PART VI

MUSSOLINI THE “FASCISTA PRIME MINISTER”

MUSSOLINI THE “FASCISTA PRIME MINISTER”

We deem it superfluous to linger over a detailed analysis of the

separate speeches delivered by Benito Mussolini after 1st November

1922, the day on which, by the will of the people, he rose fully

equipped to the dignities and responsibilities of power.

Foreigners are to a great extent ignorant of the origin, the

character and the evolution of the Fascista movement, owing to the

lack of literature on the subject outside Italy. They have, however,

already had the means of appreciating the qualities of strength,

balance of mind, and foresight revealed from the very first by the

Italian Fascista Premier. Although European public opinion may be

logically entitled to an attitude of reserve in the face of the

crisis of evolution and renovation through which Italy is passing,

it is certain that the young President of the Council—of humble

birth, and risen to power by a remarkable combination of

circumstances—romantic, daring, ingenious, tempestuous—stands now

the principal figure in the arena of world politics.

A NEW CROMWELL IN THE PARLIAMENT

Speech delivered in the Chamber, 16th November 1922.

_Hon. Mussolini._ Honourable Members,—(Signs of great attention.)—I

perform to-day in this hall an act of formal deference towards you for

which I do not expect any special gratitude.

I have the honour of announcing to the Chamber that His Majesty the

King, by a Decree of 31st October, has accepted the resignations of the

Hon. Luigi Facta from the office of President of the Council and of his

colleagues, Minister and Under-Secretaries of State, and has asked me to

form the new Ministry. On the same day His Majesty has appointed me

President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior and

of Foreign Affairs, etc.

For many years—for too many years—crises in the Government took place

and were solved by more or less tortuous and underhand manœuvres, so

much so that a crisis came to be regarded as a regular scramble for

portfolios, and the Ministry was caricatured in the comic papers.

Now, for the second time in the brief space of seven years, the Italian

people, or rather the best part of it, has overthrown a Ministry and

formed for itself an entirely new Government from outside, regardless of

every Parliamentary designation.

The seven years of which I speak lie between the May of 1915 and the

October of 1922. I shall leave to the gloomy partisans of

super-Constitutionalism the task of discoursing, more or less

plaintively, about all this. I maintain that revolution has its rights;

and I may add, so that everyone may know, that I am here to defend and

give the greatest value to the revolution of the “black shirts,”

inserting it intrinsically in the history of the nation as an active

force in development, progress and the restoration of equilibrium. (Loud

applause from the Left.) I could have carried our victory much further,

and I refused to do so. I imposed limits upon my action and told myself

that the truest wisdom is that which does not forsake one after victory.

With three hundred thousand young men, fully armed, ready for anything

and almost religiously prompt to obey any command of mine, I could have

punished all those who have slandered the Fascisti and thrown mud at

them. (Approval on the Right.) I could have made a bivouac of this

gloomy grey hall; I could have shut up Parliament and formed a

Government of Fascisti exclusively; I could have done so, but I did not

wish to do so, at any rate at the moment. Our adversaries remained in

their shelters and then quietly issued forth and obtained their freedom,

of which they are already taking advantage to set traps for us and

slander us, as at Carate, Bergamo, Udine and Muggia.

I have formed a Coalition Government, not with the intention of

obtaining a Parliamentary majority, with which at the moment I can

perfectly well dispense, but in order to gather together in support of

the suffering nation all those who, over and above questions of party

and section, wish to save her.

From the bottom of my heart I thank all those who have worked with me,

both Ministers and Under-Secretaries; I thank my colleagues in the

Government, who wished to share with me the heavy responsibilities of

this hour; and I cannot remember without pleasure the attitude of the

Italian working classes, who indirectly encouraged and strengthened the

Fascisti by their solidarity, active or passive. I believe also that I

shall be giving expression to the thoughts of a large part of this

assembly, and certainly of the majority of the Italian people, if I pay

a warm tribute to our Sovereign, who, by refusing to permit the useless

reactionary attempts made at the eleventh hour to proclaim martial law,

has avoided civil war and allowed the fresh and ardent Fascista current,

newly arisen out of the war and exalted by victory, to pour itself into

the sluggish main stream of the State. (Cries of “Long live the King!”

The Ministers and a great many deputies rise to their feet and applaud.)

Before arriving here we were asked on all sides for a programme. It is

not, alas! programmes that are wanting in Italy, but men to carry them

out. All the problems of Italian life—_all_, I say—have long since been

solved on paper; but the will to put these solutions into practice has

been lacking. The Government to-day represents that firm and decisive

will.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FASCISTA GOVERNMENT

Same speech delivered in the Chamber, 16th November 1922.

_Hon. Mussolini._ Honourable Members,—Our foreign policy is the business

which chiefly concerns us at the present moment. I shall speak of it at

once, as I think that what I am going to say will dispel many

apprehensions. I shall not touch upon all the questions connected with

the subject, because, in this sphere as in all others, I prefer actions

to words.

The fundamental principle upon which our foreign policy is based is that

treaties of peace, once signed and ratified, must be carried out, no

matter whether they are good or bad. A self-respecting nation cannot

follow another course. Treaties are not eternal or irreparable; they are

chapters and not epilogues in history; to put them into practice means

to try them. If in the course of execution they are proved to be absurd,

that in itself constitutes the possibility of a further examination of

the respective positions.

I shall bring before the consideration of Parliament both the Treaty of

Rapallo and the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which are derived from

it.

Agreed that treaties, when once perfected and ratified, must be loyally

carried out, I go on to establish another fundamental principle, which

is the rejection of all the famous “reconstructive” ideology. We admit

that there is a kind of economic union or interdependence among European

countries. We admit that this economic life must be reconstructed, but

we refuse to think that the methods hitherto adopted will succeed in

doing so. Commercial treaties concluded between two Powers—the basis of

the closest economic relations between nations—are of more value in the

reconstruction of the European economic world than all the complicated

and confused general plenary conferences, whose lamentable history

everybody knows.

As far as Italy is concerned, we intend to follow a policy which will be

dignified and at the same time compatible with our national interests.

(Loud applause.) We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of a policy of

foolish altruism, or of complete surrender to the desires of others. _Do

ut des._ For Italy to-day has a new importance which must be reckoned

with adequately, and this fact is beginning to be recognised beyond her

boundaries. We have not the bad taste to exaggerate our powers, but

neither do we wish to belittle them with excessive and useless modesty.

My formula is simple: “Nothing for nothing.” Those who wish to have

concrete proofs of friendship from us must give us the same. Fascista

Italy, just as she does not intend to repudiate treaties for many

reasons, political, moral and economic, does not intend, either, to

abandon the Allies—Rome is in line with London and Paris; but Italy must

assert herself and impose upon the Allies that strict and courageous

examination of conscience which has not been faced by them from the time

of the Armistice up to the present day.

Does an Entente still exist in the full sense of the word? What is the

position of the Entente with regard to Germany and Russia? with regard

to an alliance between these two countries? What is the position of

Italy in the Entente, of the Italy who, not solely by reason of the

weakness of her governors, lost strong positions in the Adriatic and the

Mediterranean, who did not obtain any colonies or raw materials, who is

literally crushed under the load of debts incurred in order to obtain

victory, and whose most sacred rights, even, were held in question? In

the conversations I intend to have with the Prime Ministers of England

and France, I mean to face clearly and in its entirety the question of

the Entente and Italy’s position within it.

As a result of this, alternatives will arise; either the Entente,

finding a way of settling her inward perplexities and contradictions,

will become a really solid homogeneous body, with evenly distributed

forces, with equal rights and equal duties, or her hour will have

struck, and Italy, regaining her freedom of action, will turn loyally

with a new policy to the work of safeguarding her interests.

I hope that the first eventuality will be realised, particularly in view

of the new uprising in the East and the growing intimacy between Russia,

Turkey and Germany. But, however it may be, we must get beyond

conventional phrases. It is time, in fact, to abandon diplomatic

expedients, which are renewed and repeated at every conference, in order

to deal directly with historical fact, by which alone it is possible to

decide one way or another the trend of events. Our foreign policy, which

aims at protection of our interests, respect of treaties and the

settling of our position in the Entente, cannot be described as

adventurous and imperialist, in the vulgar sense of the word. We want to

follow a policy of peace that will not, however, be at the same time

suicidal.

In order to refute the pessimists who expected catastrophic results to

follow upon the advent of the Fascisti to power, it is enough to remind

them that our relations with the Swiss are perfectly friendly, and that

a commercial treaty, already in the process of formation, will further

contribute towards strengthening them when it is completed; that they

are perfectly correct as regards Yugoslavia and Greece; we are on good

terms with Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania, and the other

Baltic States, where of late Italy has gained a great deal of sympathy,

and where we are trying to make commercial agreements; and on equally

good terms with the other States.

As far as Austria is concerned, Italy will keep faith as regards her

promises, and will not neglect to enter into economic relations with her

as well as with Hungary and Bulgaria.

We maintain, as regards Turkey, that what is now an accomplished fact

ought to be recognised as such at Lausanne, with the necessary

guarantees as to trade in the Straits, European interests and the

interests of the small Christian communities. The situation which has

arisen in Islam is going to be carefully watched. When Turkey has got

what belongs to her she must not try to obtain more. There will come a

day when it will be necessary to say, “Thus far and no further!” The

danger of complications in the Balkans, and in consequence in Europe in

general, can be avoided by firmness, which will have an increased effect

in proportion to the loyalty of the Allies’ conduct. We do not forget

that there are 44,000 Mohammedans in Roumania, 600,000 in Bulgaria,

400,000 in Albania, and 1,500,000 in Yugoslavia; a world which the

recent victory of the Crescent has exalted, at any rate secretly.

As far as Russia is concerned, Italy believes that the moment has come

to face the question of her relations with that country in their actual

reality; but this apart from internal conditions in that country, with

which we, as a Government, do not wish to interfere, since in our turn

we shall admit of no interference in our home affairs. In consequence we

are disposed to consider the possibility of a definite solution of the

situation. As regards the presence of Russia at Lausanne, Italy has

supported the most liberal point of view and does not despair of its

eventual triumph, although thus far she has only been invited to discuss

the single question of the Dardanelles.

Our relations with the United States are very good, and I shall make it

my care to see that they are improved, especially as regards a close

economic co-operation. A commercial treaty with Canada is on the point

of being signed. We are on cordial terms with the republics of Central

and South America, and especially with Brazil and the Argentine, where

millions of Italians live. They must not be denied the possibility of

taking part in the local political life around them, which will not

estrange them from, but rather bind them all the closer to their Mother

Country.

As for economic and financial problems, Italy will maintain in the

approaching conference at Brussels that debts and reparations form an

indivisible binomial.

In order to carry out this policy of dignity and regard for our national

interests, we need to have at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a central

staff competent to deal with the new necessities of the national life

and of the increased prestige of Italy in the world. (Applause.)

THE POLICY OF FASCISMO FOR ITALY: ECONOMY, WORK AND DISCIPLINE

Same speech delivered in the Chamber, 16th November 1922.

_Hon. Mussolini._ Honourable Members,—The policy we shall follow as

regards the country itself can be summed up in three words: economy,

work and discipline. The financial problem is a fundamental one, the

balancing of the State Budget must be accomplished as soon as possible

by a régime of careful administration, intelligence in the use of money,

the utilisation of all the productive forces of the nation and the

removal of the trappings of war. (Loud applause.) For further

information as regards the financial question, which, though serious, is

open to rapid improvement, I refer you to my colleague Tangorra,[11] who

will give you information when the financial measures are discussed.

Footnote 11:

Late Minister of Finance.

He who talks of work, talks of the productive middle classes in the

towns and in the country. It is not a question of privileges for the

first or for privileges for the second, but of the safeguarding of all

the interests which are in accordance with national production. The

proletariat which works, and whose well-being concerns us, though not

from weak demagogic motives, has nothing to fear, nothing to lose and

everything to gain from a financial policy which preserves the balance

of the State and prevents bankruptcy, which would have a disastrous

effect, especially among the humbler classes.

