Count Federigo enters the Neapolitan service--His two
campaigns in Tuscany--Fall of Constantinople--Peace of
Lodi--Nicholas V.--The Count's fruitless attempt at
reconciliation with Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta; followed
by new feuds with him--Death of his Countess Gentile.
The establishment of Francesco Sforza as Duke of Milan had virtually
settled the affairs of Lombardy, for although the Emperor and the
French King refused to recognise his rights to the Visconti
succession, they deferred their respective claims upon that duchy till
a fitter season. The Angevine pretensions to the crown of Naples were
also in temporary abeyance, and the triple tiara had passed from the
turbulent Eugenius to Nicholas V., whose early habits of scholarship
continued undisturbed by ambitious dreams. There thus seemed no
element of contention left, and a prolonged peace was the natural as
well as the true policy of Italy. But, in the words of Sanzi,
"No long repose Ausonia e'er can brook,
For peace to her brings languor, and she deems
It loathsome to lie fallow."
So paltry were the pretexts, so remote the motives for renewed
hostilities, that Sismondi is content to ascribe these to diplomatic
intrigue, seconded by a general irritability of temperaments, and
avows that, ere they were resumed, a review of interests and
reconstruction of alliances became absolutely necessary. Venice and
Florence had hitherto co-operated to protect themselves, and maintain
a balance against the ambitious dynasties of Visconti and Aragon; but
jealousy of the terra-firma acquisitions of the former having induced
her sister republic to league with Sforza, she consulted at once her
safety and her vengeance by an intimate union with Alfonso. Sigismondo
Malatesta being retained in her service, the Duke of Milan bought him
over by an offer of better terms, and the Count of Urbino, finding
himself thus exposed to the same contact with his personal enemy which
had recently annoyed him in the Maremma campaign, renounced his
engagement with Sforza, and as a natural consequence transferred it to
the other side. The King of Naples, disgusted by the late treachery of
Sigismondo, and by similar instances of light faith on the part of
other Italian condottieri, had announced his determination to employ
none of them without sureties for their fidelity. But he made an
exception in favour of Federigo, declining his offer of the Venetian
signory as his sponsors, on the ground that he knew his word to be
sufficient guarantee. In consequence, however, of the coronation of
Frederick III. at Rome, and his stay in Italy, it was not until 1452
that these arrangements were so far completed as to enable the
Venetians to declare war upon Sforza in May of that year, and Alfonso
to publish hostilities with Florence in the following month.[90]
[Footnote 90: Berni dates the Tuscan campaign as in 1451, but Sismondi
is correct.]
The King being desirous of bringing into notice his natural son
Ferdinando Duke of Calabria, the destined heir of his crown, now
placed him at the head of 8000 cavalry, and half that number of foot
soldiers, but bestowed on Federigo the rank and title of
Captain-general. Entering Tuscany by Cortona, this army penetrated by
the valleys of Chiana and Arno, carrying terror almost to the gates of
Florence, and overrunning a vast extent of country. But no permanent
impression was made, for, trusting to the artillery of Siena, which
was refused him, Alfonso had not provided his troops with the means
of taking any strong places. It accordingly cost them six weeks to
reduce Foiano, and after spending as long before Castellina, the
bursting of their only battering-gun rendered further perseverance
useless. Thus when they betook themselves to winter quarters at
Aquaviva on the Mediterranean coast, they could boast no important
result of the campaign. A colourable pretext was thus afforded for
murmurs from the captains, many of whom served reluctantly under a
commander so much their junior. Although these complaints reached
Alfonso, they no way diminished his confidence in Federigo, whom he
encouraged to meet such jealousy by redoubled exertions. In order to
arrange a plan of operations, the Count repaired to Naples, and
received from him a cordial welcome. As spring advanced, the pestilent
air of the Maremma, which had formerly compromised the Neapolitan army
in
"That sun-bright land of beauty,"
again proved their scourge. Many officers and men were attacked by
fever, and among them the Captain-general, who was removed to Siena
whilst his troops fell back upon Pitigliano.
