THE GROWTH OF LIBERALISM, 1808-1898
[Sidenote: The Spanish American wars of independence and the virtual
completion of Spain’s gift to the Americas.]
With the outbreak of the Spanish “War of Independence” against Napoleon
the interest of Spain proper as affecting the Americas almost if not
wholly ceased. Her gift to the new world was by this time complete
except as regards the island dependencies of the West Indies and the
Philippines in the Far East. She was still to have important relations
with the Americas, such as her vain endeavor to suppress the revolutions
of her colonies and her relations with the United States concerning
Florida and Cuba, but those matters belong to the field of Hispanic
American history rather than to that of Spain as conceived in the
present work. In 1808 the news of the accession of Joseph Bonaparte to
the throne of Spain, after Napoleon had wrested the abdication of their
rights from Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, was received in the colonies
with hostile demonstrations, for the majority of Spanish Americans were
loyal to Ferdinand. When in 1809 all the peninsula seemed lost, many
began to hold to the view that relations with Spain, which had always
been rather with the king than with the nation, were severed, and in the
next year certain regions set up governments of their own, thus starting
the movement for independence which ended only with the battle of
Ayacucho in 1824.[67] Circumstances, skilfully directed by separatist
leaders, had led the Americas to proceed out of what was at first a
feeling of patriotism to the royal government to what eventually
resulted in embittered wars against it. The wars were fought largely,
though not wholly, by the colonists themselves, one faction supporting
the newly constituted governmental machinery in the Americas, and the
other following the lead of the changing national régimes in
Spain,--just as if the war of the American Revolution had been a
conflict of Whigs and Tories. It becomes pertinent, then, to enquire why
Spain did not make a more strenuous effort to overcome the rebellions in
her colonies, which she had always regarded as vital to her, and why she
did not seriously attempt to reconquer them in the course of the
nineteenth century. The answer lies in a statement of the internal
affairs of Spain, who went through one of the most trying periods in the
annals of the peninsula, characterized by an incessant recurrence of
disturbances and even civil war. For Spain herself, however, it was a
period of advance along Liberal lines. Spain gained, though it cost her
an empire.
[Sidenote: Patriotic Spanish uprising against Napoleon.]
The years 1808 to 1814 are almost the only time in the century to which
Spaniards may look back with satisfaction and pride, but the glory of
their war against Napoleon may well be regarded by them as compensation
for their losses and degradation in other respects. It took several
weeks for the news of the treachery of Bayonne, followed by the events
of the _Dos de Mayo_, to circulate throughout Spain. When at last the
people comprehended what had happened, a wild outburst of rage against
the French swept the peninsula. Between May 24 and June 10 every region
in the country rose in arms against the invaders, each district acting
independently, but all actuated by the same motives. As an English
writer (Oman) has expressed it: “The movement was spontaneous,
unselfish, and reckless; in its wounded pride, the nation challenged
Napoleon to combat, without any thought of the consequences, without
counting up its own resources or those of the enemy.” _Juntas_, or
governing groups, for the various provinces hastily constituted
themselves and prepared for the conflict. There were some 100,000 widely
scattered Spanish troops, between men of the regular army and the
militia, but they were almost wholly unfit to take the field, and as
events proved were badly officered. Against them were about 117,000
French soldiers in the peninsula (including 28,000 in Portugal), and
though these were far from equalling Napoleon’s best military units they
were vastly superior in every technical respect to the Spaniards. If it
had been a mere question of armies in the field there could have been no
doubt as to the outcome in the shape of a decisive French victory, but
something was going on in Spain which Napoleon had never dreamed of and
seemed unable to understand; in a land stirred by the furor of
patriotism such as had permeated all Spain the ordinary rules of
military science had to be left in abeyance. Napoleon thought that all
was over, when things were just about to begin; flying patrols here and
there, a species of mounted police, would be enough, he believed, in
addition to the existing garrisons, to keep the peninsula under control.
