THE LAW OF THE THREE STATES
In Comte’s system the constitution of sociology may be considered at
the same time as a terminus and as a starting point. One sees the
positive method attaining with it to the order of the highest, the most
“noble,” the most complicated phenomena: in this sense sociology is the
term reached by the positive spirit in its ascent. It thus reaches the
summit of the hierarchy of the sciences, and henceforth rules over them
all. On the other hand, positive philosophy, possible from this moment,
will make this a starting point for establishing the principles of
morality and of polity.
“Through the foundation of sociology,” says Comte at the beginning of
the _Cours_, “positive philosophy will acquire that universal character
which it still lacks, and will thus become qualified to take the place
of theological and metaphysical philosophy, whose only real property
to-day is this universality,”[10] and at the end of the _Cours_ he
concludes: “The creation of sociology endows with fundamental unity the
entire system of modern philosophy.”[11]
This creation, upon which everything else depended, dates from the time
when Comte discovered _the law of the three states_ as it is called.
For, once this law is established, “social physics” ceases to be a mere
philosophical conception, and becomes a positive science. This law
had been anticipated and even already formulated in the XVIII. century
by Turgot, then by Condorcet, and by Dr. Burdin. Comte, nevertheless,
takes to himself the merit of the discovery. As he is generally most
precise in doing full justice to his “precursors,” we must admit that,
according to him, none of them had seen the scientific importance of
this law. It certainly is one thing to gather the notion of a law out
of a number of facts, and another to understand its capital importance,
and to discern in it the fundamental law which governs the whole of the
evolution of humanity.
This is the way in which Comte enounces it, in the _Plan des travaux
scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société_ (1822).
“According to the very nature of the human intellect every branch of
our knowledge must necessarily pass successively in the course of its
progressive development, through three different theoretical states:
the theological or fictitious state, the metaphysical or abstract
state, finally the scientific or positive state.”[12]
In the first lesson of the _Cours de philosophie positive_, after
having reproduced this statement, Comte adds: “In other words the
human mind, by its nature, in each one of its researches makes use
successively of three methods of philosophising, essentially different
and even opposed to each other: firstly, the theological method,
next, the metaphysical, and lastly the positive. Hence we find three
kinds of philosophies, or general systems of conceptions of the
totality of phenomena, which mutually exclude each other. The first
is the necessary starting-point of human intelligence, the third, its
fixed and final state; the second is solely destined to serve as a
transition.”[13]
The words “theological” and “metaphysical” are here taken in a
particular sense, strictly defined.
Comte calls “theology” a general system of conceptions concerning the
universality of phenomena, which explains the appearance of these
phenomena by the will of gods. He has not in his mind theological
speculation as one usually understands it, as a rational or sacred
science. He does not in the least dream of a study of revealed truth.
He only designated by this name an interpretation of natural phenomena
by means of supernatural and arbitrary causes. Theological--that is
to say--fictitious. Elsewhere Comte calls this mode of explanation
“imaginary” or “mythological.” It is in this sense that he could ask
if each one of us did not remember having been in regard to his most
important notions, a theologian in his infancy, a metaphysician in his
youth, and a physicist in his manhood?[14] Comte does not allude to the
religious traditions which the child receives from his parents, but
indeed to the spontaneous tendency which causes him in the first place
to explain natural phenomena by wills, and not by laws. Theology is
here synonymous with anthropomorphism in the conception of causes.
Similarly Comte does not take the word “metaphysics” in the most usual
extension of its meaning. The science of Being as such, the science of
Substance or of first Principles, is not here in question, at least
directly. He only refers to a certain mode of explaining phenomena
given in our experience. For example, in physics, the hypothesis of an
ether to explain optical and electrical phenomena is metaphysical. So
it is in physiology with the hypothesis of a vital principle, or, in
psychology, with the hypothesis of a soul. “Metaphysical or abstract,”
says Comte. At bottom this mode of explanation is no other than the
preceding one, but more and more pale and colourless, vanishing, so to
speak, as natural phenomena, better observed, are referred no longer
to capricious wills, but to invariable laws.
