SOME PECULIARITIES OF OUR VETERANS.
Every leader of our armies has had his story written--has carved it out
with his sword, and impressed himself on the time.
But who shall write the history of our soldiers?
Who shall dare attempt to tell the story or portray the characteristics
of our veterans?
The nation, in its hour of distress, found leaders worthy to lead in
any cause. No better marshals followed the great Napoleon. We shall
leave to posterity the task of comparing our greatest general, Grant,
with Napoleon; but the present generation may be bold enough to defy
any ardent admirer of the "Little Corporal" to find among his marshals
the equal of Grant, who rather resembles in his characteristics,
and, it is said, in his features too, the conqueror of Napoleon. We
developed, indeed, counterparts for all the great generals of modern
warfare. The tenacious Thomas has the colossal proportions of mind
and body of Kleber, the clearness in danger of Massena, and, though
ponderous and unwieldy in his movements, is not more so than was
Macdonald. Halleck, like Marmont, "understands the theory of war
perfectly," and we might say of him, as Soult once said of Marmont,
and in the same sarcastic sense, that "History will tell what he did
with his knowledge." His biographer's description of Mack, wherein he
says, "Although able in the war office, he was wholly deficient in
the qualities of a commander in the field," is a perfect description
of Halleck, and adding the paragraph about Mack's popularity with the
soldiers it applies equally well to McClellan. The "first strategist of
Europe," Soult, was not one whit the superior in conception of Sherman,
and not his equal in mobility and energy. Sherman has all the vigor
and acuteness which characterized Frederick the Great, and is at heart
his equal as a military despot. Hooker has all the ardor, and Howard
all the enthusiasm of Gustavus, and were capable of as great things.
Steedman has all the roughness, nonchalance, and impudence of Suwaroff.
McPherson was a Moreau, alike young, indecisive, and unfortunate.
True, we have developed many Grouchys, who can not command above a few
thousand men, and several Berthiers, who can not even calculate a day's
march correctly; but we have also given opportunity to one or two Neys
in Sheridan and Rousseau, and several Murats in Hancock, Logan, and
Gordon Granger.
But not less worthy of the cause have been the men who fought in the
ranks of our armies, and still more worthy to be compared to the best
armies of Europe than are our generals to be paralleled with the great
leaders of Europe. The superiors of our veterans never witnessed
battle. They form, as combined in armies, a study not less enticing and
interesting than that of the characters of their leaders.
One of the many fallacies which have been dissipated by our late
warlike experience is the idea which once prevailed that an uneducated
man made as good, if not a better soldier than the educated man.
When the late war began, it was an assertion made as positively as
frequently. It was believed, particularly by the regular officers, that
the persons of the former class more readily and completely adapted
themselves to the discipline of the camps--more readily became the
pliant and obedient tools that regular soldiers are too often made. It
is to the veteran volunteers of the late war for the Union that we are
indebted for the explosion of this fallacy. The proofs of its falsity
are not less interesting than conclusive.
Every reader familiar with the history of modern warfare in Europe
must have noticed, in watching the events of the late rebellion in
this country, the very great difference between the practice of war as
carried on in Europe and by ourselves. The rules have been the same;
the theory of war is too firmly and philosophically established to be
changed. It can not be said that we originated a single new rule, but
our application of those long established has been unlike any other
practice known to history. The extent of the field of operations, the
peculiar configuration of the country, and the extended line of coast
and inland frontier which each party to the contest had to guard,
conspired to this end, and caused to be originated such peculiarities
of warfare as long and arduous raids by entire armies, flank marches
of an extent and boldness never before conceived, the construction
of many leagues of fortified lines, and the execution of strategic
marches of great originality and brilliancy, while there have been
effected at the same time, owing to changes and improvements in the
arms, several innovations in minor tactics not less curious than
important. The contending parties fought dozens of battles, each of
which would have been decisive of a war between any two of the great
powers of Europe. There the limits of the field of operations are
restricted by the presence of armed neutral powers on each frontier.
Here the line of frontier extended across a whole continent. No
necessities exist there, as here, for large numbers of large armies.
The most important and extensive modern European wars witnessed the
prosecution of only one important operation at a time, while in this
country we have carried on several campaigns simultaneously, and fought
pitched battles whose tactical as well as strategic success depended
on the result of operations five hundred miles distant. Bragg won the
victory of Chickamauga only by the aid of re-enforcements sent him
from Richmond; the besieged army of Rosecrans at Chattanooga was saved
from dispersion only by the timely re-enforcements sent him, under
Hooker, from Washington; while Schofield, with twenty thousand men,
after fighting at Nashville, Tennessee, in the middle of winter, was
operating in North Carolina, opening communications with Sherman, a
fortnight subsequently. In Europe, concentration is forced on each
party by the configuration and confined area of the seat of war. In
this country the opposite effect has naturally been the result of the
opposite circumstances, and the finest display of generalship which
we have had was shown by Grant in the consummate skill with which, in
the latter year of the war, he concentrated our two greatest armies,
and employed his cavalry against the vital point of the rebellion,
while with the fractional organizations he kept the enemy employed in
the far West. Generally speaking, any two European powers at war are
represented each by a single army, which are brought together upon a
field of battle to decide at a blow the question in dispute, and thus
the European generals are afforded better chances for the display of
tactical abilities. In Europe, cavalry plays an important part on
every battle-field, while in this country its assistance has seldom
been asked in actual battle, though a no less effective application
has been made of it in destroying communications. Except in the battle
of General Sheridan, and in some instances where accident has brought
cavalry into battle, our troopers were never legitimately employed.
