THE SUBJUGATION OF ASIA MINOR.
However unexpected the attack of the Lydians had been by the ruler of
the Medes and Persians, however inconvenient the war with them, he had
brought it to a rapid and prosperous decision. Though he had entertained
no thought of conquests in the distant West before Croesus took up arms
against him, he resolved to maintain the advantage which the war had
brought him to such a surprising extent. Great as was the distance
between Sardis and Pasargadae, Lydia was to be embodied in his empire,
and the AEgean was to form its western boundary. His army took up winter
quarters in Lydia; from Sardis he arranged in person the new government
of the land, and the fate of the nations which had been subject to the
Lydians. We do not know whether the Phrygians, Bithynians, and
Paphlagonians submitted to the change of dominion without resistance.
AEschylus represents Cyrus as subjugating Phrygia. According to Xenophon,
Phrygia was reduced by Cyrus as he returned from Sardis; the
Paphlagonians submitted voluntarily, like the Cilicians; this was the
reason why no satraps were sent there, yet the fortresses were occupied
with Persian garrisons, and the Paphlagonians and Cilicians had to pay
tribute and perform service in war.[30] Cilicia had not been subject to
the Lydians; ever since the irruption of the Scyths had broken the
cohesion of the Assyrian power, her princes were independent, though
they had paid tribute to Assurbanipal (III. 166, 178), They bore the
standing title of Syennesis. More than sixty years previously
Nabopolassar of Babylon and Syennesis of Cilicia had brought about peace
and alliance between Cyaxares of Media and Alyattes of Lydia (V. 295).
That Cilicia now voluntarily submitted to Cyrus, if it had not done so
previously, can be concluded with certainty from the fact that we
subsequently find kings named Syennesis at the head of Cilicia, who are
bound to pay tribute to the Persian empire and render service in
war.[31]
Cyrus met more vigorous resistance in the west of Asia Minor. The
Lycians, who maintained their independence against the Lydians in their
mountains to the south, were not inclined to submit to the Persians, nor
were their neighbours in the south-west, the Carians. The cities of the
Greeks, who possessed the entire western coast, hesitated which course
to take. After their ancestors had set foot on this coast, 400 years
previously, they had succeeded in maintaining their ground for a century
and a half against the rising power of the Lydians under the Mermnads;
indeed it was during this period that they had extended their trade and
colonisation, and risen to be a second naval power beside the
Phenicians,--the centre of a commerce, which on the one hand included
the Black Sea and the Maeotis, and on the other almost all the
Mediterranean--which included in its empire Cyprus and Sicily and
Corsica, Egypt and the mouths of the Po and Rhone, and even extended to
the banks of the Baetis. Along with the trade and wealth of these cities,
poetry had burst into a new bloom, plastic art and architecture were
eagerly cultivated, the foundations were laid for Greek science, natural
history, geography, history, and philosophy. Life was pleasant and
luxurious; no doubt the morals of the Lydians had found their way into
the cities, but the old vigour still remained in the inhabitants by sea
and land. At last they had succumbed to Croesus, not because they did
not know how to fight, but because they had not followed the advice of
Thales of Miletus, who urged them to carry on the war in common, and
place at their head a council with dictatorial powers (III. 450). But
the supremacy of Croesus, to which they did not submit for much more
than a decade, had not been of an oppressive character. It had left the
cities unchanged in their internal trade, and in fact had increased
rather than destroyed it. Croesus had contented himself with yearly
tributes from the cities, and we have seen to what a large extent Greek
art and manners found protection, favour, and advancement at the court
of Croesus. Now these cities suddenly found themselves in the presence
of a power of which they had hardly heard the name, and which had
prostrated with a mighty blow the kingdom of Croesus. As they were not
pledged to provide soldiers for the king of the Lydians, they had looked
on in irresolute neutrality during the war. And they had paid no heed to
the request of Cyrus that they would join his side. Previously it might
have been to their interest to weaken the power of Lydia, in order to
regain their full independence, but when Cyrus marched upon Sardis it
became much more imperative to prevent a stronger power from taking the
place of the Lydians. A diversion on the part of the Greek cities when
Cyrus was besieging Sardis, would have delayed the fate of the city, and
might have rendered possible the arrival of the allies. But they had
done nothing, and now found themselves alone in the presence of the
conqueror. Their danger prompted them to offer submission to the king of
the Persians on the same terms as those on which they had served
Croesus. Cyrus rejected the offer which the ambassadors of the Ionian
and Aeolian cities brought to Sardis. Mere recognition of his supremacy
and payment of tribute he did not consider sufficient to secure the
obedience of cities so remote, and he was strong enough to insist on a
more dependent relation without great efforts. But ever cautious and
provident, he took means to separate the cities. To Miletus, the
strongest, he offered a continuance of the relations in which she had
stood to Lydia. When Miletus, "from fear," as Herodotus remarks,
accepted these conditions, Cyrus had already won the victory. The cities
were divided, robbed of their strongest power and natural head.