It was of a piece with this estimate that he should send General Dupont
with a column of 13,000 men, later reinforced up to 22,000, to effect
the conquest of Andalusia. Dupont found, what other French commanders
were to learn after him, that the only land he could conquer was that
actually occupied at a given time by his soldiers; the country in his
rear rose behind him as surely as the armies before him stood ready at
the first opportunity to oppose his advance. Getting into a difficult
position at Baylén, he surrendered to the Spanish general, Castaños, on
June 23, with 18,000 men. In less than two months the disorganized
Spanish forces had been able to strike a blow such as French arms had
not received for nine years. Meanwhile, Joseph Bonaparte, who had been
designated by Napoleon for the crown of Spain as early as in the month
of March, had been offered the throne on May 13 by the French-dominated
_Junta_ of the Regency, of Madrid, and on June 15 at Bayonne by a
deputation of Spanish nobles who had been ordered to go there for
precisely that purpose. Joseph had entered Madrid in July, but the
capitulation of Baylén caused him to leave that city and retire with
most of his forces behind the Ebro. Thus had the patriots won in their
first trial of arms, and the moral effect of the victory made it
certain, henceforth, that the Spaniards would fight to the end.
[Sidenote: The Spanish War of Independence.]
It is not necessary to go into the details of the six year conflict,
which ended only with the fall of Napoleon in 1814, although the French
had been expelled from Spain by the close of the preceding year. English
historians, with a pardonable pride, have been wont to make it appear
that this achievement was primarily a British feat of arms under the
leadership of Sir Arthur Wellesley, the later Duke of Wellington, and,
to be sure, English history does not record a more brilliant series of
campaigns than that of the so-called Peninsula War. It is unlikely that
the Spaniards, unaided, could have driven the French from Spain, for
their armies almost invariably proved unable to defeat the enemy in the
open field, even though they displayed fanatical courage in the defence
of their homes,--as witness the two sieges of Saragossa, desperately
resisted by General Palafox, and the stubborn opposition of General
Álvarez in Gerona to the French, who had to waste 20,000 men to take
that post. On the other hand Wellington’s victories would have been
impossible but for the indirect aid of the Spanish soldiery. Speaking of
the situation at the close of the year 1810 Oman says: “Enormous as was
the force--over 300,000 men--which the Emperor had thrown into Spain, it
was still not strong enough to hold down the conquered provinces and at
the same time to attack Portugal [where the British army was stationed].
For this fact the Spaniards must receive due credit; it was their
indomitable spirit of resistance which enabled Wellington, with his
small Anglo-Portuguese army, to keep the field against such largely
superior numbers. No sooner had the French concentrated, and abandoned a
district, than there sprang up in it a local Junta and a ragged apology
for an army. Even where the invaders lay thickest, along the route from
Bayonne to Madrid, guerilla bands maintained themselves in the
mountains, cut off couriers and escorts, and often isolated one French
army from another for weeks at a time. The great partisan chiefs, such
as Mina in Navarre, Julian Sanchez in Leon, and Porlier in the
Cantabrian hills, kept whole brigades of the French in constant
employment. Often beaten, they were never destroyed, and always
reappeared to strike some daring blow at the point where they were least
expected. Half the French army was always employed in the fruitless
task of guerilla-hunting. This was the secret which explains the fact
that, with 300,000 men under arms, the invaders could never concentrate
more than 70,000 to deal with Wellington.” This is a fair statement of
the general situation throughout the war. It would seem that the
Spaniards accounted for rather more than half of the French troops, even
when practically every province of the kingdom was theoretically
occupied by the enemy. In so doing they rendered a service not only to
themselves but also to Europe, for they detached enough troops from the
main body of Napoleon’s armies to enable the allies to swing the balance
against the emperor in his northern European campaigns. Incidentally it
was quite evident that Spain could give scant attention to her American
colonies while fighting for her very existence as an independent nation;
indeed, it was not until 1815 that Spain turned to a consideration of
the American wars.
[Sidenote: Spanish government in the early years of the war and the
calling of the Cortes.]
Meanwhile, events of a political nature had been going on in Spain which
were to determine the whole course of Spanish history in the nineteenth
century. It was several months after the original outbreak before the
various local _juntas_ were able to agree upon a supreme authority
during the enforced absence of Ferdinand VII, who was regarded as the
legitimate king. Late in September the somewhat unwieldy _Junta Central_
of at first twenty-four, afterward thirty-five, members was created,
sitting at Aranjuez. Two months later when Napoleon himself advanced
upon the capital the _Junta_ fled to Seville, and joining with the
_junta_ of that city remained in session there for over a year. It was
there that the _Junta_ declared, in January, 1809, that the overseas
possessions of Spain were an integral part of the kingdom, refuting the
colonial claim of a connection merely through the crown. Driven out
again by the French the _Junta_ took refuge in Cádiz, where, in January,
1810, it appointed a Regency of five men to arrange for the calling of a
_Cortes_ representative of Spain and the Americas. The _Junta_ thereupon
resigned. Fearful of the radical tone that a _Cortes_ might adopt, the
Regency postponed its summons as long as it could, but at last issued
the call, and the _Cortes_ met in September, 1810. Very little was known
at the time as to the exact status and powers of the various _Cortes_ of
earlier centuries, but nothing was more certain than that the _Cortes_
of 1810 was like no other which had ever met in the peninsula. It was a
single chamber body, designed to consist of elected deputies from the
towns with a traditional right of representation, from the provincial
_juntas_, from groups of 50,000 population, and from the Americas. Since
the American deputies could not arrive in time, and since a still
greater number of Spanish deputies could not be chosen by the
complicated elective machinery provided, with the land mostly in the
possession of the French, their places were supplied by persons from
those regions happening to be resident in Cádiz. Thus the _Cortes_ came
to be made up of men who did not in fact reflect the conservative
temperament of the interior districts, but, rather, stood for the
radical views of the people of the coast. Most of them dreamed of
founding a representative body which should combine the supposed virtues
of the French Revolutionary Assembly with those of the British House of
Commons and the earlier _Cortes_ of the peninsula kingdoms.
