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THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
BY
L. LÉVY-BRUHL
_Maître de Conférences de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres
de l’Université de Paris,
Professeur à l’Ecole libre des Sciences politiques_.
_AUTHORISED TRANSLATION_
TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
AN INTRODUCTION
BY
FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A.
_Honorary Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford_
[Colophon]
London
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. LIM.
PATERNOSTER SQUARE
1903
NOTE
BY
MR. FREDERIC HARRISON
The publication in 1900 of Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s volume _The
Philosophy of Auguste Comte_ was an event in the history of the
Positive movement. The eminent position in the University of Paris
and in recent philosophical history that is held by Prof. Lévy-Bruhl
gave great interest and importance to a systematic judgment from his
pen such as the present work. The commemorative festival of Comte held
this year, when the statue in the Place de la Sorbonne was unveiled
by the Minister of War, in presence of an international gathering of
delegates from the civilised world, has called fresh attention to
the lifework of the philosopher who died 45 years ago. Accordingly,
a translation of Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s book was urgently demanded.
When I was invited to add to this translation, which I can confidently
recommend to students of philosophy, a slight introductory essay, I
proposed to use a piece which I wrote on the publication of the French
work. It appeared in “The Speaker,” (14 April, 1900;) and, as I see no
reason to modify my opinion of this masterly book, I leave it nearly
as then written. I may add that the learned Professor was a member of
the International Committee with many eminent representatives of the
government of France and of the Universities of the Old and New World,
which in May last raised the monument to Auguste Comte in Paris.
Professor Lévy-Bruhl followed up his _History of Modern Philosophy in
France_ by a substantial work on the philosophy of Auguste Comte. It
forms a volume of the _Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine_,
which has already devoted four other works to the Positive Philosophy.
It is as well to premise that this treatise dealt solely with the
_philosophy_, not with the polity, or any part of the religious scheme
of Comte. Professor Lévy-Bruhl writes as a student, but not as an
adherent of Auguste Comte. His entire work is rather an exposition, not
a refutation, or a criticism, or an advocacy of Comte’s philosophical
system. But it may be said at once that no one abroad or at home,
certainly neither Mill, nor Lewes, nor Spencer, nor Caird, has so truly
grasped and assimilated Comte’s ideas as M. Lévy-Bruhl has done.
In his _Introduction_ M. Lévy-Bruhl very clearly states the scope of
his work, and his own general attitude. He traces the origin of Comte’s
philosophy in the mental effervescence of the first generation of
the present century towards a reorganisation of society, after the
upheaval left by the Revolution and its consequences. He correctly
states the relation of St. Simon to Comte as being that of an initial
stimulus. The cardinal difference between Comte and all the socialists
and founders of social and religious Utopias consisted in this,
that Comte saw the necessity of a new system of philosophy as the
indispensable preliminary to any reorganisation of society. In 1824, at
the age of twenty-six, Comte wrote:—“Discussions about institutions are
pure folly until the spiritual reconstitution of society is effected
or much advanced.” The construction of an intellectual reorganisation,
before any social restoration was possible, occupied twenty or thirty
years of Comte’s life. And when he opened his _Polity_, or social and
religious scheme, the conditions had much changed: the public and its
interests were no longer what they had been in 1820-30.
M. Lévy-Bruhl effectively disposes of the objection of Littré, to which
Mill gave countenance, that the _Polity_, with the whole of Comte’s
second or social system, was in contradiction with his first and
philosophic system as propounded in the _Philosophy_. As M. Lévy-Bruhl
proves, the six _Opuscules_ dating from 1819 to 1826, some years before
the _Cours_, which only began in 1830 and occupied twelve years,
contain in germ the scheme ultimately elaborated in the _Politique_,
from 1851 to 1854. Besides this, the _Letters to Mill_, which M.
Lévy-Bruhl edited in 1899, and the _Letters to Valat_, which are long
antecedent to the _Politique_, show the same governing design. To the
unity of Comte’s doctrine M. Lévy-Bruhl bears emphatic testimony:—
“His whole life was the methodical execution of his programme.... He
had but one system, not two. From the _Opuscules_ of his twentieth
year, to the _Synthèse_ of his last year, it is the development of one
and the same conception.”
M. Lévy-Bruhl then explains that, whilst recognising the entire
coherence of Comte’s collective labours, he proposes to confine his
present study to the earlier and principal work, the _Philosophy_,
which in M. Lévy-Bruhl’s opinion is the dominant and more fruitful
composition.
This he regards as the representative work of the nineteenth century,
as shown by the intellectual history of the period. He points to its
influence on thought in England, in Europe, and in America. It will
surprise many persons to learn that in M. Lévy-Bruhl’s opinion two
eminent French writers, who assuredly neither were, nor were supposed
to be, Positivists, “have done more for the diffusion of the ideas and
method of Comte than Littré and all the other Positivists together.”
These two are Taine and Renan, much as they differed from Comte’s
actual scheme and doctrines. Renan indeed spoke of Comte as destined
to prove one of the typical names of the century. The present writer
remembers Renan saying to him with a most genial welcome, “I too am a
believer in the religion of humanity.” History, romance, poetry, says
M. Lévy-Bruhl, have all reflected the positive spirit:—
“Contemporary sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific
psychology, in a certain degree has sprung from him. It is not rash
to conclude that the Positivist Philosophy expresses some of the most
characteristic tendencies of the age.”
It is clear that, if M. Lévy-Bruhl is in no sense an adherent of Comte,
he is a most sympathetic and discerning master of the positive system.
M. Lévy-Bruhl opens his analysis of Comte’s philosophy by examining
his main conceptions:—(1) The law of the three states, theological,
metaphysical, and positive, through which all human ideas pass; (2) the
Classification of the Sciences; (3) the scheme of each science in turn.
And he closes with an explanation of the general doctrines of Humanity,
as the centre of human thought, feeling, and activity.
The law of the three states announced by Comte in 1822, is thoroughly
explained and entirely assimilated by M. Lévy-Bruhl. Its demonstration,
he thinks, is complete when we recognise that, although many orders
of ideas have not finally reached their positive state, all of them
exhibit the tendency to the same evolution, and there is no single
instance of a conception of a positive science ever retrograding
into unverified figment. Of course the terms _theological_ and
_metaphysical_ have to be understood in the sense adopted by
Comte--_i.e._ “anthropomorphic” and “hypothetical,” a bare hypothesis
wearing a scientific form. M. Lévy-Bruhl himself regards the law
as irrefutable and of capital importance, “the corner stone of the
positive system.”
Our professor is equally conclusive in his estimate of Comte’s
classification of the sciences. He quite demolishes the objections
made to it by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his essay with that title. M.
Lévy-Bruhl repeats the criticisms to which Spencer has been exposed in
this country and abroad by Littré, Lewes, Mill, and others. And he has
no difficulty in showing that Mr. Spencer’s objections are due to his
very slight acquaintance with Comte’s text, and his own superficial
study of the English abridgments. In proposing a classification of
the _concrete_ sciences, Mr. Spencer enters on a task which Comte
distinctly repudiates, and which on good grounds he treats as
philosophically impracticable for purposes of evolutionary sequence.
Comte’s strictly _relative_ theory excludes such a scale of _concrete_
science; whilst Spencer’s _absolute_ theory of the universe forces
him to attempt it in vain. If it be objected that Comte’s ascending
scale of the sciences is “anthropocentric,” the answer is that, when
reasonably understood as a philosophic device for sorting human
ideas, not as a statement of _absolute_ truth, the “anthropocentric”
arrangement of human knowledge is the only one which is at once
possible and useful.
