THE GREAT WAR BEGINS
Years before 1914, when Germany declared war against civilization, it
was decided by the German General Staff to strike at France through
Belgium. The records of the German Foreign Office prove that fact.
The reason for this lay in the long line of powerful fortresses along
the line that divides France from Germany and the sparsely spaced and
comparatively out-of-date forts on the border between Germany and
Belgium. True, there was a treaty guaranteeing the inviolability of
Belgian territory to which Germany was a signatory party. Some of the
clauses of that treaty were:
Article 9. Belgium, within the limits traced in conformity with the
principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a
perpetually neutral state. The five powers (England, France, Austria,
Prussia and Russia), without wishing to intervene in the internal
affairs of Belgium, guarantee her that perpetual neutrality as well
as the integrity and inviolability of her territory in the limits
mentioned in the present article.
Article 10. By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held to observe this
same neutrality toward all the other states and to make no attack on
their internal or external tranquillity while always preserving the
right to defend herself against any foreign aggression.
This agreement was followed on January 23, 1839, by a definitive
treaty, accepted by Belgium and by the Netherlands, which treaty
regulates Belgium’s neutrality as follows:
Article 7. Belgium, within the limits defined in Articles 1, 2 and
4, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. She is
obligated to preserve this neutrality against all the other states.
To convert this solemn covenant into a “scrap of paper” it was
necessary that Germany should find an excuse for tearing it to pieces.
There was absolutely no provocation in sight, but that did not
deter the German High Command. That august body with no information
whatever to afford an excuse, alleged in a formal note to the Belgian
Government that the French army intended to invade Germany through
Belgian territory. This hypocritical and mendacious note and Belgium’s
vigorous reply follow:
Note handed in on August 2, 1914, at 7 o’clock P. M., by Herr von
Below-Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
BRUSSELS, 2d August, 1914.
IMPERIAL GERMAN LEGATION IN BELGIUM
(Highly confidential)
The German Government has received reliable information according to
which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet
and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of
France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial
Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best
will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed
French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty
of a threat directed against Germany.
It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall
this attack of the enemy.
The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard
as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures
of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian
territory.
In order to dissipate any misunderstanding the German Government
declares as follows:
1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against
Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take
up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German
Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to
guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.
2. Germany undertakes under the conditions laid down to evacuate
Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.
3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared,
in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to
buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give
indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.
4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops,
and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the
opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying
roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be
compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.
In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but
she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two states
toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has
a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the
Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder
its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the
two neighboring states will become closer and more lasting.
THE REPLY BY BELGIUM
Note handed in by M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr
von Below-Saleske, German Minister.
BRUSSELS, 3d August, 1914.
(7 o’clock in the morning.)
By the note of the 2d August, 1914, the German Government has made
known that according to certain intelligence the French forces intend
to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur and that Belgium, in spite
of her good-will, would not be able without help to beat off an
advance of the French troops.
The German Government felt it to be its duty to forestall this attack
and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany
proposes to the King’s Government to take up a friendly attitude,
and undertakes at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity of
the kingdom and of her possessions in their whole extent. The note
adds that if Belgium raises difficulties to the forward march of
the German troops Germany will be compelled to consider her as an
enemy and to leave the later settlement of the two states toward one
another to the decision of arms.
This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King’s
Government.
The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction
with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st of
August, in the name of the government of the republic.
Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian
neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfil all
her international duties and her army would offer the most vigorous
opposition to the invader.
The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish
the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee
of the powers, and particularly of the Government of his Majesty the
King of Prussia.
Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations;
she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she
has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it
respected.
The attempt against her independence with which the German Government
threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international
law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.
The Belgian government would, by accepting the propositions which are
notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same
time betraying her duties toward Europe.
Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years
in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the
independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the
violation of her neutrality.
If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly
resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her
rights.
The German attack upon Belgium and France came with terrible force
and suddenness. Twenty-four army corps, divided into three armies
clad in a specially designed and colored gray-green uniform, swept in
three mighty streams over the German borders with their objective the
heart of France. The Army of the Meuse was given the route through
Liége, Namur and Maubeuge. The Army of the Moselle violated the Duchy
of Luxemburg, which, under a treaty guaranteeing its independence
and neutrality, was not permitted to maintain an army. Germany was a
signatory party to this treaty also. The Army of the Rhine cut through
the Vosges Mountains and its route lay between the French cities of
Nancy and Toul.
[Illustration: _Photo Trans-Atlantic News Service Co._
KING ALBERT AT THE HEAD OF THE HEROIC SOLDIERS OF BELGIUM
It is universally agreed that the Belgian monarch was no figurehead
general but a real leader of his troops. These were the men who,
facing annihilation, astonished the world by opposing the German
military machine successfully enough to allow France to get her armies
into shape and prevent the immediate taking of Paris that was planned
by Germany.]