[Sidenote: The Liberal _Cortes_ of 1810 and the constitution of 1812.]
One of the earliest acts of the _Cortes_ was to accept the resignation
of the conservative Regency and to appoint a new body of three of that
name responsible and subservient to the _Cortes_. Soon the _Cortes_
declared itself to be the legislative power, and turned over the
executive and judicial authority to the Regency, following this up by
declaring itself to have sovereign power in the absence of the king.
When it became clear that these measures, which were bitterly opposed by
the church and the other conservative elements, were also distasteful to
Ferdinand, the _Cortes_ decided that all acts or agreements of the king
during his captivity were to be regarded as invalid. The greatest
innovation of all, however, was the famous constitution of 1812. Under a
belief that they were returning to the system of the past the members of
the _Cortes_ broke sharply from all the precedents of Spanish history,
enthroning the people through their representatives, and relegating the
crown and the church to a secondary place in the state. Among the
several hundred items of this ultra-democratic document were the
following: sovereignty was declared to rest with the people, to whom,
therefore, was reserved the right of legislation; the laws were to be
made through the popularly elected _Cortes_; the king was to be the
executive, but was prevented from doing much on his own initiative by
the requirement that his decrees should be countersigned by the
ministers of state, who were responsible to the _Cortes_; all Spaniards
in both hemispheres were declared a part of the Spanish nation; all
Spanish men over twenty-five years of age were entitled to vote for
members of the _Cortes_, of whom there was to be one for each group of
60,000 people; various paragraphs included a Bill of Rights, a
complicated elective machinery, and the abolition of exemptions from
taxation. In only one respect did a conservative tone appear in the
document,--the Catholic faith was declared to be the religion of Spain,
and the exercise of any other was forbidden. Nevertheless, both before
and after the adoption of the constitution, the _Cortes_ had shown
itself to be distinctly anti-clerical, as witness its overthrow of the
Inquisition, its restriction of the number of religious communities, and
the expulsion of the papal nuncio when he protested against some of
these laws. It was not by their workings in practice, however, that the
constitution and the laws of the _Cortes_ became important; rather it
was that they constituted a program which became the war-cry of the
democratic faction in Spain for years to come. The constitution of 1812
eventually got to be regarded as if it would be the panacea for all the
ills of mankind, and was fervently proclaimed by glib orators, who could
not have stated the exact nature of its provisions.
[Sidenote: Despotic rule of Ferdinand VII and the revolution of 1820.]
Early in 1814 Ferdinand VII was freed by Napoleon, and allowed to return
to Spain. It was inevitable that he should adopt a reactionary policy,
toward which his own inclinations, the attitude of other continental
monarchs, and the overwhelming majority of the clergy, nobles, and the
people themselves of Spain impelled him. He had hardly reached the
peninsula when he declared the constitution of 1812 and the decrees of
the _Cortes_ of no effect. This was followed by the arrest of the
Liberal deputies and by the beginning of a series of persecutions. All
might have been well, but the personal character of the rancorous,
cruel, disloyal, ungrateful, and unscrupulous king and the blindness of
the absolutists drove the reaction to extremes. Ferdinand not only
restored absolutism, but also attempted to undo the enlightened work of
Charles III for the economic and intellectual betterment of the people.