The following letter, written by him during an earlier stage of his
malady, and probably in reply to pressing invitations from the priors
of that city, proves his reluctance to leave his post:--
"Mighty and potent Lords, dearest Fathers;
"Although I have experienced the singular goodwill, paternal
affection, and love displayed by your lordships towards
myself and my house, not only now and on this occasion, but
in other times and circumstances, yet the renewed offers and
cordial proposals so freely made me in your most courteous
letters, in reference to this illness of mine, have imposed
upon me further and greater obligations. Not that I admit
these to render me more devoted to your lordships than
before, seeing that I was already your son, and as such
sincerely attached to your state and magnificent community:
but I desire your lordships to be aware that I acknowledge
my obligations to be ever and greatly on the increase, and
that I am most anxious to acquit them, so far as in my
power, for the advancement of your lordships' honour and
advantage. More I cannot at present; nevertheless, being
desirous to do my best, I give your lordships infinite
thanks; and having nothing new to offer, I yet tender what
has been yours a thousand years past,--my state and person;
assuring your lordships that, in so far as consists with my
honour, your lordships may dispose of me and mine, as a son
faithful and devoted beyond all others. Notwithstanding a
violent and serious attack of illness, I have not thought
fit to come to Siena, nor to repair to any other part of
your lordships' territory (though ready to go thither with
the same confidence as to my own house), because from the
first I resisted leaving my illustrious Lord Duke, however
unimportant my remaining by him might be. Since then, thanks
to God, I have gone on improving, and am now pretty well, so
that I hope to be speedily quite restored; whereof I wished
to inform you, convinced that it would be gratifying to your
lordships, from whom I pray instructions, should anything
occur that I can do. From his Majesty's successful army at
Aquaviva, the 26th of July, 1453.
"FEDERIGO COUNT OF MONTEFELTRO, URBINO, AND DURANTE,
Captain-general of the Serene King of Aragon."[91]
[Footnote 91: Though pruned of not a few redundant particles which
obscure the original, this letter proves that even before Spanish
fashion had elaborated feebly magniloquent expletives, the Italian
style was justly chargeable with verbiage.]
This campaign differed little in tactics, and no way in results, from
that in which Federigo, under the Florentine standard, had lately
contested much of the same ground with Alfonso. We pass rapidly over
the events of both, for although minutely dwelt upon by his
biographers, and tending to develop his military science and
reputation, they were marked by no brilliant incidents, and involved
no general interests. Machiavelli, ever willing to sneer at mercenary
warfare, observes that places were then deemed impregnable which in
his day were abandoned as untenable, and explains the policy of the
invaded to consist in avoiding a general engagement; "for they deemed
it impossible to be ultimately worsted, so long as they were not
beaten in any pitched battle, the loss of petty castles being
recovered with returning peace, while more important places were
secure in the enemy's inability to assault them."[92]
[Footnote 92: _Istorie_, lib. VI.]
The Count's engagement was renewed by the King of Naples in autumn for
another year on the same terms, which appear from the Oliveriana MSS.
to have been 1500 ducats a month for his own pay, 8 ducats, of ten
gigli, for each lance, and 2 for each foot-soldier; his company to
consist of 700 lances and 600 infantry. No active service was,
however, required; and the general pacification, to which Alfonso
reluctantly acceded in January, 1455, restored matters to their former
state,--the usual issue of such contests.
Europe was now startled by an event which exposed Italy to peculiar
peril. The Eastern Empire had long been falling into feeble senility,
and in proportion as her vigour relaxed and her frontier receded, the
Crescent extended its domination, and menaced the Bosphorus. The
Greeks appealed for aid to Western Christendom; but men's enthusiasm
had become selfishness; the crusading spirit was extinct, and the cry
echoed unheeded along the Mediterranean shores. The siege of
Constantinople by Mahomet II., a barbarian endowed with qualities
which would have shone in any sphere, might have been prevented or
raised by very moderate efforts of the Italian powers; and it was not
until the loss of that great capital, that they perceived the folly of
their neglect, which had sacrificed the best bulwark of Europe against
Ottoman aggression. But besides this general consternation, the
maritime republics staggered beneath the blow, for it annihilated that
trade with the Archipelago and the Euxine which had crowded their
ports and filled their coffers; and when Constantinople fell, many
wealthy Christian merchants, there resident, were stripped of their
property, and passed into menial slavery. It was in the moment of
universal alarm, that Nicholas V. urged a general reconciliation and
league of Italy, with a zeal which, notwithstanding the doubts of
Simonetta adopted by Sismondi, we believe to have been sincere. The
congress held for this purpose at Rome was, however, distracted by
narrow views and shallow intrigues, and broke up without effecting its
object. Yet, ere long, policy prevailed over petty ends, and the peace
of Lodi, signed in April, 1454, to which at first only Venice and
Milan were parties, was ratified within a few months by all the
Peninsular states, and secured to them a long period of comparative
repose.