Let us then be careful not to give here to the words “metaphysics”
and “theology” their full meaning. For instance, to conclude from the
law of the three States that the evolution of humanity ever carries
it further from theology, to end in a final state wherein religion
should have no place is singularly to misapprehend Comte’s doctrine.
On the contrary the evolution of humanity is leading it to a state
which will be pre-eminently religious. In it religion will regulate
the whole life of man. Comte perhaps would not refuse to define man,
as has often been done, as a religious animal. The history of humanity
may be represented, in a sense, as an evolution which proceeds from
primitive religion (fetichism) to final religion (positivism). But the
object of the law of the three States is not to express the religious
evolution of humanity. It is only concerned with the progress of the
human intellect. It sets forth the successive philosophies which that
intelligence has been obliged by turn to adopt in the interpretation of
natural phenomena. It is, in a word, the general law of the evolution
of _thought_.
Those who made a mistake about it probably only considered this law in
the first lesson of the _Cours_, where it is separately presented. But
the error is no longer possible when one refers to the fourth volume
of the _Cours_, where the law is put in its place, in social dynamics,
especially in the fifty-eighth lesson, in the sixth volume.
It is not, however, without reason that Comte set forth this law in
the first pages of his _Cours de philosophie positive_. In sociology
as he conceives it, the law of the intellectual evolution of humanity,
that is to say the law of the three States is the essential law of
dynamics, and therefore of the whole of social science. For, of all
the social factors of which the concomitant and joint evolution
constitutes the progress of humanity, the intellectual factor is the
most important. It is the dominant one, in the sense that the others
depend far more upon it than it does upon them. The history of art, of
institutions, of morals, of law, of civilisation in general could not
be understood without the history of intellectual evolution, that is to
say of science and of philosophy, whereas this one, strictly speaking,
would still be intelligible without the others. This evolution is
therefore the principal axis around which the other series of social
phenomena are arranged. Thus the law which expresses it is the most
“fundamental,” the most “general,” in the precise sense in which Comte
understands this word. In enunciating this law he declares legitimate
by anticipation the existence of a social science. He proves _ipso
facto_ not only that it is possible, but that it already exists. Hence
the eminent position which he gives to the law of the three states.
II.
The demonstration of this law presents itself under two distinct forms.
In the first place Comte supports his argument by history. This proves
indeed that every branch of our knowledge passes in turn through the
three states, with never a single retrogression. It is true that much
of our knowledge has not yet reached the positive state. But at any
rate it is established that up to the present even those sciences which
have not yet reached that state have all described the same curve,
already described by those that have reached it.
Historical verification would suffice, if necessary, provided it were
complete. Comte is not satisfied with it. He claims moreover to deduce
the law of the three states from the nature of man. He will thus give
a direct demonstration of it. However useful history may appear to
him as an instrument of proof, he still wishes to render its verdict
intelligible. To reach this end he has recourse to psychology. “We
ought,” he says, “carefully to characterise the general motives, drawn
from an exact knowledge of human nature, which must have rendered
partly inevitable, partly indispensable, the necessary succession of
social phenomena, considered directly with respect to the intellectual
development which dominates essentially their chief advance.”[15]
In the first place, the human mind could only begin to interpret nature
by a philosophy of the theological type. For it is the only one which
is spontaneously produced, the only one which does not presuppose
another. Man at first conceives all activity on the same plan as his
own. In order to understand phenomena, he likens them to his own
actions, whose mode of production he thinks he apprehends, because he
has the feelings of his own efforts and the consciousness of his own
volitions. This anthropomorphic explanation comes so naturally to us
that we are always ready to give way to it. Even to-day, if we forget
positive discipline for a moment, if we venture to ask for the mode of
production of some phenomenon, we immediately dimly imagine an activity
more or less like our own. And among the metaphysicians who profess to
give an idea of God, the most consistent, according to Comte, are those
who make a person of Him.
