THE PLOTTER BEHIND THE SCENE
One factor alone caused the great war. It was not the assassination
at Sarajevo, not the Slavic ferment of anti-Teutonism in Austria
and the Balkans. The only cause of the world’s greatest war was the
determination of the German High Command and the powerful circle
surrounding it that “_Der Tag_” had arrived. The assassination at
Sarajevo was only the peg for the pendant of war. Another peg would
have been found inevitably had not the projection of that assassination
presented itself as the excuse.
Germany’s military machine was ready. A gray-green uniform that at
a distance would fade into misty obscurity had been devised after
exhaustive experiments by optical, dye and cloth experts co-operating
with the military high command. These uniforms had been standardized
and fitted for the millions of men enrolled in Germany’s regular and
reserve armies. Rifles, great pyramids of munitions, field kitchens,
traveling post-offices, motor lorries, a network of military railways
leading to the French and Belgian border, all these and more had been
made ready. German soldiers had received instructions which enabled
each man at a signal to go to an appointed place where he found
everything in readiness for his long forced marches into the territory
of Germany’s neighbors.
More than all this, Germany’s spy system, the most elaborate and
unscrupulous in the history of mankind, had enabled the German High
Command to construct in advance of the declaration of war concrete gun
emplacements in Belgium and other invaded territory. The cellars of
dwellings and shops rented or owned by German spies were camouflaged
concrete foundations for the great guns of Austria and Germany. These
emplacements were in exactly the right position for use against the
fortresses of Germany’s foes. Advertisements and shop-signs were used
by spies as guides for the marching German armies of invasion.
[Illustration: GERMANY’S POSSESSIONS IN AFRICA PRIOR TO 1914]
In brief, Germany had planned for war. She was approximately ready for
it. Under the shelter of such high-sounding phrases as “We demand our
place in the sun,” and “The seas must be free,” the German people were
educated into the belief that the hour of Germany’s destiny was at hand.
German psychologists, like other German scientists, had co-operated
with the imperial militaristic government for many years to bring the
Germanic mind into a condition of docility. So well did they understand
the mentality and the trends of character of the German people that it
was comparatively easy to impose upon them a militaristic system and
philosophy by which the individual yielded countless personal liberties
for the alleged good of the state. Rigorous and compulsory military
service, unquestioning adherence to the doctrine that might makes right
and a cession to “the All-Highest,” as the Emperor was styled, of
supreme powers in the state, are some of the sufferances to which the
German people submitted.
German propaganda abroad was quite as vigorous as at home, but
infinitely less successful. The German High Command did not expect
England to enter the war. It counted upon America’s neutrality with
a leaning toward Germany. It believed that German colonization in
South Africa and South America would incline these vast domains toward
friendship for the Central Empire. How mistaken the propagandists and
psychologists were events have demonstrated.
It was this dream of world-domination by Teutonic kultur that supplied
the motive leading to the world’s greatest war. Bosnia, an unwilling
province of Austria-Hungary, at one time a province of Serbia and
overwhelmingly Slavic in its population, had been seething for years
with an anti-Teutonic ferment. The Teutonic court at Vienna, leading
the minority Germanic party in Austria-Hungary, had been endeavoring
to allay the agitation among the Bosnian Slavs. In pursuance of that
policy, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir-presumptive to the thrones of
Austria and Hungary, and his morganatic wife, Sophia Chotek, Duchess of
Hohenberg, on June 28, 1914, visited Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia.
On the morning of that day, while they were being driven through the
narrow streets of the ancient town, a bomb was thrown at them, but
they were uninjured. They were driven through the streets again in the
afternoon, for purpose of public display. A student, just out of his
’teens, one Gavrilo Prinzep, attacked the royal party with a magazine
pistol and killed both the Archduke and his wife.
Here was the excuse for which Germany had waited. Here was the dawn of
“The Day.” The Germanic court of Austria asserted that the crime was
the result of a conspiracy, leading directly to the Slavic court of
Serbia. The Serbians in their turn declared that they knew nothing of
the assassination. They pointed out the fact that Sophia Chotek was a
Slav, and that Francis Ferdinand was more liberal than any other member
of the Austrian royal household, and finally, that he, more than any
other member of the Austrian court, understood and respected the Slavic
character and aspirations.