The heroic defense of the Belgian army at Liége against the Army of the
Meuse delayed the operation of Germany’s plans and in all probability
saved Paris. It was the first of many similar disappointments and
checks that Germany encountered during the war.
The defense of Liége continued for ten heroic days. Within that
interval the first British Expeditionary Forces were landed in France
and Belgium, the French army was mobilized to full strength. The little
Belgian army falling back northward on Antwerp, Louvain and Brussels,
threatened the German flank and approximately 200,000 German soldiers
were compelled to remain in the conquered section of Belgium to
garrison it effectively.
Liége fortifications were the design of the celebrated strategist
Brialmont. They consisted of twelve isolated fortresses which had been
permitted to become out of repair. No field works of any kind connected
them and they were without provision for defense against encircling
tactics and against modern artillery.
The huge 42-centimeter guns, the first of Germany’s terrible surprises,
were brought into action against these forts, and their concrete and
armored steel turrets were cracked as walnuts are cracked between the
jaws of a nut-cracker. The Army of the Meuse then made its way like a
gray-green cloud of poison gas through Belgium. A cavalry screen of
crack Uhlan regiments preceded it, and it made no halt worthy of note
until it confronted the Belgian army on the line running from Louvain
to Namur. The Belgians were forced back before Louvain on August 20th,
the Belgian Government removed the capital from Brussels to Antwerp,
and the German hosts entered evacuated Brussels.
During this advance of the Army of the Meuse, strong French detachments
invaded German soil, pouring into Alsace through the Belfort Gap. Brief
successes attended the bold stroke. Mûlhausen was captured and the
Metz-Strassburg Railroad was cut in several places. The French suffered
a defeat almost immediately following this first flush of victory, both
in Alsace and in Lorraine, where a French detachment had engaged with
the Army of the Moselle. The French army thereupon retreated to the
strong line of forts and earthworks defending the border between France
and Germany.
England’s first expeditionary force landed at Ostend, Calais and
Dunkirk on August 7th. It was dubbed England’s “contemptible little
army” by the German General Staff. That name was seized upon gladly by
England as a spur to volunteering. It brought to the surface national
pride and a fierce determination to compel Germany to recognize and to
reckon with the “contemptible little army.”
The contact between the French, Belgian and British forces was speedily
established and something like concert resistance to the advance of
the enemy was made possible. The German army, however, followed by a
huge equipment of motor kitchens, munition trains, and other motor
transport evidencing great care in preparation for the movement, swept
resistlessly forward until it encountered the French and British on a
line running from Mons to Charleroi.
The British army was assigned to a position between two French armies.
By some miscalculation, the French army that was to have taken its
position on the British left, never appeared. The French army on the
right was attacked and defeated at Charleroi, falling back in some
confusion. The German Army of the Moselle co-operating with the Army of
the Meuse then attacked the British and French, and a great flanking
movement by the German joint commands developed.
This was directed mainly at the British under command of Sir John
French. There followed a retreat that for sheer heroism and dogged
determination has become one of the great battles of all time.
The British, outflanked and outnumbered three to one, fought and
marched without cessation for six days and nights. Time after time
envelopment and disaster threatened them, but with a determination
that would not be beaten they fought off the best that Germany could
send against them, maintained contact with the French army on their
right, and delayed the German advance so effectively that a complete
disarrangement of all the German plans ensued. This was the second
great disappointment to Germany. It made possible the victory of the
Marne and the victorious peace of 1918. The story of that immortal
retreat is best told in the words of Sir John French, transmitting the
report of this encounter to the British War Office. It follows:
“The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was
effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at
its destination well within the scheduled time.
“The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday,
the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force
during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable
from which to commence operations which the French commander-in-chief,
General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in
prosecution of the campaign.
“The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on
the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up
as follows:
“From Condé to Mons, inclusive, was assigned to the Second Corps, and
to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted.
The Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
“In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry
divisions as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank,
or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward
reconnoissance was intrusted to Brig. Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode, with
the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send
forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.
“During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent
work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several
encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.
“2. At 6 A. M., on August 23d, I assembled the commanders of the
First and Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the
position and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I
understood to be General Joffre’s plan. I discussed with them at some
length the immediate situation in front of us.
“From information I received from French headquarters I understood
that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy’s army corps,
with perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and
I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was
confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no
undue opposition in their reconnoitering operations. The observations
of my airplanes seemed to bear out this estimate.
“About 3 P. M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the
effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line,
apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from
Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.
“The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some
high ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated
Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.
“The right of the Third Division, under General Hamilton, was at
Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the
commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on
this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the
center behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about
5 P. M., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre
by telegraph, telling me that at least three German corps, viz., a
reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my
position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning
movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the
two reserve French divisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were
retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of
the passages of the Sambre, between Charleroi and Namur.
