7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had placed
him.
But our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity of
matter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems to him
that after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us, and
that it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree of
life has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one might have
something to say in objection, but the body of the discourse by our author
on the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions, which I have
judged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I must pass on to the subject
of our controversy, that is, the explanation of the nature of freedom.
12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing to
explain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up half
of the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from that of
physical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures. For,
as we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral evil comes rather
from that which he calls a perfection, which the creature has in common,
according to him, with the Creator, that is to say, in the power of
choosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause. It is
a very great paradox to assert that the greatest imperfection, namely sin,
springs from perfection itself. But it is no less a paradox to present as a
perfection the thing which is the least reasonable in the world, the
advantage whereof would consist in being privileged against reason. And
that, after all, rather than pointing out the source of the evil, would be
to contend that it has none. For if the will makes its resolve without the
existence of anything, either in the person who chooses or in the object
which is chosen, to prompt it to the choice, there will be neither cause
nor reason for this election; and as moral evil consists in the wrong
choice, that is admitting that moral evil has no source at all. Thus in the
rules of good metaphysics there would have to be no moral evil in Nature;
and also for the same reason there would be no moral good either, and all
morality would be destroyed. But we must listen to our gifted author, from
whom the subtlety of an opinion maintained by famous philosophers among the
Schoolmen, and the adornments that he has added thereto himself by his[417]
wit and his eloquence, have hidden the great disadvantages contained
therein. In setting forth the position reached in the controversy, he
divides the writers into two parties. The one sort, he says, are content to
say that the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint; and the
other sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity. But this
exposition does not suffice, unless one distinguish the necessity that is
absolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moral
necessity, as I have already explained in many places.
13. The first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of choice.
The author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believe
that the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding, or by
anterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course that it
adopts. But he confuses these authors with those who assert that the will
is prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who maintain
that the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that is, he
confuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. He makes use of the admissions and the
odious declarations of Mr. Hobbes and his like, to lay them to the charge
of those who are infinitely far removed from them, and who take great care
to refute them. He lays these things to their charge because they believe,
as Mr. Hobbes believes, like everyone else (save for some doctors who are
enveloped in their own subtleties), that the will is moved by the
representation of good and evil. Thence he imputes to them the opinion that
there is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connected
by an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning; yet he
adds also, that properly speaking there will be no evil will, since if
there were, all one could object to therein would be the evil which it can
cause. That, he says, is different from the common notion, since the world
censures the wicked not because they do harm, but because they do harm
without necessity. He holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunate
and by no means culpable; that there would be no difference between
physical evil and moral evil, since man himself would not be the true cause
of an action which he could not avoid; that evil-doers would not be either
blamed or maltreated because they deserve it, but because that action may
serve to turn people away from evil; again, for this reason only one would
find fault with a rogue, but not with a sick man, that reproaches and [418]
threats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further,
according to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save the
prevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the evil
already done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise gratitude
would have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, without which
the mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficient
reason. Finally the author thinks that if this doctrine, which derives the
resolution of the will from the representation of good and evil, were true,
one must despair of human felicity, since it would not be in our power, and
would depend upon things which are outside us. Now as there is no ground
for hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agree
together in accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something to
us, and there will always be something too much. All these conclusions
hold, according to him, against those also who think that the will makes
its resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, an
opinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and renders
the soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against countless
serious writers, of accepted authority, who are here placed in the same
class with Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and with some other discredited authors,
whose doctrine is considered odious and insupportable. As for me, I do not
require the will always to follow the judgement of the understanding,
because I distinguish this judgement from the motives that spring from
insensible perceptions and inclinations. But I hold that the will always
follows the most advantageous representation, whether distinct or confused,
of the good or the evil resulting from reasons, passions and inclinations,
although it may also find motives for suspending its judgement. But it is
always upon motives that it acts.
14. It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion before
proceeding to establish that of our author. The misapprehension of my
opponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessary
absolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a consequence which
is founded only upon truths of fitness, and nevertheless has its effect. To
put it otherwise, there is a confusion between what depends upon the
principle of contradiction, which makes necessary and indispensable truths,
and what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason, which [419]
applies also to contingent truths. I have already elsewhere stated this
proposition, which is one of the most important in philosophy, pointing out
that there are two great principles, namely, _that of identicals or of
contradiction_, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one
is true and the other false, and _that of the sufficient reason_, which
states that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by
one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding.
Both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent
truths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason
should not exist. For one may say in a sense that these two principles are
contained in the definition of the true and the false. Nevertheless, when
in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upon
truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is
absolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest
extent, one can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must
say that it is contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reason
which inclines without necessitating. Once that is granted, it is seen how
we can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians, that the
thinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailing
representation of good or of evil, and this certainly and infallibly, but
not necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it without necessitating
it. That is why contingent futurities, foreseen both in themselves and
through their reasons, remain contingent. God was led infallibly by his
wisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power, and to
give it the best possible form; but he was not led thereto of necessity,
and the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supreme
wisdom. And I do not know if it would be easy, apart from the reflexions we
have just entertained, to untie the Gordian knot of contingency and
freedom.