This pacification of Italy, which the Pontiff had ardently desired, he
was not long spared to witness, for he closed his exemplary life on
the 24th of March. Tommaso de' Parentucelli, though of Pisan
parentage, was born and brought up at Sarzana, from whence he took his
usual designation. He was early vowed to the Church in consequence of
his mother's dream, and at the University of Bologna his progress
attracted notice from the bishop, who took him into his family, where
he remained for about twenty years. On the return of Eugenius to Rome,
in 1443, he was elevated to the purple, as vice-camerlingo; and three
years and a half later, was chosen to succeed that Pontiff. The tastes
and habits of scholarship which Nicholas had formed in early youth
preserved their ascendency after this remarkable advancement. The
first object of his government was the maintenance of general peace;
and when he had failed to effect this, his uniform policy was
neutrality. His attention was thus left free to follow out, for the
benefit of his subjects, and of mankind, those aspirations for
justice, and those enlarged views of mental development which formed
his character. The revenues which other pontiffs of that age
misapplied to promote miserable contests, or lavished on schemes of
nepotism and courtly vices, he directed into more wholesome channels.
Magnificent in all that could lend dignity to the religion of whose
faith and ritual he was the guardian, careful of whatever could
promote the dignity of his sacred office, an economical management
enabled him largely to gratify his literary longings. At his court,
habits of study were an unfailing recommendation; mental acquirements
were duly honoured, and men of letters were sure of finding a generous
and enlightened friend. With him originated the Vatican library,
which, under liberal popes, and by favourable opportunities, has since
been gradually augmented into one of the brightest ornaments of the
papacy. His mild and useful reign ended far too soon for the welfare
of Italy and the interests of letters, but the light which it diffused
scattered the last shadows of the dark ages, and still gilds the
remainder of this century.
It chanced that a few days before peace had been concluded, a subsidy
of 36,000 ducats reached Federigo from the King of Naples, which he
immediately offered to return, as no longer required. Regarding this
as an act of unusual conscientiousness, Alfonso desired him to retain
the money on account of future services; whereupon the Count, after
sending home his company from the Tuscan war, attended the Duke of
Calabria to Naples, to offer acknowledgments in person. To his
suggestion, while there, has been ascribed by Muzio and Baldi a
double matrimonial alliance, now proposed between the hitherto hostile
houses of Aragon and Sforza, as a means of cementing the new league,
but of which only that of Hippolita Maria Sforza took effect. On the
same authority we must attribute to him a selfish and ill-timed
counsel, which marred that measure and perilled the peace of Italy.
Whilst a party to the losing game which Sforza played in La Marca
during 1445-6, several of his townships were seized by the Lord of
Rimini, in whose possession they had since remained. With the ultimate
hope of reclaiming these on some fitting opportunity, he is alleged to
have reminded Alfonso of the scurvy trick played upon him in 1448 by
Sigismondo, in passing over to the service of Florence after receiving
his pay, and to have suggested such treachery as sufficient ground for
specially excluding the latter from the league, and for reserving a
right to make reprisals. The King adopted this hint the more readily,
that he had other wrongs to settle with the Genoese and with Astorre
Manfredi, seigneur of Imola; he accordingly, on ratifying the treaty
of Lodi in January, 1455, introduced an exceptional clause against
these three states, the effect of which was not only to keep up petty
warfare in Romagna and Liguria, but eventually to entail upon his son
a disputed succession which well-nigh cost him his crown.