“3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons
position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be
reconnoitered. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the
right and extended west to Jenlain, southwest to Valenciennes, on the
left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing
crops and buildings made the placing of trenches very difficult
and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It
nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.
“When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by
airplane reconnoissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect
a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.
“A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line
throughout the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division
from the neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration
as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of
both the First and Second Divisions, while the First Division took
up a supporting position in the neighborhood of Peissant. Under
cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the line
Dour-Quaroule-Framéries. The Third Division on the right of the corps
suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had
retaken Mons.
“The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to
withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further
loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P. M. Toward midday the
enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.
“I had previously ordered General Allenby with the cavalry to act
vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the
pressure off.
“About 7.30 A. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles
Ferguson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard
pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message
General Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct
support to the Fifth Division.
“During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the Second
Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the
further advance of the enemy’s infantry by making a mounted attack on
his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held
up by wire about five hundred yards from his objective, and the Ninth
Lancers and the Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement
of the brigade.
“The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of
communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and
23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south
of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.
“With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was
enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two
corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he
suffered great losses in doing so.
“At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west
of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the
Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position
between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.
“4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as
was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts
of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his
intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not
a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.
“I had every reason to believe that the enemy’s forces were somewhat
exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped,
therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me
effecting my object.
“The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not
only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the
exhaustion of the troops.
“The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a
position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rear guards were ordered
to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eih Road by 5.30 A. M.
“Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps,
covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry
division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of
General Allenby, covered the west flank.
“The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,
the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade
of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.
“I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his
right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road
south of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help
to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new
position.
“Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le
Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been
partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts, owing to the
information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the
enemy against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.
“Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right,
my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy’s western corps (II)
to envelope me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the
troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat
until I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the
Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some
opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to
the corps commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly
could toward the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.
“The cavalry under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the
retirement.
“Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps
continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern
border of the Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10
o’clock. I had intended that the corps should come further west so as
to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were
exhausted and could not get further in without rest.
“The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 P.
M. a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies
was heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were
coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought
most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in
issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss
has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the
same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First
Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent
urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on
my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they
eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the
skillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they
were able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.
“By about 6 P. M. the Second Corps had got into position with their
right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the
line of defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward
Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.
“During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good
deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th, General Allenby
had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.
“The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer
commanding the Second Army Corps.
“On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions
under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my
way back from Bavai, which was my ‘Poste de Commandement’ during the
fighting of the 23d and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly
requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction
from his army commander to act on my left flank, but said that his
horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered
me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was
unable, for the reasons given, to afford me any support on the most
critical day of all, viz., the 26th.
“At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of
his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second
Corps and the Fourth Division.
“At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position
against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he
judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as
ordered) in face of such an attack.
“I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action
and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me
to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable
of movement.
“The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our
left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to
do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank;
but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to
intervene in any way.
“There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the
troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted
them.
“The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a
splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.
“At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be
avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to
commence it about 3.30 P. M. The movement was covered with the most
devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had
itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the
further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final
completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.
“Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an
energetic pursuit.
“I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British
troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable
services rendered by Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
“I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army
under my command on the morning of the 26th of August, could never have
been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation.
“The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through
the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line
Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy’s
pursuit.
“On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the
French cavalry division which he commands for materially assisting my
retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.
“General D’Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French
Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on the
enemy’s right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British
forces.
“This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at
Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a
four days’ battle.
“At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch.
“I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have
suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the
fact that the British army--only two days after a concentration by
rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five Germany
army corps.
[Illustration: A SCENE FROM EARLY TRENCH WARFARE
From the woods in the background the British charge on an angle of
the German breastworks under cover of artillery and machine-gun fire.
This illustrates the early French warfare before the development of
elaborate concrete structures like the Hindenburg line which the
Germans later devised.]
“It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by
the two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing
and devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by
divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller
units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed
by non-commissioned officers and men.
“I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship’s notice the admirable
work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their
skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have
furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has
been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at
constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every
kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.
“Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy’s machines.”
The combined French and British armies, including the forces that
had retreated from Alsace and Lorraine, gave way with increasing
stubbornness before von Kluck. That German general disregarding the
fortresses surrounding Paris, swung southward to make a junction with
the Army of the Crown Prince of Germany advancing through the Vosges
Mountains. General Manoury’s army opposed the German advance on the
entrenched line of Paris. General Gallieni commanding the garrison of
Paris, was ready with a novel mobile transport consisting of taxicabs
and fast trucks. The total number of soldiers in the French and British
armies now outnumbered those in the German armies opposed to them.
General Joffre, in supreme command of the French, had chosen the
battleground. He had set the trap with consummate skill. The word was
given; the trap was sprung; and the first battle of the Marne came as a
crashing surprise to Germany.