Our policy as regards emigration must free itself of an excessive

“paternalism,” while, at the same time, an Italian who emigrates must

know that his interests will be securely guarded by the representatives

of his country abroad. The growth of the prestige of a nation in the

world is in proportion to the discipline it shows at home. There is no

doubt that the internal condition of the country has improved, but it is

not yet as I should like to see it. I do not intend to indulge myself in

easy optimism. I am no lover of Pangloss. In the big cities, and in all

the towns in general, there is peace; instances of violence are sporadic

and peripheral; but, at the same time, these also must cease. The

citizens, no matter to what party they belong, shall have freedom of

movement; all religions shall be respected, with particular regard to

the dominant faith, Catholicism; statutory liberty shall not be

infringed and the law shall be made to be respected at all costs!

The State is strong and will prove its power equally where all classes

of citizens are concerned, including illegal Fascismo, because it would

now be irresponsible illegality and without any justification. I must

add, however, that almost all the Fascisti have submitted to the new

order of things. The State does not mean to abdicate for anyone, and

whoever opposes it must be punished. This explicit statement is a

warning to all citizens, and I know will be particularly pleasing to the

Fascisti, who have fought and won in order to have a State which would

make itself felt in every direction with inexhaustible energy. It must

not be forgotten that, besides the minority that represent actual

militant politics, there are forty millions of excellent Italians who

work, by their splendid birth-rate perpetuate our race, and who ask, and

have the right to obtain, freedom from the chronic state of disorder

which is the sure prelude to general ruin. Since sermons, evidently, are

not enough, the State will put the army it has at its disposal in order

by a process of selection and improvement. The Fascista State will form

a perfectly organised and united police force, of great mobility and

with a high moral standard; while the army and navy—glorious and dear to

every Italian heart—withdrawn from the vicissitudes of Parliamentary

politics, reorganised and strengthened, will represent the last reserve

of the nation both at home and abroad.

Gentlemen, from the last communication issued you will learn what the

Fascista programme is in detail with regard to each individual Ministry.

I do not wish, as long as it is possible to avoid it, to govern against

the wishes of the Chamber; but the Chamber must understand the peculiar

position it holds, which makes it liable to dismissal in two days or in

two years. (Laughter.) We ask for full powers, because we wish to take

full responsibility. Without full powers you know perfectly well that

not a penny—a penny I say—would be saved. By this we do not intend to

exclude the possibility of voluntary co-operation, which we shall

cordially accept, whether it be from deputies, senators or single

competent citizens. We have, every one of us, a religious sense of the

difficulty of our task. The country encourages us and waits. We shall

not give you further words but facts. Let us solemnly and formally

pledge ourselves to balance the Budget, and we shall do it. We wish to

have a foreign policy of peace, but, at the same time, it must be

dignified and firm; and we shall have it. None of our enemies, past or

present, need deceive themselves about the rapidity of our advent to

power. (Laughter; comments.) Our Government has a formidable hold upon

the hearts of the people and is supported by the best elements in the

country. There is no doubt that in these last days an enormous step has

been taken towards spiritual unity. The Italian nation has found herself

again, from the north to the south, from the Continent to those generous

islands which shall no more be forgotten—(Applause.)—from Rome to the

industrious colonies of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Gentlemen,

do not throw useless words at the nation; fifty-two requests to speak on

my lists is too much. Let us work, rather, with pure hearts and ready

brains to assure the prosperity and the greatness of the country.

And may God help me to carry my arduous task to a victorious end. (Loud

applause. Many deputies come down to congratulate the President.)

“CONSCIENTIOUS GENERAL DIAGNOSIS OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY AND

ITS FOREIGN POLICY”

Sitting of 27th November 1922, Senate.

_Hon. Mussolini._ Honourable Senators,—I have listened with deep

interest and attention to all the speeches touching upon various

subjects which have been delivered in this hall. The Ministers directly

concerned can answer to the different individual questions. I shall

limit myself to confuting some of the statements which can be said to be

of a general order. Of course if the vote of the Senate be unanimous, it

will please me—(Laughter.)—but you must not believe that unanimity

flatters me excessively. I entertain a thorough contempt for those who

have more or less clamorously sided with me in these last days. They are

so often the kind of people who follow the fair wind and are ready to

tumble headlong over to the other side when the wind changes direction.

(Laughter.) I prefer sincere enemies to doubtful friends.

Of the speeches delivered in this hall some have a particular

importance, as for instance that, generally optimistic, of Senator

Conti, which reminded me of the analogous speech, also optimistic,

delivered in the Chamber by the Hon. Buozzi. This favourable view of

economic conditions in Italy, coming thus from a head of the proletariat

and a head of the great Italian industries, is a curious coincidence and

certainly of good omen.

_A Neat Surgical Operation._ I owe a special answer to Senator

Albertini. I admire his firm faith in pure Liberalism, but I take the

liberty to remind him that Constitutionalism in England, Liberalism in

France, in fact all the ideas and doctrines which have in common the

name of Liberalism, spring out of a fierce revolutionary travail without

which, to-day, Signor Albertini would not, very probably, have been able

to pay these tributes to pure Liberalism.

How was it possible to find a way out of this internal crisis, which

every day was becoming more alarming and distressing? A temporary and

transitional Ministry was no longer possible. It did not solve the

problem, it hardly delayed it. Consequently in two, three or six months’

time at the most, with that mobility of opinions and desires that

characterised certain Parliamentary circles, we should have found

ourselves where we were at the beginning, with nothing gained but the

failure which would have aggravated the crisis. (Hear, hear!)

After having thought over the matter deeply, therefore, and having

clearly realised the ironic paradox, becoming every day more manifest,

of the existence of two States—one the actual State itself and the other

which nobody succeeded in defining—I said to myself at a certain moment

that only a neat surgical operation could make one compact State of the

two and save the fortunes of the nation.

Senator Albertini must not think that this decision was other than the

result of long meditation; he must not think that I had not well

considered all the dangers and risks of this illegal action. I willed it

deliberately. I dare to say more than this—I forced it on. To my mind

there was no other way except by revolution to revive a political class

grown enormously tired and discouraged in all its sections; and since

experience teaches something, or ought to teach something, to

intelligent men, I at once set limits and established rules for my

action. I have not gone beyond a certain point, I did not in the least

become intoxicated by victory, nor did I take advantage of it. Who could

have prevented me from closing Parliament? Who could have prevented me

from proclaiming a Dictatorship with two or three men? Who could

withstand me? Who could have withstood a movement which consisted not

only in 300,000 membership cards but in 300,000 rifles? Nobody. It was I

who, for love of our country, said that it was necessary to subordinate

impulse, sentiment and personal ambition to the supreme interests of the

nation; and it was I who put the movement at once on constitutional

lines.

I have formed a Ministry with men from all parties in the House. I did

not hesitate to include a member of the old Cabinet. I gave importance

to technical efficiency and paid no attention to political labels. I

formed a Coalition Ministry and I presented it to the Chamber. I asked

for its judgment and its vote and I found that Chamber a little changed.

But when I found out that not less than thirty-three orators had

presented thirty-six orders of the day, I said to myself that perhaps it

was not necessary to abolish Parliament, but that the country would be

glad to see it enjoying a holiday for a certain period. (Laughter.) I

have, therefore, no intention of dismissing the Chamber, of destroying

all the fruits of the Liberal revolution. I can boast of all this

philosophically from a point of view which might almost be called

negative. But philosophy must be silent in the face of political

necessity. Let us speak frankly! What is this Liberalism, this

Liberalism put into practice? Because if there is anyone who believes

that, to be a true Liberal, it is necessary to give some hundreds of

irresponsible people, fanatics and scoundrels, the power of ruining

forty millions of Italians, I refuse absolutely to give them this power.

(Applause.) Gentlemen, I have no fetishes, and where the interests of

the country are concerned the Government has the right to intervene. If

it did not do so, it would be inadequate the first time and the next

time suicidal.

_Respect for the Constitution._ I do not intend to deviate from the

Constitution or to improvise. The example of other revolutions has shown

me that there are some fundamental principles in the life of the people

that must be respected. (Hear, hear!) I do not intend that national

discipline shall be any longer merely a word. I do not intend that the

law shall be any longer a blunt weapon. (Hear, hear!) I do not intend

that liberty shall degenerate into licence. I do not intend, either, to

remain above the fray among those who love, who work for, and who are

ready to sacrifice themselves for the nation, or, on the other hand,

among those who are ready to do the reverse.

It was for just such a foolish “Rolandism” that this last Government

failed. One cannot remain above the fray when the moral forces which are

the foundation of the national community are at stake; and nobody can

say that a national policy, understood thus, is reactionary. For me all

these names of Left and Right, of Conservative, Aristocracy and

Democracy are so many empty academic terms. They serve occasionally to

distinguish, but more often to confuse.

I shall not follow an anti-proletariat policy, for reasons national, and

other than national. We do not want to oppress the proletariat; we do

not want to drive it back into humiliating conditions of life. On the

contrary we want to elevate it materially and spiritually; but not

because we think that the masses, the populace, could create a special

type of civilisation in the future. Let us leave this kind of ideology

to those who profess themselves to be ministers of this mysterious

religion. The reasons for which we wish to follow a policy of

proletarian welfare are quite different. They lie in the interests of

the nation; they are dictated by the reality of facts, by the conviction

that no nation can be united and at peace if twenty millions of workmen

are condemned to live in humiliating and inadequate conditions of life.

And it may be, nay, it is certain, that our labour policy—or rather

anti-demagogic policy, because we cannot promise the paradise we do not

possess—will ultimately prove to be much more useful to those same

working classes than the other policy which, like an oriental mirage,

has hypnotised and mystified them into a vain attitude of waiting.

(Approval.)

_The Military Organisation of Fascismo._ “What will you do with the

military organisation of Fascismo?” I have been asked. This military

organisation gave Rome an imposing spectacle. There were 52,000 “black

shirts,” and they left Rome within the twenty-four hours prescribed by

me. They obey. I dare even to go further and to say that they have the

mysticism of obedience! I do not intend to disperse these exuberant

forces, not only for the sake of Fascismo itself, but in the interests

of the nation. What I shall impose upon Fascismo is the discontinuance

of all the acts for which there is now no necessity—(Hear, hear!)—those

small, individual and collective acts of violence which are rather

humiliating to everyone, which are often the result of local situations

and could with difficulty be associated with the big problems of the

different Italian parties. I am sure that what might be called “illegal

Fascismo,” now happily on the decline, will soon end altogether. This is

one of the conditions of that pacification to which my friend Senator

Bellini alluded; but in order that this pacification may succeed, the

other side must also cease their ambushes and acts of violence.

_Foreign Policy._ I thank the Senate for not having dwelt too much on

foreign policy. I am particularly glad that Fascismo has universally

accepted with enthusiasm my firm decision as regards the application of

treaties, because if I do not allow illegality in internal policy, still

less shall I allow it in foreign affairs. (Hear, hear!) So let it be

clear to all inside this hall and out. Foreign policy will be in the

hands of one man alone, of the man who has the honour of representing

and directing it; because there cannot be an unlimited division and

diffusion of responsibility, and foreign policy is too difficult and

delicate a matter to be thrown as occupation to those who have nothing

better to do. (Laughter.)

I can then tell the Hon. Barzilai that I shall keep the Ministry for

Foreign Affairs for myself. At bottom the Ministry of the Interior is a

Ministry of Police, and I am glad to be the head of the police. I am not

in the least ashamed of it. On the contrary, I hope that all Italian

citizens, forgetting certain atavisms, will recognise in the police one

of the most necessary forces for the welfare of our social existence.

But, above all, I intend to follow a line of foreign policy which will

not be adventurous, while, at the same time, it will not be

characterised by self-sacrifice. (Strong approval.) Certainly miracles

are not to be expected in this field, as it is impossible to cancel in a

conversation, even in a dramatic one of half an hour, a policy which has

been the result of other conditions and of another period of time.