At six o’clock on the evening of July 23d, Austria sent an ultimatum
to Serbia, presenting eleven demands and stipulating that categorical
replies must be delivered before six o’clock on the evening of
July 25th. Although the language in which the ultimatum was couched
was humiliating to Serbia, the answer was duly delivered within the
stipulated time.
The demands of the Austrian note in brief were as follows:
1. The Serbian Government to give formal assurance of its
condemnation of Serb propaganda against Austria.
2. The next issue of the Serbian “Official Journal” was to contain a
declaration to that effect.
3. This declaration to express regret that Serbian officers had taken
part in the propaganda.
4. The Serbian Government to promise that it would proceed rigorously
against all guilty of such activity.
5. This declaration to be at once communicated by the King of Serbia
to his army, and to be published in the official bulletin as an order
of the day.
6. All anti-Austrian publications in Serbia to be suppressed.
7. The Serbian political party known as the “National Union” to be
suppressed, and its means of propaganda to be confiscated.
8. All anti-Austrian teaching in the schools of Serbia to be
suppressed.
9. All officers, civil and military, who might be designated by
Austria as guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda to be dismissed by the
Serbian Government.
10. Austrian agents to co-operate with the Serbian Government in
suppressing all anti-Austrian propaganda, and to take part in the
judicial proceedings conducted in Serbia against those charged with
complicity in the crime at Sarajevo.
11. Serbia to explain to Austria the meaning of anti-Austrian
utterances of Serbian officials at home and abroad, since the
assassination.
To the first and second demands Serbia unhesitatingly assented.
To the third demand, Serbia assented, although no evidence was given to
show that Serbian officers had taken part in the propaganda.
The Serbian Government assented to the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh
and eighth demands also.
Extraordinary as was the ninth demand, which would allow the Austrian
Government to proscribe Serbian officials, so eager for peace and
friendship was the Serbian Government that it assented to it, with the
stipulation that the Austrian Government should offer some proof of the
guilt of the proscribed officers.
The tenth demand, which in effect allowed Austrian agents to control
the police and courts of Serbia, it was not possible for Serbia
to accept without abrogating her sovereignty. However, it was not
unconditionally rejected, but the Serbian Government asked that it be
made the subject of further discussion, or be referred to arbitration.
The Serbian Government assented to the eleventh demand, on the
condition that if the explanations which would be given concerning the
alleged anti-Austrian utterances of Serbian officials would not prove
satisfactory to the Austrian Government, the matter should be submitted
to mediation or arbitration.
Behind the threat conveyed in the Austrian ultimatum was the menacing
figure of militant Germany. The veil that had hitherto concealed the
hands that worked the string, was removed when Germany, under the
pretense of localizing the quarrel to Serbian and Austrian soil,
interrogated France and England, asking them to prevent Russia from
defending Serbia in the event of an attack by Austria upon the Serbs.
England and France promptly refused to participate in a tragedy which
would deliver Serbia to Austria as Bosnia had been delivered. Russia,
bound by race and creed to Serbia, read into the ultimatum of Teutonic
kultur a determination for warfare. Mobilization of the Russian forces
along the Austrian frontier was arranged, when it was seen that
Serbia’s pacific reply to Austria’s demands would be contemptuously
disregarded by Germany and Austria.
During the days that intervened between the issuance of the ultimatum
and the actual declaration of war by Germany against Russia on
Saturday, August 1st, various sincere efforts were made to stave off
the world-shaking catastrophe. Arranged chronologically, these events
may thus be summarized: Russia, on July 24th, formally asked Austria
if she intended to annex Serbian territory by way of reprisal for the
assassination at Sarajevo. On the same day Austria replied that it had
no present intention to make such annexation. Russia then requested an
extension of the forty-eight-hour time limit named in the ultimatum.