Conscious that their submission on the conditions proposed had been
refused, the cities of the Ionian tribe took counsel at their old common
place of sacrifice on the shore of the sea, opposite Samos, under Mount
Mycale. Miletus, it is true, was absent; but among the Ionians there was
far too much pride, far too great a sense of freedom, to offer
unconditional submission to Cyrus. The defection of Miletus seemed to be
compensated when ambassadors of the cities of the Aeolian tribe appeared
on the same day as the Ionians, which had never occurred before, and
declared their common resolution "to follow the Ionians wherever they
led."[32] It was resolved to fortify the cities, to make a resistance to
the Persians, and for this object to call as quickly as possible on the
mother country for help. A common embassy of the Ionian and Aeolian
cities went to Sparta, in order to ask aid of the Dorians there, the
leading state in the peninsula. But in vain did Pythermus of Phocaea,
the mouthpiece of the embassy, put on his purple robe in order to
manifest the importance and wealth of the cities, when the ephors
introduced the legation before the common assembly. Though the Spartans
at that time were at the height of their power, and had promised help to
Croesus, though the ships had been equipped and the contingent was ready
to embark when the news came of the capture of Sardis, Sparta now
refused to send aid, regardless of the fate of her countrymen. She
merely resolved to despatch ambassadors to Cyrus with the request that
he would leave the Greek cities in peace. A ship of fifty oars carried
the embassy to Asia, with the real object, as Herodotus supposes, of
ascertaining the position of affairs in Ionia and with Cyrus. It landed
at Phocaea. Lacrines, the spokesman of the ambassadors, found Cyrus in
Sardis, and there warned him in Sparta's name, "to do no harm to any
Hellenic city, for Sparta would not allow such conduct to go
unpunished." Without the support of an army this warning was an empty
and foolish threat, which Cyrus treated as it deserved.[33]
There must have been some urgent necessity which summoned Cyrus to the
East before he subjected the Lydians, Carians, and Greeks of the coast.
Herodotus tells us that he intended to conquer Babylon, the Bactrian
nation, the Sacae and Egyptians. In the early spring he set out with the
bulk of his army to Ecbatana.[34] Croesus was in his train. He had given
the government of Lydia to Tabalus, a Persian, but the management of the
revenues to Pactyas, a Lydian.[35] He may have thought that Lydia was
more peaceable than it really was, or more reconciled to its fate by his
gentle treatment of Croesus, and the nomination of a Lydian as manager
of the taxes. The dominion of the Persians had come upon the Lydians
suddenly; they refused to recognise the superior power of their rulers,
and could not finally accept the rapid change which had so suddenly
overthrown their ancient kingdom and their fame in arms. So far from
being subdued, they hardly considered themselves seriously beaten. The
rapid and decisive action, in which they had been defeated, might appear
to them rather a fortunate surprise, than a victory won by the Persians.
It was Pactyas, whom Cyrus had made manager of the revenues, who raised
the standard of revolt. He collected the Lydians, and induced the
inhabitants of the coast, i.e. the cities of the Greeks, to join him.