I think that foreign policy should have as its supreme aim the

maintenance of peace. This is a fine ideal, especially after a war that

has lasted four years. Our policy, therefore, will not be that of the

Imperialists who seek the impossible, while, at the same time, it will

not necessarily rest upon the negative formula according to which one

should never have recourse to force. It is well to keep the possibility

of war in sight; it cannot be discarded _a priori_, because in that case

we should find ourselves disarmed with the other nations in arms. (Great

applause.)

But I have no illusions, for, in accordance with my temperament, I

disdain all easy optimism. People who see things through rose-coloured

spectacles make me laugh; I often pity them. I think, however, I have

already succeeded in something, and in no small thing either, which will

have no small results. That is to say, I think I have succeeded in

making the Allies and other peoples of Europe, who had not yet attained

a true vision of Italy, see her as she really is. Not as something

vaguely prehistoric, not the Italy of monuments and libraries—all most

respectable things—but Italy as I see her born under my eyes, the Italy

of to-day, overflowing with vitality, prepared to give herself a new

lease of life, pregnant with serenity and beauty; an Italy which does

not live like a parasite on the past, but is prepared to build up her

own future with her own forces and through her own work and martyrdom.

This is the Italy which has now flashed, be it ever so vaguely, before

the eyes of the representatives of other nations, who henceforward must

be convinced, whether they wish it or not, that Italy does not intend to

follow in the wake of others, but intends to vindicate her rights with

dignity, and with no less dignity to protect her interests. (Approval.)

_God and the People._ I have been admonished in turn by all those who

have spoken in this hall. They have said to me: “The responsibility

which you take is enormously heavy.” Yes! I know it and I feel it.

Sometimes, intensified by a deep and vibrating expectancy, it almost

crushes me. At these times I have to gather all my force, to arm myself

with all my determination, in order to keep before me the interests and

the future of our country. Well I know that it is not my interests that

are at stake. Certainly, if I do not succeed I am a broken man. These

are not experiments that can be tried twice in a lifetime. But my person

is of little value. Not to succeed would not mean much to me personally,

but it would be infinitely serious for the nation. (Hear, hear!) I

intend to take the helm of the ship, and I do not intend to yield it to

anybody. But I shall not refuse to take on board all those who wish to

form my crew, all those who wish to work with me, who will give me

advice and suggestions, who will, in a word, give me their invaluable

and indispensable co-operation.

In the other Chamber I invoked the help of God. In this—and I hope my

words will not be taken as mere rhetoric—I shall invoke the Italian

people. In doing this I might feel that I was walking in the steps of

Mazzini, who made a union between God and the people. But if, as I hope

and earnestly desire, the people will be disciplined, laborious, and

proud of this their glorious country, I feel I shall not fail to arrive

at my goal! (Ovation; the Ministers and many Senators advance to

congratulate the orator.)

“I REMAIN THE HEAD OF FASCISMO, ALTHOUGH THE HEAD OF THE ITALIAN

GOVERNMENT”

Speech delivered in London, 12th December 1922, before the Fascisti.

Fascisti! You must feel that in this last month the Italian people have

raised themselves considerably in the eyes of all the other nations.

Everybody knows now that a new and vigorous Italy was born in those

historic days of October. Remember that the revolution was great, but

that it is not over, indeed that it has hardly begun. Hard tasks and

heavy responsibilities await us. I remain the head of Fascismo, although

the head of the Government. Beneath these official clothes, which I wear

as a duty, I shall keep the Fascista uniform, just as I wore it before

His Majesty when he summoned me to form a new Cabinet.

Fascista Italy, I assure you, is in very strong hands. All our enemies

know that every attempt at revolt will be inexorably crushed. The old

Italy is dead and will not come to life again. The men who gave their

lives in the war will prevent it; those who fell in the Fascista war, no

less sacred and necessary, will prevent it; the living will prevent it.

We, here and everywhere, are ready for any battle so that we may uphold

the foundations of our race and of our history. The time has come to

face serenely the sons of other nations. The era of renunciations and

obligations is past; the head of the Government tells you this. You

asked me to come here upon this occasion of the inauguration of the

London section of the Fascista Party. I present you with your banner;

keep it as you keep alive the flame of that faith for which so many fine

young men have died, keep it for the fortunes of Italy and Fascismo.

“OUR TASK IN HISTORY IS TO MAKE A UNITED STATE OF THE ITALIAN NATION”

Speech delivered 2nd January 1923, upon the occasion of the

Ministerial Reception in Palazzo Chigi at Rome, in answer to the

Hon. Teofilo Rossi, Minister of Industry and Commerce, who had

concluded his address to the President by saying: “The victorious

Greeks returning from Troy through the storm cried: ‘Nil desperandum

Teucro duce et auspice Teucro.’ We in our turn will say: ‘_Nil

desperandum_ while at the helm of the State there is a man like

Benito Mussolini.’”

Dear Colleagues,—Let me first of all say how happy I am that we should

have met in these magnificent rooms which furnish evidence of the

strength and beauty of our race, and are also a testimony of our

victory, as, if I am not mistaken, these were the apartments of an

enemy’s Embassy.[12]

Footnote 12:

Palazzo Chigi, at present Ministry for Foreign Affairs, formerly was

the seat of the Austrian Embassy to the Quirinal.

I was very much touched by the words spoken just now by our colleague

Rossi. The nation as a whole is not deceived, and follows with brotherly

sympathy the work of our Government. It is aware of the difficulties we

have to overcome: difficulties which arise from the double work of

demolition and reconstruction which we have undertaken simultaneously.

The nation, little by little, is being restored to order. There are more

than ten thousand communes in Italy, and there is no reason to fear a

catastrophe because there is a quarrel, without any particular positive

importance, in one of them during the critical days of Saturday and

Sunday.

All this does preoccupy me, however, and I intend by every means

possible to get the nation back into a state of general discipline that

will be above all sects, factions and parties.

There was an Italian people who had not yet become a nation; the travail

of fifty years of history and, above all, the last war has made them a

nation. The task in history which awaits us is this: to make a State of

this nation, that is to say, a moral idea which is personified and

expressed in a system of individual, responsible hierarchies composed of

men who, from the first to the last, feel it a pride and a privilege to

fulfil their duty.

This work, seen from the standpoint of historical development, cannot be

completed in two months and probably not even in two years. But this is

the direction in which our Government is working, and every decision we

make and every act we achieve is guided by the necessity of establishing

one united State, which will be the only depositary of our history and

of the future and the strength of the Italian nation.

It is a difficult and arduous undertaking. But life would not be worth

living if we did not face these tasks, and if we had not the

satisfaction of having met them all the more serenely for their

difficulty.

No! I am certain that we shall not frustrate the legitimate hopes of the

Italian people. We can and we will adopt a policy of wisdom and severity

towards the people and towards ourselves. We must foster the ideals of

the nation, and deal relentlessly with the slightest manifestation of

lack of discipline.

I, too, should like to quote from the tales of ancient Greece. When the

Spartan mothers presented their departing sons with their shields, it

was with these words: “Either with this or on it.” Now I should like our

programme to be inspired by this idea, for with this programme, and with

this only, shall we win.

Through our efforts, our work and our suffering will rise that powerful,

prosperous and peaceful Italy of which we dream, which we long for and

desire to see! Long live Italy!

THE ADVANCE IN THE RUHR DISTRICT

Speech delivered at Rome, 15th January 1923, before the members of the

Cabinet.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Colleagues,—The most important event of

these last few days in the international world has been the French

advance on the Ruhr. It is well to establish clearly the attitude of

Italy with regard to this advance, since, for political reasons and also

for reasons connected with the Stock Exchange, it has purposely not been

properly estimated.

It is necessary to go back to the Conference of Paris, and the rejection

of Bonar Law’s proposals on the part of Italy, France and Belgium, in

order to understand the line of conduct adopted by the Italian

Government. It is a fact that each one of the Powers in the Entente has

taken up an attitude of its own, due to its own particular conditions.

Without taking into consideration the Americans, who have withdrawn

their troops from the Rhine, this is the position of the Powers.

England has not joined with France, but has not decided, at any rate up

to the present, to recall her troops from German soil, nor has she

changed in her friendly attitude towards France, as was set forth by the

most recent communications from the Foreign Office.

France, interested in the problem of reparations, has, upon the basis of

the deliberations of the Commission appointed to enquire into this

question, sent into the Ruhr a Board of Control for the production of

coal and, later, troops for the purpose of protection.

Belgium has afforded France some military co-operation and undivided

political support.

Italy has only given political and technical support, sending her

engineers to the Ruhr. Our country could not isolate herself without

committing a very grave mistake. She could not exclude herself entirely

from any operation of control taking place in a region of coalfields,

and, therefore, of fundamental importance in European and Italian

economics.

As regards the project for a continental alliance directed against

England, such an idea simply does not exist. The Italian Government

never suggested such a thing, and, in any case, would never have been

able to consider the possibility of a continental union against England,

both on account of her importance in the economic life of the Continent

and of existing relations between Italy and that country.

It is true, on the contrary, that the Italian Government had advised

France to limit, as far as possible, the military character of the

advance in the Ruhr district, and not to reject all possibilities of

agreement in this burning question. But if this understanding, which

would give peace to Europe, were to be realised, it is the opinion of

Italy that it could not come about without the co-operation of England.

Italy, which has no coal, cannot afford the luxury of renunciations and

isolation, but it is as well to make it clear—because it is the

truth—that Italian policy upon this occasion, as upon all others, is

inspired by considerations of a general nature, as decided in the

Memorandum of London, for the protection of Italian interests and of

European economics generally. The Italian Government thinks that if

there is a possibility of agreement—and it works in this direction—it

would be a grave mistake on the part of Germany to refuse it.

It seems as if a _détente_ between the French command and some of the

industrial magnates of the Ruhr district has already taken place. As for

the mass of the workmen, it appears as if they do not intend to put

insuperable difficulties in the way of the work of control.

The payment of the quota for the 15th January is postponed until the end

of the month. There are, therefore, fifteen days of useful time,

sufficient to mend the situation. It does not seem improbable that the

French will support the Italian project presented at London upon the

subject of reparations.

As for the attitude of the Soviet Government, it appears to be very

circumspect, and has not changed from that previously manifested, though

only in words, towards the German proletariat.

From Lausanne comes satisfactory news. I have the pleasure of announcing

that, in some of the very delicate questions which seemed to be leading

to a rupture, such as that of minorities, if an agreement has been

reached, it has been due to the wise and level-headed work of the

Italian Delegation.

(Without discussion, the declarations of the Prime Minister are

unanimously approved.)

_The Great Fascista Council._ My colleagues in the Cabinet will

certainly have read with attention the deliberations of the Great

National Council of the Fascisti, and have noticed the importance of

their character.

It is an essentially political organisation, which, however, does not

encroach in any way upon the sphere of action of the Government,

represented by the Cabinet. In fact none of the legislative measures

passed or to be passed by the Cabinet were made the subject of

discussion by the Fascista Council. All its decisions are of a purely

political nature. Thus they have definitely settled the character of the

national militia. They have constituted the organisation which is to

establish relations between Fascisti and Nationalists, as well as those

between Fascismo and the other parties which loyally co-operate with the

Government and the organisations of employers already in existence

before the formation of the analogous Fascista groups.

Important also is the vote by which the associations of ex-soldiers

(including the disabled) who have entered the sphere of the State have

been asked to give men for the purposes of administration. The

declaration of loyal devotion to the Monarchy is both magnificent and

solemn, and dispels every little misunderstanding of interested dabblers

in politics on that score, for whom the warning that closed the

proceedings of the Great Council came opportunely—the warning, that is

to say, that the Government—note, the Government—will inexorably crush

every attempt at direct or indirect opposition to its authority.

The Great Fascista Council has also sent messages to the working people

of Italy, who are in the process of re-establishing active discipline

amongst themselves, and who accept the provisions of the Government,

even the hardest, because they are sure that they are inspired by purely

national necessity.