Austria, on the morning of Saturday, July 25th, refused Russia’s
request for an extension of the period named in the ultimatum. On the
same day, the newspapers published in Petrograd printed an official
note issued by the Russian Government warning Europe generally that
Russia would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia. These
newspapers also printed the appeal of the Serbian Crown Prince to the
Czar dated on the preceding day, urging that Russia come to the rescue
of the menaced Serbs. Serbia’s peaceful reply surrendering on all
points except one, and agreeing to submit that to arbitration, was sent
late in the afternoon of the same day, and that night Austria declared
the reply to be unsatisfactory and withdrew its minister from Belgrade.
England commenced its attempts at pacification on the following day,
Sunday, July 26th. Sir Edward Grey spent the entire Sabbath in the
Foreign Office and personally conducted the correspondence that was
calculated to bring the dispute to a peaceful conclusion. He did
not reckon, however, with a Germany determined upon war, a Germany
whose manufacturers, ship-owners and Junkers had combined with its
militarists to achieve “Germany’s place in the sun” even though
the world would be stained in the blood of the most frightful war
this earth has ever known. Realization of this fact did not come
to Sir Edward Grey until his negotiations with Germany and with
Austria-Hungary had proceeded for some time. His first suggestion
was that the dispute between Russia and Austria be committed to the
arbitration of Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany. Russia
accepted this but Germany and Austria rejected it. Russia had
previously suggested that the dispute be settled by a conference
between the diplomatic heads at Vienna and Petrograd. This also was
refused by Austria.
Sir Edward Grey renewed his efforts on Monday, July 27th, with an
invitation to Germany to present suggestions of its own, looking toward
a settlement. This note was never answered. Germany took the position
that its proposition to compel Russia to stand aside while Austria
punished Serbia had been rejected by England and France and it had
nothing further to propose.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION IN 1815]
During all this period of negotiation the German Foreign Office, to all
outward appearances at least, had been acting independently of the
Kaiser, who was in Norway on a vacation trip. He returned to Potsdam on
the night of Sunday, July 26th. On Monday morning the Czar of Russia
received a personal message from the Kaiser, urging Russia to stand
aside that Serbia might be punished. The Czar immediately replied with
the suggestion that the whole matter be submitted to The Hague. No
reply of any kind was ever made to this proposal by Germany.
All suggestions and negotiations looking forward to peace were brought
to a tragic end on the following day, Tuesday, July 28th, when Austria
declared war on Serbia, having speedily mobilized troops at strategic
points on the Serbian border. Russian mobilization, which had been
proceeding only in a tentative way, on the Austrian border, now became
general, and on July 30th, mobilization of the entire Russian army was
proclaimed.
Germany’s effort to exclude England from the war began on Thursday,
July 30th. A note, sounding Sir Edward Grey on the question of British
neutrality in the event of war was received, and a curt refusal to
commit the British Empire to such a proposal was the reply. Sir Edward
Grey, in a last determined effort to avoid a world war, suggested
to Germany, Austria, Serbia and Russia that the military operations
commenced by Austria should be recognized as merely a punitive
expedition. He further suggested that when a point in Serbian territory
previously fixed upon should have been reached, Austria would halt and
would submit her further action to arbitration in the conference of the
Powers. Russia agreed unreservedly to this proposition. Austria gave a
half-hearted assent to the principle involved. Germany made no reply.
The die was cast for war on the following day, July 31st, when Germany
made a dictatorial and arrogant demand upon Russia that mobilization of
that nation’s military forces be stopped within twelve hours. Russia
made no reply, and on Saturday, August 1st, Germany set the world
aflame with the dread of war’s horror by her declaration of war upon
Russia.
Germany’s responsibility for this monumental crime against the
peace of the world is eternally fixed upon her, not only by these
outward and visible acts and negotiations, not only by her years of
patient preparation for the war into which she plunged the world.
The responsibility is fastened upon her forever by the revelations
of her own ambassador to England during this fateful period. Prince
Lichnowsky, in a remarkable communication which was given to the world,
laid bare the machinations of the German High Command and its advisers.