Tabalus could not resist in the open field the sudden outburst of
rebellion. When Pactyas marched against Sardis, he was compelled to shut
himself up in the citadel, and was there besieged. While yet on his
march Cyrus received the news of the revolt. Yet his presence in upper
Asia was so necessary that he did not return in person; he sent Mazares,
a Mede, with a part of the army, to bring the Lydians once more to
obedience. The rebellion appears to have been undertaken in haste
without sufficient preparations, and Pactyas was not the man to lead it
with energy. He did not venture to await the arrival of Mazares; the
citadel of Sardis was delivered; Tabalus was free; the rebellion was
crushed; Pactyas fled to the Greeks on the coast, to Cyme, the leading
city of the Aeolians. When Mazares demanded that he should be given up,
the oracle of Apollo at Miletus twice ordered the Cymaeans, in answer to
their repeated inquiry, to surrender him. The priests of that temple,
the Branchidae, well knew that the arrangement which their city had made
with Cyrus, pledged her to carry out the wishes of the Persians. The
Cymaeans did not obey even the second response, but first took Pactyas in
safety to Mytilene in Lesbos, and when they found that the Mytileneans
were ready to give him up, they took him to Chios. But the Chians,
though, like the Lesbians, they had nothing to fear from the Persians in
their island, nevertheless surrendered him.[36]
The hopes which the Greek cities might have built upon the rebellion of
the Lydians were quickly broken. The mother country had refused any
help. Sparta would not come to their assistance, and Athens, torn as she
was by internal dissensions, could not. No one in the cantons of the
Greek peninsula roused themselves to give aid to an important section of
the Greek nation, to the colonies which had outstripped the mother
country in their development, or strove to save the most vigorous
centres of Greek nationality from subjection to a foreign people, which
had come out of the remote part of Asia. If the voice of a common blood
and the sense of nationality failed to warn the Greeks beyond the sea
against giving over to strangers for plunder such rich and flourishing
cities, was there no one in Hellas who foresaw that if the establishment
of the Persian dominion on the coasts of Asia Minor were not prevented,
and the cities of the coast with their navy were allowed to fall into
the hands of the Persians, Greece itself would not be safe from their
attack, and they would be able to visit the coasts of Hellas in Greek
ships? Yet even without assistance the power of the Hellenic cities
would have sufficed for a considerable resistance to the Persians--for
the position of affairs in Asia did not allow Cyrus to bring any great
force against these distant coasts--if they had been able to understand
and take to heart the lessons of their own past. If they had neglected
to unite their forces against the Lydians, such union was now doubly
necessary. They had learned from experience the evil of delay, and the
danger was now greater than ever. The Greek cities were in uncontested
possession of the sea,[37] and thus in a position to give help in common
to any city which the Persians might attack. An organisation which
permitted the whole force of the city to be used for the benefit of each
one, would have given a prospect of successful resistance. But no step
whatever was taken in this direction. Each city turned its attention to
strengthening its own walls, and awaiting the attack of the Persians.
After the subjugation of the Lydians, Mazares, as Herodotus tells us,
turned his arms against "those who had besieged Tabalus along with
Pactyas." He invested Priene, took the city, and reduced the inhabitants
to slavery; then the plain of the Maeander was laid waste, the city of
Magnesia taken, and its inhabitants enslaved. After the capture of
Magnesia Mazares fell sick and died. Cyrus sent Harpagus the Mede as his
successor. He marched northwards from the valley of the Maeander; in the
first instance against Phocaea, which appeared to have taken the leading
part in resistance, or at any rate had done most to gain the help of
Sparta; after Miletus it was the most powerful city of the Ionians. The
trade in the Adriatic and the Tyrrhene sea, on the coasts of Gallia and
Iberia, was in the hands of the Phocaeans. A strong and magnificent
wall, well built of large stones, surrounded the city, the circuit of
which, as Herodotus says, reached "not a few stadia." Harpagus invested
Phocaea, and threw up works round the walls; he then sent intelligence
to the Phocaeans that he should be content if they would pull down but
one tower, and solemnly give up to him the possession of one dwelling.
The Phocaeans must have thought that they could no longer hold the city
or repulse an attack. According to Herodotus, they answered the offer of
Harpagus with a request that he would allow them a day for
consideration, and for that day would lead his army from the wall.
Harpagus replied that he knew very well what their intentions were, but
he would give them time for consideration. When Harpagus led his forces
from the wall, the Phocaeans drew their ships to the sea, put upon them
their wives and children, and everything that they could carry away,
even the images of the gods and the votive offerings, and then embarked
and sailed to Chios. It was their intention to purchase from the Chians
the Oenussae, islands lying off Chios, and to settle there. But the
Chians refused to sell them, fearing that their trade would go there.
