JAPAN AS A WORLD POWER
OUTLINE OF TOPICS: Standards of world-power; conscription; draft
and exemption; army; arms and ammunition; officers of the army;
navy; types of Japanese war-vessels; coal supply; “Blue-jacket
Spirit”; Japan as a sea power; growth of cosmopolitan spirit;
Anglo-Japanese Alliance,—natural, guarantee of peace, confession
of England’s weakness, admission of Japan’s strength; Japan’s
responsibility; meaning for Christianity; the United States a silent
partner.—Bibliography.
It is a sad commentary on the present standards of civilization that
a consideration of Japan as a world power requires special attention
to military and naval affairs. It is rather a strange coincidence that
it was not until little Japan in 1894 showed that she could easily
overcome immense China that the “Great Powers” were willing to revise
their treaties with her on terms of equality and admit her to the
comity of nations. And it is another strange coincidence that it was
the Boxer troubles which gave Japan another opportunity to display
the efficiency of her military and naval organizations, and win such
laurels side by side with troops of the other “Powers,” that Great
Britain, the mightiest of them all, abandoned her time-honored policy
of “splendid isolation” and sought Japan’s assistance by means of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is not, however, to be imagined that Great
Britain overlooked or ignored Japan’s other elements of power; but it
is quite evident that the latter’s military and naval efficiency made
a great impression on the former. Therefore it is our duty, having
considered Japan’s geographical, industrial, commercial, social,
historical, and political features, to take up now her polemic ability.
[Illustration: DISTINGUISHED LAND COMMANDERS
GENERAL BARON KUROKI
GENERAL BARON OKU
GENERAL BARON NODZU
]
The Japanese army and navy are created and sustained, as to personnel,
by a conscription system, quite like that of Germany. Theoretically,
“all males between the full ages of 17 and 40 years, who are Japanese
subjects, shall be liable to conscription.”[106] This period is,
moreover, divided up as follows: (1) Active service with the colors,
for 3 years in the army and 4 years in the navy, by those who have
“attained the full age of 20 years”; so that those who are between
17 and 20 are apparently exempt except “in time of war or other
emergency”; (2) First Reserve term, of 4 years in the army and 3 years
in the navy, “by such as have completed their service with the colors”;
(3) Second Reserve term of 5 years, “by those who have completed their
service in the First Reserves”; and (4) Service in the Territorial
Army for the remaining years by those who have completed the preceding
term. But the last three services are merely nominal, as the First and
Second Reserves and the Territorial Army are ordinarily called out only
for drill once a year and are mobilized, in order, “in time of war or
of emergency.” And, by a special arrangement, the actual service in
barracks may be only 2 years.
A very thorough method of drafting carries into effect these
provisions, and would make more than 200,000 young men annually liable
to service. But, as this is a much larger number than the government
could possibly care for, or would need in times of peace, there is a
“sweeping system of exemptions” that brings the number of conscripts
down within practical limits. This system takes into account physical
conditions, educational courses, individual and family necessities,
official duties, business requirements, etc. Even then the number of
those available who pass the examination is too large, so that it is
reduced by lot. Those who are finally enrolled are divided up among the
various lines of service according to physique, former occupation and
attainments. “Conscripts for active naval service shall be selected
from youths belonging to the sea-coast or insular districts.” The term
of active service is computed from December 1 of each year; so that
the days just preceding or following that day are busy ones for those
who are either giving new conscripts a fine send-off or welcoming home
those whose terms have expired.
Japan is divided, for military purposes, into eighteen districts,
each of which is occupied by a division. The headquarters of these
districts are located at Tōkyō, Sendai, Nagoya, Ōsaka, Hiroshima,
Kumamoto, Asahigawa, etc., etc. There is also the Imperial Guard, with
headquarters, of course, at Tōkyō: they are to be distinguished from
other soldiers by having a red instead of a yellow band around the
cap, and are “a picked corps,” who present a very fine appearance.
The war-footing of the Japanese army exceeds 500,000 men, and its
peace-footing is almost 200,000: these figures take account only of
combatants. The discipline, courage, and endurance of the Japanese army
have been clearly exhibited side by side with the troops of Occidental
nations in China, and have suffered naught by comparison. The army has
been called “the most formidable mobile land force in the Far East,
indeed in the whole of Asia,” and “the best army in the world, for its
size.” And the remarkable manner in which the various parts of the
service coöperate and smoothly carry out the general plans has won the
admiration of capable critics.[107]
The guns for the artillery service used to be purchased abroad, but
are now chiefly manufactured in Ōsaka. There is an excellent arsenal
in the Koishikawa District of Tōkyō; it is on part of the site of the
magnificent _yashiki_ (mansion) of the Prince of Mito, whose beautiful
garden still remains a delight to all visitors. This arsenal is where
the once famous Murata rifle was formerly manufactured; but that has
been superseded by the “30th Year” (of Meiji) rifle; and both of these
are Japanese inventions. The arsenal is also turning out ammunition at
the ordinary rate of a million rounds a day.