He was a guest of the Kaiser at Kiel on board the Imperial yacht Meteor
when the message was received informing the Kaiser of the assassination
at Sarajevo. His story continues.
Being unacquainted with the Vienna viewpoint and what was going on
there, I attached no very far-reaching significance to the event;
but, looking back, I could feel sure that in the Austrian aristocracy
a feeling of relief outweighed all others. His Majesty regretted
that his efforts to win over the Archduke to his ideas had thus been
frustrated by the Archduke’s assassination....
I went on to Berlin and saw the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg. I
told him that I regarded our foreign situation as very satisfactory
as it was a long time indeed since we had stood so well with
England. And in France there was a pacifist cabinet. Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism. He complained of
the Russian armaments. I tried to tranquilize him with the argument
that it was not to Russia’s interest to attack us, and that such an
attack would never have English or French support, as both countries
wanted peace.
I went from him to Dr. Zimmermann (the under Secretary) who was
acting for Herr von Jagow (the Foreign Secretary), and learned from
him that Russia was about to call up nine hundred thousand new
troops. His words unmistakably denoted ill-humor against Russia,
who, he said, stood everywhere in our way. In addition, there were
questions of commercial policy that had to be settled. That General
von Moltke was urging war was, of course, not told to me. I learned,
however, that Herr von Tschirschky (the German Ambassador at Vienna)
had been reproved because he said that he had advised Vienna to show
moderation toward Serbia.
Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home in Silesia, quite unaware of
the impending crisis. He continues:
When I returned from Silesia on my way to London, I stopped only
a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to
proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end an unbearable state
of affairs. Unfortunately, I failed at the moment to gauge the
significance of the news. I thought that once more it would come to
nothing; that even if Russia acted threateningly, the matter could
soon be settled. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and
declare there and then that I would have no hand in such a policy.
There was a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5th, between the
German and Austrian authorities, at which meeting war was decided on.
Prince Lichnowsky says:
I learned afterwards that at the decisive discussion at Potsdam on
July 5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval
of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm
would be done if war with Russia did come out of it. It was so stated
at least in the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff
(the Austrian Ambassador to England).
At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the
English press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal
the death-blow to “Greater-Serbian” hopes. I was to use all my
influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking a stand
against Austria. I remember England’s attitude during the Bosnian
annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy
with the Serbian claims to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent
promotion of nationalist hopes that went on in the days of Lord
Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds I thought it
extremely unlikely that English public opinion would support a
punitive expedition against the Archduke’s murderers. I thus felt
it my duty to enter an urgent warning against the whole project,
which I characterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recommended
that counsels of moderation be given Austria, as I did not believe
that the conflict could be localized (that is to say, it could not be
limited to a war between Austria and Serbia).
Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not prepared; that there
would be more or less of a rumpus; but that the more firmly we
stood by Austria, the more surely would Russia give way. Austria
was already blaming us for flabbiness and we could not flinch. On
the other hand, Russian sentiment was growing more unfriendly all
the time, and we must simply take the risk. I subsequently learned
that this attitude was based on advices from Count Pourtales (the
German Ambassador in Petrograd), that Russia would not stir under any
circumstances; information which prompted us to spur Count Berchtold
on in his course. On learning the attitude of the German Government
I looked for salvation through English mediation, knowing that Sir
Edward Grey’s influence in Petrograd could be used in the cause of
peace. I therefore, availed myself of my friendly relations with the
Minister to ask him confidentially to advise moderation in Russia in
case Austria demanded satisfaction from the Serbians, as it seemed
likely she would.
The English press was quiet at first, and friendly to Austria,
the assassination being generally condemned. By degrees, however,
more and more voices made themselves heard, in the sense that,
however necessary it might be to take cognizance of the crime, any
exploitation of it for political ends was unjustifiable. Moderation
was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum came out, all the
papers, with the exception of the _Standard_, were unanimous in
condemning it. The whole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna,
realized that it meant war, and a world war too. The English
fleet, which happened to have been holding a naval review, was not
demobilized.