Liberalism in every form was crushed, and in accomplishing it such
ferocious severity was displayed that the government of Ferdinand was
discredited both at home and abroad, even in countries where the
reactionary spirit was strongest. Back of the established forms of the
restored absolutism stood the unofficial _camarilla_ (small room), or
“kitchen cabinet,” of the king’s intimate friends, but back of all was
the king. So suspicious was Ferdinand that more than thirty royal
secretaries, or ministers, were dismissed from office between 1814 and
1820, and dismissal was usually accompanied by a sentence of exile or
imprisonment. Periodical literature of a political character was
suppressed, although the bars began to be let down for magazines of a
scientific or literary type. Despite the rigors of the administration--in
a measure because of them--there were insurrections each year from 1814
to 1817, all led by military chieftains of Liberal ideas. They were put
down, for in no case was there a popular uprising; the people were as
yet little affected by the new doctrines. Meanwhile, secret plots
against the government were fostered, in part as the result of Spanish
American influences which desired to prevent the sending of troops to
suppress the revolutions of the new world, but more largely related to
the Liberal ideal in Spain. This activity seems mainly to have been the
work of societies of Freemasons, in which military men were strongly
represented. Many other elements had also become pro-Liberal by this
time, including prominent representatives of the middle class, almost
all of the patriots who had organized the resistance to the French in
1808, and the young men of education. The storm broke when orders were
given in 1819 for the assembling of an army at Cádiz for the extremely
unpopular service of the wars in the Americas. Colonel Riego raised the
standard of revolt on January 1, 1820, proclaiming the constitution of
1812. The government seemed paralyzed by the outbreak. Uncertain what to
do it waited. Then late in February the example set by Riego was
followed in the larger cities of northern Spain. The king at once
yielded, and caused an announcement to be made that he would summon a
_Cortes_ immediately and would swear his adhesion to the constitution of
1812. Thus, without a battle, it seemed as if the revolution had
triumphed.
[Sidenote: The Liberal _Cortes_ of 1820 and the triumph of the
reaction.]
In July, 1820, the _Cortes_ met. Its earliest measures aimed to restore
the legislation of the _Cortes_ of 1810, together with other laws of a
similar character. The _Cortes_ of 1820 has been charged with being
anti-clerical, as indeed it was, for the church was the most serious
opponent of Liberalism, still able to dominate the opinions of the
masses. Notwithstanding all it accomplished, the _Cortes_ of 1820
satisfied nobody. Like most new-born democracies Spain found herself
splitting on the rock of divergent opinions. The Liberals broke up into
various well-defined groups: the Radicals felt that the _Cortes_ had
been too moderate and cautious; the Moderates found the new laws
dangerously radical; still others wished for a reform of the
constitution in the direction of yet greater moderation than most of the
Moderates desired. These were only a few of the groups to spring up.
Meanwhile, the king and the absolutists, who had never intended to abide
by the revolution, began to turn these divisions to account. Armed bands
favorable to the king were formed, while others representing other
factions also came into existence, and a state of anarchy ensued. The
crisis was settled from abroad, however. From the first, Ferdinand had
sent appeals to the reactionary kings of Europe, representing himself to
be a prisoner, much as Louis XVI had been at the outbreak of the French
Revolution. At length his appeals were listened to, and France, Russia,
Austria, and Prussia joined together to restore matters to the situation
they were in prior to 1820. It was as a result of this decision that a
French army invaded the peninsula in the spring of 1823. No effective
resistance was offered; indeed, the country seemed rather to second the
French efforts and to facilitate their advance. No better proof could be
furnished that the revolution of 1820 did not represent the sentiment of
the people; the masses were yet steeped in ignorance and weighed down by
traditional influences, so that they rejected a system intended for
their benefit in favor of one which had lost even the benevolent
disposition of the eighteenth-century Bourbons; the intellectual
elements which had promoted the revolution had shown an incapacity to
face realities or to compromise with the full meed of their ideals. Thus
had the revolution of 1810 been re-enacted. The example was to be many
times repeated in the course of the next two generations. The
constitution and the laws of the _Cortes_ were abolished, and savage
persecution of Liberalism began. From 1823 to 1829 the political history
of Spain was a series of alternations between terrorism and a relaxation
of coercive measures, according as one group or another prevailed with
the king, but the dominant note was at all times that of absolutism. It
is to be noted that Spain had scarcely had a moment’s respite from
domestic difficulties since the invasion of Napoleon in 1808. In the
meantime, between 1810 and 1824, the American colonies of the mainland
had seized their opportunity to separate from the mother country
forever.
[Sidenote: María Cristina and the Carlist wars.]
[Sidenote: Progress of Liberalism.]
[Sidenote: Rule of Espartero.]