Thus the essentially historic function of the Great Fascista Council at

this moment is clearly outlined. The Council will support and safeguard

the action of the Government, and perform in the party and in the nation

the work of general political orientation which must serve as a base for

the work of the Government itself. (The Council of Ministers approves

the declarations of the Prime Minister.)

THE GOVERNMENT OF SPEED

Speech delivered at Rome, 19th January 1923, at the headquarters of the

Motor Transport Company.

_Hon. Mussolini._ I warmly thank Commendatore De Cupis and all the

workmen—I was going to say my colleagues—for the warm welcome I have

received. If my minutes were not numbered, I should like, here in the

presence of the “controllers of the steering wheel,” to sing the praises

of speed, in this the epoch of speed. The times in which we live no

longer allow of a sedentary egoistical life; everything must be on the

go, everybody must raise the standard of his activity, both in the

offices and in the factories where the work is done—(Applause.)—and the

Government, which I have the honour to represent, is the Government of

speed, that is to say, we get rid of all that is stagnant in our

national life.

Formerly the bureaucracy dozed over deferred decisions, to-day it must

proceed with the maximum of rapidity. (Applause.) If we all go ahead

with this energy, good-will and cheerfulness we shall surmount the

crisis, which for that matter is already partly overcome.

I am pleased to see that Rome also is waking up and can offer us sights

such as these works. I maintain that Rome can become an industrial

centre. The Romans must be the first to disdain to live solely upon

their memories. The Coliseum and the Forum are glories of the past, but

we must build up the glories of to-day and of to-morrow. We belong to

the generation of builders who, by work and discipline, with hands and

brains, desire to reach the ultimate and longed-for goal, the greatness

of the future nation, which will be a nation of producers and not of

parasites.

THE MARCH OF EVENTS ON THE RUHR THE POSITION OF ITALY

Speech delivered at Rome, 23rd January 1923, before the Cabinet.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Colleagues,—Since the last meeting of

the Cabinet, the situation on the Ruhr has become more complicated, and

this also from the social point of view, as the result of the closing

down of the factories and the outbreak of strikes in the mines and

public services of the occupied zones.

In order to understand the attitudes of the different Powers and the

fact that these attitudes have not undergone any changes worthy of note,

it is necessary to summarise briefly the events of these last few days

of high tension, political and economic.

The period of time granted for the Moratorium having elapsed on 15th

January, France and Belgium have caused a Mission of Control to be sent

to the mines in the Ruhr district, escorted by protecting troops, and

have extended the area of territory occupied in the Ruhr district as far

as Dortmund. On 16th January the French Government gave notice that the

industrial magnates on the Ruhr had declared that they had received

orders from the German Government not to hand over any more coal. The

German Minister for Foreign Affairs himself communicated these

instructions to our Ambassador at Berlin.

France and Belgium were not, therefore, receiving any more coal, even

when payment was made in advance. In the face of the German resistance,

the French and Belgian troops have proceeded to requisition the coal

deposits at the pitheads, the factories and the railway stations, and

have also taken other serious steps of a political and military order.

Italian experts, sent only to take part in economic operations of

control, received orders to limit their co-operation to that which

concerned coercive measures of a political nature.

Such an attitude was clearly faced and decided in Paris. On the strength

of the decision made on 26th December by the Commission of Reparations,

which reported the failure of Germany, as regards Italy also, to supply

wood, France and Belgium decided to proceed to the exploitation of the

Crown and Communal forests in the Rhine territory. Germany had, besides,

made it known that coal supplies and cattle would be refused to France

and Belgium, by way both of reparation and restitution.

The Commission of Reparations in its decision of 16th January verified

this intentional failure on the part of Germany from the 12th January,

and notified it to the Government. As a result of this, France and

Belgium decided to take possession of the west customs frontier of

Germany in the occupied zone. The Italian Government took over control

of the customs and also of the forests, this being included among the

measures which the Italian Memorandum had reserved as a security in the

case of the concession of the Moratorium; but it asked the French

Government what was going to be the extent to which the action was to be

carried. The French Government replied that the occupation of the Ruhr

was not of a military character, but was for the protection of French

technical bodies, which were very numerous in the occupied area. The

Italian Delegate, who was already on the High Commission of the Rhine,

which directs the exploitation and also the control of the mines, has

received orders to take part in those deliberations which have an

economic and financial character, and to abstain from attending those

which are political.

As I said before, the attitudes of the Great Powers have not altered to

any great extent. England seems officially uninterested in what happens

on the Ruhr, but this has not prevented the English Representative on

the Rhine High Commission from declaring in the name of his Government

that he will be present at the deliberations, abstaining from recording

his vote when he thinks it best; but he adds, also, that his Government

will not oppose the carrying out of the provisions in the zone occupied

by the English troops which still remain on the Rhine. As you see, it is

not England’s intention to accentuate the difference between her policy

and that which is, at present, adopted by France.

Mediation on the part of Italy was spoken of, which might have led later

to a direct Anglo-Italian intervention, both at Berlin and Paris. An

offer of real mediation does not exist, and could not be made without

the certainty that it would be accepted with a certain favour. It would

be a grave mistake to expose Italian policy to a failure of this sort.

It is a fact that the Italian Government did warn the Germans of the

danger of the blind-alley situation in which she has voluntarily placed

herself, and in which she seems determined to stay. She also called the

attention of France, in a friendly manner, to the complications, not

only economic but also political and social, which might arise from the

occupation of the Ruhr.

_The Work of the Italian Government._ Matters standing thus, the Italian

Government cannot at present change its attitude, because no step it

took now would alter the general situation or exercise a preponderating

influence in the decisions of the Governments most involved. The opinion

of the Italian Government is that the situation on the Ruhr has not yet

reached the stage at which a solution must necessarily be found, and

only when that moment arrives will it be able, perhaps, to have an

influence on the situation itself.

As for the Moratorium which President Poincaré has decided to propose to

the Germans, in view of the fast approaching date of payment, 31st

January, it is worthy of note that it will include some of the points

made in the Italian Memorandum of London, namely the two years’

Moratorium and the German internal loan.

As far as America is concerned, having once withdrawn her troops from

the Rhine, she has not altered her policy of neutral inactivity.

One understands that the events in the Ruhr district have caused a

general uneasiness over the whole of Europe, especially in the countries

which form the Little Entente. Rumours which spoke of mobilisation and

the concentration of troops upon some of the frontiers have proved

unfounded and exaggerated. As regards Russia, beyond reports of certain

political activities on the part of the Third International, carried on

with a view to taking advantage socially of the events on the Ruhr,

there is no definite news of serious preparations for military

intervention on a large scale. At Lausanne, the reaction of the

situation on the Ruhr is being felt, and is arousing an increased

intransigence on the part of Turkey.

To sum up: The policy of Italy must be inspired first of all by the

defence of her own interests, though, at the same time, due note must be

taken of considerations and needs of a general order. It is a question

whether, by a more exact valuation of the conditions put forward in the

Italian Memorandum of London, the grave complications which exist to-day

would not have been avoided. At any rate the Italian Government will

take careful and speedy measures to avoid any further difficulties and

re-establish as soon as possible a release of tension throughout Europe,

which might make it possible to face the problem of reparations and

debts under other conditions.

(The Cabinet at the end express entire approval of the line of foreign

policy adopted by the Prime Minister.)

THE RUHR, THE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE AND THE PORT OF MEMEL

Speech delivered at Rome, 1st February 1923, before the Cabinet.

_The Prime Minister._ With reference to foreign affairs, the situation,

as far as Italy is concerned, cannot be said to have altered much in the

interval which has elapsed between the last Cabinet meeting and to-day.

The German resistance on economic grounds has provoked aggravation of

the measures—both military and political—which are being taken by France

and Belgium, but from which Italy, following her previous line of

conduct, has kept apart.

The complications which were—or could have been—feared, so far have not

occurred. Fresh factors have not entered into the close duel which is

being fought on the Ruhr. Russia has not altered her attitude as a

State, although the dominating party continues to give clamorous verbal

demonstrations of solidarity with the German proletariat.

The serious disquietude which had been manifested by the Powers of the

Little Entente is diminishing. There had been rumours—more or less

without foundation and spread, perhaps, with the object of producing

complications—of plans for repeating in Hungary what France had done on

the Ruhr, which were attributed to one State or another. These have

given Italy the opportunity of confirming and clearly establishing her

attitude of opposition to any movement which could extend the conflict

to other zones or give the opportunity of attacking the validity of the

treaties of peace already concluded.

The Italian Government has been and is following attentively the coal

situation on the Ruhr, above all as regards its reaction on other

events. I can say that all internal measures, reduction of the train

services, including those from abroad, and contracts for fresh supplies,

have been quickly and diligently carried through, because, whatever may

happen, no paralysis of our industrial activity or of our communications

must result. In connection with the supplies of raw materials, I have

the pleasure to announce to the Cabinet that the Italian Government has

succeeded in concluding a favourable agreement with the Polish

Government for oil.

As I said last time, the events on the Ruhr have had the most serious

consequences in the developments at the Conference of Lausanne, which

has now arrived at its last stage. The Italian Delegation has carried

out successful work there with the object of obtaining peace in the

East.

The Italian Government has not been among the last to recognise the

legitimate rights of Turkey, and thinks to-day that it would not be in

her interests to entrench herself in a position of absolute

intransigence. It may be that Turkey has not realised the extensive

programme that was laid down by the Grand National Assembly of Angora,

but it cannot be denied that a great part of that programme has been put

into execution, since the Turks from Angora have returned not only to

Smyrna but to Constantinople and Adrianople, and have got their way, it

can be said, in questions of the highest importance, such as that of the

domination of the Straits and that of Capitulations.

Taken as a whole, although the general situation continues to be very

critical, there seems to be a small ray of light upon the horizon. The

action of the Italian Government is directed decidedly towards a policy

of general peace.

As regards the question of Memel, the Italian Government has pursued a

temperate policy, inspired by principles of equity and justice. It is

not possible to do less than recognise the rights of Lithuania over that

port, but the Lithuanian Government cannot be allowed to substitute

itself for the Allied Powers in deciding its fate.

We, then, have remained in an attitude of solidarity with the Allies in

the measures taken for facing the situation there. But we have, on the

other hand, tried effectively to reduce those measures to the necessary

minimum, avoiding those of such a nature as to provoke further

complications.

RATIFICATION OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY OF NAVAL DISARMAMENT

Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of 6th February 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Members,—I do not think that it is

worth while losing time in a general discussion upon the qualities of

men, good and bad, and upon the question as to whether the war of 1914

will be the last or the one before the last. That would be perfectly

idle and would only lead to academic discussions. Let us, instead, turn

our attention more practically to the Project of Law which I have

presented.

The Convention of Washington was closed a year ago. Now the delay in the

ratification of the treaty on the part of Italy has already had

ambiguous and, I should almost say, unfavourable consequences in the

international world. It will be a good thing, then, to proceed at once

to complete this act.

The Conference at Washington shared the fate of all the conferences. It

opened with great hopes, flashing before our eyes the possibility of

eternal peace. Then the concrete results frustrated these hopes. I

confess that I do not believe in perpetual and universal peace. In the

life of the peoples, notwithstanding ideals—noble and worthy of

respect—there exist the permanent factors of race, and the greatness and

decadence of nations, which lead to differences often only settled by a

recourse to arms. Now it is not a case of weighing these conventions

with a view to peace; they represent a breath, a pause, and it is

useless to enquire if they have been laid down for idealistic or for

business reasons. In any case I declare that Italy did well to adhere to

this Convention. If she had not done so, we should have appeared in the

eyes of the world as Imperialists and jingoists, which is far from what

we have in our hearts and minds. The fact that the Government asks the

Chamber for this ratification gives an idea of the general trend of the

Fascista foreign policy. (Applause.)