It was the destiny of Urbino long to endure the full weight of
Malatesta's troublesome qualities; to be in turn agitated by his
intrigues, compromised by his instability, deluded by his duplicity,
harassed anew by his inroads, and again cajoled by his hollow
repentance. The Count, whose sense of honour was delicately
susceptible, and who felt warmly for his people's welfare, could no
longer brook such aggressions. Bent upon signally punishing them, he,
however, before concerting measures with Alfonso, judged it prudent to
visit Florence, Bologna, Milan, and Mantua, in order to justify to
their governments the necessity of making an example of his inveterate
foe. Nothing could exceed the honourable reception accorded him at
these places; but he did not obtain anything beyond general assurances
or cold civilities in regard to the matter he had in view. The
proffered mediation of Borso d'Este, Duke of Modena and Marquis of
Ferrara, held out one last hope of an arrangement; so he paid him a
visit on his return homewards, in May, 1457, and found that Malatesta
was already his guest. The interview of these rivals is described by
Sanzi and Baldi with details probably more dramatic than historical.
The Lord of Rimini came reluctantly, with arms at his side and
implacable passions in his breast; he commenced the discussion with a
long catalogue of grievances, and quickly wrought himself up to
violent and insulting language, which Federigo met by mild but firm
remonstrance, ending with a proposal to settle by single combat, "hand
to hand, in field, or plain, or valley," whatever misunderstandings
could not be amicably disposed of by their host. Sigismondo, for
answer, drew his sword, and after the parties had exchanged ferocious
defiance, the Duke separated them, grieved at the total failure of his
intervention. Before leaving Ferrara, the Count offered to submit to
his arbitration their differences, the chief of which was as to
restoration of the places in Montefeltro retained by Malatesta; but
the latter declined any reference of the sort.
After provocations so aggravated, and in the certainty that
opportunity alone was wanting to renew them in manner more perilous to
his interests, Federigo no longer hesitated to act upon the
reservations of the treaty of Lodi, and in June hastened to Naples, in
order to obtain assistance. It happened that Giacopo, son of Nicolò
Piccinino, was then in the Abruzzi with his company of adventure,
retained by Alfonso, but waiting the chances of war. The Count,
therefore, applied for permission to employ him against Malatesta,
who, like a true braggart, lost courage on finding himself exposed to
just vengeance, and virtually excluded from assistance by the terms of
the league. Recurring as usual to intrigue, he sent his eldest son
Roberto to Naples, that he might gain favour with the beautiful
Lucrezia Allagno, or del Lagno, who, though said to have equalled her
Roman namesake in propriety, held the elderly monarch by the silken
chain of youthful passion. Her dragon-like virtue did not exempt her
from womanly weakness, and in exchange for the most brilliant ruby
which the jewellers of Venice could supply, backed by an offer of his
hand for her niece, Roberto gained her influence in his father's
behalf. Months were lost in the counteracting this back-stairs
interposition; and meanwhile Federigo was widowed by the death of
Gentile, of whom nothing is known beyond the excessive stoutness of
her person. These delays enabled him to prepare the munitions of war,
and he addressed to the magistrates of Siena this request for a person
qualified to cast mortars:--
"Mighty and potent Lords, and Fathers honourable and
beloved:
"I have immediate want of a master mortar-founder, and being
informed that there is in Siena one such, able and
sufficiently qualified, who would well satisfy me, and whom
I knew when detained there ill [in 1453], I urgently pray
your lordships, as a particular favour, to give him leave of
absence. And my need of him being urgent, I trust that he
will come quickly along with the bearer hereof, and I shall
so pay him his dues that he shall be well satisfied. I have
reason to hope that your lordships will oblige me as to this
artist, for in all that tends to the weal of your republic I
would be most affectionate, and observant beyond any other
ally you have in the world. As for the mortars, I want to
use them against the Lord Sigismondo, the enemy of your
lordships, to whom I commend myself. From Urbino, the 7th
of November 1457."[93]
[Footnote 93: _Carteggio d'Artisti_, I., p. 178. Promis, the recent
editor of Francesco di Giorgio's works, conjectures this
artillery-founder to have been Agostino da Piacenza, not Francesco, as
had been supposed.]
It was in this month of November that the Count and Piccinino at
length took the field, although the season already warned them to
winter-quarters in the inclement climate of the Apennines. After
reducing several places near Fossombrone, Federigo, in order to save
his own people, seized some townships of Carpegna, a tiny fief held by
a branch of his family with whom he was at variance, and there left
the troublesome troops of Giacopo until the spring. When it opened,
notwithstanding the dilatory and heartless tactics of their leader,
who, like a true condottiere, regarded decisive movements as fatal to
his trade, this "war of petty sieges by petty armies," as it is aptly
called by Sismondi, soon exhausted and humbled the refractory
Sigismondo, whose unhappy condition is thus pitiably described in
another interesting despatch to the Sienese authorities.