Reactionary as Ferdinand had shown himself to be, he did not go far
enough to suit the extremists in the absolutist faction headed by the
king’s brother Don Carlos (Charles). This group soon formed a party,
which believed that its principles could be secured only through the
accession of Don Carlos to the throne, wherefore its members came to be
known as Carlists. The king was childless and in feeble health, but the
hopes of the Carlists received a setback when in 1829 he married again.
The new queen, María Cristina of Naples, was reactionary by instinct,
but was forced by Carlist opposition to lean toward the Liberal faction
in order to find some element on which she could depend for support. As
it soon became clear that she was about to give birth to a child, the
chances of Don Carlos’ succession were gone in case the infant should
prove to be a boy, but the Carlists relied upon the so-called Spanish
Salic Law of Philip V to exclude the enthronement of a girl. The
exigencies of the political situation in 1713 had led Philip V to
declare that the male line should always succeed to the Spanish throne.
In 1789 Charles IV in agreement with the _Cortes_ abrogated the law, but
the decision seems not to have been published. To meet every contingency
Cristina persuaded Ferdinand in 1830 to publish the law of 1789.
Henceforth the struggle turned on the question of the validity of the
law of 1789. In October, 1830, Cristina gave birth to a daughter, María
Isabel, who was crowned as Queen Isabel, or Isabella II, with her mother
as regent, on the death of the king in 1833. This was the signal for the
outbreak of the Carlist wars, fought principally in the north and east
of Spain, where the party of Don Carlos had a strong following.
Meanwhile, a Liberal policy had been inaugurated, but in the main it was
of a half-hearted type, for Cristina was both illiberal by temperament
and unreliable in government; she would promise reforms, only to
withdraw them, and would perhaps re-enact them in the very next breath.
Nevertheless, the period of her regency was one of distinct gain for the
principle of limited monarchy. A wider and wider circle of the people
came to believe in that ideal, the _Cortes_ met frequently, Liberal
legislation was passed which was not to be so lightly tossed aside as
formerly, and the constitutional principle was definitely established.
To be sure, the same divisions as before tore the Liberal element
asunder, and even led to insurrections at the very time that the Carlist
wars were in their most dangerous stage; Spain still had a long road to
travel to achieve democracy. The most important piece of legislation was
the constitution of 1837, overthrowing the impossible instrument of
1812, though agreeing with it in many respects, including its
recognition of the sovereignty of the people, and establishing a
_Cortes_ of two houses, with an absolute veto by the crown, and a
restricted suffrage,--a compromise between the position of the
Moderates, or conservative element of the Liberals, and that of the
Progressives, or radicals. Neither party was satisfied, and as a
working instrument the constitution was not long-lived, but henceforth
this, and not the idolized 1812 document, was to serve as a basis in
constitution making. The year 1837 marked the first appearance in power
of Espartero, who had distinguished himself as a general in the war
against the Carlists, thus beginning an era in which successful military
men were to be the virtual rulers of Spain, more or less under
constitutional forms, but in reality depending upon the army as the only
force which all elements would recognize. Espartero’s credit reached
still higher when he was able to bring the Carlist war to a close in
1840, following his negotiations with the leading enemy generals. In the
same year, Cristina, who had long maintained a precarious hold on the
regency as a result of her insincerity and her affiliations with the
Moderates, was at length compelled to abdicate. Espartero stepped into
the breach, becoming regent in 1841, and for another two years
maintained himself as a veritable dictator, but proclaiming Liberal
principles, fighting the Moderates, defending himself against the
intrigues of Cristina, and resisting the Progressives, who were
dissatisfied with his policy or jealous of his preponderance. In 1843
the storm broke, and Espartero fled to England.
[Sidenote: Isabella II and the rule of the generals.]
[Sidenote: Narváez and O’Donnell.]
[Sidenote: Rise of General Prim.]
[Sidenote: Character of the queen.]