The art of marching as practiced in Europe was also varied here, and
the European system of supplying an army is very different from our
own. Their lines of march are decided by the necessities for providing
cantonments in the numerous villages of the country, while on this
continent marches are retarded, if not controlled, by the necessity of
carrying tents for camps. The parallel which is here merely outlined
might be pursued by one better fitted for the task to a highly
suggestive and interesting conclusion.
In the same sense, and in still better defined contrast, the armies of
America and of Europe have differed in their _personnel_. The armies of
the principal powers of Europe are composed of men forced to arms by
necessity in time of peace, and conscriptions in time of war; not, like
the people of our own country, volunteering when the crisis demanded,
with a clear sense of the danger before them, and for the stern
purpose of vindicating the flag, and forcing obedience to the laws of
the country. The European soldiers are conscripted for life, become
confirmed in the habits of the camp, and are subjected to a system
of discipline which tends to the ultimate purpose of rendering them
mere pliant tools in the hands of a leader; while those of the United
States, separated from the outer world only by the lax discipline
necessary to the government of a camp, are open to every influence that
books, that letters, and, to a certain extent, that society can lend.
The highest aim of the European system is to sink individuality, and
to teach the recruit that he is but the fraction of a great machine,
to the proper working of which his perfectness in drill and discipline
is absolutely necessary. In the United States volunteer army this same
system was only partially enforced, and individuality was lost only on
the battle-field, and then only so far as was necessary to _morale_
did the man sink into the soldier. The private who in camp disagreed
and disputed with his captain on questions of politics or science was
not necessarily disobedient and demoralized on the battle-field. No
late opportunity for a comparison between the prowess of our own and
any European army has been presented, though the reader will have very
little difficulty in convincing himself that the discipline of our
troops in the South was better than that of the English in the Crimea
or the French in Italy; while the "outrages of the Northern soldiers,"
at which England murmured in her partiality for the rebels, were not
certainly as horrible as those committed by her own troops in India.
This same difference was visible in the _personnel_ of our own and
the rebel armies, and it resulted from the same cause, and that cause
was education. The Union army was superior in prowess to that of the
South because superior in discipline, and it was superior in discipline
because superior in education. The Union army was recruited from a
people confirmed in habits of industry, and inured to hard and severe
manual and mental labor. That of the rebels was recruited from among
men reared in the comparative idleness of agricultural life, and not
habituated to severe toil, or conscripted from that hardier class of
"poor whites" whose spirits had been broken by long existence in a
state of ignorance and of slavery not less abject because indirectly
enforced and unsuspectedly endured. Neither fraction of the rebel army,
as a class, was the equal either in refinement, education, or habits of
the men of the North, nor were both combined in an army organization
equal in discipline, or the courage and effectiveness which results
from it, to that which sprang to the nation's aid in 1861. Although the
camp morality of both armies might have been better, there can be no
doubt in any unprejudiced mind that the moral sentiment of the soldiers
of the North was much more refined and correct than that of the
organized forces of the South. Not only was their discipline better,
not only were they under superior control in battle and in camp, but
when, at times, relieved of the restrictions which are thrown around
camps, their thoughts naturally turned less to dissipation and excesses
than those of the Southern soldiers. The military despotism at the
South was much more severely enforced by the rebel armies than it was
by our own, though looked upon as that of an enemy. The excesses which
at times existed in both armies were of Southern parentage. Sherman's
"bummers" were legitimate descendants of Morgan's raiders and Stuart's
cavalry, and at no time during the period in which they were "let
loose" in Georgia and South Carolina could they excel Wheeler's cavalry
in the art of plundering and destroying. The destruction of Atlanta and
Columbia by our army under Sherman occurred nearly two years after the
burning of Chambersburg by the rebels under Ewell.
The superiority of our veterans over those of the rebel armies was
evinced not only in the grand result of the war, but in all its
details. Their superior endurance was acknowledged by their enemies
on dozens of fields, and their superior discipline was generally
confessed. Northern men are by nature no braver than Southern men, and
the superiority of the Northern army was not the result of natural
gifts, but of cultivation. The Northern people are the superiors of the
Southern classes, first, in education, and, secondly, in habits and
physique. Their endurance was the result of the latter advantage; their
superiority in discipline and _morale_ was naturally the consequence
of the former. Though something of the spirit, endurance, patience,
and thorough discipline of our armies was to be attributed to the
consciousness of the justice of the cause for which they fought, the
general superiority of our veterans over the rebel soldiers was,
without dispute, the result of the superior general education received
by the Northern masses.
And, _par parenthesis_, while on this subject of education, let me
stop to say, even though I break the continuity of the argument, that
I think, if there is a single duty which the North, as the conqueror,
owes to the South as the conquered, it is the granting to her
people--ay, even enforcing upon them, the great educational advantages
with which the North is so bountifully blessed. The first plank in the
reconstruction platform of the _people_--not the mere politicians,
for so much virtue can not be expected of them--should provide for
the education of the Southern masses, white as well as black. All the
reconstruction schemes which have been advanced are calculated for
speedy operation, and political power, not the social improvement and
prosperity of the people, is aimed at. Universal suffrage, as a remedy,
is chimerical, and one which can not enter into the practical solution
of the question. Negro suffrage is an experiment as dangerous to the
country as it can possibly be advantageous to the negro. I would gladly
see the present generation of adult negroes allowed by the states to
vote in all local elections, for his vote is really all the protection
he has against the injustice of an elective judiciary, each member of
which naturally enough decides in all suits against the negro without
a vote, to curry favor and popularity with the white man with a vote.