15. This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent.
In the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together with
freedom. Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do harm, but
also because they are a source of harmful things, or of physical evils, a
wicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, what the evil principle
of the Manichaeans would be in the universe. Moreover, the author has
observed (ch. 4, sect. 4, § 8) that divine wisdom has usually forbidden
actions which would cause discomforts, that is to say, physical evils.[420]
It is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable. But
there is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means the
force of the considerations of good or evil, real or apparent, that have
prompted man to do ill: else anyone stealing a great sum of money or
killing a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be less
deserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mug
of beer or wantonly kill his neighbour's dog, since these latter were
tempted less. But it is quite the opposite in the administration of justice
which is authorized in the world: for the greater is the temptation to sin,
the more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement.
Besides, the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer,
the more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and the
more readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment.
Thus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called _stellionate_,
and a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very
foundations of our security in written documents. But one will have greater
indulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness. The Romans
punished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, when these
had prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her to
distraction, making him pass as their god; while it was found enough to
send the lover into exile. But if someone had done evil deeds without
apparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would be
tempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that he was given
to committing such extravagances often: this might tend towards reduction
of the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness and
punishment. So far removed are the principles of our opponents from the
practice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men.
16. Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will
still remain, although there be this in common between them, that they have
their reasons and causes. And why manufacture new difficulties for oneself
concerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed in the
solution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to account
for voluntary evils? That is to say, it suffices to show that one could not
have prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing the [421]
constitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at every
turn. It is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness,
and even the largest; but that does not prevent one from being able to say
that men are wicked and deserving of punishment: else one must needs say
that the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable, because they
spring from the first cause of our wretchedness, which is original sin.
Fourthly, to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the true
cause of sin, if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects,
as our author asserts in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1,
sub-sect. 3, § 18, is to create for oneself new senses for terms. When the
ancients spoke of that which is [Greek: eph' hêmin], or when we speak of
that which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of our
actions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for these
representations are in our souls, they are a portion of the modifications
of this active principle which is within us. No agent is capable of acting
without being _predisposed_ to what the action demands; and the reasons or
inclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable the
soul to decide between various courses. One will have it that the will is
alone active and supreme, and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queen
seated on her throne, whose minister of state is the understanding, while
the passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influence
often prevail over the counsel of her ministers. One will have it that the
understanding speaks only at this queen's order; that she can vacillate
between the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the
favourites, even rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, and
giving them audience or not as seems good to her. But it is a
personification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived. If the will is to
judge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the
understanding or the senses offer it, it will need another understanding in
itself, to understand what it is offered. The truth is that the soul, or
the thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations,
and decides according to the predominance of the representations modifying
its active force, in order to shape the action. I have no need here to
apply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our independence to
the best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects. For
what I have just said is sufficient to answer the objection. Our [422]
author, even though he admits with people in general this physical
influence of objects upon us, observes nevertheless with much perspicacity
that the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas,
much less the active force of our soul, and that they serve only to draw
out that which is within us. This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes'
belief that the soul, not being able to give force to the body, gives it at
least some direction. It is a mean between one side and the other, between
physical influence and Pre-established Harmony.
17. Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin would
neither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but because the
censure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time; whereas men
demand something more, namely, satisfaction for the crime, even though it
should serve neither for amendment nor for example. So do men with reason
demand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the past
benefit, and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit. This
objection contains noble and sound considerations, but it does not strike
at me. I require a man to be virtuous, grateful, just, not only from the
motive of interest, of hope or of fear, but also of the pleasure that he
should find in good actions: else one has not yet reached the degree of
virtue that one must endeavour to attain. That is what one means by saying
that justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake; and it is also
what I explained in justifying 'disinterested love', shortly before the
opening of the controversy which caused so much stir. Likewise I consider
that wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, as
when a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or because
he fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killing
them, and even in making them suffer beforehand. Such a degree of
wickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected with it
finds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides than
he had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear. I have
also observed in answering the difficulties of M. Bayle that, according to
the celebrated Conringius, justice which punishes by means of _medicinal_
penalties, so to speak, that is, in order to correct the criminal or at
least to provide an example for others, might exist in the opinion of those
who do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity. True [423]
retributive justice, on the other hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumes
something more, namely, intelligence and freedom in him who sins, because
the harmony of things demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form of
suffering, to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil
whereto it has consented. Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, has
rejected retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselves
the condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinian
party are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom.
18. Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for
felicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good and
evil. But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I think
it would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever put
upon it. Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a most
astounding nature: it is that our felicity depends upon external things, if
it is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil. It is
therefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no ground for
hoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure. This
argument is halting from every aspect. _There is no force in the inference:
one might grant the conclusion: the argument may be retorted upon the
author_. Let us begin with the retort, which is easy. For are men any
happier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument,
or because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason?