"Mighty and potent Lords, dearest Fathers:
"I have not cared to write sooner to your lordships, nothing
further having been decided by the serene King regarding
peace or war with the Lord Sigismondo; but I have at length
determined to write this, in order that your lordships may
not marvel at my silence, and that you may be informed how
matters stand. And I hereby advise you how the Lord
Sigismondo has sent many humble and respectful messages,
through his son, to the serene King, supplicating that his
Majesty would condescend to have mercy, and notwithstanding
misconduct so gross as to merit no favour nor compassion,
that his Majesty would take to himself his sons as his
Majesty's slaves, and would deign to decide that they should
not go begging their bread. And the son besought his
Majesty to permit that his father should come and throw
himself at his feet, with a halter round his neck, publicly
to crave mercy, bringing with him as much money as possible,
and the jewels formerly offered; and should this not
suffice, that his Majesty might take whatever else of his he
would, until satisfied. His Serene Majesty replied that the
youth should remain at Naples whilst he went to Magione, and
that he would cause an answer to be sent through his
council. Thus passed many days without further incident. And
although the ambassador of the Duke of Modena strongly
interceded, no further reply was obtained, nor any other
resolution come to, things remaining in suspense. And I am
informed that the serene King is decided to exact the sum
demanded, of 27,000 ducats of the highest value, and 70,000
for expenses; besides insisting on restitution of my
territory, without restoring his own conquests. But the Lord
Sigismondo's people declare it impossible for him to give
such a sum in cash, though he might pay 20,000 down, with
the jewels, and as far as 60,000 by instalments, so that I
do not see how the matter can well be arranged. I, however,
hourly look for further advices, and your lordships will be
informed of what I hear, for things cannot now remain much
longer in suspense, Gottefredo being gone to Naples with the
Lord Sigismondo's ultimatum. From Urbino, 2nd of May, 1458.
"FEDERIGO COUNT OF MONTEFELTRO, URBINO, AND DURANTE,
Captain-general of the Serene King of Aragon."[94]
[Footnote 94: From the Italian original, in the Archivio Diplomatico
at Siena.]
These sanguine anticipations were, however, premature, as fortune had
still some trials in store for Federigo. Alfonso's death took place on
the 1st of July, that of Pope Calixtus III. a few weeks later; both
events materially affected the struggle which he had thus regarded as
at an end. Indeed, the whole state of parties in that strife
curiously illustrates the chances and changes on which depended
success in the intestine broils of Italian feudatories and captains of
adventure. The great ambition of the latter was to attain the
sovereignty of some petty state, and Piccinino conceived himself, as
representative of the Braccian influence, well entitled to watch an
opportunity of turning it to such account. His calculation probably
was that he might be able to possess himself of one at least of the
seigneuries which Malatesta's ruin would vacate; but as the contest
went on, that wily intriguer appears to have suggested to him Urbino
as a richer guerdon, attainable by gradually wasting Federigo's
resources, and finally at a fitting moment turning round to crush him.
The Duke of Milan's sympathies were naturally with the Count, who had
stood by him single-handed in adversity, and in his cause had incurred
those losses he was now endeavouring to recover, whilst the Lord of
Rimini had betrayed him again and again, and with his own hands had
strangled his natural daughter, the third wife murdered by this
Bluebeard of real life.[*95] Yet such was Sforza's detestation of
Giacopo as head of the old Braccian faction, and fear lest his
ambition of sovereignty should be gratified, that he actually advanced
money to support Sigismondo, who also obtained similar assistance from
the Duke of Modena, jealous perhaps of the growing Montefeltrian
influence. The Pontiff's death opened a new hope to Piccinino, and on
the speculation of possibly making good a footing in Perugia, he
profited by this vacancy of the Holy See to seize upon Assisi, Nocera,
and Gualdo. Thus, within three months after his letter to Siena,
Federigo found himself deprived of his only ally Alfonso, deserted by
his confederate Piccinino, and left to maintain the contest
single-handed against an adversary suddenly enabled to rally under his
standard some of the boldest adventurers of Romagna.