But in the event of a general election for presidency, the giving of
the right of suffrage to the negroes would be practically equivalent to
throwing the power of the government again into the hands of the three
hundred thousand slaveholders who formerly ruled the country, and who,
still remaining the capitalists of the South, through the influence
of their capital would rule the vote of the negroes and laborers. A
generation for reconstruction is short enough, and the only true means
for the permanent reconstruction of the people is through education.
The great strength of the rebellion lay in the ignorance of the
Southern masses. The "poor whites" of the South are among the
most ignorant people on the face of God's earth. The slaveholders
purposely kept them in ignorance--kept them from books, and schools,
and newspapers more carefully, more persistently than they did their
slaves. They surrounded their section and their people with a Chinese
wall of prejudice, against which all arrays of fact, argument, appeal,
threw themselves in vain. Through this ignorance, the "poor whites"
of the South were ruled even more despotically than the slaves; and
through this ignorance the slaveholders of the South were enabled
to commit the greatest of wrongs against humanity. They engendered
prejudices between the "poor whites" and the negroes, never losing an
opportunity of fostering the hatred and enmity which they were soon
enabled to create. A perfect system prevailed all over the South, and
the "poor whites" were placed in every position, socially, politically,
and otherwise, in which they could be made offensive to the slaves.
The harsh overseer was always a "poor white," and, if possible, he was
selected from among the "Yankee" emigrants; the sheriff who tied the
slave to the whipping-post, and the constable who laid on the lash,
were always elected from the "poor whites;" and the men who, with
bloodhounds, hunted the runaway negro through marsh and wood, were
hired from among the "poor white" neighbors. In their ignorance, these
two factions of the same laboring class of the South were made to
believe that their interests were antagonistic instead of identical,
and that the slaveholders were the mutual enemies of each. Andrew
Johnson, in laboring for years in Tennessee to create a feeling of
antagonism between the "poor whites" and the rich slaveholders, was
touching at one root of the evil, but not the root. The war has thrown
open the field to the laborers of the North, and if the people of the
country seek to restore harmony, to obliterate all sectional feelings,
to make the union of the States really one and indivisible, they must
aid in the work of educating the Southern people, black and white, into
understanding their former condition and false positions toward each
other. A few good men, like General Wager Swayne (who understands this
great question thoroughly, who is a charming enthusiast on the subject,
and who ought to be at the head of an Educational Bureau instead of a
subordinate in the Freedmen's Bureau), and General Davis Tillson, and
one or two others, are doing much good by encouraging education among
the negroes. But the sympathy of the country should not be entirely
absorbed by the blacks. There are four millions of "poor whites" in
the South who need education fully as much as do the negroes, and,
deceived, betrayed, and ruined by their leaders, they deserve sympathy
and aid fully as much. One inalienable right which should not be denied
even to traitors--and if there had been education at the South there
would have been no treason--is the right to educate himself; and since
the Constitution provides that there shall be no attainder of blood for
treason, the North owes it to the rising generation of these deceived
people to educate them into a proper appreciation of the liberty
which our veterans have won for them in defeating and conquering
their fathers. Oh, how grand and sublime would appear the record in
history that the Great Republic, after putting down the most monstrous
rebellion the world ever saw, imposed upon the conquered only the tax
for their own education, and erected no prisons save those of the
school-house and the church!
In returning to the subject of the effect of education on armies, I
have even a better illustration of the idea I have advanced than those
already given. When the war first broke out, it will be remembered
that the organization of the troops, brigades, and even divisions
were formed of regiments coming from a single state, and we were thus
rapidly falling into an error which, had it not been wisely corrected,
would have left us, at the close of the war, with an army distracted
by the same contemptible jealousies, resulting from state or sectional
pride, which were among the minor causes of the rebellion. But,
though that error was corrected by the commingling of regiments from
different states in the same brigade organization, we did commit the
error of forming two grand armies, each composed of troops exclusively
from the Eastern and Western States. The Army of the Potomac was the
representative army of the Northeastern States, being composed almost
exclusively of Eastern men. The Army of the Tennessee was composed of
men from the West, and, as it existed under General Grant, was properly
the representative army of the West. The same army was _dovetailed_
with that of the Cumberland, and placed under General Sherman, and at
the time of its dissolution was not so clearly a representative army,
Sherman having impressed his own manner on his men, and made them
a peculiar and not exactly proper type of the Western soldier. The
contrast between the men of these two armies of the East and West, in
_physique_, habits, discipline, and _morale_, was so apparent that
it is difficult to conceive that they did not belong to different
nationalities. Any comparison which would assert the superiority of
either army in endurance, courage, or fighting qualities would be
invidious and untrue, for the men of both sections fought with equal
effect and won equal honor; but it is undeniable that the Potomac
Army was by far the best disciplined army we ever had in the field.