The spontaneity which characterises the theological mode of thought has
been extremely useful. Without it, we do not see how man’s intelligence
could have begun to unfold itself. For, in order to form a scientific
theory, however modest and fragmentary, of natural phenomena, the mind
needs previous observations, while, on the other hand, in default of
a theory, or at any rate of a preexisting hypothesis, no scientific
observation is possible. Absolute empiricism, says Comte, is barren,
and even, strictly speaking, inconceivable. Simple collections of
facts, however numerous we may suppose them to be, do not possess by
themselves any scientific significance. Such, for instance, would be
the case in the meteorological facts, making interminable lists, and
filling volumes. They would only become observations if in collecting
them the mind tried to put upon them some interpretation, however vague
or precise, real or chimerical.
Caught between the two equally imperative necessities of observing
in the first place in order to reach “suitable conceptions”, and of
conceiving at the same time some theory in order to make coherent
observations, the human mind saves itself by the theological mode
of thought. For it has no need of previous observations to imagine
everywhere in nature activities similar to its own. Once this
hypothesis has arisen, observation comes into play, first to confirm
it, but soon to oppose it. From that moment the impulse has been given.
The evolution of the sciences and of philosophy will be continued
through doctrines which will succeed each other in a necessary order.
In the same way, from the moral point of view, a theological philosophy
alone could at first inspire weak and ignorant humanity with sufficient
courage and confidence to shake off its primitive torpor. To-day, if
man knows that phenomena are subject to invariable laws, he also knows
that a knowledge of these laws gives him a certain control over nature.
But in the days when man could not foresee the power of science,
the idea that phenomena obeyed necessary laws would have filled him
with despair. It would probably have paralysed him for all exertion.
The theological mode of thought was far more encouraging since the
phenomena are imagined to be arbitrarily modifiable. Anything may
happen. Nothing is impossible, neither is anything necessary. The will
of the gods suffices for a thing to happen or not to happen. Directly,
man has no power over nature; indirectly he can do everything, provided
only that he can propitiate the divinities whose will is law. In this
way, it is at the moment when man’s impotence is greatest, that his
confidence in his own power is the strongest.
Finally, from a social point of view, theological philosophy was
indispensable for human society to subsist and to be developed. For
this society does not merely imply sympathy of feeling and union of
interests among its members, but first and above all unanimous adhesion
to certain beliefs. Without a “certain system of common preliminary
opinions” there can be no human society. But, on the other hand, how
can we conceive the appearance of such a system, if social life is not
organised? Here is a new vicious circle, out of which the theological
philosophy alone can release us. It constitutes at first sight a
totality of common beliefs. All the members of the society defend them
all the more energetically, because with them are bound up their hopes
and their fears, for this world, and for the next, if they already
believe in it.
At the same time, this theological philosophy determines the formation,
in society, of a special class, consecrated to speculative activity.
What an immense progress this division between practice and theory must
have been, however roughly outlined! Such a division was established
as soon as a sacerdotal class began to be distinguished from the rest
of the social body. And how slow this progress must have been, when we
see even to-day how hard it is for men to accept any innovation which
does not seem to carry with it any immediate practical advantage!
The sacerdotal class, invested, by the nature of its functions with
an authority which was precious for social progress, at the same
time enjoyed that leisure which is indispensable for theoretical
research. “Without the spontaneous establishment of such a class,”
says Comte, “all our activity, thenceforth exclusively practical,
would have confined itself to the improvement, very soon checked, of
some processes having reference to military or industrial life.”[16]
The subsequent division of labour depended upon this initial step.
Our savants, our philosophers, our engineers descend from the first
priests, sorcerers and rain conjurors.