It would need a long essay even to sketch M. Lévy-Bruhl’s analysis of
Comte’s conception of _science_, of _law_, and of the six dominant
sciences. He has thoroughly assimilated the positive spirit, that
_science_ implies a co-ordination of _laws_, not an encyclopædia of
facts, that it is _relative_ to our powers of observation and reasoning
and not an _absolute_ explanation of the universe in itself. He goes
through the sciences, physical, social, and moral, in turn, as treated
by Comte, and justly explains that Comte never attempted or conceived
a _vade-mecum_ or handbook of contemporary scientific knowledge, but
a scheme for the co-ordination of general ideas of science. A real
“philosophy of the sciences” is something wholly distinct from a
compendium of all the sciences--a thing which in 1840 was far less
possible than it might be now. Controversialists have reproached Comte
with the obvious fact that his concrete science is now sixty years
old. In dealing with these shallow criticisms, M. Lévy-Bruhl has shown
how little able is any narrow specialist to understand the abstract
conceptions of a real philosopher.
One of the most common of these misconceptions is the ignorant charge
that Comte repudiated “psychology,” in the sense of the laws of man’s
intellectual and moral nature. “_Psychologie_,” as M. Lévy-Bruhl
shows, when Comte wrote, meant Cousin’s futile introspection of the
_ego_. Comte certainly rejected that as idle, as do all competent
psychologists of our time. Psychology, meaning the laws of mind and
will, was not only an indispensable basis of Comte’s system, but its
rational, systematic foundation dates from Comte’s suggestions. His
signal contribution to psychology lies, not in his doctrine of its
physiological basis, but in his referring it to sociology as its guide
and inspiration.
M. Lévy-Bruhl concludes his study with a co-ordinate table of twelve
contrasted propositions of the metaphysical and of the positive
systems respectively. These show how simple and rational a transition
is that between Positivism and the older theological and metaphysical
hypotheses of the universe and of Man. We welcome a book which all
positivists will regard as fair, learned, and instructive, and which
all students of philosophy must regard as a masterly study of a
comprehensive subject.
_45th Anniversary of the death of Comte_,
(5th SEPTEMBER, 1902.)
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
Fifty years have now elapsed since Auguste Comte’s monumental work,
the _Cours de Philosophie Positive_, was first introduced to English
readers by Miss Harriet Martineau. But her work was much more than a
translation. It was a condensed exposition of Comte’s doctrines, done
with such mastery that it obtained the emphatic approval of Comte
himself who, in such matters, was not very easily satisfied.
In Harriet Martineau’s case, both the substance of the book and
the English form in which it was offered to the public, were her
work. In the case of the present volume, while a woman is once more
responsible for the translation, the substance of the book, that is
the comprehensive exposition of Comte’s system in the light of all his
published works, is from the pen of Professor Lévy-Bruhl, and readers
who are acquainted with Harriet Martineau’s book will be all the more
in a position to appreciate the importance of this fresh contribution
to the elucidation of the thought of Auguste Comte.
We fear that the clearness of style, the richness of expression, the
power of condensed thought which characterise our author will be found
to have been often weakened, if not sometimes altogether obliterated,
in this translation. The striking simplicity of the text at first
deceived me into the belief that I could do justice to it. I was often
tempted to sacrifice the literal sense in order to preserve some of the
graces of the original. Yet I hope to be forgiven for having uniformly
preferred to err through too much faithfulness to the letter. My sole
object has been to enable the English reader to get at the meaning of
the text.
But, while I have only too much reason to solicit the indulgence of
my readers, conscious as I am of the many defects of this translation,
I feel that no apology is needed for bringing that of which it is a
translation within the reach of the English-speaking public.
We live in times when the intimate relation between the natural
sciences and social questions is increasingly felt. Old landmarks
are disappearing, new foundations are being laid, new problems are
constantly arising, generating doubts and perplexities for which the
solutions of other days supply no adequate answer.
Meanwhile, as the facts of science reveal to us more of the conditions
of human life, we give, more or less consciously, a larger place to
sociology in our mental preoccupations. Thus renewed interest is being
felt in the writings of the Founder of the Science of Sociology. The
most conflicting schools of thought study the works of Auguste Comte
and many ask: who is that man whose ideas appear to contain a clearer
message to our generation than they did to his own? For such inquirers
Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s book should prove singularly useful and timely.
It is a plain, independent account of what Comte really taught, written
by one possessed of the fullest qualifications for such a task, and
no work of recent date will enable students to understand so clearly
the solution given by the French philosopher to the perplexing moral,
social, and religious problems of our time.
Here, as elsewhere, “il s’agit de tout comprendre, non de tout
admirer,” and Professor Lévy-Bruhl is himself too much of a philosopher
to forget that golden rule; but, nevertheless, by his free, independent
judgment of Comte’s teaching, he helps us to realise to what an extent,
in these days, Comte is inspiring many who are not perhaps conscious of
following him.
KATHLEEN DE BEAUMONT-KLEIN.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Note by Mr. Frederic Harrison v.
Translator’s Preface xiii.
Introduction by Professor Lévy-Bruhl 1
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.--The Philosophical Problem 23
“ II.--The Law of the Three States 35
“ III.--The Classification of the Sciences 49
“ IV.--Science 60
“ V.--Science (continued) Phenomena and Laws 79
“ VI.--Science (continued) Positive Logic 103
BOOK II.
INTRODUCTION.--The Philosophy of the Sciences 121
CHAPTER I.--Mathematics 125
“ II.--Astronomy 142
“ III.--Sciences of the Inorganic World 154
“ IV.--Biology 171
“ V.--Psychology 188
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.--Transition from Animality to Humanity--Art
and Language 213
“ II.--General Considerations on Social Science 230
“ III.--Social Statics 249
“ IV.--Social Dynamics 260
“ V.--The Philosophy of History 276
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.--The Principles of Ethics 303
“ II.--Social Ethics 319
“ III.--The Idea of Humanity 334
CONCLUSION 343
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.
INTRODUCTION.
I.
Every new system of philosophy, however original in appearance, is
more or less directly related to the doctrines which have preceded
it. But it is also connected with more general conditions in a manner
no less close, if not so immediately obvious. It depends upon a whole
set of social conditions. The influence of the religious, political,
economical, intellectual phenomena, in a word of the contemporary
_milieu_ upon this system is as indisputable as its own influence
upon the _milieu_. It is therefore not enough to study it as a
self-sufficient whole. This whole which is in itself but a part, must
be restored to its place within the greater whole which alone explains
its essential characteristics.
This rule of historical method, which Comte likes to recall, applies
very well to his own system. In order to reach as complete an
understanding as possible of his doctrine, to appreciate exactly
its general orientation, to understand the importance which the
author attaches in it to this or that part, the study of the text
will not suffice. We must further take into account the historical
circumstances in which the doctrine found its birth, the general
movement of contemporary ideas, and the manifold influences which have
reacted upon the mind of the philosopher.
Now one great fact, above all others, dominates the period in which the
positive philosophy appeared. It is the French Revolution, as Comte
expressly states: without it, neither the theory of progress, nor
consequently social science, nor consequently again positive philosophy
would have been possible. Was it not, moreover, inevitable that this
extraordinary social upheaval should by reflex action have determined a
vast and prolonged movement in philosophical and political speculation?