The overthrow of Espartero had been accomplished by a combination of the
extreme conservative and the radical elements, which aimed to prevent
the recurrence of a regency by illegally proclaiming the
thirteen-year-old Isabella II to be of age. Such widely divergent groups
could not long remain harmonious, and the conservatives were soon in the
saddle. The twenty-five year period of Isabella’s active reign, from
1843 to 1868, was one in which reactionary forces were almost constantly
in control under constitutional forms. Except for the discredited
Carlists, who engaged in several minor outbreaks during these years, no
party stood frankly for absolutism, although that form of government was
in fact the wish of many and the virtual type of rule employed. The real
master was, not the queen, but the army through its generals. The saving
factor in the situation was that the latter were not united; while
certain of them were ultra-reactionary, others were Liberal, though
none of those who attained to power went the lengths of the radicals. In
the numerous ministries of the era an occasional non-military individual
was at the head of the state,--such as the reactionary González Bravo,
or the clerically backed Bravo Murillo, but the terms of these and other
civilian ministers were brief. The two principal rulers of the times
were General Narváez and General O’Donnell. Narváez, who had won
notoriety for his severity against the Carlists, was six times in office
(1844-1846, 1846 again, 1847-1851, 1856-1857, 1864-1865, and 1866-1868).
It became the habit of the queen to send for him whenever the monarchy
was in danger, not only because he could control the army, but also
because he invariably struck hard and successfully against Liberalism at
the same time that he upheld constitutional government, though
disregarding its mandates as suited his pleasure. Execution or exile
followed swiftly where Narváez was displeased with an individual.
Meanwhile, he made meritorious reforms which tended to restore good
order and check anarchy, such as his success in stamping out brigandage
and revolution. The ability of this despotic veteran was well displayed
when he saved Spain from the storm which shook other European thrones in
1848. O’Donnell, who came into prominence in the temporarily successful
Liberal revolution of 1854, was three times in office (1856, 1858-1863,
1865-1866), once holding power for five years. While far more liberal
than Narváez he was a staunch supporter of the Bourbons. He sought to
divert public attention from domestic affairs by laying stress upon
foreign policy, as witness his well-advertised refusal to sell Cuba to
the United States, his plans to join France in the latter’s intervention
in Mexico, and especially his engaging in a war with Morocco
(1859-1860). The chief political result of the war was to make a popular
hero of General Prim, a man of Liberal tendencies and of less resolute
devotion than O’Donnell to the Bourbons. Prim was the third of the great
military figures who, together, explain this era. Beside them must be
considered the queen. The former regent, María Cristina, had not been
free from charges of immorality, but her daughter Isabella was notorious
for her bad conduct. Furthermore, she was perfidious, selfish,
superstitious, and lacking in principle. Withal she was devoutly
religious. The result was that her opinions were swayed by her numerous
transitory lovers or by her confessors, and ministries rose and fell
according to the dictates of the _camarilla_. Even O’Donnell declared it
was impossible to govern under her, for no dependence could be placed
upon her word.
[Sidenote: Constitutional changes in the reign of Isabella II.]
The character of the period was reflected in the new constitutions which
were drawn up. The constitution of 1845 included the following
provisions: the introduction of a property qualification, narrowing the
franchise of those electing deputies to the _Cortes_; the nomination of
senators by the crown; life tenure of senators; the packing of the
senate with grandees, ecclesiastics, successful soldiers, and financial
magnates,--reactionary elements; emphasis on the recognition of the
Catholic Church as the established religion; an assent to the theory of
the sovereignty of the people, but in such an attenuated form as to
deprive the right of its vitality; restrictions on the freedom of the
press; and the reduction of the national militia--the hope of
Liberalism--to an innocuous state by making it subject to the central
executive. The church was strengthened still further upon the fall of
Narváez in 1851, for, reactionary though he was, he did not go far
enough in ecclesiastical matters to suit the clergy. The brief term in
office of their candidate, Bravo Murillo, resulted in the restoration of
part of their former endowment as a result of the concordat of 1851, but
their acceptance of this document was denounced by the Carlists and
absolutists in general, including the pseudo-constitutional
reactionaries, as a betrayal of the cause for which the churchmen had
stood. Bravo Murillo proposed a constitution in 1852 which amounted to a
virtual abrogation of parliamentary government, granting the crown the
right to enact the budget by royal decree and to propose legislation
which must be accepted or rejected by the _Cortes_ without amendment,
together with other provisions of a like character. It was Narváez who
pointed out to the queen that the Bravo constitution would result in
disaster to the government, and the instrument was only productive of
its proposer’s fall. During the period of Liberal control, from 1854 to
1856, at which time Espartero returned to head the ministry, a fresh
constitution was presented to the _Cortes_ in 1855. The former provision
for life senators was abolished; financial control was vested in the
_Cortes_, which was to meet at least once a year; liberty of the press
was granted; and it was decided that nobody should be persecuted for his
religious views contrary to the Catholic faith, provided he should not
manifest them publicly. The constitution of 1855 remained an ideal only,
for the _Cortes_ separated without promulgating it. In the next year
O’Donnell brought about a restoration of the constitution of 1845, with
added enactments providing for the control of national finances by the
_Cortes_ and for an elected senate. When Narváez returned to power late
in the same year, he caused such reform measures of the Liberals as had
not already been done away with to be rescinded, and reinforced the
constitution of 1845.