Have they less bodily suffering? Have they less tendency toward true or
apparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils? Are they any less
enslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive?
less envious? Yes, our gifted author will say; I will prove it by a method
of counting or assessment. I would rather he had proved it by experience;
but let us see this proof by counting. Suppose that by my choice, which
enables me to give goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to the
object chosen six degrees of goodness, when previously there were two
degrees of evil in my condition; I shall become happy all at once, and with
perfect ease, for I should have four degrees surplus, or net good.
Doubtless that is all very well; but unfortunately it is impossible. For
what possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the
object? To that end we must needs have the power to change our taste, or
the things, as we please. That would be almost as if I could say to [424]
lead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt be
diamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it. Or it would be like the
common explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that the
desert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it. They
only had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt be a
partridge. But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the
object, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? I think that I am. But
if that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodness
conceivable? Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of
goodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidents
of fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: by means of
this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events.
The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3,
§ 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be
overcome by any of them; and he regards it (§§ 20, 21, 22) as the soundest
foundation for happiness. Indeed, since there is nothing capable of
limiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason,
and of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either this
goodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek in
objects, these appetites and objects being limited while this power is
independent or at the least this goodness, given by the will to the chosen
object, must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires. For
whence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible, if
it is within reach of him who wills, and if the will can give it the
goodness it desires to give, independently of reality and of appearances?
It seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious,
which contains something of a fairy-tale kind, _optantis ista sunt, non
invenientis_. It therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction
cannot render us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently that
when men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they
do so through other desires, which always have their foundation in the
representation of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant the
conclusion of the argument', which states that our happiness does not
depend absolutely upon ourselves, at least in the present state of human
life: for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand
accidents which human prudence cannot evade? How, for example, can I [425]
avoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, by
an earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also deny
the inference in the argument, which states that if the will is only
actuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not
depend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God,
if everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is that for
the attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous. Thus, if the
soul follows reason and the orders that God has given it, it is assured of
its happiness, even though one may not find a sufficiency thereof in this
life.
19. Having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of my
hypothesis, our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own. He
believes that it alone is capable of saving our freedom, that all our
felicity rests therein, that it increases our goods and lessens our evils,
and that an agent possessing this power is so much the more complete. These
advantages have almost all been already disproved. We have shown that for
the securing of our freedom it is enough that the representations of goods
and of evils, and other inward or outward dispositions, should incline us
without constraining us. Moreover one does not see how pure indifference
can contribute to felicity; on the contrary, the more indifferent one is,
the more insensitive and the less capable of enjoying what is good will one
prove to be. Besides the hypothesis proves too much. For if an indifferent
power could give itself the consciousness of good it could also give itself
the most perfect happiness, as has been already shown. And it is manifest
that there is nothing which would set limits to that power, since limits
would withdraw it from its pure indifference, whence, so our author
alleges, it only emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been.
Finally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies:
on the contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledge
and goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules,
and no measures that could be taken. There are, however, still some
advantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed. He
considers then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which our
actions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the compulsion
of external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe to
oneself the merit of one's own felicity, and feel pleased with [426]
oneself. But the exact opposite is the case: for when one happens upon the
action through an absolutely indifferent movement, and not as a result of
one's good or bad qualities, is it not just as though one were to happen
upon it blindly by chance or hazard? Why then should one boast of a good
action, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks or
blame redounds to fortune or hazard? I think that one is more worthy of
praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and the more
culpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one's evil
qualities. To attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualities
whence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinable
something in the place of causes. Thus, if this chance or this indefinable
something were the cause of our actions, to the exclusion of our natural or
acquired qualities, of our inclinations, of our habits, it would not be
possible to set one's hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve of
others, since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite, or to
conjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant
indifference will drive the vessel of the will.
20. But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how our
learned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so
much good. He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who are
active in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must be
determined by oneself only. Now that which is determined by itself must not
be determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so far as
it is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge from
this indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the object
pleasing to it. But almost all the stages of this argument have their
stumbling-blocks. Not only the free creatures, but also all the other
substances and natures composed of substances, are active. Beasts are not
free, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one assume, with
the Cartesians, that they are mere machines. Moreover, it is not necessary
that in order to be active one should be determined only by oneself, since
a thing may receive direction without receiving force. So it is that the
horse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered by the helm; and
M. Descartes' belief was that our body, having force in itself, receives
only some direction from the soul. Thus an active thing may receive from
outside some determination or direction, capable of changing that [427]
direction which it would take of itself. Finally, even though an active
substance is determined only by itself, it does not follow that it is not
moved by objects: for it is the representation of the object within it
which contributes towards the determination. Now the representation does
not come from without, and consequently there is complete spontaneity.
Objects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physical
causes, but as final and moral causes. When God acts in accordance with his
wisdom, he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects,
but which have no reality outside him before their actual creation. Thus
this kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of
the substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even though
free power were not determined by the objects, it can never be indifferent
to the action when it is on the point of acting, since the action must have
its origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will do anything from
anything, _quidvis ex quovis_, and there will be nothing too absurd for us
to imagine. But this disposition will have already broken the charm of mere
indifference, and if the soul gives itself this disposition there must
needs be another predisposition for this act of giving it. Consequently,
however far back one may go, one will never meet with a mere indifference
in the soul towards the actions which it is to perform. It is true that
these dispositions incline it without constraining it. They relate usually
to the objects; but there are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously
_a subjecto_ or from the soul itself, and which bring it about that one
object is more acceptable than the other, or that the same is more
acceptable at one time than at another.