The Potomac Army rivaled the regulars in evolutions, while Sherman's
Western boys, with their careless, free, easy gait, would outmarch a
battalion of the hardiest of the old regulars. The Potomac men did
not march as well as Sherman's troops; they had less of the elastic
spring of Western men, were perhaps too exact, and disposed to be too
stiff and prim, but they marched with a precision equal to the regulars
of any army. McClellan taught the Potomac Army the pure discipline
of the old regulars, and it would have required but little more of
such teaching to make them all that is expected of such troops; but
Sherman, forcible a tutor as he is, could never hope to transform
them into "bummers." General McClellan would have failed, as General
Buell did, in making regulars of the Western volunteers; and I very
much doubt if any of the old army officers who remained constantly
in the service, and who had become confirmed in the ideas of the
Academy, could have succeeded in making effectives of the Western men
in the short time that Grant and Sherman did. The success of Grant
appears to have been much influenced by his absorption, during his
long residence in the West, of the elements of the Western character,
and the toning down of the West Point precision in his education. The
same may be said of Sherman. No army of the country was under better
control, or committed fewer excesses, than the Army of the East, as the
Potomac force should have properly been called. No army committed so
many useless excesses as did that of General Sherman, and in none was
the discipline so lax, yet no army could be more implicitly trusted
in the emergencies of battle than Sherman's Army of the West. The
Potomac Army wore kid gloves off duty, and had the air of an exquisite
on parade, but this exquisite was a proficient in the warlike arts,
was always ready to fight, and did not hesitate to accept battle
with courage and confidence equal to that of its rougher ally of the
West. The Army of the West cared nothing for appearances, wore a
slouched hat and a loose blouse, and had the air of careless ease and
indifference which we often see in the pioneer. The Western veteran
had more care for his rifle than his uniform, paid more attention to
his cartridge-box than his carriage, and heartily despised drill and
parade. The Western troops lacked culture, they had less respect for
"the proprieties" than the Eastern troops, and the relations of officer
and man were maintained by them with less of the strictness that is
due to proper discipline than among Eastern troops. The Eastern men
were very particular regarding their dress, and displayed their badges
and medals with commendable pride. They devoted many hours to the
adornment of their camps, and nothing could have been more beautiful
and picturesque than many of their old camps in the Southern pine
country. The decorations were generally made with the evergreens which
abound in the South, but often mechanical contrivances operated by
the wind produced picturesque and curious effects. They indulged in
gymnastic and ball exercises to a great extent, and were very fond of
horse-racing and the higher order of games at cards. The amusements
of the Western troops were of a ruder character. Cock-fighting and
card-playing were the chief recreations. Every man was armed with
a pack of cards, and each company boasted a fighting-cock, while
every brigade had its fast horse. The Western soldier had a clearer
appreciation of the practical than the picturesque, and their camps
were seldom or never decorated as were those of the Eastern men.
Practice with the pistol was a frequent amusement in the Western Army.
Cats and dogs seemed to be necessaries of camp life. "Company" and
"head-quarter" cows were a common article of pets, and the evidences of
care, kindness, and affection shown for them by their self-constituted
proprietors were often very amusing. In the Western Army fighting-cocks
were favorite pets, and they were almost as numerous as the men
themselves. During the campaign in the Carolinas General Sherman gave
one of his attendants permission to occupy a wagon with his spoils,
chiefly consisting of fighting chickens. He was very much astonished
to find, in a few days, that the one wagon had increased to a dozen,
other followers having also employed a wagon or two to carry their
spoils. The general immediately ordered them to be burned, and executed
the order with a remorseless hand until he came to the wagon he had
originally permitted. He was about to burn this too, as it had been
the bad example which was plead in excuse for the others, when he
was appealed to to spare that, as "it contained all the head-quarter
fighting-cocks." Sherman occasionally enjoyed the sport himself, and
the appeal saved the wagon and chickens. Card-playing was common among
the veterans from both the East and West, but the style of games played
varied according to the education of the men. Among the Eastern troops,
"Whist" and "Euchre" were the favorite games; among the Western men,
"Poker" and "Seven up," invariably for money, were popular. Gambling
was the great vice of the veterans, as jealousy was the great crime of
their generals. Immediately after the appearance of the pay-master, the
troops of both armies invariably indulged in cards as persistently and
as regularly as the generals did in bickering after a battle.
Here the contrast ends and the comparison begins. The Eastern and
Western men had many peculiarities in common, and the cause of the
existing differences, education, produced the similarities. The
fighting qualities of each were the same. Both armies went into battle
with the same resolute air of men of business, and, under the same
leaders, each displayed equal endurance. Grant was instrumental in
showing the equality existing in this respect, and at the same time
he smothered a painful feeling which at one time existed in the West,
based on the ill success of the Potomac Army under former leaders, and
finding expression in the idea that the Eastern troops did not fight as
well as the Western men. This feeling at one time threatened to become
a serious sectional difficulty, when General Grant took immediate
control over the Potomac Army, and infused his spirit of persistence
into it. The discipline of the Potomac Army men amid the continually
recurring disasters of the first three years of the war, their firmness
under defeat or questionable success, was always admirable, and it only
required the tutorship of Grant to prove their endurance, and make them
the admiration of the whole country. That army always confronted the
best of the rebel armies at the key-point of the field. It fought more
battles than any other two armies in the field. Grant added the only
lesson it needed to make its education perfect, and taught it, as he
had taught the Army of the Tennessee, how to display its endurance by
showing it how to fight its battles through.
The same cause, education, which produces this marked distinction,
may also be observed as tracing a difference between either of
these classes in our army and a third class--a mere fraction,
however--representing the Southern element. In the Union army there
have been from the first a number of Southern Unionists, generally
mountaineers and refugees from the East Tennessee regions, who,
according to all statistics and observation, were uneducated and
ignorant, and whose lax discipline has more than once caused slurs to
be cast upon the army. In camp they were unclean, on the march they
were great stragglers, and in battle untrustworthy and ineffective.
Only the very strict discipline of one or two regular officers assigned
to their command redeemed the character of a few of these regiments
from this general reputation. The men of this class were not superior
to the rebel soldiers in any respect.