Thus, given the nature of Man, the theological philosophy was bound
to appear _spontaneously_. This appearance was at the same time
“inevitable and indispensable,” in a word, necessary. Immediately
begins what one might call the dialectics of the intellectual history
of humanity. The theological philosophy has made possible the
observation of phenomena. In its turn, this observation introduces
the idea of invariable laws into the mind, whereby the theological
philosophy begins to be compromised. The time comes when it appears
antiquated and pernicious and reason tends to take the place of the
imagination in the interpretation of nature. The more evolution
advances, the more marked becomes the preference of the human mind
for the positive mode of thought, and, in the several orders of the
sciences, after a more or less prolonged conflict, this latter ends by
obtaining the ascendancy.
As a matter of fact, the theological stage of our knowledge, even when
it exercises its greatest dominion, that is to say, at the time nearest
to its origin, already contains the germs of its own decomposition. It
is never perfectly homogeneous. There are very common phenomena whose
regularity man has never failed to recognize, and which he has never
conceived as depending upon arbitrary wills. Comte likes to quote a
passage from Adam Smith, where that philosopher remarks that in no
time and in no country do we find a god of Weight. Moreover, since the
existence of society, man must have had some idea of psychological
laws since he was obliged to regulate his conduct according to the way
in which his fellows thought and acted. Consequently “the elementary
germ of positive philosophy is quite as primitive, at bottom, as that
of theological philosophy, although it could only be developed very
much later.”[17] Not being universal, theological philosophy could
only be provisional. The philosophy, that is to say, the method of
interpretation of natural phenomena, will alone be final, which will be
applicable to all phenomena without exception, from the most simple to
the most complicated. For this philosophy alone will realise the unity
demanded by the understanding.
The passage from theological to positive philosophy is never suddenly
accomplished. Their opposition is too sharply defined, and our
intelligence does not lend itself to such an abrupt change. The
metaphysical state serves as a transition. This state is distinguished
from the two others, in that it has no principle proper which defines
it. Theological philosophy is sufficient to itself. It forms a
harmonious whole, at least so long as the germ of positiveness which
it contains has not yet revealed its activity. In the same way, the
positive state will be perfectly homogeneous. On the contrary, the
metaphysical state is only described by a mixture of the two others.
“The metaphysical conceptions,” wrote Comte in 1825, “proceed at the
same time from theology and physics, or rather are only the former
modified by the latter.”[18] Under ever varying and progressively
attenuated forms, metaphysics procure the indispensable conciliation
in order that the theological and positive philosophies may coexist
in men’s minds, so long as the latter is not perfectly worked out.
Under cover of metaphysical hypotheses, the scientific method has been
able to push its conquests, without greatly alarming the defenders of
theological philosophy. Thus metaphysical speculation has a very active
critical quality. It has not slightly contributed to the decomposition
of the ancient system of beliefs. In this sense, Comte regards the
French philosophers of the XVIII. century, for the most part, as
excellent representatives of the metaphysical spirit.
Nevertheless, if we must refer this intermediate stage to one of
the two extremes, Comte does not hesitate to approximate it to the
theological stage. As a matter of fact, metaphysical philosophy
substitutes entities to will, and Nature to the Creator, but with a
very analogous function. It supplies, at bottom, the same “explanation”
of the real, although weakened by a stronger and stronger sense of
the need of natural laws. This equivocal method preserves theology,
“while destroying its principal mental consistency.” It denies the
consequences in the name of the principles. Moreover, it offers no
guarantee against an offensive return of theological conceptions, so
long as they have not been replaced by positive notions. In the final
conflict between the theological spirit, and the positive spirit, the
metaphysicians will probably be seen, with the Deists, involved in
a retrograde concentration.”[19] “Positive philosophy,” says Comte,
“has neither historical nor dogmatic solidarity with this negative
philosophy, and can only contemplate it as a final preparatory
transformation of theological philosophy.”[20]
Thus the metaphysical stage is never other than an unstable compromise.
It only lasts on condition that it changes continually. In default of
a principle of its own, metaphysical philosophy is purely critical
in character. As a fact, there are but two philosophies, that is
to say two methods, two organic modes of thought. Only theological
philosophy and positive philosophy allow the mind to construct a
logical and harmonious system of ideas, the basis of a morality and of
a religion. The theological spirit is “ideal in its advance, absolute
in its conception, arbitrary in its application.” The positive spirit
substitutes the method of observation to that of imagination, relative
notions to absolute notions. It does not flatter itself with unlimited
dominion over the phenomena of nature; it knows that its power is
measured by its knowledge. The intellectual history of humanity shows
by what stages it has passed from the former mode of thought to the
latter.