21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and he
undertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, and
even that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) nothing
is to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural appetite, to
be satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is therefore
absolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he can neither
be helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and create as it were
an appetite in making his choice. And having once chosen, he will wish to
abide by his choice, just as if he had been prompted thereto by a natural
inclination. Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings.
That is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their [428]
nature, but by the will of God: whereas if that will be excluded neither
good nor evil can exist in things. It is difficult to imagine how writers
of merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reason
which appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force. It seems to
me as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the
consideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so that
they cannot act upon him or determine him. But this is clearly an instance
of self-deception. When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by
the goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object is
necessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for us
that it be conceivable: for its representation acts in the substance, or
rather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed and
influenced by this representation. With God, it is plain that his
understanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is how
everything is in him in a transcendent manner. These ideas represent to him
the good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder,
the congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness
makes him choose the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself by
himself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized
and directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since his
understanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his
inclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may be
deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is it
possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas
before the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideas
which are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author so
strange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and would
subvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are independent of
will, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be
independent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is it
not rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more than
others of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than others
for forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? that
the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that
are called perfect? that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh?
that of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? that [429]
certain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill-adapted for
harmony? Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring
from the idea of the thing, and that the contrary would imply
contradiction? Can it be thought that the pain and discomfort of sentient
creatures, and above all the happiness and unhappiness of intelligent
substances, are a matter of indifference to God? And what shall be said of
his justice? Is it also something arbitrary, and would he have acted wisely
and justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent? I know that there
have been writers so ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous and
so liable to overthrow religion. But I am assured that our illustrious
author is far from holding it. Nevertheless, it seems as though this
hypothesis tends in that direction, if there is nothing in objects save
what is indifferent to the divine will before its choice. It is true that
God has need of nothing; but the author has himself shown clearly that
God's goodness, and not his need, prompted him to produce creatures. There
was therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution; and, as I have
said so many times, it was neither by chance nor without cause, nor even by
necessity, that God created this world, but rather as a result of his
inclination, which always prompts him to the best. Thus it is surprising
that our author should assert here (ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, § 5) that
there is no reason which could have induced God, absolutely perfect and
happy in himself, to create anything outside him, although, according to
the author's previous declarations (ch. 1, sect. 3, §§ 8, 9), God acts for
an end, and his aim is to communicate his goodness. It was therefore not
altogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create or not
create, and creation is notwithstanding a free act. Nor was it a matter of
indifference to him either, whether he should create one world rather than
another; a perpetual chaos, or a completely ordered system. Thus the
qualities of objects, included in their ideas, formed the reason for God's
choice.
22. Our author, having already spoken so admirably about the beauty and
fittingness of the works of God, has tried to search out phrases that would
reconcile them with his hypothesis, which appears to deprive God of all
consideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The indifference
of God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but as soon as God
has chosen something he has virtually chosen, at the same time, all [430]
that which is of necessity connected therewith. There were innumerable
possible men equally perfect: the election of some from among them is
purely arbitrary (in the judgement of our author). But God, once having
chosen them, could not have willed in them anything contrary to human
nature. Up to this point the author's words are consistent with his
hypothesis; but those that follow go further. He advances the proposition
that when God resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the same
time, by virtue of his infinite goodness, to give them every possible
advantage. Nothing, indeed, could be so reasonable, but also nothing could
be so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right to
overthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with
incongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is the
way to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just
been said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not,
and wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something in
order to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter of
indifference to him whether he shall create or not. Next the question is
asked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needs
answer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the
best, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, following
his own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that
there is no _wherefore_, because God is absolutely indifferent towards
creatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true that
our author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5,
sub-sect. 4, § 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men of
equal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures.
Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the more
perfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or
less with others, God will choose those that agree best together; there
will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thus
comes back to my principles. But let us speak, as he speaks, in accordance
with his hypothesis, and let us assume with him that God chooses certain
creatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them. He will
then just as soon choose creatures that are irregular, ill-shapen,
mischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, monsters everywhere, [431]
scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils filling the whole
universe, all this rather than excellent systems, shapely forms, upright
persons, good angels! No, the author will say, God, when once he had
resolved to create men, resolved at the same time to give them all the
advantages possible in the world, and it is the same with regard to
creatures of other kinds. I answer, that if this advantage were connected
of necessity with their nature, the author would be speaking in accordance
with his hypothesis. That not being so, however, he must admit that God's
resolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new election
independent of that one which prompted God to make men. But whence comes
this new election? Does it also come from mere indifference? If such is the
case, nothing prompts God to seek the good of men, and if he sometimes
comes to do it, it will be merely by accident. But the author maintains
that God was prompted to the choice by his goodness; therefore the good and
ill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him, and there are in him
primary choices to which the goodness of the object prompts him. He chooses
not only to create men, but also to create men as happy as it is possible
to be in this system. After that not the least vestige of mere indifference
will be left, for we can reason concerning the entire world just as we have
reasoned concerning the human race. God resolved to create a world, but he
was bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world
as should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity,
virtue, happiness. For I can see no excuse for saying that whereas God was
prompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create as
perfect as is possible within this system, he had not the same good
intention towards the whole universe. There we have come back again to the
goodness of the objects; and pure indifference, where God would act without
cause, is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our gifted author,
with whom the force of truth, once the heart of the matter was reached,
prevailed over a speculative hypothesis, which cannot admit of any
application to the reality of things.