The British Government labored to make the Serbian reply conciliatory,
and “the Serbian answer was in keeping with the British efforts.” Sir
Edward Grey then proposed his plan of mediation upon the two points
which Serbia had not wholly conceded. Prince Lichnowsky writes:
Mr. Cambon (for France), Marquis Imperiali (for Italy), and I were to
meet, with Sir Edward in the chair, and it would have been easy to
work out a formula for the debated points, which had to do with the
co-operation of imperial and royal officials in the inquiries to be
conducted at Belgrade. By the exercise of good-will everything could
have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance
of the British proposal would have relieved the strain and further
improved our relations with England. I seconded this plan with all my
energies. In vain. I was told (by Berlin) that it would be against
the dignity of Austria. Of course, all that was needed was one hint
from Berlin to Count Berchtold (the Austrian Foreign Minister); he
would have satisfied himself with a diplomatic triumph and rested
on the Serbian answer. That hint was never given. On the contrary,
pressure was brought in favor of war....
After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with our
proposal. We insisted on war. No other answer could I get (from
Berlin) than that it was a colossal condescension on the part of
Austria not to contemplate any acquisition of territory. Sir Edward
justly pointed out that one could reduce a country to vassalage
without acquiring territory; that Russia would see this, and
regard it as a humiliation not to be put up with. The impression
grew stronger and stronger that we were bent on war. Otherwise our
attitude toward a question in which we were not directly concerned
was incomprehensible. The insistent requests and well-defined
declarations of M. Sasanof, the Czar’s positively humble telegrams,
Sir Edward’s repeated proposals, the warnings of Marquis San Guiliano
and of Bollati, my own pressing admonitions were all of no avail.
Berlin remained inflexible--Serbia must be slaughtered.
Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided upon his well-known warning.
I told him I had always reported (to Berlin) that we should have to
reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Time
and again the Minister said to me, “If war breaks out it will be the
greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.” And now events moved
rapidly. Count Berchtold at last decided to come around, having up to
that point played the rôle of “Strong man” under guidance of Berlin.
Thereupon we (in answer to Russia’s mobilization) sent our ultimatum
and declaration of war--after Russia had spent a whole week in
fruitless negotiation and waiting.
Thus ended my mission in London. It had suffered shipwreck, not on
the wiles of the Briton but on the wiles of our own policy. Were
not those right who saw that the German people were pervaded with
the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi, which glorifies war as an
end instead of holding it in abhorrence as an evil thing? Properly
speaking militarism is a school for the people and an instrument
to further political ends. But in the patriarchal absolutism of
a military monarchy, militarism exploits politics to further its
own ends, and can create a situation which a democracy freed from
junkerdom would not tolerate.
That is what our enemies think; that is what they are bound to think
when they see that in spite of capitalistic industrialism and in
spite of socialistic organizations, the living, as Nietzsche said,
are still ruled by the dead. The democratization of Germany, the
first war aim proposed by our enemies, will become a reality.
This is the frank statement of a great German statesman made long
before Germany received its knock-out blow. It was written when German
militarism was sweeping all before it on land, and when the U-boat was
at the height of its murderous powers on the high seas.
No one in nor out of Germany has controverted any of its statements and
it will forever remain as one of the counts in the indictment against
Germany and the sole cause of the world’s greatest misery, the war.
America’s outstanding authority on matters of international conduct,
former Secretary of State Elihu Root, declared that the World War was a
mighty and all-embracing struggle between two conflicting principles of
human right and human duty; it was a conflict between the divine right
of kings to govern mankind through armies and nobles, and the right
of the peoples of the earth who toil and endure and aspire to govern
themselves by law under justice, and in the freedom of individual
manhood.
After the declaration of war against Russia by Germany, events marched
rapidly and inevitably toward the general conflagration. Germany’s
most strenuous efforts were directed toward keeping England out of the
conflict. We have seen in the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky how
eager was England to divert Germany’s murderous purpose. There are some
details, however, required to fill in the diplomatic picture.
