CHAPTER X

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

OUTLINE OF TOPICS: Local government under feudalism; periods of modern

local self-government; gradual development therein; prefectural

assemblies; candidates and electors; standing committee; sessions;

business; speaking; petitions; how bills become laws; powers of

prefectural assemblies, theoretical and practical; residents and

citizens of cities, towns, and villages; rights and duties of

citizens; administration in city, town, and village; city council;

town and village officials; city assembly; assemblymen; powers of

city assembly; town or village assembly; special provisions for

towns and villages; administration of territories; pacification of

Formosa; colonial government; policy in Formosa; political progress in

Japan.—Bibliography.

We have already noted incidentally in preceding chapters some of the

steps in the development of local self-government in Japan; and now we

must treat that subject more particularly. First it is well to observe

in passing that the steps from feudalism to local self-government were

not so difficult as might be imagined; for under the feudal system

local government by clans had prevailed.[98] And yet when feudalism

was abolished, the reconstruction of local government was entered

upon slowly and cautiously in order to minimize jealousies and other

obstacles.

Wigmore, in his articles[99] on this subject, divides the period from

1867 to 1889 into two parts (1867-1878 and 1878-1889), and explains

as follows: “The former was occupied with testing the capacity of the

people for self-government; the latter with extending to them a larger

and larger measure of power, and in advancing towards a proper degree

of decentralization.” As he wrote in 1890, he was just at the beginning

of the third period, what he himself calls “a new period,” during which

local self-government, under the new constitutional _régime_, was to be

still further expanded in the line of popular privileges.

After the Shōgunate fell, but before feudalism was formally abolished,

that is, from 1867 to 1871, the chiefs of the clans were allowed to

continue their administration of local affairs under the title of

_chi-hanji_ (local governor). But when feudalism was formally abolished

in 1871, these feudal lords were retired on annuities; their fiefs (263

in number) were incorporated, regardless of former geographical and

feudal boundaries, and with regard for convenience of administration

by the central government, into 72 _Ken_ and 3 _Fu_; and outsiders

were largely appointed to the position of governor in these new local

governments. The first attempts on the part of the central government

to consult local public opinion were by means of meetings of the local

officials; but the people were gradually allowed, in rather an informal

and limited way, to have a voice in certain matters. In 1878, however,

as we have seen, prefectural assemblies, the members of which should be

chosen by popular election, were established; and just ten years later

a law extending local self-government to cities, towns, and villages

was enacted, to go into effect in 1889. And these two agencies of local

self-government in Japan are worthy of a little study.

The Japanese _Kenkwai_ and _Fukwai_ correspond, in general, with an

American State legislature, but differ in many respects, because they

are part of a centralized national administration. They are “to counsel

about the budget of expenses to be met by local taxation, and about

the manner of collecting such taxes.” The members are elected in each

_Ken_ or _Fu_ according to the population, at the rate of 1 member for

each 20,000 people. Each electoral district may also elect _yobi-in_

(reserve members), twice the number of regular members. As their name

indicates, they are to take the places of regular members who may for

any reason be unable to serve. It is, therefore, unlikely that there

would ever be a vacancy to be filled by a special election; for each

member has two “substitutes” ready to step into his vacant place! The

term of service covers 4 years; but half of the members retire every 2

years. Each member receives an emolument of 1 _yen_ _per diem_ during

the session, and travelling expenses.

A candidate for representative in a prefectural assembly must be over

25 years of age, a permanent resident of that _Ken_ or _Fu_, and be

paying an annual land-tax of more than 10 _yen_. Voters in such an

election must be over 20 years of age, permanent residents of that

_Ken_ or _Fu_, and be paying annual land-taxes of more than 5 _yen_.

There are about 2,000,000 voters in all.

From among the members, the assembly elects a “standing committee of

from five to seven persons,” who serve for a period of two years.

They remain in the capital throughout the year, to give advice when

the Governor asks it about the manner and order of carrying out the

enactments of the assembly and about the payment of extraordinary

expense. A member of this committee receives “from 30 _yen_ to 80 _yen_

per month, and travelling expenses.”

The ordinary annual session of an assembly opens some time in November

and continues for not more than 30 days. But the Governor has power to

call a special session and to suspend an assembly; while the power to

prorogue an assembly rests with the Minister of State for Home Affairs.

Each session of an assembly is formally “opened” by the Governor;

and the business to come before the assembly is presented in bills

originating with him and his subordinates. At any time, when a member

of the assembly wishes explanations concerning any matter within the

purview of the assembly, the Governor or his representative must

explain. In fact, such officials may speak at any time, provided they

do not interrupt the speech of a member; but they have no vote.