The effects of this reflex action varied according to the value and the
originality of the minds which experienced them. But in the greatest as
in the most mediocre we recognise infallibly certain common features.
For instance, men and women, in the rising generation at the beginning
of the XIX. century, never fail to put the same question to themselves:
“What social institutions should be established after the Revolution?”
and by this all understand not only the political form of government,
but the very principles of social order: a problem which appeared as
urgent from the practical point of view, as it was supreme from the
theoretical point of view. It is this problem in various forms which
preoccupies Chateaubriand as well as Fourier and Saint-Simon, and
Joseph de Maistre as well as Cousin and Comte.
All agree upon the first point. We must “reconstruct.” An “organic”
period must succeed the “critical” period which has just come to
an end. According to Saint Simon’s striking expression, humanity
is not made to inhabit ruins. The revolutionary storm had been so
formidable, the din so deafening, the social back-wash so violent,
that no one exactly measured the effect which had been produced. Many
institutions which had only been shaken seemed to be overthrown. A
good part of the old régime had even gone through the crisis without
being too greatly damaged, and had survived. But this fact, which was
very well appreciated by the men of 1850, could not yet be discovered
by the first generation of the century. It conscientiously believed
that the old régime had crumbled altogether, and that the task either
of restoring it, or of again laying down the very bases of society
belonged to it. In this the first generation remained faithful to the
spirit of the Revolution, which had considered itself as an effort to
institute an entirely new social and political system, a thought in
which the civilised world had shared. Now, in spite of the labours of
the revolutionary assemblies, in spite of the power and of the great
talent which the Convention had at its command, this ambitious hope
had not been realised. The question remained open after the Directoire
and after the Empire. When the old régime was supposed to have been
destroyed, how was society to be “reorganised”?
Thus, at the opening of the XIX. century, philosophical speculation
was at first to be directed towards the religious and social problems.
Undoubtedly the influence of the uninterrupted advance of the positive
sciences was also felt at the same time. A study of Auguste Comte’s
system could hardly fail to recognise the fact. But, even with Comte,
scientific interest, however active it may be, is subordinated to the
social interest. What he asks of philosophy is the rational settlement
of the bases of modern society. Thus, he means to discover the elements
of a religion which can be substituted to Catholicism, whose mission he
considers as at an end.
“The XIX. century,” Ranke has said, “is especially a century of
restoration.” A deep saying, which exactly expresses one of the leading
features in the historical physiognomy of this century. It is precisely
thus that it was conceived by those who inaugurated it. Such indeed
is the main tendency of the greater number of philosophical doctrines
which have expressed its most intimate characteristics. Only, as is
generally the case, this restoration absorbs and consolidates a large
part of the results acquired during the crisis. At the same time new
problems, raised especially by the development of industry in its
larger aspects, made clear-sighted men feel that the revolutionary
period, however desirable it might be to bring it to a close, was
really only beginning.
II.
Like many of his contemporaries Auguste Comte thought himself
singled out for the mission of formulating the principle of “social
reorganisation.” But this is where he differs from them. Each of the
reformers begins by proposing his own solution of the social problem,
and all his efforts only tend to justify it. As this problem is the
most urgent one in their eyes, it is also the only one which they have
put directly to themselves. Now this method, according to Comte, is a
bad one, and in following it they court certain failure. For a social
problem is such that its solution cannot be obtained immediately; other
problems, more theoretical in character, must be solved beforehand.
It is therefore these which must first be dealt with, if we seek
anything else than the lengthening of the history of political dreams
and of social chimeras. “Institutions,” Comte says, “depend on morals,
and morals, in their turn, depend on beliefs.” Every scheme of new
institutions will therefore be useless so long as morals have not been
“reorganised,” and so long as, to reach this end, a general system
of opinions has not been founded, which are accepted by all minds as
true, as was, for instance, the system of Catholic dogma in Europe in
the Middle Ages. Therefore, either the social problem admits of no
solution--and Comte does not stop at this pessimistic hypothesis,--or
the solution sought for supposes that a new philosophy shall have
been previously established. This is why Comte wishes to be at first
only a philosopher. In 1824 he writes “I regard all discussions upon
institutions as pure nonsense, until the spiritual reorganisation of
society has been brought about, or at least is very far advanced.”[1]
Comte’s originality will therefore lie in taking from science and
philosophy the principles upon which depends the social reorganisation,
which is the real end of his efforts. While having the same aim as the
reformers of his time, he will follow a different path. It is indeed a
polity which he also claims to found, but this polity is _positive_: it
rests upon ethics and philosophy both equally _positive_. Undoubtedly
the polity is the _raison d’être_ of the system, which Comte has
constructed for it. But, without the system, the Polity would remain
arbitrary. It would lack authority and that which would make it
legitimate. Philosophy is no less indispensable to the foundation
of politics, than are politics to the completion and unification of
philosophy.
Whence comes it that Comte has put this great problem, which
preoccupied all the minds of his time, in a form which belongs to
him alone? We cannot here enter into the detailed biographical study
which would throw some light upon this question. Let us only recall
that Comte was born in a Catholic Royalist family. From the age of
thirteen, he tells us, he had broken with the political convictions and
the religious beliefs of his own people. Perhaps, however, the trace
of these beliefs was less completely effaced than he himself thought.
During the whole of his life he professed the liveliest admiration for
Catholicism. On his own confession he was especially inspired in this
by Joseph de Maistre; but, if he so much appreciated the book _du
Pape_, did not his great sympathy partly spring from impressions of
childhood indelibly stamped upon a passionate and sensitive nature?
Whatever may be the case, the first subject which seriously occupied
his mind was mathematics. Being admitted to the _Ecole polytechnique_
a year before the usual age, he began to study the natural sciences.
At the same time he “meditates” upon Montesquieu and Condorcet. He
approaches philosophy properly so called by reading the Scottish
philosophers, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Hume, and he sees very well
that the last one is far above the others. Having left the _Ecole
polytechnique_, he remains in Paris, and while giving lessons to earn
his living, he completes his scientific education with Delambre, de
Blainville, and the Baron Thénard. He reads assiduously Fontenelle,
d’Alembert, Diderot, and especially Condorcet who has distilled
and clarified the philosophy of the XVIII. century. While studying
Descartes and the great mathematicians who came after him, he also
follows attentively the labours of naturalists and of biologists, of
Lamarck, for instance, of Cuvier, of Gall, of Cabanis, of Bichat,
Broussais and of so many others. He understands the philosophical
importance of these new sciences, as already pointed out by Diderot.
But for all that he does not neglect historical and social studies. He
has read the ideologists, among whom he especially esteemed Destutt
de Tracy. Without giving up Montesquieu or Condorcet, he studies the
traditionalists: M. de Bonald, this “energetic thinker” and, more than
the others, Joseph de Maistre who made the deepest and most enduring
impression upon his mind.
Before knowing Saint-Simon then--and his correspondence with Valat
testifies to the fact--Comte already possessed a large portion of
the materials for his future system. Up to this time his labours had
borne upon two distinct orders of subjects. The one scientific proper
(mathematics, physics and chemistry, natural sciences) the other more
properly political (history, politics, and social questions).
In 1818 Comte meets Saint-Simon. He is attracted and surrenders himself
almost unreservedly. For four years he works with Saint-Simon. He
loves and venerates him as a master. He feeds upon his ideas, and
collaborates in his labours and enterprises. He calls himself “pupil
of M. Saint-Simon.” However, from 1822 he detaches himself from this
greatly-admired master, and in 1824 the rupture is complete and final.
What can have happened?