23. Since, therefore, nothing is altogether indifferent to God, who knows
all degrees, all effects, all relations of things, and who penetrates at
one and the same time all their possible connexions, let us see whether at
least the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him absolutely
indifferent in his choice. The author regales us with this pure [432]
indifference as with a handsome present. Here are the proofs of it which he
gives: (1) We feel it within us. (2) We have experience within ourselves of
its marks and its properties. (3) We can show that other causes which might
determine our will are insufficient. As for the first point, he asserts
that in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at the same time pure
indifference. But I do not agree that we feel such indifference, or that
this alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom. We feel usually within
us something which inclines us to our choice. At times it happens, however,
that we cannot account for all our dispositions. If we give our mind to the
question, we shall recognize that the constitution of our body and of
bodies in our environment, the present or previous temper of our soul,
together with countless small things included under these comprehensive
headings, may contribute towards our greater or lesser predilection for
certain objects, and the variation of our opinions from one time to
another. At the same time we shall recognize that none would attribute this
to mere indifference, or to some indefinable force of the soul which has
the same effect upon objects as colours are said to have upon the
chameleon. Thus the author has no cause here to appeal to the judgement of
the people: he does so, saying that in many things the people reason better
than the philosophers. It is true that certain philosophers have been
misled by chimeras, and it would seem that mere indifference is numbered
among chimerical notions. But when someone maintains that a thing does not
exist because the common herd does not perceive it, here the populace
cannot be regarded as a good judge, being, as it is, only guided by the
senses. Many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by the
wind. The majority do not know of imperceptible bodies, the fluid which
causes weight or elasticity, magnetic matter, to say nothing of atoms and
other indivisible substances. Do we say then that these things are not
because the common herd does not know of them? If so, we shall be able to
say also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition or
inclination contributing towards the production of its act, because there
are many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently perceived
by the common herd, for lack of attention and thought. Secondly, as to the
marks of the power in question, I have already refuted the claim advanced
for it, that it possesses the advantage of making one active, the real
cause of one's action, and subject to responsibility and morality: [433]
these are not genuine marks of its existence. Here is one the author
adduces, which is not genuine either, namely, that we have within us a
power of resisting natural appetites, that is to say of resisting not only
the senses, but also the reason. But I have already stated this fact: one
resists natural appetites through other natural appetites. One sometimes
endures inconveniences, and is happy to do so; but that is on account of
some hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill and
exceeds it: either one anticipates good from it, or one finds good in it.
The author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearances
which he has introduced on the scene, that we render agreeable what at
first displeased us. But who cannot see that the true reason is, that
application and attention to the object and custom change our disposition
and consequently our natural appetites? Once we become used to a rather
high degree of cold or heat, it no longer incommodes us as it formerly did,
and yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice. Time is
needed, for instance, to bring about that hardening, or rather that
callosity, which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a degree of
heat that would burn our hands. The populace, whom the author invokes,
guess correctly the cause of this effect, although they sometimes apply it
in a laughable manner. Two serving-maids being close to the fire in the
kitchen, one who has burnt herself says to the other: Oh, my dear, who will
be able to endure the fire of purgatory? The other answers: Don't be
absurd, my good woman, one grows used to everything.
24. But (the author will say) this wonderful power which causes us to be
indifferent to everything, or inclined towards everything, simply at our
own free will, prevails over reason itself. And this is his third proof,
namely, that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without having
recourse to this power. One sees numbers of people despising the entreaties
of their friends, the counsels of their neighbours, the reproaches of their
conscience, discomforts, tortures, death, the wrath of God, hell itself,
for the sake of running after follies which have no claim to be good or
tolerable, save as being freely chosen by such people. All is well in this
argument, with the exception of the last words only. For when one takes an
actual instance one will find that there were reasons or causes which led
the man to his choice, and that there are very strong bonds to fasten [434]
him thereto. A love-affair, for example, will never have arisen from mere
indifference: inclination or passion will have played its part; but habit
and stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather than
separation from the beloved. Here is another example cited by the author:
an atheist, a man like Lucilio Vanini (that is what many people call him,
whereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of Giulio Cesare Vanini in
his works), will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera rather
than renounce his impiety. The author does not name Vanini; and the truth
is that this man repudiated his wrong opinions, until he was convicted of
having published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism.