(The ratification of the Treaty is approved of without discussion, only

the Communists being against it.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HON. MUSSOLINI TO THE ITALIANS IN AMERICA UPON THE

OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE LAYING OF CABLES

BETWEEN ITALY AND THE AMERICAN CONTINENT

The National Government, which has worked indefatigably for three months

to set the country going upon the path to better fortunes, has in these

days signed the Convention for the laying of cables which are to put our

country into communication with you, who represent it in the numerous,

rich and patriotic colonies beyond the Atlantic.

The enthusiasm for this work, so necessary to our life as a great

nation, seemed at one time to have died down, but to-day with the rise

of youth upon the scenes of Italian politics, that which it seemed would

be relegated to some remote future has been transformed into a concrete

and almost immediate reality. It is not you, who suffer almost more than

any the pangs of homesickness for our adored country, who need to be

shown the usefulness and necessity of this undertaking, which will be

carried through in the shortest space of time possible. It will render

frequent, daily and, above all, free the communications between the

forty million Italians who live in our beautiful peninsula and the six

millions who live beyond the ocean. All the Italians who can give

financial and moral support must co-operate so that the undertaking may

succeed. The Italian Government does not appeal in vain to its emigrant

citizens, because it knows that distance makes the love of their country

stronger and more intense.

The cables, which in two or three years will bind together Italy and the

Americas across the boundless ocean, are like a gigantic arm which the

country stretches out to her distant sons to draw them to her and to

make them share more intimately her griefs and her joys, her work, her

greatness and her glory.

MUSSOLINI.

ROME, _6th February 1923_.

FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE TREATY OF RAPALLO

Prefatory remarks to the Deputies, 8th February 1923, accompanying

the Project of Law presented by the Hon. Mussolini, Minister for

Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Members,—Last November I began my

statement to Parliament of the programme of the National Government as

regards foreign policy with the following words:

“The fundamental principle upon which our foreign policy is based is

that treaties of peace, once signed and ratified, must be carried out

whether they are good or bad. A self-respecting nation cannot follow

another course. Treaties are not eternal or irreparable; they are

chapters and not epilogues in history; to put them into practice means

to try them. If in the course of execution they are proved to be absurd,

this in itself may constitute the new element which may open the

possibility of a further examination of the respective positions.”

The preceding Government had undertaken to present to Parliament the

Agreements concluded at Santa Margherita, and signed at Rome on the 23rd

October last. This undertaking I now fulfil.

These Agreements, contrary to what has been stated by someone, do not

contain any new political pledges on the part of Italy, but regulate the

relations between the Commune of Zara and the surrounding territory of

Dalmatia, make clear some recognised rights on the part of citizens who

are Italian by option, and endeavour, by means of friendly agreements,

to find a possibility of giving and assuring a peaceful and industrious

life to the troubled city of Fiume.

Owing to the way in which it is drawn up—whether on account of its

diffuseness in those clauses which touch upon territorial questions, and

its brevity in others, or whether on account of the seeming precedence

given to the task of the commissions which ought, according to the

letter of the treaty itself, to proceed exclusively to the settlement of

territorial questions, while for the commissions to which were entrusted

the settlement of other questions, limits were established, _a priori_,

of a certain amplitude (Art. VI.)—the Treaty of Rapallo has given

Yugoslavia the opportunity of maintaining that it was necessary first to

effect the evacuation of the territories over which the sovereignty of

the Serbo-Croat-Slovak Kingdom had been recognised, and then of

proceeding to the stipulations of the agreements for the regulation of

the new relations between the two countries.

They tried to justify this with arguments of a political nature. That is

to say, they saw, in the first place, that the opposition met with in

various Italian political spheres to the transactions concluded at

Rapallo had stirred up the discontent and opposition of the Yugoslavs to

the treaty; secondly, that the suspended execution of the Territorial

Clauses, evidently attributed to some Italian parties, had given the

impression to the Yugoslavs that Italy did not want to proceed to the

carrying out of the treaty; thirdly, that, in consequence, the

parliamentary opposition to a policy of friendliness towards Italy had

become very marked, and rendered extremely difficult the adoption of

direct provisions for the favourable regulation of these relations; and

lastly, that if, instead, the prearranged course had been followed—that

of proceeding, say, first to the evacuation of the territories—a radical

change of position would have been realised, which would have allowed of

the conclusion of more favourable agreements.

In Italy, on the other hand, the discontent was increased by an idea,

entertained by many, that the new State, which had also arisen as the

result of Italy’s victorious war, ought to give to the citizens, and in

Italian interests, privileges no less great than those granted by the

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, not taking into account that a national

State, newly formed, may have particular exigencies and

susceptibilities. The contrast of such opposite tendencies ended by

creating in the relations between the two countries an atmosphere of

uneasiness, which has at times reached an acute stage. And in Italy, the

intransigence of some circles found justification, above all, in the

weakness of the Governments, inasmuch as they had ground for fearing

that all our rights would be trodden underfoot the moment we no longer

had tangible securities in our hands. By the Agreements which are now

handed to us, the Government of Belgrade has recognised the necessity of

determining the régime which will have to regulate the reciprocal

relations of the new boundaries before passing to the definite execution

of the Territorial Clauses.

As for the substance of the Agreements, it is my conviction that their

greater or less efficacy will depend upon the spirit in which they are

carried out, because never, perhaps, has it been so true, as in this

case, that the most perfect pacts become empty formulas if a doubtful or

hostile spirit is brought to their execution.

I observe, in conclusion, that the uncertainty which has been manifested

in the foreign policy of Italy as regards the Treaty of Rapallo has

created a situation unfavourable to her, often preventing her from

taking a decided attitude, which would have been in her interest, in

most essential questions of a general nature, and making her appear in a

light contradictory to her position as a Great Power.

My intense, though brief, experience of Government has shown me that it

is not possible to carry out a strong foreign policy without having

decisive and clearly defined attitudes as regards the other States.

Italy must get away from this weak situation, must regain her full

liberty and efficiency of action also in this sphere. We shall,

therefore, carry out the treaty resolutely and loyally, exacting its

scrupulous observance. We shall watch over this as is our right and

duty. And we wait for time to pass definite judgment upon the soundness

and the fate of to-day’s Conventions.

With this understanding, I ask you, Honourable Members, to approve of

the following Project of Law:

“Full and entire execution is given to the Agreements and Conventions

signed at Rome on 23rd October 1921, between the Kingdom of Italy and

the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes for the execution

of the Treaty of Rapallo of 12th November 1920.”

THE AGREEMENTS OF SANTA MARGHERITA, ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA

Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of 10th February 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Members,—With the approval of the

Agreements of Santa Margherita, there came to an end what might be

called “the Foreign Policy week” of the Italian Government; a week that

might also be called pacific, since it began with the ratification of

the Convention of Washington, which represents a pause in the great

naval armament, and ends with the approval of the Agreements of Santa

Margherita, which are the consequence of the Treaty of Rapallo already

ratified and partly carried out.

In closing this week of the life of Parliament, I realise that the

Chamber has done good work, and that it has during this session

undoubtedly raised, in some ways, its prestige in the country.

(Comments.) The questions with which the Chamber has dealt are large;

they are not concerned with treaties and bills of minor importance, as

some have said.

I refuse to embark, as was attempted on the Left, upon the usual

discussions of a general character which do not conclude anything. While

I am on this bench, the Chamber will not be changed into an electoral

meeting.

_No Discussion._ There is nothing to discuss as regards home policy;

that which happens, happens because it is my direct and clear desire and

in accordance with my precise orders, and for which I naturally assume

full personal responsibility. (Comments.)

It is useless, therefore, to go to the police officials, because the

orders are mine. It does not affect me to know of the existence of a

plot, in the sense usually attributed to that word; this will be settled

by competent authorities. But there are those who thought that they

would fight with impunity against the State and Fascismo. By now they

must be disillusioned; and they will be more so in the future. The

difference between the Liberal and Fascista States consists precisely in

this: that the Fascista State does not defend itself only, but attacks,

and those who intend to slander it abroad and to undermine its authority

at home must be warned that their manœuvres bring with them unforeseen

consequences. The enemies of the Fascisti must not be surprised if I

treat them severely as enemies.

As regards the speech of Filippo Turati, my old fighting scent did not

deceive me when a few days ago I refused the advances which came to me

from that quarter through Gregorio Nofri, who, having been in Russia,

felt the overpowering necessity of becoming anti-Bolshevist. Strayed

sheep do not enter my fold. I am still faithful to my old tactics. I do

not seek anybody. I do not refuse anybody. I put faith above all in my

own forces. This is why, lately—after the meeting of the Great Fascista

Council—I desired that there should be a closer union with those parties

with which, fighting on national ground, friendly relations can be

established for common work. But all this, let it be said at once, has

not been done for parliamentary purposes, but for the sake of cohesion,

unity and the pacification of the country.

I agree wholly with that which the Hon. Cavazzoni said yesterday with

regard to the eight-hour day. I declared, before a meeting of eight

hundred printers, that the eight-hour day represents an inviolable

conquest on the part of the working classes. To-day there are those who

dream of setting on foot a long discussion because opposing ideas are

attributed to this and that member of the Cabinet. I give definite

notice that the Government, in one of its forthcoming meetings, will

decide once and for all the question of the eight-hour day. This having

been said, and I hope that everybody will understand also the sense of

all I have not said, I pass on to the subject of foreign policy.

_A Circumspect Policy of Activity._ In the meantime, I cannot accept the

statement of the Hon. Lucci, who makes out that I am original. In the

first place, he must give me time. In the second, there is no

originality in foreign affairs, and I refuse to be original, if this

originality would result in the slightest damage to my country.

(Applause.) And I cannot accept, either, his too idealistic point of

view. I see the world as it really is, that is to say, a world of

unbounded egoism. If the world was Arcadia, it would be pleasant to

amuse oneself with nymphs and shepherds; but I do not see anything of

all this, and even when the more or less respectable standards of great

principles are displayed, I see behind them interests which seek for a

footing in the world. If all foreign policy were brought into the region

of pure idealism, it would certainly not be Italy who would refuse to

join in. But it is not so; hence all that the Hon. Lucci says belongs to

the music of the most distant spheres. (Laughter.)

When I first took up my position on this bench, there was a moment of

trepidation in certain sections of international politics. It was

thought that the advent to power of Fascismo would mean, at the very

least, war with Yugoslavia. After a few months, international opinion is

fully reassured. The foreign policy of Fascismo cannot be, especially in

these historic times, other than extremely circumspect, though at the

same time very active.

The nation, having issued from the splendid and blood-stained travail of

the war, is now fully intent on the work of building up its political,

economic, financial and moral life. To compel it to make an effort which

was not absolutely necessary, would be to follow an anti-national and

suicidal policy. At London, as at Lausanne, Italian foreign policy has

pursued this direction; at Lausanne, above all, the work of the Italian

Delegation has been highly appreciated. If peace was not concluded

there, it was not the fault, in any way, of Italy.

On the other hand, it is not good to speak too pessimistically of the

development of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean. It must not be

thought that a certain harmless showing of teeth, sometimes the result

of reciprocal restlessness, means the beginning of a war. I think that

if Greece is prudent and the Entente remains firmly united—as in the

case of their ships in the port of Smyrna—that Turkey too, since she has

realised a large part of the programme laid down at Angora, will become

reasonable. There is no reason, therefore, to fear military

complications in Europe. Still Italy will keep a careful look-out that

the disturbances resulting upon the events in the Ruhr district shall

not have serious consequences among the countries of the Danube basin.

The situation on the Ruhr is stationary. I declare once again that Italy

could not have followed a different line of policy. The time for fine

gestures is past, as they are useless. The attitude which was advocated

by certain elements on the Left would have been equally useless. We

could not have prevented the French from marching on the Ruhr, and we

might have encouraged the German resistance. Also the other plan of our

mediation could not have been carried out, because no mediation of any

kind is possible if it is not asked for and welcomed. (Applause.)