[Footnote *95: There are here three mistakes in three lines. (1)
Sigismondo had not betrayed Sforza; (2) he had not strangled his
natural daughter; (3) his third wife Isotta outlived him. See EDWARD
HUTTON, _op. cit._]
But the reaction in his favour was not long postponed. Ferdinand
continued his commission as captain-general, with a pension of 6000
ducats assigned to him by Alfonso three years before; and fully aware
of the importance of conciliating papal sanction to his own
questionable sovereignty, commanded Giacopo to quit the ecclesiastical
territory and return to the banner of Montefeltro. A miserable contest
of sacked villages and barbarous reprisals was continued during autumn
and winter, and though the advantage preponderated on the Count's
side, these successes were at his people's cost.
Meanwhile the repose of Italy was exposed to more serious
interruption. Alfonso V. of Aragon and Sicily had maintained his very
doubtful title to the crown of Naples[96] by a happy union of energy
and judgment. Devoting his life to Italy, he first established his
reputation by a series of victories over his Angevine competitor, and
then cemented his popularity by an easy and accessible address, by
lavish profusion of treasure and honours, by a zealous pursuit and
patronage of learning. The epithet of Magnanimous, which graces his
name, was merited by his testamentary disposition as well as by his
character. Having no legitimate issue, he left to his brother John his
hereditary dominions in Spain and the islands, but conceived himself
at liberty to bestow the crown of Naples, received at first as a gift
and retained by the sword, upon his natural son Ferdinand, whose
substitution to it had been sanctioned by two popes, recognised in
various treaties, and formally voted by a native parliament. His chief
confidant and agent in these arrangements had been his countryman
Cardinal Alfonso Borgia, who at his death filled the papal throne
with the title of Calixtus III., and who, anticipating that bad faith
and unscrupulous nepotism which, under Alexander VI., consigned to
enduring infamy their subsequently canonised name, used his authority
to supplant Ferdinand by his own nephew Pierluigi Borgia. With this
view he, as suzerain of Naples, declared its sovereignty lapsed on the
King's death without a legitimate son, and although he published a
notice calling upon all claimants to appear for their interests, his
real object was divulged by an offer to Francesco Sforza of his
father's fiefs in the Abruzzi and Apulia, on condition of his enabling
him to place the crown on Pierluigi's head. These intrigues were,
however, frustrated by this Pope's death on the 8th of August; and his
successor Pius II., a man in all respects his opposite, hastened to
recognise Ferdinand, maintenance of peace in the Peninsula being the
first requisite towards his grand project of a crusade against the
Turks.
[Footnote 96: See above, p. 68, and afterwards ch. XIV.]
Full of this scheme, he summoned a congress of European powers at
Mantua, which proved one of the most interesting assemblages recorded
in mediæval history, and offered to Christendom the rare spectacle of
a pontiff engaged in reconciling his universal flock. From the British
Isles no adequate response answered his summons, "England being
hopelessly convulsed by civil broils, and Scotland hidden in the ocean
depths." His self-imposed task including the arrangement of all
disputes, those of the rival Lords of Urbino and Rimini attracted
early notice. Sigismondo attended at Mantua in person to plead his
cause: that of Federigo, who reluctantly consented to transact with
one whom he well knew no award, no promise, could bind, was conducted
by an envoy. The treachery of the former being made manifest, he was
condemned by the Pope to a pecuniary mulct, and, failing payment, to
the surrender of some fastnesses in security. Thereupon new
difficulties arose, Malatesta avowing himself as yet unconquered, and
ready to brave extremities rather than accept the proffered terms. His
swaggering was thus checked by Pius:--"Hold your peace; our care is
not for you, but for your house: our pity belongs to your subjects,
not yourself, whose manner of life merits no commiseration. However
you may defend it by a multitude of words, your whole life tells
against you, and your sole plea is upon the deeds of an ancestry
deserving well of the Romish Church. Hence is it that we seek to
pacify your foes; and if you now resile from what is fair and
equitable, we shall leave you in the slough wherein we found you: nor
would it surprise us were the divine mercy to permit the poor to be
afflicted for a season, that you may finally expiate your guilt by a
bloody end, or by a wretched and impoverished exile." Daunted by these
words, Sigismondo succumbed to terms approaching the award; but the
other party, elated by success, would make no concession, though the
Pontiff, indignant at such clinging to victory rather than
conciliation, strove to settle the points still at issue.[*97] It was
in this state of matters that he indited the following brief.