The grievances brought forward by Comte are only of secondary
importance. As a matter of fact master and pupil were bound to separate
sooner or later. There was a radical incompatibility between those two
minds. Saint-Simon, marvellously inventive and original, throws out
a multitude of new ideas and views, of which many will be fruitful.
But he quickly affirms, and proves little. He has not the patience to
continue working long at the same subject, or to probe it to the bottom
in an orderly way. Comte, on the contrary, thinks with Descartes,
that method is essential to science, and that “logical coherence” is
the surest sign of truth. He could not long remain satisfied with
Saint-Simon’s disconnected essays. He could even, without dishonesty,
turn to account the brilliant but disorderly intuition in which his
master abounds and believe that his own doctrine alone gave those
disconnected essays scientific value, because his doctrine alone was
in a position to systematise them and to connect them with their
principles.
It would therefore seem that we can admit at the same time that
Saint-Simon’s influence upon Comte was considerable, and, on the other
hand, that Comte’s philosophical originality is no less certain.
Saint-Simon’s influence would chiefly have consisted: 1. in suggesting
to Comte a certain number of general ideas and of views of detail,
especially for his philosophy of history; 2. in showing him how
the two orders of labours which he had been following until then
were to blend into a single one, through the creation of a _science_
which would be social, and consequently of a _polity_ which would be
scientific. Would this synthesis of the two orders of studies which
Comte had undertaken side by side have been produced in his mind, had
he not known Saint-Simon? In any case it would have been produced
more slowly. Let us at least leave Saint-Simon the credit which Comte
himself granted him, that of having “started” his disciple upon the
line best suited to his genius.
The intellectual intimacy between them could never be perfect. If
Comte entered entirely into Saint-Simon’s ideas, (without adopting
them all, however), in return there was an aspect in Comte’s thought
which Saint-Simon scarcely discerned through the lack of a sufficiently
strong scientific education. It is enough to see how he speaks of
the law of universal attraction. Comte must have been scandalised by
it. So, at the very moment when he submits with most enthusiasm and
youthful confidence to Saint-Simon’s influence he does not neglect his
special mathematical studies. “My labours,” he writes to Valat on the
28th of September, 1819, “are and will be in two orders, scientific and
political. I should set little value upon the scientific studies, did I
not continually think of their utility to the human race. As well then
amuse myself in deciphering very complicated puzzles. I have a supreme
aversion for scientific labours whose utility, either direct or remote,
I do not see. But I also confess, in spite of all my philanthropy, that
I should put far less eagerness into political labours, if they did
not stimulate the intellect, if they did not bring my brain strongly
into play, in a word: if they were not difficult.”[2] A year later,
in sending a parcel of political tracts to his friend, in which he
distinguishes what is in his own manner and what is from Saint-Simon,
he says that he is besides very eagerly occupied with mathematical
work. He wants to take part in the competition opened by the Institut;
and his ambition is soon to enter the _Academie des Sciences_.
From 1822, in the celebrated pamphlet entitled _Plan des travaux
scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société_, the synthesis
between the two orders of labours is accomplished in Comte’s mind,
thanks to the double discovery of the classification of the sciences
and of the great law of social dynamics. We know that this work was,
if not the principal reason, at least the occasion of the rupture
between Comte and Saint-Simon. It is the moment which Comte himself
considers to have been decisive in the history of his mind. The whole
of his future doctrine was essentially contained in this pamphlet.
The preface added by Saint-Simon shows that he did not understand its
full bearings. Comte is henceforth his own master. At length he has
found what for several years he had been seeking without being clearly
conscious of it; and the rest of his life is now consecrated to the
work which he has conceived and of which he has just outlined the plan.
Since he has established a philosophical hierarchy of the sciences,
whose summit is crowned by social physics, he has no further occasion
to ask how he can conciliate his scientific labours with his political
studies.
“In the interval of my great philosophical labours,” he writes on
the 8th September, 1824, “I propose to publish a few more special
works upon the fundamental points in mathematics, which I have long
conceived, and which I have at last been able to connect with my
general ideas of positive philosophy: so that I shall be free to give
myself up to them without _breaking through the unity of my thought_,
which is the great condition for the life of a thinker.”[3] And in a
very remarkable letter to de Blainville, on the 27th February, 1826,
he explains in the clearest way the generating idea of his system. “My
conception of politics as social physics, and the law which I have
discovered upon the three successive states of the human mind are but
one and the same thought, considered from the two distinct points of
view of method and of science. That being established, I shall show
that this single thought directly and completely satisfies the great
actual social need, _considered under its two aspects of theoretical
need and practical need_. I will therefore show that what on one hand
tends to consolidate the future by re-establishing order and discipline
among intellects, tends, on the other hand to regulate the present, as
far as possible, by furnishing statesmen with _rational_ lines to work
upon.”[4]
Henceforth Comte’s life was to be but the methodical execution of his
programme. In turn, with perfect regularity, he wrote and published the
philosophy of the sciences and of history, the ethics, the positive
polity and the positive religion. Does this mean that Comte’s thought
remained stationary? Most certainly not. It evolved from 1822 to 1857.
But this evolution followed a curve which an attentive observer might
have sketched beforehand after having read the _Plan des travaux
scientifiques nécéssaires pour réorganiser la société_. Comte had but
one system, not two. From the _opuscules_ of his twentieth year to the
_Synthèse subjective_ of his last year, it is the development of one
and the same conception.
III.
The unity of the doctrine has been disputed. Comte himself
distinguished two successive “careers” in his life. In the first, he
says, without affected modesty, he was Aristotle: in the second he
will be St. Paul. The founder of the philosophy did but pave the way
for the organiser of the religion. “I have systematically devoted my
life to draw at last from real science the necessary basis of a sound
philosophy, according to which I was afterwards to construct the true
religion.”[5]
Many of Comte’s disciples, even some of the more illustrious, and
at first more fervent, such as Littré, refused to follow him in his
“second career.” Their admiration for the philosopher could not
persuade them to submit to the pontiff.
Littré and his friends were undoubtedly free to follow Comte only up
to a certain point, and, while accepting his philosophy, to reject
his religion. If they had stopped there, Comte could but have blamed
their want of logic and himself have disowned “those incomplete
positivists, who are not more intelligent because they call themselves
intellectual.” But it is they, on the contrary, who accused Comte of
inconsistency and of self contradiction. Comte, they said, betrayed his
own principles. The “subjective method” in his second career ruined the
precious results he had obtained in the first by his objective method.
In refusing to go beyond the _Cours de philosophic positive_ they
remained more faithful to Comte’s master-thought than Comte himself. In
a word, they defended true positivism against its misguided founder.
Comte answered these attacks, which were all the more painful to him
because they came from those whom he had long regarded as his faithful
disciples and his best friends. In the course of this work it will
appear that those attacks were unfounded.[6] Comte’s two methods are
not opposed to each other. They complete each other, as do also the two
“careers” which they characterize.
It is true that during the last two years of his life an increasingly
marked tinge of mysticism spread over his thought and his writings.
His brief friendship with Mme. de Vaux, and the death of this “holy”
friend had stirred very strong emotions within him, and these emotions
with him were transformed into ideas which came to be incorporated into
his system. At the same time he laboured to organise the Religion of
Humanity. He claimed to secure for it an authority over souls at least
equal to that which had been enjoyed by Catholicism at the period of
its greatest power. The exaltation of his sentiments, the preoccupation
of the new religion which was to be established, the ever-present
consciousness of his sacerdotal mission, all this was necessarily bound
to react upon the doctrine which he had founded in the preceding period.