President Poincaré, of the French Republic, on July 30th, asked the
British Ambassador in Paris for an assurance of British support. On the
following day he addressed a similar letter to King George of England.
Both requests were qualifiedly refused on the ground that England
wished to be free to continue negotiations with Germany for the purpose
of averting the war. In the meantime, the German Government addressed
a note to England offering guarantees for Belgian integrity, providing
Belgium did not side with France, offering to respect the neutrality of
Holland and giving assurance that no French territory in Europe would
be annexed if Germany won the war. Sir Edward Grey described this as a
“shameful proposal,” and rejected it on July 30th.
On July 31st England sent a note to France and Germany asking
for a statement of purpose concerning Belgian neutrality. France
immediately announced that it would respect the treaty of 1839 and its
reaffirmation in 1870, guaranteeing Belgium’s neutrality. This treaty
was entered into by Germany, England, France, Austria and Russia.
Germany’s reply on August 1st was a proposal that she would respect the
neutrality of Belgium if England would stay out of the war. This was
promptly declined. On August 2d the British cabinet agreed that if the
German fleet attempted to attack the coast of France the British fleet
would intervene. Germany, the next day, sent a note agreeing to refrain
from naval attacks on France provided England would remain neutral,
but declined to commit herself as to the neutrality of Belgium. Before
this, however, on August 2d, Germany had announced to Belgium its
intention to enter Belgium for the purpose of attacking France. The
Belgian Minister in London made an appeal to the British Foreign Office
and was informed that invasion of Belgium by Germany would be followed
by England’s declaration of war. Monday, August 3d, was signalized by
Belgium’s declaration of its neutrality and its firm purpose to defend
its soil against invasion by France, England, Germany or any other
nation.
[Illustration: _Photo by Underwood and Underwood, N. Y._
THE KAISER AND HIS SIX SONS
The ex-Emperor and his sons leading a procession in Berlin soon after
the declaration of war. It was noted that in spite of their martial
appearance the royal family were extremely careful to keep out of
range of the Allied guns. From left to right they are: The Kaiser,
Crown Prince Frederick Wilhelm, Princes Eitel Friedrich, Adalbert,
August, Oscar and Joachim.]
The actual invasion of Belgium commenced on the morning of August 4th,
when twelve regiments of Uhlans crossed the frontier near Vise, and
came in contact with a Belgian force driving it back upon Liége. King
Albert of Belgium promptly appealed to England, Russia and France for
aid in repelling the invader. England sent an ultimatum to Germany
fixing midnight of August 4th as the time for expiration of the
ultimatum. This demanded that satisfactory assurances be furnished
immediately that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium. No
reply was made by Germany and England’s declaration of war followed.
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, of the German Empire, wrote Germany’s
infamy into history when, in a formal statement, he acknowledged that
the invasion of Belgium was “a wrong that we will try to make good
again as soon as our military ends have been reached.” To Sir Edward
Vochen, British Ambassador to Germany, he addressed the inquiry: “Is
it the purpose of your country to make war upon Germany for the sake
of a scrap of paper?” The treaty of 1839-1870 guaranteeing Belgium’s
neutrality was the scrap of paper.
With the entrance of England into the war, the issue between autocracy
and democracy was made plain before the people of the world. Austria,
and later Turkey, joined with Germany; France, and Japan, by reason of
their respective treaty obligations joined England and Russia. Italy
for the time preferred to remain neutral, ignoring her implied alliance
with the Teutonic empires. How other nations lined up on the one side
and the other is indicated by the State Department’s list of war
declarations, and diplomatic severances, which follows:
Austria against Belgium, Aug. 28, 1914.
Austria against Japan, Aug. 27, 1914.
Austria against Montenegro, Aug. 9, 1914.
Austria against Russia, Aug. 6, 1914.
Austria against Serbia, July 28, 1914.
Belgium against Germany, Aug. 4, 1914.
Brazil against Germany, Oct. 26, 1917.
Bulgaria against Serbia, Oct. 14, 1915.
China against Austria, Aug. 14, 1917.