It is not to be inferred, from any argument used to show that an
educated man makes a better soldier than an uneducated one, that
discipline was neither demanded nor enforced in our army of educated
soldiers. The thorough discipline of the Union army made it invincible.
Its superiority to that of the rebels was the result only of the higher
discipline which they were capable, through education, of receiving,
and which was thoroughly enforced. From the very moment that the Bull
Run defeat violently dissipated the fallacies which we entertained of
a brief and bloodless struggle, and taught the country that a long and
terrible war was before it, the army, with a dogged perseverance of
which our mercurial people did not believe themselves capable, went
directly to work to discipline itself. The ineffectives were rooted
out by the surgeons, and sent home or to the hospital. Regiments were
reduced in numbers, but increased in efficiency. What was lost in
numerical strength was more than gained in the effectiveness which
resulted from the stricter discipline which was instituted. Incompetent
officers of the line were forced to give place to their betters.
This soon extended to higher ranks, and bad generals were supplanted
by better. There was little system in our first choice of generals.
We blundered on until the right man was found at last, and through
him the proper subordinates were chosen. At first the blunders were
serious, and men with false ideas of the crisis were thrust forward by
circumstances, to be discovered at fearful cost and after long delay.
With portions of the army discipline was allowed to degenerate into
mere drill, and devotion to the cause became divided with devotion to a
popular leader; while in other parts of the country the forces, though
thoroughly drilled, felt no admiration or love for their leader, or
were never taught that confidence in their commanders which is at the
root of all discipline. It was the fault of the Western armies that too
little attention was paid to the moral sentiments of the men, and that
in the Eastern Army the thoroughly-taught sentiment of devotion to the
cause was permitted to partially degenerate into love of the leader.
Circumstances, however, soon corrected these great evils, and through
much tribulation, numerous disheartenings, and many defeats, the men
slowly became veterans.
A thorough system of discipline was necessary not only to the
organization and _morale_, but to the courage of our army, as it is of
any large body of men. Men in battle are not individually courageous.
Courage amid the horrors and under the conflicting emotions of the
battle-field is as much derived from discipline as from nature. The
fact that this war affords more numerous instances of personal heroism
displayed in battle than any other which can be recalled, does not
disprove the rule. On the contrary, it corroborates the assertion;
for if we closely inquire into the characters of those who have
distinguished themselves by heroic deeds and individual prowess, we
shall find that they have invariably been men confirmed in steady
habits, and veterans of thorough discipline. Courage is derived from
the electric touch of shoulder to shoulder of men in the line. As long
as the current is perfect, extending through the line and concentrating
in the person of the commander, whose mind directs all, and in whom
all have perfect confidence, the line can not be defeated. It may be
driven, may be broken, but the men are invincible. Break the current,
and at once the _morale_, the discipline, and the courage break with
it, and men that were a moment before invincible fly to the rear,
not overcome by fright and terror, but with the dogged, stubborn,
and gruff manner of disheartened men. A broken column in disordered
flight is one of the most wonderful studies which can be conceived.
The actuality is the very reverse of what the imagination would
conceive. "Panic-stricken men," who will "fly" fifteen and twenty miles
from a battle-field, proceed to execute that manœuvre in a manner as
systematic as if they had been taught it. They "fly"--they run from
the field--only until beyond the immediate reach of stray bullets.
The flight is disordered. The men scatter for safety apparently with
the same instinct that actuates quails to separate in rising from a
field before the hunter. When beyond the reach of the enemy's guns,
they are so scattered that it is almost impossible to rally them as
they were formerly organized, and it is next to impossible to induce
a demoralized man to fight with any other than his own regiment. When
they are beyond the reach of the enemy's guns they generally halt, look
back, and examine into matters. They will look about them, inquire
for their regiments, talk of the danger from which they have escaped,
and in a perfectly intelligible manner, until a stray bullet falling
about them gives assurance that the enemy is advancing, when, without
a word, they resume their retreat for a few hundred yards farther,
deaf alike to the threats and entreaties of any officer who does not
happen to be their immediate commander. Yet these men who are thus
broken in one battle will fight with desperate courage in the next,
and, retaining their organization, go through the engagement with
great credit. Often circumstances, such as the former location of a
camp near the battle-field, previous positions in the reserve line,
the existence of rifle-pits, and various other localities which serve
as a rallying-point, enable broken troops to re-form and again go into
action. Men often rally on the part of an intrenched line which they
formerly held; and one of the best uses to which rifle-pits have ever
been put by offensive armies is that of forming a rallying-line when
attacking troops fail or are broken. It is a use known only to the
practice, and is not recognized by the theory of war.
Men under thorough discipline lose in a great measure their
individuality. A regiment becomes as a single man, moved by a single
impulse. The men individually are but fractions, each being able to
perform their part of the task only by the aid of the others. These
fractions are curious beings under fire. They perform deeds which
it would be morally impossible for an individual without similar
surroundings to accomplish. Thousands of our veterans will tell you
that in going into battle they have never imagined nor felt that they
were going to be shot; they have never felt as if in danger themselves,
but that their fears are for the comrades with whom they march shoulder
to shoulder. They become painfully indifferent in regard to themselves,
and appear to have none of those apprehensions with which they were
so terrified when they were raw recruits. They swear as usual, with
perhaps a little more emphasis, laugh at the comic features which
prevail under all circumstances of battle, talk freely and sensibly,
and do not betray any more, nor as much excitement as every one has
witnessed in crowds at political and other gatherings. I have seen
men in the "second line"--the reserves--playing cards while the first
were receiving a charge, and the spent shots were dropping in their
midst. While the hardest fighting was going on at Chattanooga, November
25th, 1863, I saw three soldiers sitting near the guns of Callender's
battery engaged, while under fire, in making entries in their diaries.