Thus the philosophy of the sciences and of history is no longer
presented to us in the same way in the _Politique positive_ as it is
in the _Cours de philosophie positive_. But it is designedly so. The
difference in tone and the difference of method in the setting forth
is explained, according to Comte, by the different object which he
has in view in each of these works.[7] Essentially, the philosophical
doctrine has not varied. All we can grant to Littré is that by the fact
of its being presented from the religious, that is to say from the
synthetic, point of view in the _Politique positive_, it undergoes an
apparent alteration. If we only knew the doctrine through this work we
should not get the perfectly clear view of it given in the _Cours de
philosophie positive_. Comte himself often advises the reader of the
_Politique_ to refer to his “great fundamental treatise.”
But, on the other hand, in carefully reading the _Cours_, we find
numerous indications of the future structure of the Politique positive.
Comte might have been content with a reference to the _Cours_, to
answer the objections of his dissenting disciples. He did better. He
reprinted at the end of the fourth volume of his _Politique positive_
six pamphlets written in his youth from 1818 to 1826. In them, not
only is his philosophy already sketched in its main outlines with
sufficient precision; but the idea that philosophy is a preliminary
work, a simple prelude and that the essential work, the supreme end,
is the positive religion which shall arise upon this philosophy--this
idea is the very soul of these pamphlets. The proof is given. Upon
the question of the unity of his doctrine Comte wins the case against
Littré.
IV.
In his correspondence with Stuart Mill which takes place between 1841
and 1846, that is to say which embraces the end of his first career
and the beginning of the second, Comte has repeatedly explained how
the two successive portions of his work are connected together, and in
what they are distinct. It may not be useless to quote his own words.
“The second half of my philosophical life,” he says, “must differ
notably from the first, especially in that feeling must take, if not
an obvious, at least a real part in it, one as great as that of the
intellect. The great work of systematization which has been reserved
for our century, must indeed embrace equally, both feelings and ideas
as a whole. Truly it was the ideas which had first to be systematized,
under pain of failing to bring about a complete regeneration by falling
into a more or less vague mysticism. That is why my fundamental work
had to appeal almost exclusively to the intellect. It was to be a work
of research, and accessorily of discussion, destined to discover and
to constitute the true universal principles, in rising by hierarchical
degrees from the simplest scientific questions to the highest
social speculations.”[8] But this being done, Comte passed to the
systematisation of the feelings, “a necessary sequel to that of the
ideas, and an indispensable basis for that of the institutions.”
It is, therefore, an entirely new work. Comte can imagine without
difficulty that it might have been reserved for another than himself.
His personal mission might have been limited to the foundation of the
philosophy which puts an end to the “_mental_ anarchy.” The ethics and
the religion which were to be established upon this philosophy, to put
an end to _moral and political_ anarchy, would, in this case, have been
the work of one of his successors. Stubborn labour and good fortune
allowed Comte to undertake this work himself. But even in 1845, he says
how “under the holy influence of Mdme. de Vaux,” he had very clearly
seen his two careers as distinct and as one, these two careers of which
the second was to transform philosophy into religion, as the first had
changed science into philosophy.
The object of the present work is to study Comte’s philosophy properly
so called, leaving aside the transformation of this philosophy into
religion. The choice which we thus make is not an arbitrary one, since,
in order to justify it, we have the distinction formally established
by Comte himself, when he admits that his philosophy and his religion
might have been the work of two different persons.
It will perhaps be asked in what our position differs from that of
Littré, and of the “incomplete positivists.” By the difference, we
shall answer, which separates the historical from the dogmatic point of
view. It is from the latter point of view that Littré and his friends
reject the “systematisation of the feelings,” the subjective method
and the religion of Humanity. It is as positivists that they connect
themselves with the first half of the doctrine, and that they exclude
the second half. But we are here working from the historical point of
view, and the historian, while using his right to define the limits of
his work has nothing to exclude from the doctrine which he sets forth.
As a matter of fact far from claiming with Littré that the second part
of Comte’s work weakens and contradicts the first, we have recognised
that they both form a whole of which he had drawn out the plan in his
early writings, and that he was not wrong in taking as an epigraph for
his _Politique positive_ the fine words of the poet-philosopher: _What
is a great life? A thought of youth fulfilled in riper age._
But then, why only study the first of the two careers, why not respect
the integrity of that whole which, according to us, Littré ought not to
have disregarded?--We do respect it, for we do not arbitrarily exclude
from the doctrine any of the parts which Comte included in it. If we
make the philosophy proper the sole object of this study, in it we
shall ever have before our minds the idea of the greater whole in which
Comte placed it. On this condition alone, our study will be accurate.
But once this condition is fulfilled we do not consider that we exceed
our right, in concentrating our effort upon the philosophy.
There are two different ways of conceiving the history of a doctrine.
The historian may place himself exactly in the mental attitude of
the philosopher whom he studies, and think again after him his
leading ideas, as indeed he should do; but further, he can judge,
just as the philosopher himself does, of the respective importance of
problems, without allowing himself to distinguish what is secondary
from what is essential. The historical work then assumes the shape
of a “monography,” or of an “intellectual biography;” or else, while
endeavouring to penetrate to the heart of the system, in order to
grasp it in its principles, the historian may nevertheless place
himself outside it and above it, and try to “situate” it in the
general evolution of philosophy. Then the system is better understood
in its entirety, since we can see its relations with the preceding,
contemporary and following doctrines. At the same time it becomes
possible to separate what is of enduring philosophical interest, from
what was merely of secondary or momentary importance, although the
author may have judged otherwise. To borrow from Comte a distinction
which he often uses, the former of these methods is better suited to
erudition, the latter to history.
Applied to the study of his doctrine, the first method would have us
to consider positive philosophy with him as simply preparatory to the
Religion of Humanity, which was the first and the last goal of his
efforts. The writer should undoubtedly give a large place to this
“préambule indispensable,” to this great fundamental work, in which
Comte lays down the intellectual bases of his political and religious
system. But he ought nevertheless to subordinate it to this system and
place in the front rank the “social reorganisation,” the dogma, the
worship and the _régime_ of the Religion of Humanity, the institution
of a spiritual power, in fact the whole of that portion of Comte’s work
in which he takes up again “the Catholic programme of the Middle Ages,”
confident of fulfilling it better than Catholicism itself ever did.
Now it is not in this part of his work that Comte shows himself most
original, and that his thought has been most fruitful. The problem of
“social reorganisation” does not belong to him alone. Its presence
is felt, so to speak, in the air at the time that Comte’s youth was
passing away. The common aspirations of the generation which grew
up with him were to re-establish order and to fix the conditions of
progress, to determine the relations of Ethics to Politics, and to
put a new religion in the place apparently left free by Catholicism.
The _Politique positive_ which claims to satisfy these aspirations,
corresponds in Comte’s system (all proper allowance being made for
the substance of the doctrines) to what the Saint Simon school had
already attempted to do before 1830. It comes thirty years later
than the previous attempts of the same kind, because Comte wanted
to found his “social organisation” upon philosophy and morality, and
because this speculative effort occupied the better part of his youth
and of his maturity. But it originated in fact in the first third of
the century as is proved by the pamphlets reprinted by Comte. When it
appears between 1850 and 1857, a new generation brought up in other
political and social circumstances gives it only passing attention.