According to the Constitution, the Emperor “has the supreme command
of the army and the navy”; and under him come the Minister of War,
the actual Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, the generals and
other officers and officials in order. The Emperor is not expected to
take command in person; but often one of the Imperial Princes will
act as Commander-in-Chief in the field. There are now only two living
Field-Marshals, Marquis Yamagata and Marquis Ōyama. There are various
schools for educating and training the officers of the army and the
navy.
As Japan is entirely an insular nation, the importance of her
navy cannot be over-estimated. Even before the war with China, the
Japanese navy had been rapidly growing; and it showed its marked
efficiency in the battles of the Yalu and Wei-hai-wei (1894, 1895).
The _post-bellum_ plans for expansion have, moreover, emphasized the
value to Japan of sea-power; and the programme of naval expansion,
in spite of increased burdens of taxation, has met comparatively
little opposition. For purposes of administration, the coast of Japan
is divided into five naval districts, each with one fort which is a
first-class naval station. These stations are Yokosuka, Kure, Saseho,
Maizuru, and (to be established) Muroran. The navy at present includes
battleships, cruisers, ships for coast defence, gunboats, torpedo
boats, torpedo catchers, and despatch ships. Of the first four kinds
there are two or three classes in each; and of battleships there are
nine first-class ones of more than 15,000 tons each. The organization
of the navy is similar to that of the army: below the Emperor, who is
nominally in supreme command, come the Minister of the Navy, the actual
Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, the admirals, etc.
[Illustration: MILITARY LEADERS OF NEW JAPAN
FIELD-MARSHAL ŌYAMA AND FIELD-MARSHAL YAMAGATA]
Attention should be called to two or three points emphasized by Mr.
Arthur Diosy.[108] The first is that “Nelson’s own plan, as valid
to-day as it was in his time,” has been carried out in the types of
vessels built for the Japanese fleet. “The main idea prevailing in
their selection is the defence of the national interests by _offensive_
operations against the enemy’s fleets,” but “at no very great distance
from the base of operations at home.” The warships of Japan, therefore,
are not required to devote so much space to the storage of coal and
other supplies for long voyages, and can utilize more space for guns
and reserve ammunition, or can be built smaller and “handier.” It is in
this way that “they are among the swiftest of all the fighting ships
afloat.”
The second point, which is related to the first, is that Japan “stands
in the foremost rank as a naval power,” not merely on account of the
number and fighting strength of her ships, the efficiency of their
officers and crews, and the perfection of the naval organization,
but also on account of the well-equipped dockyards and arsenals in
convenient locations, and the abundant supply of excellent coal in easy
reach.
The third point concerns what Diosy calls the “Blue-jacket Spirit,” a
“scarcely definable _something_” that is hard to describe in words, but
that shines forth in every word and deed of the officer, the sailor,
the marine,—the _esprit de corps_ of the personnel of the Japanese
navy. This spirit he finds only in the British, Japanese, and United
States navies.
And we cannot refrain from quoting the same writer’s paragraph of
summary as follows:—
“Japan possesses all the elements of Sea-Power: swift, powerful ships,
adapted to the work they are intended for, numerous good harbors,
excellent coal in abundance, capital facilities for the repair of her
vessels, and the necessary plant, constantly augmented and improved,
for building new ones. Her naval organization is wise and efficient,
her administrative services are thorough and honest; her naval
officers are gallant, dashing, and scientifically trained, and the
armament they control is of the latest and best pattern. Strong in
ships, strong in guns, Japan is stronger still in the factor without
which ships and guns are useless—‘the Man behind the Gun.’”[109]
Ten years ago it was improper to speak of Japan as a world power; it
was then fitting to treat of her, as Norman did in one chapter of his
“Real Japan,” under the caption of “Japan as an Eastern Power.” But,
as already pointed out, it was her overwhelming defeat of China that
at least expedited her formal and nominal recognition in the comity of
nations. The new treaties which formulated this recognition went into
effect in 1899, from which date it may be eminently proper to begin a
seventh period,[110] that of “Cosmopolitanism,” in the history of New
Japan. And by Japan’s successes in the second war with China arising
out of the Boxer troubles, she confirmed her claim to recognition
as a world power; and this recognition was completed through the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Not many years ago the ideal was still
such a narrow theme as “The Japan of the Japanese”; then the vision
widened out so as to include “The Japan of Asia”; but now the horizon
is unlimited and extends to “The Japan of the World.” Indeed, the
Japanese have outgrown “Native Japan,” and even “Asiatic Japan,” into
“Cosmopolitan Japan.” They are interested, not only in national, but
also international, problems.
It has already been pointed out that the complete recognition of Japan
as a world power was manifested in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This is
the greatest political event of 1902,[111] so far as concerns directly
the future of the Orient and indirectly the affairs of the Occident.
This convention between Great Britain and Japan caused profound
surprise and widespread rejoicing, and in Japan particularly it was the
occasion for numerous feasts, even in various provincial localities,
where more or less profuse self-gratulation was the order of the day.
But it is now possible to take a calmer view of the situation and to
make a more judicial estimate of the importance of the alliance.