[Sidenote: Revolution of General Prim and dethronement of Isabella II.]
Nevertheless, very important gains were made for democracy in this
period, in addition to the recognition of the constitutional principle.
Most vital of all was that a large proportion of the people had now
joined with the intellectual class among the civilian element in a
desire for a more liberal government. The reaction had at first been
welcomed as assuring the country of peace, but the promise was not
fulfilled. Insurrections soon began to occur on behalf of Liberalism,
and people got to believe that there would be no security from anarchy
until the policies of that party triumphed. The Liberal opposition more
and more directed its attacks against the queen, whose instability of
character seemed to preclude the attainment, or at least the continued
practice, of any political ideal. Prim at length became convinced that
the dynasty must be swept away, and headed an unsuccessful revolution in
1866. The queen’s position was steadily weakened, however. Radical
newspapers had been founded which exposed her immorality, and the
government was unable to suppress these publications. The deaths of
O’Donnell in 1867 and of Narváez in 1868 were also fatal to her. The
last-named was succeeded by González Bravo, who had held the leadership
of the ministry from 1843 to 1844, only to lose it because he was not a
soldier, and could not control the army. This time he proposed to defeat
the generals, and sought to do so by banishing all of them known to hold
Liberal views. But the generals returned with Prim at their head, though
Serrano was the nominal leader. At last the blow had fallen, and as the
year 1868 drew toward a close the long, corrupt reign of Isabella II
came to an end with the dethronement of the queen. The first question
now to resolve was that of the type of government to be established.
This was left to the _Cortes_, which voted for a continuance of
monarchy; it is significant of the advance of democratic ideas that 71
votes in a total of 285 favored the establishment of a republic. The
next problem was to find a monarch. Prince after prince was approached,
but it seemed as if nobody cared to be king of Spain. Leopold of
Hohenzollern consented to become king, but later withdrew his candidacy,
and it was this trifling incident which served as the occasion, hardly
the cause, for the outbreak of war in 1870 between France and Prussia.
Finally, after a search which had lasted two years, the Duke of Aosta,
Amadeo of Savoy, gave a reluctant consent. On the very day when Amadeo
touched Spanish soil, December 30, 1870, General Prim died of wounds
received a few days before from a band of assassins. It meant that the
new king (who was crowned a few days later, in January, 1871) was to
lack the support of the only individual who might have saved him from
the difficulties of his position.
[Sidenote: Troubled reign of Amadeo of Savoy.]
Amadeo found himself king in a country where he had no party. At his
accession there were three well-defined groups, the Alfonsists, the
Republicans, and the Carlists. The first-named favored the principle of
limited monarchy, under Alfonso of Bourbon, son of Isabella II. This
party as yet had a meagre following, owing to the hatred of her family
which Isabella had inspired among Spaniards. Republicanism was loudly
proclaimed, but was untried and not trusted. The Carlist faction,
standing for absolutism as well as for the accession of the heir of the
earlier Don Carlos, was by all odds the strongest group of the day. Its
backbone was the clergy, who were especially influential in the country
districts of the north and east. They were deeply offended by the choice
of a monarch from the House of Savoy, which had just occupied the last
remnant of the Papal States and made the pope a “prisoner of the
Vatican.” They also feared that the new government might withdraw its
financial support of the church, leaving them to the uncertain
contributions of the faithful. Carlism was aided by the disintegration
of the regular army, growing out of Prim’s promise to abolish compulsory
service, a policy which the Republicans included in their program,
although no definite enactment to this effect was made. The morale of
the army was thus destroyed, depriving the state of its only sure
resort, disgusting the officers, and leading to a renewal of brigandage,
anarchy, and an aggressive type of socialism. Altogether there was a
recrudescence of grave disorder. There were six changes in ministry and
three general elections in two years. At last Amadeo was told that he
must suspend the constitution and rule with an iron hand. This he
refused to do, seizing the first opportunity which offered to resign his
crown, leaving the country once more without a king, in February, 1873.
[Sidenote: The Spanish republic.]