When he was asked whether there was a God, he plucked some grass, saying:
_Et levis est cespes qui probet esse Deum._
But since the Attorney General to the Parliament of Toulouse desired to
cause annoyance to the First President (so it is said), to whom Vanini was
granted considerable access, teaching his children philosophy, if indeed he
was not altogether in the service of that magistrate, the inquisition was
carried through rigorously. Vanini, seeing that there was no chance of
pardon, declared himself, when at the point of death, for what he was, an
atheist; and there was nothing very extraordinary in that. But supposing
there were an atheist who gave himself up for torture, vanity might be in
his case a strong enough motive, as in that of the Gymnosophist, Calanus,
and of the Sophist who, according to Lucian's account, was burnt to death
of his own will. But the author thinks that that very vanity, that
stubbornness, those other wild intentions of persons who otherwise seem to
have quite good sense, cannot be explained by the appetites that arise from
the representation of good and evil, and that they compel us to have
recourse to that transcendent power which transforms good into evil, and
evil into good, and the indifferent into good or into evil. But we do not
need to go so far, and the causes of our errors are only too visible.
Indeed, we can make these transformations, but it is not as with the
Fairies, by a mere act of this magic power, but by obscuring and
suppressing in one's mind the representations of good or bad qualities
which are naturally attached to certain objects, and by contemplating only
such representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices; or [435]
again, because one attaches to the objects, by dint of thinking of them,
certain qualities which are connected with them only accidentally or
through our habitual contemplation of them. For example, all my life long I
detest a certain kind of good food, because in my childhood I found in it
something distasteful, which made a strong impression upon me. On the other
hand, a certain natural defect will be pleasing to me, because it will
revive within me to some extent the thought of a person I used to esteem or
love. A young man will have been delighted by the applause which has been
showered upon him after some successful public action; the impression of
this great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation;
he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes this passion,
and that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to attain his end.
For although he may know very well that he will not feel what is said of
him after his death, the representation he makes of it for himself
beforehand creates a strong impression on his mind. And there are always
motives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless and absurd to
those who do not enter into these motives. In a word, a strong or
oft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs, our imagination,
our memory, and even our reasoning. It happens that a man, by dint of
having often related something untrue, which he has perhaps invented,
finally comes to believe in it himself. And as one often represents to
oneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to imagine, and one thinks it
also easy to put into effect, whence it comes that one persuades oneself
easily of what one wishes.
_Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt._
25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking, never voluntary, although
the will very often contributes towards them indirectly, owing to the
pleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or owing to
the aversion one feels for others. Beautiful print in a book will help
towards making it persuasive to the reader. The air and manner of a speaker
will win the audience for him. One will be inclined to despise doctrines
coming from a man one despises or hates, or from another who resembles him
in some point that strikes us. I have already said why one is readily
disposed to believe what is advantageous or agreeable, and I have known
people who at first had changed their religion for worldly [436]
considerations, but who have been persuaded (and well persuaded) afterwards
that they had taken the right course. One sees also that stubbornness is
not simply wrong choice persevering, but also a disposition to persevere
therein, which is due to some good supposed to be inherent in the choice,
or some evil imagined as arising from a change. The first choice has
perchance been made in mere levity, but the intention to abide by it
springs from certain stronger reasons or impressions. There are even some
writers on ethics who lay it down that one ought to abide by one's choice
so as not to be inconstant or appear so. Yet perseverance is wrong when one
despises the warnings of reason, especially when the subject is important
enough to be examined carefully; but when the thought of change is
unpleasant, one readily averts one's attention from it, and that is the way
which most frequently leads one to stubbornness. The author wished to
connect stubbornness with his so-called pure indifference. He might then
have taken into account that to make us cling to a choice there would be
need of more than the mere choice itself or a pure indifference, especially
if this choice has been made lightly, and all the more lightly in
proportion to the indifference shown. In such a case we shall be readily
inclined to reverse the choice, unless vanity, habit, interest or some
other motive makes us persevere therein. It must not be supposed either
that vengeance pleases without cause. Persons of intense feeling ponder
upon it day and night, and it is hard for them to efface the impression of
the wrong or the affront they have sustained. They picture for themselves a
very great pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comes
upon them every moment, and which causes some to find vengeance sweeter
than life itself.
_Quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa._
The author would wish to persuade us that usually, when our desire or our
aversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it, we have
given to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us, through the
alleged power of choice which makes things appear good or evil as we wish.