In the first place, it is well to remember that this formal alliance
is only the natural outcome of a community of interests in the Far
East, and is the natural result of practical coöperation for some time
past. As Count Ōkuma put it, they (Great Britain and Japan) have been
allies in effect for some years; they are now allies in name. Indeed,
for several years past this alliance has existed in spirit, and it has
now merely become a public acknowledgment of sympathy and similar aims
in policy in the Far East. This alliance, then, is not artificial or
compulsory, but natural, spontaneous, and voluntary.
The second point to notice is that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance includes
the greatest power each of the Occident and of the Orient. This
alliance is also the combination of two of the greatest naval powers,
as well as two great military powers of the world. It would seem
likely, therefore, as a prominent Japanese expressed it, “that there
is no power or combination of powers that could make head against this
union in the Far East; the attempt would be like spitting at a tiger.”
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is, therefore, a guarantee, of the very
first quality, of peace in the Orient, and of just dealings with China
and Korea.
Another important point in connection with this alliance is the fact
that herein Great Britain has abandoned, has broken to pieces, her
traditional policy of “splendid isolation.” For many decades she has
not been in the habit of contracting alliances with other powers in
carrying out plans to advance her own interests. The fact, therefore,
that in this case she has seen fit to depart from her usual policy is
a positive indication that the situation in the Far East was one of
imminent peril and demanded unusual precaution. It is a proof that
Russian aggressions were no mere phantoms, but were terribly real and
threatening.
And the fact that, when Great Britain broke her policy of grand
isolation, it was to enter into alliance with an Oriental rather than
an Occidental power, is also one of great significance. It proves more
effectively than folios of verbal argument, and speaks out more loudly
than a thousand tongues could tell, the present satisfactory status
of Japan. The insignificant, “half-civilized” country of a few years
ago is now “on the same lotus-blossom” with Great Britain. That little
island-empire of the Orient is now but fifty years out of her own
practically complete isolation from the rest of the world; she is only
thirty years out of feudalism; she has been only a little more than a
decade in constitutionalism and parliamentary government, and she has
been only a few years in the comity of nations by virtue of treaties on
terms of equality; nevertheless, she has become the political partner
of that immense island-empire which stretches in all directions, and
encircles the globe with the drum-beat of her garrisons. The huge
empire on whose possessions the sun never sets has taken as its ally
the small empire of the rising sun!
This recognition of the status of New Japan has been, of course, a
matter of great pride and rejoicing to that nation and therefore a
source of encouragement to continue steadfast in the paths of progress
along which she has been moving so rapidly.[112] It has likewise
been recognized that this alliance imposes great responsibilities
upon Japan, if she would maintain her new position.[113] These
responsibilities are along not only military, naval, political, and
commercial lines, but also along social, moral, and religious lines.
The new alliance means that licentiousness, dishonesty, and other vices
should not be tolerated, and that ignorance, superstition, and idolatry
should not be allowed to thrive among a people in alliance with such a
progressively Christian nation as Great Britain. In other words, this
alliance should hasten the spread of the Gospel in Japan.
But this alliance means much to Christianity, not merely in Japan,
but over all the Orient. For the prime objects of the alliance are the
independence of Korea and the integrity of the Chinese Empire; and the
prime effect of the alliance is peace in the Orient. This means that
Russian aggressions in China and Korea will be, already have been,
considerably checked, and that Anglo-Saxon and Japanese influences will
be paramount in those countries. And all this means that Christian
missionary work will be practically unhindered, unless it be by local
and spasmodic prejudice; and that the word will have freer course and
be glorified. The alliance of the first nation of Christendom with a
largely Christianized nation like Japan cannot fail to Christianize the
Far East.
[Illustration: STATESMEN OF NEW JAPAN
COUNT ŌKUMA, MARQUIS INOUYE, COUNT ITAGAKI, MARQUIS MATSUKATA]
Finally, one significant phase of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the
fact that, to all intents and purposes, it includes the United States
of America, which may be called a “silent partner.” It is well known
that the convention was shown at Washington before it was promulgated,
and that it was heartily approved by our government. Practically,
therefore, it is, in a very broad sense, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Certainly our interests in the Far East have been and are identical
with those of Great Britain and Japan; and all our “moral influence,”
at least, should be exerted toward the purposes of that convention.
Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should mean the union of Great
Britain and the United States with Japan to maintain in the Orient
the “open door,” not merely of trade and commerce, but of all social,
intellectual, moral, and religious reforms; the open door, not of
material civilization only, but also of the gospel of Jesus Christ.[114]
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
“The Real Japan” (Norman), chaps. v., xiii.; “Advance Japan”
(Morris), chap. xiii.; “The New Far East” (Diosy), especially
chap. vii.; “Heroic Japan” (Eastlake and Yamada); “The Awakening
of the East” (Leroy-Beaulieu), chap. ix; and “Japan in Transition”
(Ransome), chap. xv.; “Japan Today” (Scherer), chap. xi.; “The Real
Triumph of Japan” (Seaman); “Every Day Japan” (Lloyd); “Dai Nippon”
(Dyer), chaps. vi., xvi., and xvii.; and “The Imperial Japanese Navy”
(Janes).