Besides, England has limited herself to non-technical participation in

the operations on the Ruhr, but has not pushed her difference of opinion

with France to the point of withdrawing her troops from the Rhine. It is

opportune to add that France has not asked us, up to now, for formal and

concrete assistance. Should this happen, it is evident that Italy should

reserve to herself the right of exposing all the complex system of the

relations between the two countries. (Loud applause.)

_The Last Phase of the Adriatic Drama._ As to the Agreements of Santa

Margherita, of which the Chamber is asked to approve, they represent the

last phase of our sad and lamentable Adriatic drama. I could here reply

in detail, I could show the Hon. Chiesa, for example, how only

yesterday, 9th February, I received a telegram from Belgrade to this

effect: “The Ministry of Yugoslavia communicates that orders have been

sent to the authorities of Spalato that the premises of the school shall

be evacuated and put at the disposal of the school itself, and that the

house which adjoins the Church of Santo Spirito shall be emptied and

handed over.” I could correct other inaccuracies, but it is not my

business, it is not worth while to descend to the discussion of detail.

I am always of the opinion that this Convention must be carried out in

order to test it. At the same time, I do not feel like defending, at too

great a length, a treaty of which I did not approve when it was

concluded, and which I still hold to be, as regards a great many of its

clauses, absurd and harmful to Italian interests. But matters, to-day,

stand thus: either the treaty must be definitely enforced or denounced.

Since, in present conditions, it cannot be denounced, for that would

mean the reopening of all difficulties, there remains nothing but its

loyal and scrupulous application on our part, as loyal and scrupulous as

the application on the part of Belgrade will have to be. (Applause.)

To wait indefinitely for events which may occur is the worst of systems

at this moment. It is necessary to put an end to a situation which has

become unbearable and which gave us all the disadvantages without

assuring us of what might be the advantages of clearly defined

relations. Moreover it is difficult to understand why the Treaty of

Rapallo, of all the treaties which have been made from the beginning of

history, should be the only one irreparable and perpetual. No treaty has

ever withstood new conditions of affairs developed by the progress of

time. The essential thing, to my mind, is to place ourselves in such a

position that an eventual revision will enable us to vindicate our

eternal rights with dignity and power. (Applause.)

_The Government in favour of Fiume and Zara._ By the application of the

Agreements of Santa Margherita the Fascista Government gives a solemn

proof of its probity, its spirit of decision and of absolute loyalty.

Belgrade must do the same. Yugoslavia must take into account the

intrinsic value of this act, and follow, where the Italians who remain

in Dalmatia are concerned, a policy of freedom and judicious action; as

a policy which would tend to suppress the Italian element in Dalmatia

would not be tolerated by the Fascista Government. (Applause.) By the

ratification of these Agreements the Government offers Yugoslavia the

opportunity of furthering the economic relations between the two

countries.

The Government, which has already done all it can, within the limits of

its possibilities, for Fiume and Zara, will continue to work with the

utmost energy and diligence for these two cities. The evacuation of

Susak having been carried out—and of Susak only, because the Delta and

Porto Baros will still be occupied by our troops until Fiume has become

juridically a perfect State—Italy will continue to interest herself in

the fate of Fiume, so that she may be restored in a short time to her

ancient splendour.

As for Zara, her destiny is serious and difficult, and I, for one,

understand the tragedy of that city and the suffering of all the

Italians scattered in Dalmatia up as far as Cattaro. But Zara, the

sentinel of Dalmatia, is ready to bear, with the spirit of absolute

national discipline, the completion of the last act of the Adriatic

drama.

The Government will meet its needs immediately, because Zara must live,

because Zara beyond the Adriatic represents one of the most vital

portions of the Italian people. And the people of Zara and Dalmatia may

be sure that the Government will watch over their fate with the most

loving care. These are not merely words spoken to help them through this

difficult time; deeds will follow them.

As for public, national opinion, it is unanimous in feeling that these

Agreements had to be applied in order that Italy might be free in the

ever closer international competition, free to carry out a policy of

defence of her interests and free to influence with increasing activity

the course of events. I think that the best part of the Italian people

agree in this line of home and foreign policy. (Applause.)

QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE SENATE. THE RUHR; FIUME; ZARA AND

DALMATIA

Sitting of the Senate, 16th February 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Senators,—After having written the

prefaces and the introductions to the Bills, and after the speech made

in the other branch of Parliament, I do not think that there remains

much to say.

The very rapidity of the discussion itself bears witness to the fact

that all these treaties and agreements are already, in a certain sense,

superseded. By this I do not wish to deny their importance, but it is a

question of treaties and conventions of some time back, and life to-day

moves at a very great rate. I do not disguise the fact that in

continuing the eternal theory of conferences, people have reason to show

a certain scepticism about the likelihood of results. (Laughter.)

_Why Italy intervenes._ Senator Crespi tried to carry the discussion

on to general ground—the burning ground of debts and reparations. He

demands new pacts; but there are none. Perhaps there cannot be any.

With reference to a recent appeal for Italy’s intervention in this

matter, if responsible members of Governments, and especially those

engaged or interested in the conflict, turned to Italy, the only

nation in the world which, at this moment, is following a policy of

peace—(Applause.)—I should not hesitate one moment in answering the

appeal.

There is a new factor, Senator Crespi, which it would be a good thing to

take into consideration, though it is one which tends to stifle rather

than arouse enthusiasm. It is that England and the United States have

come to an agreement. England has undertaken to pay her debts to

America. It is no good, therefore, for us to entertain too many

illusions about the likelihood of a cancellation of our debts. It would

be perfectly just, I think, from the strictly moral point of view; but

the criteria and principles of absolute morality do not as yet guide the

relations of the peoples. (Approval.)

It was said in a foreign Parliament that Italy had attempted to mediate

between France and Germany. No such attempt was ever made. My duty was

to make investigations in the European capitals, and I have done so. But

having gathered that there was no possibility of proceeding in that

direction, I drew back, as to continue would have been a great mistake.

I think, however, that the crisis has reached its culminating point. It

is a question now of knowing whether the Entente still exists and still

will exist. (Comments.)

I do not think that I shall be revealing secrets if I say here what

meets the eye of anyone who reads the daily news in the papers. Not a

single event has occurred, not a single question arisen, without the

problem of the unity of action of the Entente having been brought

forward. Of necessity in this political situation there can be no

improvised action and still less originality. All foreign policies, not

excluding that of Russia, which is simply terrifying in form and method,

are of a cautious and circumspect nature at this moment. There is no

reason why Italy should follow a different course. When it is a question

of the interests of our nation and of forty million inhabitants who have

the right to live, it is necessary to be careful about improvisations,

and it is necessary to take into account that, besides our wishes, there

are also the wishes of others.

If we had coalfields; if we had in some way solved the problem of raw

materials; if we could dispose of large reserves of gold in order to

keep up the value of our money, we could follow a given policy, even one

of generosity towards Germany. But we cannot afford the luxury of

prodigality and generosity when we have to toil to carry on life, when

we have to summon all our energies to avoid falling into the abyss.

And so you will agree with me, Honourable Members, that Italy could not

keep aloof from that which is taking place on the Ruhr, could not

deprive herself of participation in an economical and technical

capacity. It is always better, in my opinion, to be present, because

sometimes complicated problems find unexpected solutions. It was not

possible to run the risk capriciously of not being present, in the

event—not at all improbable—of an economic agreement, as regards iron

and coal, between Germany and France. (Applause.)

_Zara and Dalmatia._ Coming to the Agreements of Santa Margherita, I

understand perfectly the grief and anguish expressed in the words of

Senators Tamassia and Tivaroni. Undoubtedly sentiment is a great

spiritual force, both in the lives of individuals and of peoples, but it

cannot be the one dominating influence of foreign policy.

It is necessary to have the courage to say that Italy cannot remain for

ever penned up in one sea, even if it is the Adriatic. Beyond the

Adriatic there is the Mediterranean and other seas which can interest

us. The Treaty of Rapallo was, in my opinion, a lamentable transaction,

which was the result of a difficult internal situation and of a foreign

policy which was not marked by its excessive autonomy. And here allow me

to repeat that a strong and dignified foreign policy cannot be carried

out if the nation does not present a daily example of iron discipline.

(Approval.) I do not think that these Agreements of Santa Margherita

sign the death warrant of Zara and Dalmatia. With the last concessions

we have saved the use of the Italian language for our brothers there.

Now I think it was Gioberti who said that where the language is spoken

there is the nation. For this reason, if these brothers of ours can

speak, write and learn in their mother tongue, I think that already one

of the foundations of their Italian nationality is saved.

For a decade the Italians of Zara and Dalmatia have resisted the furious

attempts at denationalisation made by the Hapsburg Monarchy. In those

days Italy could not give active assistance to those brothers; now you

see that she has another realisation of herself. Those brothers of ours,

who might have felt themselves forgotten if the Agreements of Santa

Margherita were applied by another nation, cannot feel the same when the

definite and necessary application of the Treaty of Rapallo is carried

out by the Government over which I have the honour of presiding and of

which the members are those who won the victory. (Applause.) We firmly

believe that the strict and scrupulous application of the Agreements of

Santa Margherita on our part, as well as on the part of Yugoslavia, will

save the Italian character of Zara and Dalmatia. There is no need for me

to repeat that treaties are transactions, and are like the steps of an

equilibrist. No treaty is eternal and perpetual; all that is happening

to-day under our eyes gives us clear warning.

_The Question of Fiume._ We shall then carry out these Agreements

immediately and loyally. It must not be thought that the Third Zone is a

kind of vast continent, and that in it we have immense forces. It is a

question of the territory round Zara and a group of islands; all told,

we have only 120 policemen, 18 custom-house guards, and 20 soldiers. At

Susak we have a battalion of infantry. It will be a case of turning them

back to the line of Eneo, because until it is known what is to become of

Fiume, Porto Baros and the Delta, they will remain under the control of

Italian troops. (Applause.) What is this Arbitration Commission? It

represents an attempt to bring about the existence of that more or less

vital creature, first conceived at Rapallo, known as the Independent

State of Fiume. (Laughter.) One thing is certain, at any rate, and that

is that there are three Italians on the Commission. And another thing is

certain, and that is that it is not absolutely necessary for Fiume to

become a new province of the realm. That there should actually be a

prefect at Fiume is to me a secondary matter; the important thing is

that Fiume shall keep her spirit sound and intact, that she shall remain

Italian, and that such means shall be found that shall make her a city

which lives in itself and for itself and not only through the largess of

the Italian State. (Loud applause.)

The Government, which sometimes makes deeds precede words, has already

taken steps for the provision of Zara, economically, politically and

spiritually. The same has been done for Dalmatia. It is necessary to

admit frankly that since the coming of the Fascista Government the

Yugoslavs have been less intransigent with regard to us. There is no

doubt that the definite carrying out of the Treaty of Rapallo is the

cause of great grief to the citizens of Fiume and Zara, of Dalmatia and

many in the old kingdom.

(Cries of “It is true.”)

_Mussolini._ At other times there might perhaps have been difficulties.

But the Government over which I have the honour of presiding does not

hesitate; it faces difficulties, I was almost going to say seeks them. I

intend to regulate as soon as possible all that more or less successful

heritage of foreign policy left me by my predecessors. It is no good

being alarmed by what happens. I have what I dare to call a Roman

conception of history and life. Things must never be thought to be

irreparable. Rome did not believe in the irreparable, even after the

battle of Cannæ, when she lost the flower of her generation. On the

contrary, you will remember that the Senate went out to meet Terentius

Varro, who, having wished to undertake the battle against the advice of

Paulus Æmilius, was certainly one of those responsible for the defeat.

Rome fell, and rose up again; she marched slowly, but she marched; she

had a goal to reach, and she intended to reach it. Italy, our Italy, the

Italy which we carry in our hearts, and which is our pride, must be like

this; the Italy which accepts her destiny when it is imposed, by hard

necessity, but only while she prepares her spirit and her forces to

overcome it some day. (Loud and prolonged applause, many Senators

advance to congratulate the Prime Minister. Silence being once more

established, Mussolini continues.)