III.
Comte regards the law of the three stages as demonstrated. “Seventeen
years of continuous meditation on this great subject,” he writes in
1839, “discussed under all its aspects, and subjected to all possible
tests, authorise me to affirm beforehand, without the slightest
scientific hesitation, that we shall always see confirmed this
historical proposition, which now seems to me as fully demonstrated
as any of the general facts actually admitted in the other parts of
natural philosophy.”[21] It could only be doubted if we found any
branch of our knowledge which had gone back from the metaphysical to
the theological state, or from the positive state to either of the
two preceding states. But this case has never presented itself. The
theoretical demonstration of the law has established that it _could
not_ present itself.
Indeed this demonstration has shown that the successive advance
through the three stages, in invariable order, was the necessary form
of progress of the human mind in the knowledge of phenomena. It is
founded upon the nature of the mind. In Comte’s thought, the law of the
three states could therefore have been equally called psychological or
historical.
But we are not here concerned with introspective Psychology, which
uses self-consciousness as a means of investigation. Comte does not
recognize any scientific value in this method.[22] He even denies its
possibility. Moreover the observation of a subject by himself, were
it possible, would be of no help in the present case. For it would
only reveal to him the present state of his individual intellect,
and not the law of the evolution of the human mind. For this law
to become manifest, we must consider not the individual, but the
species. Giving up a fruitless effort at self-contemplation in its
activity, the intellect must grasp the law of its successive phases
in the progress of what it has produced. The philosophical history
of our beliefs, of our conceptions, and of our systems: such is the
consciousness which the human intellect can have of itself. There only,
the philosopher sees the faculties of which this intellect contained
the germ coming into play by turns, to reach a “durable harmony.” Then,
once discovered, the law of the three States helps us to understand
the intellectual evolution of each individual, and the study of the
individual then furnishes us with a supplementary verification of
the law. But, by itself, this study of the individual could not have
established it. Whatever utility I may have often derived from the
consideration of the individual, says Comte, it is evidently to the
direct study of the species that I owed, not only the fundamental
thought in my theory, but afterwards its specific development.
The law of the three States is then the general formula of the progress
of the human intellect, considered not in an individual subject, but in
the _universal subject_, which is humanity.
It is indeed also the “universal subject” that Kant has studied in
his _Critic of Pure Reason_. But Kant’s method is altogether abstract
and metaphysical, the universal subject of which he seeks the laws is
a human mind “in itself,” considered in its essence. Comte, on the
contrary, represents the universal subject as a concrete unity, which
realized itself in time. For him, the study of the mental functions
characteristic of man only becomes positive when it is carried out
from an historical and sociological point of view. That is why the
discovery of the law of the three States is an event of capital
importance. It inaugurates the positive science of humanity, which was
an indispensable condition for positive philosophy to be established.
It marks the time when, all phenomena being henceforth studied after
the same method, the “perfect logical coherence” is definitely assured.
This law of social dynamics is the corner-stone of the whole positive
system.
FOOTNOTES:
[10] Cours de philosophie positive, I, 19 (5e edition, Paris, 1892).
[11] Cours, VI, 786.
[12] Pol. pos. IV, appendice, p. 77.
[13] Cours, I. 3.
[14] Cours, I. 6.
[15] Cours IV, 526.
[16] Cours IV, 548.
[17] Cours, IV, 554-5.
[18] Pol. pos., IV. Appendix, p. 144.
[19] Correspondence de H. Comte avec John Stuart Mill. Lettre du 5
avril 1842, p. 51.
[20] Cours, V. 573-5.
[21] Cours, IV, 523.
[22] Cp. infra, book II, chap. V, p.