[Footnote *97: Pius II. hated Sigismondo for his supposed treachery to
Siena quite as much as Federigo did.]
"To Federigo, Count of Montefeltro, &c.
"Beloved son, we salute you. It is our urgent desire, in
accordance with the charge committed to us, that harmony
should be restored between the dissentient faithful; and to
this we are the more urgently bound, when misunderstandings
arise between our own friends and the subjects of the Holy
Roman Church. Seeing, therefore, that quarrels have for some
time past prevailed under our vicars, between you and our
beloved son the noble Messer Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta
of Rimini, occasioning bloodshed, fire-raising, rapine, and
the like calamities, and that worse evils impend, unless
timeously averted, we have thought fit specially to
intimate to you our pleasure that a friendly adjustment
should take place, rather than arbitrarily to employ our
supreme authority to that end. Twice have we fully discussed
this matter at Florence, and now again at Mantua, and in
this good and pious work we have had the aid of the noble
and our beloved son Francesco Sforza Duke of Milan. We
entertained the hope of bringing the affair to a happy
conclusion, and of ensuring you an honourable and lasting
peace, in which your credit and advantage should be equally
regarded; nor shall this hope be fallacious if you will at
all accede to our mediation. But since you demand very rigid
conditions, giving your ambassador no discretion as to
modifying them, and limit us to merely ministerial
interference, it is impossible for us to bring about a
compromise; for rather than thus accept a compulsory
dictation, Sigismondo is ready to try the chances of war,
and expose himself to all impending risks. It is with equal
grief and astonishment that we perceive another great
explosion ready to burst forth. You despise the pacification
we offer you, sure, enduring, advantageous, honourable
though it be. You are victorious, and Sigismondo
acknowledges you to be so; as worsted, he is ready to submit
to terms, and if you consent to our arbitration the matter
is settled. Better surely to accept a certain and favourable
proposal than to hazard a doubtful hope. You are the
conqueror; let not your rigour and obstinacy wrest from you
your conquest. Often have we read and observed how mutable
are the events of war, how rapid and various its reverses,
how constantly in the end an over-confident victor is
vanquished. We therefore exhort your Highness in the Lord to
weigh well this matter, and if you deem an honourable peace
advantageous to your affairs, to leave open for our
mediation somewhat of the terms you have dictated to your
envoy, in which case we repeat our assurance that you will
best consult your own reputation and advantage. Given at
Mantua, 21st June, in our first year [1459]."[98]
[Footnote 98: Bibl. Laurentiana, plut. 90, cod. sup. 138, f. 4. We
take these proceedings from the Pope's own narrative, _Commentaria_,
pp. 52, 74.]
The Pontiff's eventual decision was, that their conquests should be
mutually restored, but that La Pergola, Pietrarobbia, and other
townships should be given over to the Count, in compensation of
damages; also that Malatesta should consign Sinigaglia and Mondavio as
security for payment to Ferdinand of 50,000 ducats, in full of his
debts to the crown of Naples; this money, or, failing it, these towns,
to be given to Piccinino in lieu of all demands on account of services
to Alfonso and Federigo. The only difficulty in carrying out these
terms appears to have originated with that selfish adventurer, who,
trusting to the terror with which his robber bands were regarded, and
conceiving that he might extort still greater advantages from a
Pontiff intent on promptly settling every divisive element in Italian
politics, made several demonstrations against the ecclesiastical
territory. But the temporising Nicholas had been succeeded by a
practical and energetic statesman, who at once ordered the Count of
Urbino to protect the interests of the Church.[99] In the following
spring an interview between the rivals, in token of their perfect
reconciliation, was brought about by the Duke of Milan. It took place
in presence of a numerous and noble concourse, witnesses to studied
displays of affectionate cordiality, which on one side were neither
voluntary nor sincere.
[Footnote 99: See letters to him from Pius II., of Nov. 11 and Dec.
12, 1459, in the Laurentian MS. just quoted.]