I propose that the Senate, having concluded the discussion suspended

yesterday evening, should be adjourned. I do not know for how long. The

Government must be left free to work and to prepare work for the Chamber

and the Senate.

Meanwhile, I feel the necessity of thanking the President, who has

directed the proceedings with that tact and high wisdom for which he is

known. I am glad that the Senate, in approving of these political and

commercial treaties—which are two aspects of the same policy—has thus

brought to a conclusion a part of our foreign policy. I beg the

President to accept the expression of my profound admiration.

_Tittoni, President of the Senate_, replies, reciprocating the words of

the Prime Minister and praising his spirit and his patriotic faith. He

pays tribute to the way in which the Hon. Mussolini has assumed, with a

firm hand, the direction of public interests.

A REVIEW OF EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THEIR RELATION WITH ITALY

Speech delivered before the Cabinet, 2nd March 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Colleagues,—The situation on the Ruhr

has remained stationary during these last weeks. While the two

disputants seem to settle themselves more rigidly in their respective

positions of passive resistance on the part of Germany and active

pressure on the part of Belgium and France, England has not changed her

attitude of benign disapproval and Italy has neither increased nor

reduced the number of technical experts representing her on the Ruhr. So

far there has not arisen the new factor which would lead, in one sense

or the other, to the solution of the crisis. This new factor could

consist either in a direct proposal made by one disputant to the other,

or in a request for mediation, or in the modification, on a political

basis, of the aims which France says she has in view—aims of an economic

nature, which so far have not gone beyond the limit of the payment of

reparations—or else in an increase of the opposition of England which

would lead to the withdrawal of her troops from the Rhine.

It seems, however, clear—notwithstanding the solicitations of an element

of the advanced democracy—that England maintains her attitude of

circumspect waiting, without impatience or precipitation. The war, which

at the present moment has for its theatre the basin of the Ruhr, is one

of attrition, and it may yet last for some time, in spite of the general

expectation all over Europe of a rapid conclusion. As I have already

said both in the Senate and the Chamber, Italy will not refuse her

assistance in any attempt that may be made to render normal the

situation in Central Europe as soon as possible, and of this she has

given tangible proof in the help afforded, before any other country, to

Austria. The solidarity which Italy was bound to show towards France

upon the common ground of reparations, has given rise to projects of

greater importance, which might have been interpreted in certain circles

as having been directed against other Powers or to the exclusion of some

one of them. An official declaration on the part of the Government has

established the truth of the matter. The campaign in certain papers has

not been approved of and still less authorised. That it is very

opportune that friendly and cordial relations should exist between Italy

and France is the sincere conviction of my Government. It is very much

to be desired that the economic relations between these two neighbouring

countries shall be intensified and strengthened, and the Government has

worked in this direction in concluding the recent commercial agreement.

But this has nothing to do with a real treaty of alliance, as has been

suggested in certain sections of public opinion. The Fascista Government

intends on the whole to follow a line of foreign policy as far as

possible autonomous, and it could never adhere to alliances which did

not protect the interests of Italy in the highest degree and which did

not constitute a solid guarantee of peace and prosperity for Italy in

particular and Europe in general.

Fascista Italy cannot and will not adhere to a system of alliances which

does not take into account these fundamental premises. For her to pledge

herself in any way definitely while the Entente is still in a state of

crisis, and there are still many obscure points in the general situation

in the world, would be unpardonable.

_Turkey and Peace._ No reliable news has hitherto reached us as to the

intentions of the Government at Angora concerning the acceptance or

non-acceptance of the projected treaty presented by the Allies to the

Turkish Delegation at Lausanne. Information is contradictory, because,

whereas on the one hand it is said that, in spite of the moderating

influence of Mustapha Kemal and Ismet Pasha, the Assembly of Angora has

shown itself adverse to some of the conditions already accepted by the

Turkish Delegation at Lausanne and intends to re-discuss the projects of

the treaty, article by article; on the other hand, especially from

British quarters, it is continually said that the Turks seem favourably

disposed towards the rapid conclusion of peace.

Whatever may be the decision of the Government at Angora, it must be

remembered that, once the deliberations of the Assembly are at an end,

the Turks will, by means of the Secretary-General of the Conference, who

remains for the present at Lausanne, give a definite reply to the Allies

concerning eventual requests and proposals.

Between the Governments at Rome, London and Paris there is in

consequence an active diplomatic correspondence in progress with the

object of establishing the common line of action to be adopted by the

Allies in certain important questions, such as that of Capitulations and

those concerning the Economic Clauses, as well as the course to be

adopted in the eventual resumption of the work of the Conference, if the

Turkish proposals are such as to furnish a serious basis for discussion.

The British Government is showing itself to be very rigid in this

respect and seems not to wish to allow discussion upon other than these

three points:

(_a_) The formula of the Turko-Grecian reparations.

(_b_) The formula of the judicial guarantees for foreigners.

(_c_) Economic Clauses.

As regards the first, it is a question of putting in the hands of an

Arbitration Commission the reciprocal claims of the two countries, since

the Turks do not even admit that the Greeks have any claims to present.

For the second, it is a question of finding a formula which will provide

more efficient guarantees for foreigners where the searching of private

houses and arrests are concerned; and as regards the third, of resuming

the discussion and negotiations upon all economic questions and of

handing them over to another commission to be dealt with apart from the

treaty of peace.

The Italian Government is fully convinced of the necessity of bringing

about the conclusion of this peace in order that grave dangers, derived

from the actual situation in the East, may be avoided, and in order that

normal conditions, favourable to the free exercise of trade and

industry, may be re-established. Although we are resolute in demanding

from Turkey the acceptance of the really moderate conditions proposed by

the Allies, we do not think, however, that every and any request, not

connected with the three points mentioned above, made by Turkey, should

be excluded _a priori_, but rather that the possibility of examination

without preconception should always be considered where some

well-defined and limited proposal is concerned.

As to procedure, the British Government would be inclined towards the

renewal of the discussion at Constantinople, while the Italian

Government, realising the dangers which would menace the success of the

negotiations in the surroundings of the Turkish capital, would prefer

that it should take place at Lausanne with a limited gathering of

technical delegates.

In any case it will not be possible to make a definite decision about

this before knowing the answer of the Turkish Government, which is to be

decided by the vote of the Grand Assembly.

_Memel and the Polish Frontier._ The question of Memel has been solved

in theory, and it is not probable that in practice overpowering

obstacles will be met with, since in the solution the rights of both the

Lithuanians and the Poles have been taken into account.

This incident has afforded an opportunity of examining generally the

still uncertain position of Poland with regard to her boundaries. It

seemed to the Italian Government that such uncertainty was pregnant with

dangers, and that it was of the utmost importance to arrive, as soon as

possible, at the recognition of the frontier, the delimitation of which

is reserved for the Allied Powers by the Treaty of Versailles.

Consequently, at the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, the Government

proposed that such a delimitation should be proceeded with at once, a

proposal which, not having appeared at first to meet with the approval

of the other representatives, has recently been presented again by the

French Government, and to which we, for the sake of consistency, have

adhered.

As far as the boundaries between Lithuania and Poland are concerned, we

should have preferred the League of Nations to have been called upon to

pass an opinion, so that the largest number of States possible should be

interested in guaranteeing the decision. Our Allies, however, having

drawn attention to the fact that the procedure of the League of Nations

is of a length and tediousness which, at the present moment, it is

better to avoid, we have also adhered on this point to the French

proposal to hand the question over to the Conference of Ambassadors.

We truly hope that Poland and Lithuania will accept the decisions which

the Conference of Ambassadors thinks it just to make. And this is one of

those typical cases in which Poland and Lithuania must take into account

the inevitable necessity of sentiment yielding to reason.

_The Problems of the Adriatic. Fiume; Abbazia; Zara._ The Italian

Delegation and part of that of Yugoslavia have already arrived at

Abbazia. At present work has not begun, but will begin as soon as

possible. At our request the Government at Belgrade has replaced Admiral

Priza by Signor Rybar as her representative. The accusations against

Admiral Priza, as a participator in the legal proceedings which led to

the condemnation and death of Nazario Sauro, are well known. The

Government at Belgrade showed itself to be appreciative of the eminently

moral reasons for our objection and consented to the substitution—even

at the cost of facing the criticism of the Italophobe opposition—with a

good-will which seems an excellent omen for the future.

Our Delegation, too, to the Commission for the Evacuation of the Third

Zone is already at Zara, and since the Yugoslav Delegation has also

arrived, work can begin at once.

An incident which occurred the night before last, when abuse of Zara and

Italy was shouted from a passing Yugoslav steamer within sight of that

port, has already evoked spontaneous and immediate apologies from the

Yugoslav consul to our prefect. But I have urged Belgrade to prevent

such deplorable, although unimportant, incidents from occurring again.

I must say that, hitherto, the Yugoslav Government has shown itself to

be animated on the whole by excellent feeling, and loyally co-operates

in seeking to smooth the way in this period of important and delicate

negotiations which has just begun.

As for the attitude of the national elements at Zara and Fiume, they

remain inspired by a high sense of discipline and recognition of the

necessity of subordinating private interests to the general welfare of

the nation.

_The Conference of the Südbahn._ The work of the Conference of the

Südbahn for the purpose of technical and administrative reorganisation

has made sufficient progress. Both the States interested and the company

have presented their proposals for amendments, in which they try,

without interfering with the basis of the projects under discussion, to

lessen the financial burden.

The project of the agreement concerning through traffic, which contains

regulations guaranteeing the regularity of the organisation of the

railways, facilities for the customs and sanitary services, and the

setting in order of the international stations, as well as regulations

regarding the railway rates of the through trains, has already been

discussed. The States have shown themselves to be of one opinion with

regard to the intentions of the project, which tend to unite in a

special convention all the different regulations which have issued from

the treaties of peace and the projects of the Convention concluded at

Barcelona and Portorose.

The project, moreover, is directed particularly towards reviving the

powers of the Convention of Berne in respect of international traffic.

The scheme of agreement for the technical and administrative

reorganisation of the Südbahn admits the possibility of direct control

on the part of the State as well as on the part of the company. It aims

also at the maintenance of that unity of commercial direction which,

without offending the sovereignty of the States with regard to tariffs,

will allow of international traffic and the direct despatching of goods,

and will take into account the special exigencies of trade which require

particular measures and which, not being prejudicial to the States, will

be advantageous as regards the economic relations between them.

The work of the Conference will probably last another week on account of

the complicated and difficult character of the various financial,

technical and administrative problems to be solved.

THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV CONFERENCE FOR THE COMMERCIAL TREATY

Opening address delivered in Rome at the Palazzo Chigi, on 6th March

1923, before the members of the Conference.

Gentlemen,—I am particularly glad to open this meeting and welcome

cordially the delegates of the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the

Slovenes. I attach great importance to this meeting and to its results,

which I am confident will be excellent.

You know that at Abbazia the Adriatic question is being settled, so that

at the present time the field may be cleared of those special problems

which up to to-day have not permitted an understanding with Yugoslavia.

Along with that of Abbazia, this meeting, convened with the object of

linking together more closely commercial relations between the two

countries, attains a great importance. Italian public opinion and the

Fascista Government consider that, together with political relations,

there must be close and profitable economic ties.

I am certain that the Italian delegates will make every effort to arrive

at this agreement and I do not doubt that the Yugoslav Delegation will

do the same. This will be in the common interest of the two countries.

(Applause.)

“HISTORY TELLS US THAT STRICT FINANCE HAS BROUGHT NATIONS TO SECURITY”

Speech delivered at the Ministry of Finance on 7th March 1923, where

Mussolini officially handed over to the Minister, Hon. de Stefani,

the Budgets of Home and Foreign Affairs, to be revised in accordance

with a decision of the Council of Ministers.

Honourable Ministers, Colleagues, Gentlemen,—It might be asked, Why such

fuss, why so many soldiers for a ceremony which could be described as

purely administrative, such as the consignment of my two Budgets to the

Finance Minister? We must answer this question thus: For various

motives, some more plausible than others. The solemnity which

accompanies this ceremony serves to demonstrate the immense importance

the Government attaches to a rapid restoration of financial normality.