The Republicans now had their innings, but the time could hardly have
been worse for the trial of their ideas. The Carlists had under arms a
force of 45,000 men in 1873, which swelled to 75,000 by the close of
1875. The south received the proclamation of the republic with a resort
to self-governing, jealous particularism, as if the day of democratic
_taifa_ states had dawned, for they were able to agree on one thing
alone,--that of refusing to pay taxes to the central government. One
Figueras had been proclaimed _ad interim_ president until a _Cortes_
could be elected, but he became terrified by the republic when he saw
it, and fled before the _Cortes_ could meet. There were three more
presidents in 1873. Pi y Margall was a federalist who believed that the
newly won freedom would provide a remedy for the prevailing
disorder,--but it did not. He was therefore put aside, and Salmerón, a
unitary Republican, took the helm. Salmerón initiated vigorous measures
to crush the forces of disintegration, but, as he was about to succeed,
drew back before the fear of militarism. Castelar was put in his place,
and he revived the army. This measure strengthened the central
authority, but it killed Republicanism, which had made the abolition of
enforced military service one of the cardinal tenets of its creed. It
was now only a question of time before the Alfonsists would take
control. Carlists of constitutional leanings went over to that side as
did many Republicans, since it now seemed clear that the accession of
Alfonso was the only alternative to the enthronement of the Carlist
representative. In December, 1874, Alfonso issued a proclamation,
promising an amnesty and constitutional government. With hardly a
struggle the republic fell.
[Sidenote: Alfonso XII and the establishment of a conservative
monarchy.]
The reign of Alfonso XII (1874-1885) marked the beginning of a new era,
based upon the acceptance of pseudo-democracy under constitutional
forms, and accompanied by a growing tendency toward internal peace.
Minor outbreaks in Spain, now of Carlists, now of Republicans, continued
to require military attention down to 1886, but no such disorder as had
so long been the rule again prevailed. A new constitution was
promulgated in 1876 which had the effect of conciliating the clergy,
since it provided for state support of the church, although that
institution did not receive all it had been promised; indeed, it
protested bitterly against the grant of toleration to other faiths. The
constitution of 1876, which with some modifications is still operative,
was patterned after that of 1845, with the addition of certain of the
more recent reforms. Some of its provisions were the following: the
_Cortes_ was to be composed of two houses, respectively the senate and
the congress; the senate was to contain eighty members in their own
right, such as princes of the royal family, grandees, presidents of the
great councils, archbishops, and captain-generals, one hundred more by
royal appointment, and one hundred and eighty elected for a term of five
years by municipal and provincial assemblies, universities, and
taxpayers of the highest class; congress was to be made up of 431
deputies, representing districts of 50,000 people each, chosen by an
electorate which was limited by the imposition of a property
qualification,--changed in 1889 by the restoration of universal manhood
suffrage; legislative power was vested in the _Cortes_ with the king;
the king was made irresponsible, but his decrees had to be countersigned
by a responsible minister; and the jury system was abolished,--although
it was restored early in the next reign. The net result was a
centralized monarchy in the control of the conservative elements. Many
principles of the Liberal program, taken especially from the
constitution of 1869 when Prim was in power, have since been added. The
death of the king, who had ruined his health as the result of excesses
which recalled the scandals of his mother’s reign, seemed likely to
raise fresh difficulties at the close of the year 1885. The queen was
then pregnant, and it was not until 1886 that her son, the present
Alfonso XIII, was born. The ex-queen, Isabella II, attempted to
intervene, but only succeeded in strengthening the position of the
queen-mother, María Cristina of Austria, who ruled henceforth as regent
until Alfonso attained his majority in 1902.
[Sidenote: The war of 1898 and disappearance of Spain as a colonial
power.]
It was primarily in Spain’s colonial policy that the evils of the old
era continued. The lesson of the Spanish American wars of independence
had not taught Spain how to govern her few remaining colonies. Indeed,
corrupt methods were if anything worse than before, as the opportunities
for engaging in them became fewer. Spanish civilians in Cuba preyed upon
the island, and political office there was reserved for those seeking
reward for party service at home. A revolution broke out in 1868 which
lasted ten years. The government then made promises which were not
fulfilled, and a second uprising occurred, but it was severely put down.
Once again there was a revolution, in 1895. This time the United States
intervened, and in the brief war of 1898 Cuba became independent, and
Porto Rico and the Philippines passed over to the United States. Thus
was the last vestige of Spain’s trans-Atlantic dominion swept away. This
was the final stroke in a century of disasters. And yet the total result
was one of internal progress for Spain. She had paid a heavy price in
her gropings for liberty, but she had reached a stage which, while not
yet satisfactory, was incomparably ahead of that with which she had
begun the century.