Other problems command attention more forcibly, and claim a more
urgent solution. The philosophy of history no longer excites the same
passionate interest. Men are less anxious to see the birth of a new
religion, and Catholicism has proved that its vitality is still very
strong.
Therefore neither Comte’s genius, nor the precautions which he thought
he had taken to place his “social reorganisation” upon a rational
basis, could shield it from the common fate which sooner or later
overtakes all attempts similar to his own. Undoubtedly the _Politique
positive_ and the other works of Comte’s second career are full of
just and deep views. Whatever may be the subject upon which a great
mind has worked it is always interesting and profitable to see what
the reflection of that mind has discovered in it. But, in fact, that
portion of his work, which to him was the most important, is far from
maintaining this position in the eyes of the historian.
By his _Politique positive_ Comte only represents his generation. By
his philosophy properly so called he is a “representative man” of
his entire century. Is it necessary to prove this? The intellectual
history of our age witnesses to it at every step. Of all the systems
which found birth in France in the XIX. century, this one alone found
a hearing beyond the frontiers and left a deep impression upon foreign
thinkers. Comte’s philosophy was at first received in England and in
Holland even with more sympathy than in France. John Stuart Mill,
Herbert Spencer, George Lewes, George Elliot and a number of English
philosophers and writers drew more or less of their inspiration from
it. To this day, it is defended by men of great talent in England. It
is true that no German philosopher had the same personal relations
with Comte as John Stuart Mill, but as a matter of fact, for thirty
years the positive spirit has gradually gained ground in the German
Universities. To be convinced of this, it is enough to see how
metaphysics are set aside in them and to observe the lines on which the
moral and social sciences are taught. In the Latin countries of the
two hemispheres Comte’s influence has been exercised with even greater
strength, in Spain, in Portugal, in South America; and North America
has also its Positivist societies. In his life time, Comte had already
found there some of his most devoted disciples. In France the principal
“vehicles” of Positivist philosophy have been the works of two writers
who, in their time, were those most beloved by the public; Renan and
Taine, although they were not positivists, have perhaps done more for
the diffusion of the ideas and method of Comte than Littré and all the
other positivists together.
It is true that Taine owes a great deal to Spinoza and to Hegel, and
more still to Condillac. Among his contemporaries he seems to be
especially connected with John Stuart Mill and Spencer. But through
them it is from Comte that he proceeds, and there we find the origin
of the greater number of his leading ideas. His conception of literary
history, of criticism, of the philosophy of art, in a word, his effort
to bring into the study of the moral sciences the method used in the
natural sciences, all this is chiefly derived from Auguste Comte. The
_Histoire de la Litterature anglaise_ is, in a sense, an application
of the positive theory according to which the evolution of the arts
and literatures is governed by necessary laws which constitute its
solidarity with that of morals, of institutions and of beliefs. The
theory of the “moment” and of the “milieu” which is the chief one in
Taine’s work was certainly not unknown in the XVIII. century. But it
is Comte who generalised it by bringing Lamarck nearer to Montesquieu;
it is he who taught Taine the general definition, at once biological
and social, of the idea of the “milieu.”
Renan spoke of Comte with extreme severity, and not without some
disdain. He owned, however, that later on Comte’s name would be one
of the most representative ones of this century, and he had himself
strongly felt his influence. We must certainly take into account all
the other French and foreign sources from which this mind at once so
supple and so large, drew inspiration. But is it not from Comte, as
much as from Hegel, that he learnt to regard history as the “sacred
science of humanity,” to expect from it what before was demanded
from theology, to transform the ancient dogmas of Providence and of
optimism into the belief in the positive idea of progress, and finally
to conceive that truth and goodness are not immutable and immoveable
realities, but are realised by degrees through the effort of successive
generations?
These two examples will suffice to show the point of extreme diffusion
which has been reached by the positive spirit.
This spirit is so intimately mingled with the general thought of our
time that we scarcely notice it, just as we do not pay attention to
the air we breathe. History, romance, and, even poetry have reflected
its influence and, being charged with it, have contributed to its
diffusion. Contemporary Sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific
Psychology, in a certain degree has also sprung from him. From all
these signs, it is not rash to conclude that positive philosophy
expresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age.
We are therefore conforming to historical reality when we attach
ourselves, in Comte’s work, to the philosophy which constitutes its
most original, and up to the present time its most fruitful and living
part. It matters little that he himself should only have considered it
as a preliminary portion of his work. How often has the speculative
effort made by a great thinker for the purpose of establishing
practical conclusions proved to be of more enduring interest than those
conclusions themselves!
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Lettres à Valat, p. 156-7 (25 Décembre 1824).
[2] Lettres à Valat, p. 99.
[3] Lettres à Valat, p. 128.
[4] Revue Occidentale, 1881, I, p. 288.
[5] Politique positive, II, p. XX.
[6] V. book, I, ch. vi. p.
[7] Correspondence de J. S. Mill et de Comte, Lettre de Comte du 14
juillet 1845, p. 456-7.
[8] Correspondance de Comte and de Stuart Mill, p. 456-7. Lettre de
Comte du 14 juillet 1845.
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
According to Comte, philosophy is destined to serve as a basis for
morality, for politics and for religion. It is not an end in itself but
a means to reach an end not otherwise attainable. Had Comte thought
it possible to reorganise society without first reorganising morals,
and to reorganise morals without first reorganising beliefs, he would
not perhaps have written the six volumes of the “Cours de Philosophie
positive” which occupied him from 1830 to 1842. He would have gone
straight to what was of supreme interest.
He early became convinced that the shortest way would not be the
best. In his view, all endeavour at religious, moral, or political
reorganisation, must be vain so long as _mental_ reorganisation has not
taken place. It is therefore with a new philosophy that he must begin.
Indispensable to the social end which Comte has in view, philosophy
becomes, at least provisionally, an end in itself.
Comte is going to endeavour to reorganise beliefs, that is to say, to
substitute a demonstrated faith to the revealed faith whose force is
now spent. This demonstrated faith will have nothing in common with
the natural religion of the XVIII. century, which was at bottom but
a weak and degenerate form of belief in the supernatural. Under the
metaphysical garb of Deism we still recognise theological thought.
On the contrary the demonstrated faith will have its origin and
its justification in positive science. The two words “faith” and
“demonstration” appear to clash with each other. But the contradiction
lies merely on the surface. For we are still concerned with “faith”
since the great majority of men will always have to take on faith the
conclusions of positive philosophy.
The number of men with sufficient leisure and enough culture to examine
these conclusions and to go into their proofs will always be small.
The attitude of the others must be one of submission and respect. But,
differing on this point from the religious dogmas which humanity has
known until now; the new faith will be “demonstrated.” It will contain
nothing which has not been established and controlled by scientific
methods, nothing which goes beyond the domain of the relative, nothing
which at any moment cannot be proved to a mind capable of following the
demonstration.
This form of “faith” already exists in the case of a great number of
scientific truths. Thus all men to-day believe in the theory of the
solar system which we owe to Copernicus, to Galileo and to Newton.
Yet how many are in a position to understand the demonstrations upon
which this theory rests? They know, however, that what here is a matter
of faith to them, is a matter of science to others, and would be so
equally for themselves had they gone through the necessary studies.
_Faith_ therefore signifies here not indeed a voluntary abdication of
the intellect in presence of a mystery which surpasses its power of
comprehension, but a submission to fact, which in no way encroaches
upon the rights of reason. Every man is not capable, at any moment, of
exercising this right to criticise. In practice, Comte will severely
restrict the use of it.[9] But in theory this right belongs to all men,
and must ever remain unalterable. In the last place the legitimate
existence of the demonstrated faith rests upon this proposition: “If
all minds were in a condition to examine the dogmas of that faith,
all, without exception, would understand the demonstration, and would
agree with it.”