Then the Phocaeans turned their course back to Phocaea; Harpagus had
taken possession of the empty city and left a garrison in it. This the
Phocaeans cut down; then they sunk a large mass of iron in the sea, with
an oath that they would not return again to the city till the iron
should float, and shaped their course to the distant Western sea, for
the island of Cyrnus (Corsica), where twenty years previously they had
founded the colony of Alalia. Harpagus is said to have burnt Phocaea,
thus punishing the houses and temples for the attack on the
garrison.[38] After the capture of this city, he besieged Teos, and
gained possession of the walls by means of the works which he threw up.
The Teians then went on board their ships, one and all, sailed to the
north, and settled on the coast of Thrace opposite Thasos, where they
founded Abdera.[39] "So all the Ionians," says Herodotus, "with the
exception of the Milesians, who had come to terms with Cyrus, fought
against Harpagus, and showed themselves brave warriors, each for his own
city; but Harpagus took them one after the other by investing them and
throwing up works against the walls. Thus conquered they remained in
their cities, with the exception of those exiles, and did what they were
bid." After the subjugation of the Ionians, Harpagus turned to the
North, reduced the cities of the Aeolians, and bade their military
forces join his army.
The line of conquest had now reached the Dorian cities of the coast, the
Carians and Lycians. The Dorians and Carians made but little
resistance.[40] The Greeks of Asia had not only been abandoned by their
kinsmen beyond the sea, but also by their gods, or at any rate by their
oracles. As Apollo of Miletus had bidden the Cymaeans to give up
Pactyas, so Apollo of Delphi bade the Cnidians to desist from making
their city impregnable. Cnidus lay on the western edge of a long and
narrow promontory. The inhabitants had begun to cut a channel through
the land with a view of securing themselves against the attack of the
Persians. But though a large number of hands were engaged, the work did
not make progress in the hard rock; and as many of the workmen were
injured the city sent to Delphi to inquire the cause of their
misfortunes. The priestess answered, according to the Cnidian account:
"Ye must not fortify the Isthmus, nor cut through it; Zeus would have
made it an island if he had wished."[41] The Cnidians desisted, and
surrendered without a struggle to Harpagus on his approach. Among the
Carians, the Pedasians alone, who had fortified Mount Lida, made a
vigorous resistance; it cost Harpagus much trouble to take this
fortification. The Lycians, who had never been subject to the kings of
the Lydians, marched out against Harpagus. In the open field they fought
bravely, though few against many. When conquered and driven into their
city Xanthus (Arna, I. 577), they brought their wives and children,
their servants, and their goods into the citadel and set them on fire;
then they bound themselves by an oath, fell upon the Persian army, and
maintained the conflict to the last man. Then the remaining towns of the
Lycians, being robbed of their best defenders, submitted. The Caunians
alone, as Herodotus tells us, followed almost exactly the example of the
city of Xanthus.[42] Even the sea put no limit to the supremacy of the
Persians. The Greeks of the islands of Chios and Lesbos voluntarily
submitted to them, though, as Herodotus assures us, "they had nothing to
fear," "for the Persians were not mariners, and the Phenicians were not
their subjects at that time."[43] The two islands would not give up all
hope of the possession of the districts on the coasts opposite.