[Illustration: NAVAL LEADERS OF JAPAN

ADMIRAL ENOMOTO

ADMIRAL KABAYAMA

]

When a member wishes to address the assembly, he rises, calls out

“_Gichō_” (Chairman), and gives the number of his seat. When the

chairman has recognized him by repeating that number, he “has the

floor.”[100]

If other matters, besides those included in the “original bill(s)” of

the Governor, seem to at least two members to warrant discussion, they

present these matters in the form of petitions; and if the assembly

grants permission, these petitions may be discussed, like bills.

No bill becomes a law until it has been signed by the Governor. If the

latter does not agree with a bill, he may appeal to the Department of

Home Affairs, where it will be finally decided.

If we now endeavor to measure the extent and limitations of the

power of a Japanese prefectural assembly, we may say that in theory

a _Kenkwai_ or a _Fukwai_ is by no means entirely independent of

the central government, nor does it possess absolute control of the

matters of its own _Ken_ or _Fu_. It will be noticed that in all cases

the final ratification or decision rests with the Governor or the

Department of Home Affairs. The latter also has the power in its own

hands of suspending an assembly at its discretion. It would seem, then,

that theoretically a _Fukwai_ or a _Kenkwai_ is pretty much under the

control of the central government, and has very little real power of

its own. Its nature appears more like that of an elective advisory

board than of a legislative body.

But, in practice and in fact, a wise Governor, though he is an

appointive officer of the central government, does not often put

himself in opposition to public opinion, unless it be a case of the

greatest importance; and the Department of Home Affairs is loath to

exercise authority unless it is absolutely necessary. The central

government holds the power to control these assemblies if it should

be necessary; but it also respects public opinion, and allows local

self-government as far as possible.[101]

The extension of local self-government to cities, towns, and villages

(_shi_, _chō_, and _son_) led to the introduction into the Japanese

language of several special terms, like _jūmin_ (resident) and _kōmin_

(citizen), and to a careful distinction between the respective rights

and duties of the two. The “residents” of a city [town or village]

include “all those who have their residence in the city [town or

village], without distinction of sex, age, color, nationality, or

condition in life.” A “citizen,” however, must be “an independent male

person,” that is, one who has completed his twenty-fifth year and has

a household; he must be “a subject of the empire and in the enjoyment

of his civil rights”; and for two years he must have been a resident

of the given local division, must have contributed toward its common

burdens, and must have paid therein a “national land-tax of 2 or more

_yen_ in other direct national taxes.” The rights of a citizen over and

above his rights as a resident are simply but comprehensively stated.

They consist in the privilege of voting in the local elections, and

of eligibility to the honorary offices. There is, however, a slight

qualification of this seemingly universal citizen suffrage. Those

whose citizenship, for reasons to be given later, is suspended, and

“those who are in actual military or naval service,” are disfranchised.

Companies, however, and “other juristic persons” are entitled to the

suffrage on similar conditions with individuals.[102]

But when we come to consider the duties of a citizen, we find peculiar

conditions. The citizen of a Japanese city, town, or village, is under

obligation to fill any honorary office to which he may be elected

or appointed; and except for certain specified reasons he cannot

decline official service without being “subjected to suspension of

citizenship for from three to six years, together with an additional

levy, during the same period, of from one-eighth to one-quarter more

than his ordinary share of contribution to the city expenditure.” Here

is compulsory “public spirit”! On the whole, citizenship seems to be

regarded more as a duty than as a privilege; and the citizens best

qualified to fill official positions of trust would find it much more

difficult than in America to “keep out of politics.”

The administration of local affairs in city, town, or village is

more or less centralized. In the cities the origination and the

administration of the local laws devolves upon a “city council”; and in

the towns and the villages, upon certain chiefs and their deputies.

A city council consists of a mayor, his deputy, and a certain number

of honorary councilmen. The mayor is appointed directly by the Emperor

from among three candidates previously selected by the city assembly, a

body to be described later. The deputy-mayor and councilmen are elected

by the city assembly. The councilmen hold office for four years, but

half of them retire every two years. In the case of a very large city

it is permissible to divide the city into _Ku_ (wards), each with its

own chief and deputy and even council and assembly. The functions of a

city council include the preparation of business for the city assembly

and the execution of the decisions of the assembly; the administration

of the city revenue, and the carrying out of the budget voted by the

assembly; and general superintendence of city affairs.

In towns or villages these duties devolve upon the mayors and deputies,

who are elected by the town or village assembly from among the local

citizens.

The city assembly, already mentioned, is a popular representative body.