One has had two degrees of natural evil, one gives oneself six degrees of
artificial good through the power that can choose without cause. Thus one
will have four degrees of net good (ch. 5, sect. 2, § 7). If that could be
carried out it would take us far, as I have already said here. The [437]
author even thinks that ambition, avarice, the gambling mania and other
frivolous passions derive all their force from this power (ch. 5, sect. 5,
sub-sect. 6). But there are besides so many false appearances in things, so
many imaginations capable of enlarging or diminishing objects, so many
unjustified connexions in our arguments, that there is no need of this
little Fairy, that is, of this inward power operating as it were by
enchantment, to whom the author attributes all these disorders. Indeed, I
have already said repeatedly that when we resolve upon some course contrary
to acknowledged reason, we are prompted to it by another reason stronger to
outward appearance, such as, for instance, is the pleasure of appearing
independent and of performing an extraordinary action. There was in days
past at the Court of Osnabrück a tutor to the pages, who, like a second
Mucius Scaevola, held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting a
gangrene, in order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than a
very acute pain. Few people will follow his example; and I do not even know
if a writer could easily be found who, having once affirmed the existence
of a power capable of choosing without cause, or even contrary to reason,
would be willing to prove his case by his own example, in renouncing some
good benefice or some high office, simply in order to display this
superiority of will over reason. But I am sure at the least that an
intelligent man would not do so. He would be presently aware that someone
would nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simply
imitated Heliodorus, Bishop of Larissa. That man (so it is said) held his
book on Theagenes and Chariclea dearer than his bishopric; and such a thing
may easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense with
his office and when he is sensitive to reputation. Thus every day people
are found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices, that is to
say, actual goods to the mere semblance of them.
26. If I wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted author,
which often come back to matters previously considered in our inquiry,
usually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition, I should be
obliged to proceed too far; but I hope that I shall be able to avoid doing
so, having, as I think, sufficiently met all his reasons. The best thing is
that with him practice usually corrects and amends theory. After having
advanced the hypothesis, in the second section of this fifth chapter, [438]
that we approach God through the capacity to choose without reason, and
that this power being of the noblest kind its exercise is the most capable
of making one happy, things in the highest degree paradoxical, since it is
reason which leads us to imitate God and our happiness lies in following
reason: after that, I say, the author provides an excellent corrective, for
he says rightly (§ 5) that in order to be happy we must adapt our choice to
things, since things are scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us, and that
this is in effect adapting oneself to the divine will. Doubtless that is
well said, but it implies besides that our will must be guided as far as
possible by the reality of the objects, and by true representations of good
and evil. Consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed to
freedom, and the power of choosing without cause, far from ministering to
our happiness, will be useless and even highly prejudicial. Thus it is
happily the case that this power nowhere exists, and that it is 'a being of
reasoning reason', as some Schoolmen call the fictions that are not even
possible. As for me, I should have preferred to call them 'beings of
non-reasoning reason'. Also I think that the third section (on wrong
elections) may pass, since it says that one must not choose things that are
impossible, inconsistent, harmful, contrary to the divine will, or already
taken by others. Moreover, the author remarks appositely that by
prejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine will,
which desires that all be happy as far as it is possible. I will say as
much of the fourth section, where there is mention of the source of wrong
elections, which are error or ignorance, negligence, fickleness in changing
too readily, stubbornness in not changing in time, and bad habits; finally
there is the importunity of the appetites, which often drive us
inopportunely towards external things. The fifth section is designed to
reconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness of God; and
this section, as it is diffuse, is divided into sub-sections. The author
has cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection: for he asserts that
without a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in the choice
there would be no sin. Now it was very easy for God to refuse to creatures
a power so irrational. It was sufficient for them to be actuated by the
representations of goods and evils; it was therefore easy, according to the
author's hypothesis, for God to prevent sin. To extricate himself from this
difficulty, he has no other resource than to state that if this power [439]
were removed from things the world would be nothing but a purely passive
machine. But that is the very thing which I have disproved. If this power
were missing in the world (as in fact it is), one would hardly complain of
the fact. Souls will be well content with the representations of goods and
evils for the making of their choice, and the world will remain as
beautiful as it is. The author comes back to what he had already put
forward here, that without this power there would be no happiness. But I
have given a sufficient answer to that, and there is not the slightest
probability in this assertion and in certain other paradoxes he puts
forward here to support his principal paradox.
27. He makes a small digression on prayer (sub-sect. 4), saying that those
who pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; but it seems
as though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. In reality, men
will be content if their prayers are heard, without troubling themselves as
to whether the course of nature is changed in their favour, or not. Indeed,
if they receive succour from good angels there will be no change in the
general order of things. Also this opinion of our author is a very
reasonable one, that there is a system of spiritual substances, just as
there is of corporeal substances, and that the spiritual have communication
with one another, even as bodies do. God employs the ministry of angels in
his rule of mankind, without any detriment to the order of nature.