About three years after Cyrus had left Sardis in the spring of the year
548 B.C. his power in Lydia was not only firmly founded, but the whole
western coast, with all its harbours and landing-places, together with
two considerable islands, was subject to him. As Aeschylus tells us, he
had reduced Ionia by force. The East had again overpowered the colonists
of the West on its western edge. Asia Minor, beyond the Halys, was
subjugated to Cyrus in even greater extent than to Croesus; in fact it
was wholly in his power.[44] He placed two viceroys over it. One, the
viceroy of Phrygia, was to govern the north-eastern; the other, the
viceroy of Lydia, was to govern the south-western half of this wide
region. The first took up his position at Dascyleum, not far from the
shore of the Propontis; the other in the citadel at Sardis.[45] Among
the cities of the Greeks, Priene and Magnesia on the Maeander had been
destroyed, and their inhabitants enslaved; Phocaea had been burned. The
rest had not been injured by Harpagus after their capture; he had not
placed any Persian governors over them, nor introduced garrisons. It was
not intended in any way to destroy their nationality or their religious
worship. Their social life, their forms of government, their autonomy
remained; even the common sacrifices and assemblies of the Ionian cities
at Mycale were permitted to continue. They had only to recognise the
supreme authority of the king of the Persians and his viceroys, to pay
yearly tribute to the king, the amount of which each city fixed for
itself, and furnish a contingent to the army when called upon by the
viceroy to do so. When the Ionians again met at the common place of
sacrifice for the first time after their subjugation, Bias of Priene,
who had escaped the destruction of his country, proposed that all the
Ionian cities should follow the example of the Phocaeans and Teians;
that there should be a general emigration to Sardinia, in order that all
might obtain a new country there. They were then to form one great
community; one city was to be founded by all in common. Had this
proposal been carried out, the achievements of Cyrus would have
exercised a far deeper influence over the distant West, than the mere
settlement of the Phocaeans in Alalia, who moreover were not able to
maintain themselves in their new settlement. The centre of Hellenic
colonisation would have been transplanted from East to West, and the
fate of Italy would have been changed; the Greeks would have retired
before the supremacy of the East in order to establish a strong insular
power among the weak communities of the West. But the Ionians could not
rise to the height of such a revolution. Among the Greeks, the
attachment to their ancient soil, their homes and temples, was
peculiarly strong. If men could and would forget independence, the
supremacy of the Persians did not seem very oppressive. It limited the
trade of the Greeks as little as it repressed their social life; on the
contrary, it rather advanced commerce, which now received the protection
of the Persian king throughout the whole of his wide dominions. The ruin
of Phocaea also aided the trade of Miletus which had suffered neither
war nor siege.
Yet the cities of the Greeks were essentially weakened by the war and
their subjugation. In Phocaea, it is true, a community again grew up.
Half of the emigrants, in spite of their solemn vow, were seized with a
longing for their ancient home; they returned to their desolated city.
But for fifty years after this time the new Phocaea would or could
furnish no more than three ships of war. In Priene also and Teos
sufficient inhabitants gradually assembled to establish small
communities.[46] Other circumstances weighed more heavily even than
their natural losses. Cyrus knew well that it would not be easy to
retain in secure obedience cities so distant in situation, so important
in population and military resources. At such a distance isolated
garrisons would have been exposed to great danger; yet without them the
cities would have closed their gates to the Persians at any moment,
manned their walls, and entered into combinations beyond the sea. Every
rebellion of this kind made new sieges necessary, and these were the
more difficult as Persia had no fleet, and could only use the ships of
the Greeks. Situated at the extreme edge of the kingdom, and supported
by the opposite shore of the AEgean, each of the larger cities could
offer a long resistance. With the unerring political insight which
distinguished him, Cyrus saw that he must gain adherents within the
cities, and have on his side influential interests of sufficient weight
to keep the cities in obedience. Yet he did not aim at supporting one or
other of the parties who contended in the Greek cities for the
leadership of the community; on the other hand, his favour and that of
his viceroys was given to this or that party-leader. His allegiance was
to be secured and certain advantages were held out in prospect to the
city when led by him. Cyrus intended to govern the cities of the Greeks
by Greeks, who were not to be his officers, but to rule the cities as
their lords and princes for their own advantage and profit. By their
position, which they owed to the favour of Persia, and could only
maintain with the help of Persia against their fellow-citizens, by the
interested desire to retain this power in their families and bequeath it
to their children, by the concentration of the princely authority, as
opposed to the republican institutions and republican spirit of their
cities--which authority rested on the Persian court, and was closely
connected with it--these rulers in union with the viceroys and their
troops must be in a position to secure the subjection of the cities.