The number of members varies, in proportion to the population, from

thirty to sixty; and the membership is divided into three classes,

elected by three classes of voters, according to the amount of taxes

paid by the electors to the city. The object of this division, copied

from the Prussian system of local government, seems to be to give the

highest tax-payers a power and a representation greater than what they

might secure by mere proportion of numbers.[103]

The assemblymen hold office for six years, are eligible for

re-election, and, like the councilmen, draw no salary, but receive

“compensation for the actual expenses needed for the discharge of their

duties.” The assemblymen go out in rotation every two years.

The principal matters to be decided by the city assembly, besides the

election of certain city officials by secret ballot, are as follows:

the making and altering of city by-laws and regulations; the voting of

the budget and all matters involving expense; the modes of imposing and

collecting all kinds of taxes; the incurring of a new liability or the

relinquishment of an acquired right; the modes of management of city

property and establishments; etc.

The constitution of a town or village assembly is also based upon the

population, according to a fixed ratio. But in the grouping of electors

according to the amount of taxes paid, there are only two classes. The

rules, powers, and functions of a town or village assembly correspond

exactly to those of the city assembly.

There are, in the case of towns and villages, two provisions which

are not necessary in the case of cities. One provision prescribes a

method by which two or more towns or villages, by mutual agreement and

with the permission of the superintending authority, may form a union

for the common administration of affairs that are common to them. The

other provision prescribes that, by a town or village by-law, decided

upon by the _Gun_ council, “a small town or village may substitute for

the town or village assembly _a general meeting of all citizens having

suffrage_.” This appears to be an imitation, in theory at least, of the

Anglo-Saxon town meeting and village assembly.

The privileges of local self-government are extended to all parts

of the empire except Hokkaidō and Formosa, which are administered as

“territories” by the central government. In Hokkaidō, moreover, a small

measure of local administration has been granted, and this will be

enlarged as rapidly as possible. But Japanese rule in Formosa is worthy

of special consideration, because it is illustrative of what Japan can

do in bringing enemies under her jurisdiction into harmony with her

government. Japanese colonial government in Formosa may be called a

success.

When Formosa[104] was ceded by China to Japan in 1895, it was well

understood that the Japanese had no easy task in pacifying the Chinese,

civilizing the savages, and thus bringing the beautiful isle, with its

great resources, under cultivation and proper restraint. But, by a wise

combination of military force and civil government, Japan has achieved

a remarkable success.

At first, for a brief period, Formosan affairs were under a separate

department of State, that of Colonization; but when administrative

economy and reform were demanded, this department was abolished,

and the Governor-General of Formosa, appointed by the Emperor upon

recommendation of the Cabinet, was made directly responsible to the

Cabinet. At first, of course, mistakes were made, and a great deal of

incapacity and corruption manifested themselves in official circles.

But, by a gradual weeding out of the incompetent and the dishonest,

the civil service has been greatly improved. Especially in dealing

with opium smoking and foot-binding among the Chinese has the Japanese

government shown remarkable tact. And it has also encouraged local

administration among the natives to the extent of employing them in

subordinate positions where they can be trained for future usefulness.

The general policy of Japan in Formosa has been stated succinctly by

Count Kabayama: “Subjugate it from one side by force of arms, and then

confer on the subjugated portion the benefits of civil government.”

It is the expressed determination to make Formosa, “body, soul, and

spirit,” a part of their empire; and reliable testimony shows that they

are making a success of their labors.[105]

We have now noticed the chief features of local self-government as

applied in Japan to prefectures, counties, cities, towns, and villages.

Although there are many enactments against which the democratic ideas

of Americans would revolt, the system is certainly well adapted to

the present needs and capabilities of Japan. It is an interesting

fact that Japan’s political institutions have been developed, since

the Restoration of 1868, from the top downward. In Japan the people

are conservative, and the government is progressive; and the people

are simply under the necessity of growing up to political privileges

that are gradually bestowed upon them. And we may feel assured that,

as the people show themselves capable of exercising power, their

privileges will be gradually extended. We should not find fault

with Japan, because in only a few years she has not leaped into the

enjoyment of political privileges which the English and American people

obtained only after centuries of slow and often bloody development;

but we should congratulate Japan, because by peaceful measures she

has gradually removed herself entirely out of the pale of Oriental

absolutism, beyond even despotic Russia, and may be classed with her

model, Germany.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Especially helpful are Iyenaga’s “Constitutional Development of

Japan,” Wigmore’s articles in the “Nation,” and several papers in the

Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan. See also the author’s “Local

Self-Government in Japan” in the “Political Science Quarterly” for

June, 1892, and “A Japanese State Legislature” in the “Nation” for

February 27, 1890. On the subject of Formosa, besides Davidson’s book

already mentioned, see chap. xiv. of Ransome’s “Japan in Transition,”

pp. 167, 169, of Diosy’s “New Far East,” and Takekoshi’s “Japanese

Rule in Formosa.”

A Handbook of Modern Japan · 第 10 / 23 章