Nevertheless, it is easier to put forward theories on these matters than to
explain them, unless one have recourse to my system of Harmony. But the
author goes somewhat further. He believes that the mission of the Holy
Spirit was a great miracle in the beginning, but that now his operations
within us are natural. I leave it to him to explain his opinion, and to
settle the matter with other theologians. Yet I observe that he finds the
natural efficacy of prayer in the power it has of making the soul better,
of overcoming the passions, and of winning for oneself a certain degree of
new grace. I can say almost the same things on my hypothesis, which
represents the will as acting only in accordance with motives; and I am
immune from the difficulties in which the author has become involved over
his power of choosing without cause. He is in great embarrassment also with
regard to the foreknowledge of God. For if the soul is perfectly
indifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice? and
what sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a[440]
thing, if there is no reason for its existence? The author puts off to some
other occasion the solution of this difficulty, which would require
(according to him) an entire work. For the rest, he sometimes speaks
pertinently, and in conformity with my principles, on the subject of moral
evil. He says, for example (sub-sect. 6), that vices and crimes do not
detract from the beauty of the universe, but rather add to it, just as
certain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they were
heard quite alone, and yet in combination they render the harmony more
pleasing. He also points out divers goods involved in evils, for instance,
the usefulness of prodigality in the rich and avarice in the poor; indeed
it serves to make the arts flourish. We must also bear in mind that we are
not to judge the universe by the small size of our globe and of all that is
known to us. For the stains and defects in it may be found as useful for
enhancing the beauty of the rest as patches, which have nothing beautiful
in themselves, are by the fair sex found adapted to embellish the whole
face, although they disfigure the part they cover. Cotta, in Cicero's book,
had compared providence, in its granting of reason to men, to a physician
who allows wine to a patient, notwithstanding that he foresees the misuse
which will be made thereof by the patient, at the expense of his life. The
author replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require, and
that the good which accrues is greater than the evil. If God had not given
reason to man there would have been no man at all, and God would be like a
physician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill. One may
add that it is not reason which is harmful in itself, but the absence of
reason; and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means, but not
adequately about an end, or about that bad end we have proposed to
ourselves. Thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil deed.
The author also puts forward the objection made by Epicurus in the book by
Lactantius on the wrath of God. The terms of the objection are more or less
as follows. Either God wishes to banish evils and cannot contrive to do so,
in which case he would be weak; or he can abolish them, and will not, which
would be a sign of malignity in him; or again he lacks power and also will,
which would make him appear both weak and jealous; or finally he can and
will, but in this case it will be asked why he then does not banish evil,
if he exists? The author replies that God cannot banish evil, that he does
not wish to either, and that notwithstanding he is neither malicious [441]
nor weak. I should have preferred to say that he can banish evil, but that
he does not wish to do so absolutely, and rightly so, because he would then
banish good at the same time, and he would banish more good than evil.
Finally our author, having finished his learned work, adds an Appendix, in
which he speaks of the Divine Laws. He fittingly divides these laws into
natural and positive. He observes that the particular laws of the nature of
animals must give way to the general laws of bodies, that God is not in
reality angered when his laws are violated, but that order demanded that he
who sins should bring an evil upon himself, and that he who does violence
to others should suffer violence in his turn. But he believes that the
positive laws of God rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause its
infliction. And that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnation
of the wicked, which no longer serves either for correction or example, and
which nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of God, although the
wicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves. He suspects, however, that
these punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous people. He
is doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to be nothing:
for it might be that the damned are fools, capable of clinging to their
state of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind which, he maintains,
makes them congratulate themselves on their false judgements in the midst
of their misery, and take pleasure in finding fault with the will of God.
For every day one sees peevish, malicious, envious people who enjoy the
thought of their ills, and seek to bring affliction upon themselves. These
ideas are not worthy of contempt, and I have sometimes had the like myself,
but I am far from passing final judgement on them. I related, in 271 of the
essays written to oppose M. Bayle, the fable of the Devil's refusal of the
pardon a hermit offers him on God's behalf. Baron André Taifel, an Austrian
nobleman, Knight of the Court of Ferdinand Archduke of Austria who became
the second emperor of that name, alluding to his name (which appears to
mean Devil in German) assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr, with this
Spanish motto, _Mas perdido, y menos arrepentido_, the more lost, the less
repentant, which indicates a hopeless passion from which one cannot free
oneself. This motto was afterwards repeated by the Spanish Count of
Villamediana when he was said to be in love with the Queen. Coming to the
question why evil often happens to the good and good to the wicked, [442]
our illustrious author thinks that it has been sufficiently answered, and
that hardly any doubt remains on that point. He observes nevertheless that
one may often doubt whether good people who endure affliction have not been
made good by their very misfortune, and whether the fortunate wicked have
not perhaps been spoilt by prosperity. He adds that we are often bad
judges, when it is a question of recognizing not only a virtuous man, but
also a happy man. One often honours a hypocrite, and one despises another
whose solid virtue is without pretence. We are poor judges of happiness
also, and often felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contented
poor man, while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of the
great. Finally the author observes, that the greatest felicity here on
earth lies in the hope of future happiness, and thus it may be said that to
the wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction or
chastisement, and to the good nothing save what ministers to their greater
good. These conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion, and one can say
nothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work.
[443]
* * * * *
CAUSA DEI ASSERTA
PER JUSTITIAM EJUS
_cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque actionibus conciliatam._
The original edition of the Theodicy contained a fourth appendix under this
title. It presented in scholastic Latin a formal summary of the positive
doctrine expressed by the French treatise. It satisfied the academic
requirements of its day, but would not, presumably, be of interest to many
modern readers, and is consequently omitted here.
[445]
* * * * *