This is a sight seen only in the ranks of the United States armies.
During the battle of Murfreesborough, Tennessee, the rebels, in making
a charge upon General Negley's division, frightened from the fields
and woods a large number of rabbits, quails, and wild turkeys, driving
them toward the Union lines. The birds appeared too frightened to fly,
and, following the example of the rabbits, hopped and jumped over the
field, escaping from the advancing rebels. They fled, of course, toward
the rear, passing through and over our front line, and approached
the reserve troops, who, without any reference to the fact that the
rebel balls were now falling like great drops of rain among them, laid
down their guns and went to capturing wild fowls. While still engaged
in this employment, laughable even under the serious circumstances,
the first line of our troops was broken, and the rebel soldiers
charged upon the second. The veteran soldiers abandoned the chase of
the wild-fowl, and, falling hastily into line, thrice repulsed the
advancing enemy. One of the men who had captured a wild turkey carried
it to Lieutenant Kennedy, of General Negley's staff, and sold it to
him. Kennedy tied the bird to his saddle, intending to have it for
supper that night, but was surprised to find that a stray bullet had
cut the strings by which the turkey had been suspended, and robbed him
of a meal.
No greater contrast can be conceived than the difference in the effect
produced on soldiers when delivering and receiving an assault. In
receiving an attack they are never quiet, although cool, composed, and
self-possessed. Put them behind breast-works to receive an assault,
and the preparations of the enemy for the attack creates among those
awaiting it an anxiety which develops into mental excitement, which
finds vent in words, noisy disputes, etc. Going to the assault, the
same men are different beings. The silence which prevails becomes
painful. A command given at one end of the line can be distinctly
heard at the other. The men become serious, and are disposed to be
gruff. They converse but little, and then in under-tones. They begin
to understand what is to be done, that they are to do it, and, without
for a moment fearing to test the questions of defeat or victory, they
carefully weigh in their own minds the chances, not of life, but of
success.
The most remarkable illustration of this peculiarity of veteran troops
which I can recall occurred during Sherman's battle at Chattanooga.
Leaving a fortified line, the Union troops of Colonel Loomis and
Generals Mathias, Corse, and Raum were required to cross a small valley
and assault a rebel fort located on a steep hill, three hundred feet
high, and of very rugged ascent. When the troops selected moved out
in the line of reserves and marched down into the valley, the rebels,
having full view of the column, grew excited and noisy. The orders
of their officers were shouted, and were plainly heard in our lines,
and, though it was impossible for the assaulting column to prepare for
its work under an hour's time, the rebels evinced every indication
of excitement, rushing hither and thither, and growing noisier every
moment. The Union troops, on the contrary, prepared for the work slowly
and quietly, with an unusually serious and composed air. They glanced
up ever and anon at the steep hill before them, and many doubtless
compared the mountain to the Walnut Hills of Vicksburg, where they
met their first repulse. The assault was made in as serious a manner
as the preparations. There was no breath wasted in loud cries. The
men twice assaulted with desperate courage, were badly repulsed by a
flanking force, and driven in confusion across the valley to their line
of reserves, but, as they came back, passing through General Sherman's
field-quarters, they looked as defiantly as ever, admitting no more
than "that they had failed this time." There was no panic, no despair.
They saw they had failed from sheer inability, not a want of effort or
disposition to accomplish their task. They retreated, but not rushing
wildly far to the rear. The powerful aided the weak, the strong bore
off the wounded, and each came back as he had advanced, cool, composed,
and serious.
The veteran when in camp had no curiosity. His indifference to matters
going on around him was positively appalling to a stranger or a raw
recruit. They would often be in camp for a month without knowing or
caring what regiment was encamped next to them. A raw recruit of two
months' standing was better authority on all _on dits_ of camp, the
location of other regiments, the names of their officers, and similar
general information, than a veteran of three years' standing. The
veteran laughed at the knowledge of the raw recruit, wondered where
the utility of that information was, boasted of superior practical
knowledge, and good-naturedly taught the raw recruit the more useful
lessons of how to march easily, sleep well, provide himself with
little luxuries, and how to take care of himself generally. The
veteran had curious modes of making himself comfortable, which the
raw recruit learned only from practice. Camp the veteran in a forest
over night, and he would sleep under his shelter-tent raised high and
made commodious, and on a soft bed of dry leaves. Encamp him for a
month in the same forest, and he would live in a log house, sleep on
good clean straw, dine off a wooden table, drink from glassware made
from the empty ale or porter bottles from the sutler's tent, comb his
whiskers before a framed looking-glass on a pine-board mantle-shelf,
and look with the air of a millionaire through a foot and a half
square window-frame on the camped world around him. The rebels used
to call our men, when working on forts, rifle-pits, etc., "beavers in
blue." The veteran was a regular beaver when building his house. He
would buy, beg, or steal from the quarter-master (a species of theft
recognized by the camp code of morals as entirely justifiable) the only
tool he needed, an axe. With this he would cut, hew, dig, drive--any
thing you like, in fact. With his axe he would cut the logs for his
cabin--miniature logs, two inches in diameter--trim them to the proper
length, and drive the necessary piles. With his axe he would cut the
brushwood or the evergreen, and thatch his roof. With his axe he would
dig a mud-hole in which to make his plaster for filling the crevices
of the logs, and thus shut out the cold. Doors, chimneys, benches,
chairs, tables, all the furniture of his commodious house, he would
make with the same instrument. When all was finished, he would sit
comfortably down on his cot and laugh at the superficial knowledge of
the raw recruit who had been shivering in his shelter-tent, looking on
in amazement at the magical labors of the "beavers in blue."