We have formally promised to make a start towards balancing the State

Budget, and with this promise we wish to keep faith at whatever cost. We

must be convinced that if the whole falls, the part falls too; and that

if the economic life of the nation falls in ruin, all that is in the

nation—institutions, men, classes—is destined to suffer the same fate.

And why these soldiers? To show that the Government has strength. I

declare that, if possible, I want to govern with the consent of the

majority of the people, but whilst waiting for this consent to be

formed, to be nourished, to be strengthened, I collect the maximum

available force. Because it may happen, by chance, that force may aid in

rediscovering consent, and, at any rate, should consent be lacking,

force still remains. In all the measures—even the most drastic—the

Government takes, we shall put before the people this dilemma: either

accept them from a high spirit of patriotism or submit to them. This is

how I conceive the State, and how I understand the art of governing the

nation.

I am glad to find myself before you—(continued the President, turning to

the officials of the Ministry of Finance present at the

ceremony)—because the Minister has spoken very favourably to me of the

high officials of the Ministry of Finance. He told me that some of you

often work up to sixteen hours a day. Well done! Those are long hours,

but it is a splendid example. But if they were not sufficient, it would

be necessary to work even twenty hours. Only thus, gentlemen, shall we

rise up out of the sea of our present difficulties and reach the shore.

We must inculcate in our spirit a sense of absolute discipline. We must

consider that the money of the Treasury is sacred above everything else.

It does not rain down from Heaven, nor can it even be made with a turn

of the printing press, which, if I could, I would like to smash to

pieces. It is made out of the sweat, it might be said of the blood, of

the Italian people, who work to-day, but who will work more to-morrow.

Every _lira_, every _soldo_, every _centesimo_ of this money must be

considered sacred and should not be spent unless reasons of strict and

proved necessity demand it. _The history of peoples tells us that strict

finance has brought nations to security._ I feel that each one of you

believes in this truth, which is fully proved by history.

With this conviction I bid you farewell. (Applause.)

“IT IS NOT THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF EUROPE ALONE THAT WE HAVE TO RESTORE

TO ITS FULL EFFICIENCY”

Speech delivered at the Palazzo dell’ Esposizione in Rome, on 18th

March 1923, before the International Congress of the Chambers of

Commerce.

Gentlemen,—The Government over which I have the honour to preside and

which I represent is glad to welcome you to Rome and offers you a

deferential and cordial greeting, which I extend also to the foreign

representatives, who have wished to honour us by their presence. The

fact that your important Congress is held in the capital of Italy, only

five months after the events which gave the control of public affairs to

the youthful forces of war and of victory is the best declaration to the

world that the Italian nation is rapidly returning to the full normality

of her political and economical life. In a meeting like this I shall not

linger on the former, but shall briefly dwell on the latter subject.

The economic policy of the new Italian Government is simple. I consider

that the State should renounce its industrial functions, especially of a

monopolistic nature, for which it is inadequate. I consider that a

Government which means to relieve rapidly peoples from after-war crises

should allow free play to private enterprise, should renounce any

meddling or restrictive legislation, which may please the Socialist

demagogues, but proves, in the end, as experience shows, absolutely

ruinous.

It is, therefore, time to remove from the shoulders of the producing

forces of every nation the last remains of that machinery which was

called the trappings of war and to examine economic problems, no longer

with a state of mind veiled by the influence of particular interests, as

they had to be examined during the war. I do not believe that the

aggregate of forces, which in industry, in agriculture, in commerce, in

banking, in transportation may be called by the world-name of

capitalism, is near its downfall, as certain doctrinarians belonging to

the Social-Extremists have claimed. One of the great historical

experiences of which we have been witnesses proves that all the systems

of associated economics which do away with private initiative and

individual effort fail more or less pitifully in a short time. But free

initiative does not exclude an agreement between groups, which will be

realised all the easier when there is a loyal protection of each

separate interest. Your Chamber of Commerce follows exactly this

programme of enquiry, and of stabilisation, of co-ordinating and

conciliating the various interests. You are here in Rome to discuss the

best means to revive the great currents of trade which, before the war,

had increased general wealth and brought all people to a high standard

of living. These are weighty and delicate problems which often cause

discussions of a political and moral nature. To solve them we must be

guided by the conviction that _it is not the economic system of Europe

alone that we have to restore to its full efficiency_, but that there

are also countries and continents which may offer a field for a larger

economic activity in the near future. It is not without significance

that the powerful Republic of the United States has sent such a large

number of her representatives to Rome. It means that, if official

political America still keeps an attitude of reserve, economic America

feels that she cannot remain indifferent to what may or may not be done

in Europe.

There is no doubt that Governments—beginning with mine—will examine with

the utmost care and give due weight to the decisions which are arrived

at by this Congress. (Loud cheers.)

“ONLY THOSE WHO PROFITED BY THE WAR GRUMBLED AND STILL GRUMBLE, CURSED

AND STILL CURSE AT THE WAR”

Speech delivered on 29th March 1923, in Milan, at Villa Mirabello,

before blind ex-soldiers.

My dear Comrades!—When a little time ago one of your officers told me

that you never grumbled at the war, even when Italy seemed overwhelmed,

I was not surprised because only those who profited by the war grumbled

and still grumble, cursed and still curse at the war. Those who have

performed their duty do not grumble, do not curse, but accept their

sacrifice with Roman simplicity and austerity.

When I am amongst the maimed I live again the greatest days of our war.

And I declare to you that a Government which did not bear you in mind

would be unworthy, and would only be worthy of being overthrown by the

fury of the people.

But the Government which I represent is entirely formed of men who have

fought from the Stelvio to the sea of Trieste, and such men cannot

ignore the sacrifices accomplished.

I express to you here this morning all my brotherly sympathy and

admiration as an ex-soldier, as a man, as an Italian, and I embrace you

all. And by this act I intend to honour and exalt all those who

contributed to the greatness of the mother country by the deeds

accomplished and by the shedding of their blood. (Applause.)

“PATRIOTISM IS NOT FORMED BY MERE WORDS”

Speech delivered at Arosio, near Milan, on 30th March 1923, before

ex-soldiers suffering from shell-shock.

Fellow-Soldiers,—I did well to accept your courteous invitation, in the

first place, as it always gives me great pleasure to offer to my

comrades of the trenches the proof of my fraternal sympathy as a

soldier, as a man, as an Italian, and as the head of the Government.

As I said yesterday to the blind ex-soldiers at Villa Mirabello, so I

say to you. The Government intends to protect you, intends to satisfy

your requests, to defend your material and moral rights.

Your invitation has given me the opportunity to see this splendid work,

which represents the results and the harmonious synthesis of faith in

your undertakings and of noble love for our country.

Everything that is done for the maimed and for ex-soldiers is a small

thing in face of the sacrifice of so many Italians who gave their life

on the battlefields or who shed their blood.

What is done here is not only a manifestation of piety, it is an

expression of national solidarity and of conscientious patriotism.

Because patriotism is not formed by mere words, it is formed by deeds,

by example, by showing oneself worthy before one’s own conscience of the

quality of being Italian.

The Government intends to exalt all the forces of the country, all the

moral forces arising from our victory; it means daily and

disinterestedly to defend all those who by their deeds and their blood

have contributed to this glorious victory. (Applause.)

QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE CABINET

Speech delivered before the Cabinet on 7th April 1923.

_The Abbazia Conference._ Colleagues,—The Commission appointed according

to the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which met, as is known, on 1st

March, started its work by the arrangement for the evacuation of Susak,

which took place on the following day. It is opportune here to note that

the Italian Delegation wished to express to the world and to the Italian

troops its gratitude for the courteous and chivalrous behaviour during

the whole occupation of Susak.

The Commission decided, at that time, a provisional settlement for

communication and traffic between Fiume and Susak, which was made

effective for two months, in view of the eventuality of the prorogation

of the sittings of the Commission. The frontier traffic between Castua

and the adjacent territories was also organised.

With reference to the military operations, the Serbo-Croatian-Slovak

Delegation has at once recorded an objection, on the grounds that with

the evacuation of Susak, it did not consider that that stipulated by the

Agreements of Santa Margherita had been carried out, seeing that the

Delta and Porto Sauro remained occupied by Italian troops. Against this

assertion the Italian Delegation replied that Italy had carried out to

the letter the provisions of the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which

refer purely and simply to the evacuation of Susak.

Apart from this objection, the Commission has continued its work and the

Italian Delegation has put forward a project for a Consortium in the

port of Fiume between the three interested States. Such a project, in a

general way, attributes to Fiume the character of an international port,

leaving the possibility of the enjoyment of special privileges and

guarantees to each of the contracting States for a freer development of

the traffic which affects them. With regard to such a project, the

Serbo-Croatian-Slovak Delegation has put forward its objections,

presenting on its own account a draft of a project, according to which

the Sauro Basin and the Delta would be excluded from the port of Fiume

and assigned exclusively to Yugoslavia.

The Italian Delegation has formally declared that it could not accede to

any pact whatsoever which, destroying the unity of the port of Fiume,

would irremediably damage the future of the new State, and, in answer to

the objections raised by the Serbo-Croatian-Slovak Delegation to the

Italian project, our Delegation has presented another plan, in which

full consideration was given to the said exceptions. But, in the course

of the following discussion, the points of view of the two Delegations

could not be reconciled. The sittings were suspended on 24th March, to

be resumed shortly.

_The new Lausanne Conference._ Following the counterproposals put

forward by the Government of Angora, the British Government has convened

in London an Inter-Allied meeting in order to examine what modifications

to the drafting and the substance of the Peace Treaty presented to the

Turks on the 30th of last January may be possible. The Allied

Representatives at this meeting have decided to invite the Turks to

resume as soon as possible at Lausanne the discussion with the Allied

experts and have at the same time come to an agreement as to the line of

conduct to follow in such a discussion.

In the text of the reply sent to the Government of Angora, which has

been published, the Allies have deemed it opportune to insert some

remarks and objections on certain points of special importance, as for

example that regarding the removal of the Economic Clauses asked by the

Turks, to which the Allies cannot accede; that concerning some part of

the judiciary declarations and the Turkish demands relative to

substantial modifications of the Territorial Clauses already agreed

upon, such as that of Castelrosso, whose restoration to Turkey could not

be countenanced.

It is to be hoped that the good-will that both parties have the

intention of displaying in the imminent negotiations of Lausanne may

bring about speedily the conclusion of peace in the East, which

corresponds with the warmest wish and interest of the Italian

Government.

_Italo-Polish Relations._ Mr. Skrzynski came to Milan to express to me

the gratitude of Poland for the friendly attitude of Italy in the

determination of the Polish frontier, which took place recently.

Expressing a personal view, I mentioned to him the advisability of a

larger extension of autonomy to the population of Eastern Galicia. I

profited by the occasion to examine with the Minister for Foreign

Affairs some concrete points, which, with regard to oil and coal,

concern more closely our commerce. I recognised with satisfaction the

friendly disposition which animates the Polish Government and I was

struck with the impression that whenever important Italian enterprises

should wish to develop their activity in Poland, they would find there

the best of welcomes. The representatives of some Italian firms of

standing, moreover, are now already in negotiation at Warsaw, and the

results, I hope, will in a short time confirm the favourable attitude of

the Polish Foreign Minister.

_The Visit of the Austrian Chancellor Seipel._ In the conversations I

had at Milan with the Austrian Chancellor, both parties expressed the

reciprocal desire and interest to improve further relations between the

two countries. The Chancellor has warmly thanked the Italian Government

for the helpful action on behalf of Austria and has asked our support

for the satisfactory solution of all problems which might contribute to

the economic reconstruction of the Republic. I gave favourable

assurances and, consequently, have accordingly hastened the negotiations

already begun for a commercial agreement and I have had examined

numerous questions which had been dragging on unsolved for some time.