planted in India. But then former
Governments had not adopted a spirited frontier policy to which
reason, justice, and humanity had to be subordinated. This was what
Lord Lytton had done. The hunting to death of an old and faithful
ally was certain to prove a costly operation; and he would need for it
every farthing which could be wrung from the population of India. Sir
George Couper's appeal was therefore rejected, and he was instructed
that these destitute creatures were to be compelled to meet their
State obligations at once, precisely as if there was no dearth in
the land. To this order Sir George Couper returned a long reply, from
which we quote the following remarkable paragraphs:--
"If the demand on the zemindars (_landlords_) is not
suspended, the cultivators can neither claim nor expect any
relaxation of the demand for rent; if pressure is put on the
former, they in turn must and will put the screw on their
tenants. All through the dark months of August and September,
zemindars were urged by district officers to deal leniently
with their tenants, and aid them by all means in their power.
Many nobly responded to the call, and it would be rather
inconsistent to subject them now to a pressure which may
compel them to deal harshly with their tenants. These remarks
are offered in no captious spirit.... His Honour trusts that
the realizations will equal the expectations of the Government
of India, but if they are disappointed, his Excellency the
Viceroy ... may rest assured _that it will not be for want of
effort or inclination to put the necessary pressure on those
who are liable for the demand_."