Thus it came to pass that not in Cyme only, the most important city of
the Aeolians, but in almost all the towns of the Greeks, men were raised
to power by the favour and support of the Persian satraps, who managed
the public affairs, and in the place of autonomous communities came
despotisms and principalities, in reality if not in name. How correct
Cyrus was is proved by the result.[47] He was able to secure the
obedience of the Lydians also. He caused the land to be stripped of its
arms, even to the extent of taking away the cavalry horses,[48] and so
abandoned all thought of forcing the Lydians to serve in his army. The
disuse of arms and the lapse of time did their work, aided as they were
by a vigorous trade, which in Lydia was due not only to the natural
wealth and the gold of the soil, but to a long-established and skilful
industry. In these pursuits and a luxurious life the Lydians forgot
their old days and ancient deeds. Persia had never again to contend with
a rebellion of the Lydians.
The tradition of the Greeks has not omitted to illustrate the important
events of the extension and establishment of the Persian dominion in
Asia Minor by a series of pointed anecdotes and stories. Among these is
the reply which Cyrus is said to have given to the Greek cities, when
they offered their submission after the fall of Sardis (p. 50). At that
time Cyrus, as Herodotus tells us, narrated the following story with
reference to their refusal of his first request:--A flute-player once
played to some fishes in the sea in order to entice them out. As they
did not come, he took them out with a net, and when they leapt about, he
said, Cease dancing now; ye did not dance out of the water when I
played. Diodorus puts the transaction later, and with him it is not
Cyrus, but Harpagus, who, as we saw, received the command against the
cities after Mazares, who told the following apologue to the
ambassadors:--He had once asked a maid of her father in marriage, but
the father betrothed her to a man of greater importance. When he
afterwards found out that the man whom he had despised as a son-in-law
was in favour with the king he brought him his daughter, and Harpagus
took her not for his wife, but for his concubine. By this Harpagus meant
that as the Greeks had not become friends of the Persians when Cyrus
wished it, they could not any longer be allies but only servants.[49]
When Lacrines brought to Cyrus from the Spartans the command that he
must not attack any Greek city, Herodotus represents Cyrus as answering,
in the pride of his absolute power, that he had never been afraid of men
who met in the market-places and deceived each other by speeches and
promises. If he remained in health, they would not have to lament over
the sorrows of the Ionians, but over their own.[50] Here also Diodorus
gives another version:--To the command of the Spartans that he must not
attack the Hellenes in Asia who were their kinsmen, Cyrus answered, that
he would acquaint himself with the bravery of the Spartans when he sent
one of his servants to subjugate Hellas.[51]
The account which Herodotus gives of the negotiations of Harpagus with
the Phocaeans is not historical. If the resistance of the Phocaeans was
so difficult to overcome that Harpagus descended to the concession that
only one tower need be pulled down and a single habitation given up to
him, the Phocaeans had no reason to abandon their city. But if they
were in such a condition that they must abandon the defence, the lapse
of one day would certainly not suffice for them to get the ships in
order, and put on board the whole population with their goods, the
images of their gods, and the votive offerings. Still more inconceivable
would be the folly of Harpagus in drawing off his army from the city and
thus allowing the Phocaeans to destroy his siege works, so that he had
to begin them all anew.
The striking change which took place in the Lydian character after the
suppression of the rebellion under Pactyas, the contrast between the
horse-breeding Lydians of the Homeric poems, between the mounted
squadrons which once pressed so heavily on the Greek cities, reduced
Asia Minor, and offered such a brave resistance to the Medes and
Persians, and the peace-loving, effeminate, submissive Lydians of the
fifth century B.C., was explained by the Greek tradition after its own
manner. When in his return from Sardis to Ecbatana, Cyrus received the
intelligence of the rebellion of the Lydians, he confided to Croesus, as
Herodotus tells us, that it seemed to him the best plan to make all the
Lydians slaves. "I have dealt with them," so Herodotus represents Cyrus
as saying, "as one who spares the children when he has slain the father.
I have captured you who have been more to them than a father, and left
them their city, and now I wonder that they rebel." Croesus replied:
"What you say is just, but let your anger pass by; do not destroy an
ancient and guiltless city. What took place before was my doing, and the
guilt lies on my shoulders; what has happened now is due to Pactyas to
whom you yourself entrusted Sardis. Punish him, but spare the Lydians.