If Napoleon could revisit the "glimpses of the moon," he would
doubtless laugh--perhaps his nephew really does laugh at the idea of
our calling the victors of this short-lived rebellion "veterans"--or
with that sternness with which he once reproved his marine secretary,
Truget, for propagating "the dangerous opinion that a soldier could
be trained to all his duties in six months," the first Napoleon would
ask us, with a look of imperial scorn, to show him in our boasted army
a _corps_ like the eighteen thousand troops of the French Monarchy
that under his discipline became the Old Guard, which "died, but never
surrendered." Julius Cæsar would doubtless smile at our presumption,
and point to the old veteran legions of his armies with which he
overran Europe, and into which no recruit was admitted until after
eight years' service and discipline in other ranks, and ask us for
veterans like his. Our soldiers were not, perhaps, the veterans for
Napoleon or Cæsar, nor for such purpose as those of Napoleon or Cæsar,
but they were such veterans as perished with Leonidas at Thermopylæ,
and won victory in following Arnold Yon Wilkenried in the mountain
passes of Switzerland. Nothing can be sublimer than the patient
heroism displayed by the veterans of the "War for the Union;" and
when Time shall have hallowed, as it will, the yet familiar scenes of
that struggle, tinting the story with a hue of romance, rounding the
irregularities in the characters of the leaders, and toning down the
rude points in the characters of the men, forgetting their excesses and
remembering only their devotion and daring, the heroes and veterans who
fought for the unity of the land will loom up as sacred in our eyes as
are those who, in ages past, fought for its independence and liberty.
INDEX.
Anderson, Gen. Patton, page 232.
Anderson, Gen. Robert, 31, 54.
Ashley, James D., 282, 283.
Avery, Capt. Wm. L., 154.
Baird, Gen. Absalom, 83, 291.
Ballard, A. J., 216, 217.
Ballard, Bland, 216, 217.
Banks, Gen. N. P., 253.
Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., 144.
Benham, Gen. Henry W., 246.
Bennett, James Gordon, 117.
Blair, Gen. Frank, 27, 198.
Blunt, Gen. James G., 141, 142.
Boggs, Gen. W. R., 138.
Bowen, Gen. John S., 138.
Boyle, Gen. J. T., 217.
Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 64, 65, 69, 110, 111, 112, 145, 148, 151, 154,
248, 255, 256, 257, 266, 285, 290, 291, 293, 319, 324.
Bramlette, Gov. Thos. E., 217.
Brannin, Gen. John M., 266, 289.
Breckenridge, Gen. John C., 257, 290.
Brough, Gov. John, 262.
Brown, Capt. Jacob, 63.
Brownlow, Col. James, 73.
Brownlow, Gov. William G., 73.
Bruce, Col. Saunders D., 212, 213.
Bryant, William C., 300.
Buchanan, James, 283, 284, 318.
Buckner, Gen. Simon B., 51, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 219, 225, 226,
232, 291.
Buell, Gen. Don Carlos, 33, 34, 43, 62, 65, 102, 147, 229, 230, 234,
245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258,
294, 333.
Bull, Mayor, 28.
Burnett, Alfred, 73, 74.
Burnham, Lieut. Howard, 82.
Burnham, Cyrus H., 227.
Burnside, Gen. A. E., 96, 110, 111, 113, 155, 184, 185.
Butler, Gen. Benj. F., 49.
Cadwallader, Gen. George, 182.
Callender, Lieut. F. D., 179.
Cameron, Simon, 32, 214, 215, 216.
Canby, Gen. E. R. S., 255.
Canty, Gen., 309.
Chalmers, Gen. James H., 144, 145.
Chamberlain, Gen. B. F., 138.
Chambliss, Gen. John R., 138.
Chase, Salmon P., 213, 214, 215, 216.
Cheatham, Gen. Benj. F., 232.
Clanton, Gen. James H., 235.
Clay, Capt. Henry, Jr., 219.
Clay, Capt. Thomas, 219.
Clifford, John H., 201.
Cluseret, Gen., 178.
Cook, Isaac, 283, 284.
Corse, Gen., 343.
Corwin, Col. Richard, 223.
Crittenden, Gen. George B., 82.
Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L., 64, 67, 68, 79, 148, 248, 249, 263, 265,
266, 267, 289, 292, 295, 296.
Crufts, Gen. Charles, 173.
Curtis, Gen. Samuel B., 140.
Dana, Charles A., 178, 263, 264, 267.
Davis, Jefferson, 97, 138, 201, 219, 221, 222, 274, 289.
Davis, Gen. Jeff. C., 63, 149, 150, 153.
De Gress, Capt. Francis, 311, 312, 313.
Dittoe, Henry, 135.
Dodge, Gen. G. M., 198, 310, 317.
Donnalson, Gen. James L., 21.
Duff, Lt. Col. W. L., 117.
Elkin, Capt. Thomas A., 235.
Elliott, Gen. W. L., 201.
Ewell, Gen. Richard S., 328.
Ewing, Col. Charles, 27.
Ewing, Gen. Hugh, 27, 39.
Ewing, Gen. Thomas, 39.