China against Germany, Aug. 14, 1917.
Costa Rica against Germany, May 23, 1918.
Cuba against Germany, April 7, 1917.
Cuba against Austria-Hungary, Dec. 16, 1917.
France against Austria, Aug. 13, 1914.
France against Bulgaria, Oct. 16, 1915.
France against Germany, Aug. 3, 1914.
France against Turkey, Nov. 5, 1914.
Germany against Belgium, Aug. 4, 1914.
Germany against France, Aug. 3, 1914.
Germany against Portugal, March 9, 1916.
Germany against Roumania, Sept. 14, 1916.
Germany against Russia, Aug. 1, 1914.
Great Britain against Austria, Aug. 13, 1914.
Great Britain against Bulgaria, Oct. 15, 1915.
Great Britain against Germany, Aug. 4, 1914.
Great Britain against Turkey, Nov. 5, 1914.
Greece against Bulgaria, Nov. 28, 1916. (Provisional Government.)
Greece against Bulgaria, July 2, 1917. (Government of Alexander.)
Greece against Germany, Nov. 28, 1916. (Provisional Government.)
Greece against Germany, July 2, 1917. (Government of Alexander.)
Guatemala against Germany and Austria-Hungary, April 22, 1918.
Haiti against Germany, July 15, 1918.
Honduras against Germany, July 19, 1918.
Italy against Austria, May 24, 1915.
Italy against Bulgaria, Oct. 19, 1915.
Italy against Germany, Aug. 28, 1916.
Italy against Turkey, Aug. 21, 1915.
Japan against Germany, Aug. 23, 1914.
Liberia against Germany, Aug. 4, 1917.
Montenegro against Austria, Aug. 8, 1914.
Montenegro against Germany, Aug. 9, 1914.
Nicaragua against Germany, May 24, 1918.
Panama against Germany, April 7, 1917.
Panama against Austria, Dec. 10, 1917.
Portugal against Germany, Nov. 23, 1914. (Resolution passed
authorizing military intervention as ally of England.)
Portugal against Germany, May 19, 1915. (Military aid granted.)
Roumania against Austria, Aug. 27, 1916. (Allies of Austria also
consider it a declaration.)
Russia against Germany, Aug. 7, 1914.
Russia against Bulgaria, Oct. 19, 1915.
Russia against Turkey, Nov. 3, 1914.
San Marino against Austria, May 24, 1915.
Serbia against Bulgaria, Oct. 16, 1915.
Serbia against Germany, Aug. 6, 1914.
Serbia against Turkey, Dec. 2, 1914.
Siam against Austria, July 22, 1917.
Siam against Germany, July 22, 1917.
Turkey against Allies, Nov. 23, 1914.
Turkey against Roumania, Aug. 29, 1916.
United States against Germany, April 6, 1917.
United States against Austria-Hungary, Dec. 7, 1917.
SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The Nations that formally severed relations whether afterward declaring
war or not, are as follows:
Austria against Japan, Aug. 26, 1914.
Austria against Portugal, March 16, 1916.
Austria against Serbia, July 26, 1914.
Austria against United States, April 8, 1917.
Bolivia against Germany, April 14, 1917.
Brazil against Germany, April 11, 1917.
China against Germany, March 14, 1917.
Costa Rica against Germany, Sept. 21, 1917.
Ecuador against Germany, Dec. 7, 1917.
Egypt against Germany, Aug. 13, 1914.
France against Austria, Aug. 10, 1914.
Greece against Turkey, July 2, 1917. (Government of Alexander.)
Greece against Austria, July 2, 1917. (Government of Alexander.)
Guatemala against Germany, April 27, 1917.
Haiti against Germany, June 17, 1917.
Honduras against Germany, May 17, 1917.
Nicaragua against Germany, May 18, 1917.
Peru against Germany, Oct. 6, 1917.
Santo Domingo against Germany, June 8, 1917.
Turkey against United States, April 20, 1917.
United States against Germany, Feb. 3, 1917.
Uruguay against Germany, Oct. 7, 1917.