Forbid them to carry weapons for the future, order them to wear coats
under their mantles, shoes with high heels, and to train their boys in
playing and singing and in trade. You will soon make them women instead
of men, and they will never revolt or be a source of alarm." Croesus
gave this advice with the double object of turning aside the vengeance
of Cyrus from the Lydians--for even such a life was better than
slavery--and of preserving the Lydians for the future from bringing
about their own destruction by new rebellions. Cyrus followed the advice
of Croesus. This story is repeated by Polyaenus. When the Lydians had
revolted, Cyrus bade Mazares take away their weapons and horses, and
allow them no longer any practice in throwing the spear and riding; on
the contrary, he was to compel them to wear women's clothes, to weave,
and play the lute. In this way the Lydians became the most unwarlike
people, though previously they had been the most warlike.[52] The new
dress which Cyrus, on the advice of Croesus, commanded the Lydians to
wear, was the hereditary dress of the Lydians (who are called
soft-footed in the response of the Delphic priestess (p. 9), because
they wore shoes), and practice in playing and singing were old customs
of the Lydians which previously had done no harm to their martial
valour. The narrative is invented, though not by Herodotus, to glorify
the wisdom of Croesus and give a reason for the clemency which Cyrus
showed after the rebellion--and at the same time to explain the contrast
between the Lydians of antiquity and their descendants.
FOOTNOTES:
[30] Aesch. "Pers." 770; Xenoph. "Cyri inst." 7, 4, 2; 8, 6, 8.
[31] Herodotus, 9, 107, remarks that Xerxes gave the satrapy of Cilicia
to Xenagoras of Halicarnassus; yet even after this date we find a
Syennesis at the head of that country, which in the list of Herodotus
formed the fourth satrapy.
[32] Herod. 1, 141, 142, 151, 169.
[33] Herod. 1, 152; Diod. Exc. Vatic. p. 27 = 9, 36, 1.
[34] Herod. 1, 153. In 1, 157, on the other hand, we find "to the
Persians;" cf. 1, 177.
[35] H. Stein on Herod. 1, 153.
[36] Herod. 1, 161. What is brought forward in the treatise "on the
unfairness of Herodotus" from Charon of Lampsacus against the
historian's statement about the surrender of Pactyas is limited to the
naked fact that he came from Chios into the power of Cyrus.
[37] Thucyd. 1, 12, 14.
[38] Herod. 1, 164, 165; Plutarch, "Aristid." c. 25; Pausan. 7, 5, 4.
[39] A party of the emigrant Teians is said to have founded Phanagoria;
Scymn. Ch. 886; "Corp. inscrip. Graec." 2, 98.
[40] Herod. 1, 174.
[41] Herod. _loc. cit._
[42] The subsequent inhabitants of Xanthus are explained by Herodotus to
be foreigners, except eighty families, who were absent at the time. He
also mentions Caunians about the year 500 B.C. The name of the city
occurs at a later date. On the continuance of the league of the Lycians,
vol. I. p. 575.
[43] Herod. 1, 143, 160.
[44] The year 548 B.C. no doubt passed before the revolt of Pactyas. The
Greek cities had time to build or strengthen their walls before they
were attacked. Phocaea entered into negotiations for this object with
the prince of Tartessus after the fall of Croesus (Herod. 1, 163), and
the great wall of the city was finished, with the assistance of money
furnished by him owing to the approach of the Medes, when Harpagus
attacked it. This attack cannot therefore have taken place before 547
B.C. The sieges of the Ionian and Aeolian cities occupied at least a
year; the campaign against the Dorian cities, the Carians and Lycians,
must therefore have taken place in 546 B.C., if not a year later.
Hieronymus puts the battle of Harpagus against Ionia in Olymp. 58, 3 =
546 B.C.
[45] Oroetes resided at Sardis in the reign of Cambyses and Mithrobates
at Dascyleum; Herod. 3, 120.
[46] Herod. 1, 168; Miletus and Samos contended in 440 B.C. for the
possession of Priene.
[47] Herod. 5, 37, 38; Heracl. Pont. fragm. 11, 5, ed. Mueller.
[48] Justin. 1, 7.
[49] Excerpt. Vatic. p. 27 = 9, 35, 1.
[50] Herod. 1, 153.
[51] Diod. Excerpt. Vatic. p. 27 = 9, 36, 1.
[52] Herod. 1, 155, 156; Polyaen. "Strateg." 7, 6, 4.