The words “belief” and “faith” must not be misunderstood. In the
“reorganisation of beliefs” which he undertakes, Comte only concerns
himself with beliefs capable of demonstration. He is here faithful to
the thought of Saint Simon, who understood “religion” chiefly as a
basis of political organisation. At any rate, in the early part of his
philosophical career Comte does not bring into “faith” the mystical,
sentimental and non-intellectual elements which this word usually
implies and which so often oppose it to “reason.” The word signifies
for Comte that which man believes concerning _what may be for him a
subject of knowledge_. Until now these beliefs have set forth a more
or less mythical or metaphysical explanation of the universe and of
man, taught by priests and philosophers. But this no longer satisfies
the human mind. By degrees positive science, which works on a totally
different plan, substitutes a knowledge of the laws of phenomena to
those “explanations.” From this moment the problem thus presents itself
to Comte: To establish by rational means a system of universally
accepted truths concerning man, society and the world.
Comte thus takes for granted: 1st, that the “opinions,” the “beliefs”
and the “conceptions” relating to these matters, are to-day
“anarchical”: 2nd, that their natural and normal condition is to be
“organised.”
There is no need to prove the first part; a glance at contemporary
society is enough. The confused disturbing movements which fill it with
trouble and agitation, and which, unless rational harmony be at last
established, threaten its destruction are not due merely to political
causes. They proceed from moral disorder. And this in turn proceeds
from intellectual disorder, that is to say from a lack of principles
common to all minds, and from the absence of universally admitted
conceptions and beliefs. For in order that a human society may subsist,
a certain harmony of sentiment or even common interests among its
members will not suffice. Above all things, intellectual concord which
finds expression in a body of common beliefs is necessary.
If, therefore, a society be a prey to chronic disorders, which
political remedies appear powerless to cure, one has every right to
believe that the deep-rooted evil has its origin in intellectual
disorganisation. All other troubles are merely symptoms. This,
according to Comte, is precisely the state of contemporary society.
It has neither “intellectual” nor “spiritual” government, and does
not even feel the want of it. The minds of men recognise no common
discipline. Not a principle subsists which negative and “corrosive”
criticism has not attacked. The individual erects himself as a judge
of all things--philosophy, ethics, politics, religion. The opinion
which he adopts most frequently without any special qualification for
so doing, and according to his passions, always appears to him to have
as much right to be admitted as those of other men. He claims to be
amenable to no one for his thoughts. And this scattering (later on
Comte will say insurrection) of intelligences is what he calls a state
of _anarchy_.
But, we may say, does not this state represent the ordinary condition
of human societies? Perhaps the “organic” state only appears
occasionally and as an exception? Such a supposition is groundless.
For, if such were the case societies could not subsist, and above all
could not develop. We must admit, on the contrary, that periods of
intellectual anarchy form the exception, and that in a normal state of
society men are united by their unanimous submission to a sufficiently
large body of principles and beliefs. History confirms this view. The
immobility of civilisation in the Far-East is especially due to the
intellectual stability which distinguishes it from our own condition.
The societies of Antiquity (Grecian and Roman), rested upon a
conception of man, of citizenship and of the world, which, as a matter
of fact, scarcely varied during the whole period of their existence.
Lastly, in the Middle-ages, Christianity had constituted an admirable
spiritual authority. The organisation of Catholicism, “a masterpiece of
political sagacity,” had established a body of beliefs which all minds
accepted with complacent docility. It is the decomposition of this
great system which has produced the majority of the evils with which
we are now struggling. Mental anarchy is therefore truly an abnormal
state, a pathological fact, what Comte will call later on the “western
disease,” a mortal disease if it is to be prolonged. Either modern
society must perish, or minds must regain their stable equilibrium by
submission to common principles.
The problem of the organisation of beliefs would seem to come under
two heads. In the first place we have the philosophical problem: how
to establish a system of principles and beliefs capable of being
universally admitted; and, in the second place, a social problem:
how to bring all minds into the new faith. But this distinction only
appears on the surface. As a matter of fact, the solution of the
first problem will necessarily imply that of the second. Does not the
principal cause for the lack of common discipline lie in the disorder
which troubles the mind of each individual? If intellects are divided
among themselves it is because each intellect is divided against
itself. Let one of them succeed in establishing a perfect harmony
within itself, and by the mere force of logic, this harmony, by gradual
diffusion will be communicated to the others--once true philosophy is
established, the rest will only be a matter of time. It will therefore
suffice to examine the opinions and beliefs which actually exist in
_one_ mind, and to inquire into the conditions necessary to substitute
in it harmony to anarchy, or in a word, to realise within it a _perfect
logical coherence_.
As Descartes, in order to test all his knowledge, had only to examine
the sources from which it originated, so Comte, in order to verify the
logical compatibility of his opinions, will content himself with the
consideration of the methods which have furnished him with them. If he
discovers methods which mutually tend to exclude each other, he will
have found the cause of the mental disorder which gives birth to all
the evils we see troubling modern society. At the same time he will
have discovered the remedy which will bring about the disappearance
of those contradictions. The human mind is so constituted, that the
first thing it requires is unity. Understanding is spontaneously
systematic. Opinions merely in juxtaposition in the mind but
logically irreconcilable cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the
contradiction, even when it is ignored, nevertheless impresses itself.
Whether we know it or not, each of our opinions implies a complexus
of connected opinions all arrived at by the same method as the one in
question; and this complexus is itself part of the more considerable
whole which finally completes itself in a comprehensive conception of
the world given in experience.
Now Comte saw in himself, as in his contemporaries, two general
methods, two “modes of thought” which cannot coexist without
contradiction, although neither one nor the other has obtained a full
mastery up to the present time. Concerning several categories of
phenomena he thinks as a scholar trained in the school of Hobbes, of
Galileo, of Descartes and of their successors. He does not seek to
explain them by causes. When, by means of observation or deduction, he
has arrived at a knowledge of their laws he remains satisfied. For the
knowledge of these laws allows him in certain cases to intervene in
the phenomena, and to substitute to the natural order an artificial
order better suited to his requirements. It is thus that mechanical,
astronomical, physical, chemical and even biological phenomena are
objects of _relative_ and _positive_ science for him to-day.
But, as soon as the question is one of facts which originate in the
human conscience, or which are connected with social life and with
history, an opposite tendency becomes predominant. Instead of solely
seeking for the laws of phenomena, our mind desires to explain them.
It wants to find the essence and the cause. It speculates upon the
human soul, upon the relation of that soul to the other realities of
the universe, upon the end which society should have in view, upon the
best possible government, upon the social contract, etc. All these
questions arise from the “metaphysical” mode of thought, and this mode
is formally incompatible with the preceding one. Yet we see both of
them subsisting in our minds to-day.
Social dynamics will show how this condition must have been produced.
But whatever the historical reasons may be, the reality is only too
evident. The human mind to-day can neither adhere entirely to nor give
up entirely one or the other of these two modes of thought. Undoubtedly
it feels that the conquests of positive science are “irrevocable.”
For example, how could it return to a metaphysical or theological
explanation of astronomical or physical phenomena? But, on the other
hand, metaphysical and theological conceptions seem to it no less
indispensable. It does not believe it could do without them. And this
is natural. For, to satisfy the desire for unity, which is its supreme
requirement, the human mind demands a conception of the whole which
embraces all the orders of phenomena, what Kant called a totalizing of
experience, in a word a “philosophy.”
Now, up to the present time, the positive mode of thought has not
shown itself in a position to respond to this demand. It has only
produced individual sciences. Positive Science has been “special” and
fragmentary, always attached to the investigation of a more or less
restricted group of phenomena. With a laudable prudence, which has made
her strength, she has applied herself solely to works of analysis and
partial synthesis. She has never ventured upon a synthesis of the whole
of the real within our reach. Until now theologies and metaphysics
alone have made the effort, and this office is, still to-day, the chief
reason of their existence, this office must be fulfilled. The human
mind is carried, by a spontaneous and necessary movement, towards the
point of view of the universal. Sooner than leave the philosophical
problems without an answer, it would remain attached indefinitely
to the solutions, chimerical as they are, which the theologies and
metaphysics offer him. In short, in the present state of things, the
positive mind is “real” but “special.” The theologico-metaphysical mind
is “universal” but “fictitious.” We can neither sacrifice the “reality”
of science, nor the “universality” of philosophy. Which is the way out
of this difficulty?
Three solutions alone are conceivable:
1. To find a reconciliation which will make it possible for the two
modes of thought to coexist without contradiction:
2. To re-establish unity by making the theologico-metaphysical method
universal:
3. To re-establish unity by making the positive method universal:
II.
The first solution at first sight appears to be the most acceptable.
Why should not the positive investigation of the divers orders of
natural phenomena be reconciled with a theological or metaphysical
conception of the universe? Nothing prevents one from conceiving the
phenomena as governed by invariable laws, and from seeking at the same
time, by another method, for the reason which renders nature in general
intelligible. Positive science liberated at last from theology and
metaphysics, would assure them of the independence which she claims for
herself. Thus, with growing precision would be fixed the boundaries on
the one hand of the domain proper of positive science, and on the other
that of the speculation which goes beyond experience.
This reconciliation, says Comte, has for a long time been considered
legitimate, because for a long time it was indispensable. Up to the
present time Theology and Metaphysics have been the only comprehensive
conceptions of the world which the human mind has formed. They have
fulfilled a necessary function. Moreover, without them positive science
could neither have originated nor have been developed. But, as she is
their heiress, she is also their antagonist. Her progress necessarily
involves their downfall. The parallel history of religions and
metaphysical dogmas on the one hand and of positive knowledge on the
other shows that the conciliation between them has never been a lasting
one.
Not that the antagonism between the two modes of thought can be
solved by a supreme dialectical struggle in which the theological and
metaphysical dogmas would be worsted. It is not thus that dogmas come
to an end. They disappear, according to Comte’s striking expression,
_by desuetude_, as is the case with forsaken methods. As a matter of
fact, have they not been as methods for the human mind, which sought
within a single point of view to embrace the universality of things
before they had been sufficiently studied? Man demanded from his
imagination at first sight an absolute knowledge of the real, which
reason could only give him at a later stage, on a very modest scale,
entirely relative and after the patient labour of the sciences. But by
degrees, as he has advanced in the positive study of phenomena, he
has forsaken the theological and metaphysical “explanations.” Without
relinquishing altogether the search after causes, he has taken the
habit of relegating them to more and more remote regions. Already, in
what concerns phenomena whose concept has reached a positive stage we
can very well do without any assumption of causes. It suffices for us
to represent these phenomena to ourselves as subject to laws. When all
the phenomena of all orders are habitually conceived in this way, when
the idea of their laws, whatever they may be, will have become equally
familiar to us, the metaphysical mode of thought will have disappeared.
In a word, as soon as the whole of science shall have become positive,
philosophy will necessarily be positive also: For we only have at our
disposal _one_ point of view concerning things. All our real knowledge
bears upon phenomena and their laws. If, therefore, considered one
by one, all the orders of phenomena are conceived according to the
positive mode of thought, how could it be that considered together,
and in their totality, they should be conceived according to a mode of
thought completely different, and even inconsistent with the former one?
As a matter of fact, the coexistence of these two modes of thought
lasts so long as the positive spirit has not reached its complete
expansion, so long as a more or less considerable portion of natural
phenomena is still explained by their essence, their cause, or their
end. But this cannot be indefinitely prolonged. The more the positive
spirit progresses, the more the theological and metaphysical conception
of the world loses ground, and it becomes more evident that we must
make our choice. The unity of the understanding the _perfect logical
coherence_, are at this price.
The conciliation being set aside, the alternative either to think
solely or not at all, according to the positive mode, presents itself.
The traditionalists, and especially Joseph de Maistre, saw this aspect
of the problem very clearly. Comte gives them very great credit for
it. De Maistre admits no salvation for our society except in the
complete return to the theological mode of thought. He thus attacks
at its very source, or to put it more plainly, in its many sources,
the spirit of modern philosophy. He does not spare Locke any more than
the philosophers of the XVIII. century who proceed from him, Bacon any
more than Locke; the promoters of the Reformation any more than Bacon.
He understood that the XVIII. century came as a mighty conclusion of
which the XVI. and XVII. centuries were the premisses, and that the
great destructive syllogism had originated in a work of decomposition
which began as early as the XIV. century. He is therefore perfectly
consistent with himself, when he endeavours to combat this diabolical
work, and to bring Europe back to the mental and religious condition
of the Middle-ages. The re-establishment of the spiritual supremacy of
the Pope would put an end to mental and moral anarchy. The catholic
doctrine would restore to men’s minds that unity which is their supreme
need.
This solution fulfils ideally the conditions of the problem, but,
as a matter of fact, the solution is impracticable. The tide of
history cannot flow back. In order to bring men’s minds once again
under the sway of that spiritual power which they freely accepted in
the Middle-ages, we should also have to reconstitute the totality
of the conditions in which they lived at that time. How can we wipe
from the pages of history the discovery of America, the invention of
printing, and so many other great social facts? How can we pretend that
Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and all the heralds of
positive Science never existed? And if, presuming what is impossible,
we should succeed in restoring the mental and moral unity of Christian
society in the Middle-ages, how could we prevent the natural laws
which have once brought about its decomposition, from producing again
the same result?
We are thus necessarily brought to the third and last solution.
Since the conciliation between the positive mode of thought and
the other one is impossible; since the exclusive ascendency of the
theologico-metaphysical mode of thought is out of the question; since
when all is said the human mind needs a philosophy, it follows that
that philosophy can only proceed from the positive mode of thought
itself. There is nothing, _a priori_, to prevent this solution from
being realised. For the last positions of the theologico-metaphysical
spirit are surely not impregnable. This spirit, “fictitious” in
its essence, never could become “real.” The positive spirit is
only accidentally “special.” It is quite capable of acquiring the
universality which it lacks. The new philosophy would then be founded,
and the problem of _perfect logical coherence_ would be solved.
The whole difficulty thus appears to be in “universalising” the
positive mode of thought. To do this it must be extended to those
phenomena which are still habitually conceived according to the
theologico-metaphysical mode, that is to say, to the moral and
social phenomena. This will be Comte’s crowning discovery. He will
found “social physics.” By so doing he will take from theology and
metaphysics the last reason of their existence. He will make possible
the transition from a positive science to an equally positive
philosophy. Thus will be realised “the unity of the understanding,” and
this mental harmony will carry with it as its consequence the moral and
religious harmony of humanity.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] cf. infra. book iii. ch. v. p.