Forrest, Gen. N. B., 145.
Franklin, Gen. Wm. B., 246.
Fremont, Gen. John C., 140, 177.
Furay, William S., 150.
Garfield, Gen. James A., 72, 264, 266.
Geary, Gen. John W., 173, 183, 184, 317, 318, 319, 320.
Gilbert, Gen. C. C., 248, 249, 251, 252.
Gilmore, Gen. Quincy A., 246.
Granger, Gen. Gordon, 64, 68, 101, 111, 143, 155, 268, 271, 272, 273,
274, 275, 276, 286, 287, 322.
Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., 18, 34, 36, 44, 45, 53, 80, 81, 128, 131,
132, 133, 137, 142, 143, 152, 153, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 172,
177, 184, 188, 191, 195, 198, 231, 232, 240, 242, 245, 246, 261,
271, 272, 304, 321, 324, 332, 333, 334, 336, 337.
Grant as a general, 98-127.
Gurowski, Count Adam, 178.
Guthrie, James, 216, 217.
Halleck, Gen. Henry W., 34, 40, 41, 42, 61, 62, 63, 80, 112, 122,
123, 140, 142, 143, 248, 249, 321, 322.
Hancock, Gen. W. S., 195, 197, 307, 322.
Hanson, Gen. Roger, 209.
Harker, Gen. Charles G., 83.
Harlan, Judge, 223.
Harney, Gen. Wm. S., 216, 217.
Harris, Col. Lew. A., 232.
Harrison, Col. Thomas, 234, 235.
Hazen, Gen. Wm. B., 27.
Hill, Gen. Ambrose P., 103, 291.
Hindman, Gen. T. C., 291.
Holt, Gen. Joseph, 225.
Hood, Gen. John B., 28, 85, 86, 87, 138, 236, 287.
Hooker, Gen. Joseph, 96, 110, 113, 154, 195, 196, 197, 242, 271, 307,
318, 319, 322, 324.
Hooker, Fighting Joe, 165-193.
Howard, Gen. Oliver O., 103, 128, 185, 186, 188, 299, 300, 302, 303,
304, 307, 319, 322.
Hunt, Col. Thomas H., 209.
Ingraham, Commodore, 38.
Ireland, Col. David, 173.
Jackson, Gen. James S., 251.
Jackson, Gen. Stonewall, 128.
Johnston, Gen. Albert S., 31.
Johnson, President Andrew, 46, 133, 253, 254, 255, 256, 331.
Johnson, Col. G. M. L., 69, 83.
Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., 39, 40, 47, 48, 83, 86, 105, 114, 123, 128,
185, 236, 309, 310, 311, 317.
Johnson, John M., 213, 214.
Johnson, Gen. Richard W., 83, 149, 219.
Jones, W., 82.
Key, Col. Francis, 213, 214.
Kennedy, Lieut., 343.
Lee, Gen. Robert E., 95, 96, 97, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 114, 138,
151, 152, 242.
Lincoln, President, 36, 40, 135, 178, 182, 183, 185, 186, 190, 213,
214, 215, 216, 224, 253, 262.
Logan, Gen. John A., 23, 51, 125, 126, 196, 197, 198, 304, 307, 308,
309, 310, 311, 314, 317, 322.
Longstreet, Gen. James, 110, 111, 113, 138, 266, 267, 271, 284, 285,
319, 320.
Loomis, Gen. C. O., 233.
Loomis, Col., 343.
Lovejoy, Owen, 38.
Lusk, Samuel, 217.
Lyon, Gen. Nathaniel, 140.
Lytle, Gen. William H., 82, 233.
Lytton, Sir Bulwer, 245.
Mallory, Robert, 237.
Manson, Gen. Malhon D., 66.
McClellan, Gen. G. B., 51, 81, 96, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 195, 196,
213, 246, 322, 333.
McClernand, Gen. John A., 104, 231.
McCook, Gen. Alex. McD., 64, 67, 68, 79, 137, 138, 148, 149, 153, 232,
233, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 263, 265, 266, 267, 286, 289,
292.
McCook, Col. Anson G., 232.
McCook, Gen. Daniel, 39.
McDowell, Gen. Irwin, 226.
McKibbon, Col. Joseph, 62.
McPherson, Gen. James B., 26, 46, 61, 136, 137, 146, 185, 198, 246,
309, 310, 311, 317, 322.
Mathias, Gen., 343.
Meade, Gen. George B., 101, 105, 125, 197.
Meigs, Gen. M. C., 107, 112, 119, 174, 175, 178.
Mitchell, Gen. O. McK., 32.
Morgan, Gen. John H., 144, 328.
Morton, Gen. St. Clair, 266.
Negley, Gen. James S., 69, 149, 153, 256, 266, 289, 290, 291, 292,
293, 294, 342, 343.
Nelson, Gen. William, 63, 147, 248, 249.
Nesmith, James W., 274.
Oglesby, Gen. Richard J., 101, 198.
Osterhaus, Gen. Peter J., 173, 198.
Palmer, Gen. John M., 149, 256, 267, 311.
Patterson, Samuel, 218.
Pierce, Franklin, 318.
Pillow, Gen. Gideon, 167, 179, 180, 181, 187, 191, 273, 274.
Pirtle, Henry, 216, 217.
Polk, Gen. Leonidas, 291.
Pope, Gen. John, 96.
Porter, Capt. Horace, 74, 75.
Prentice, George D., 216, 217, 227.
Price, Gen. Stirling, 140.
Raine, Major, 139.
Rains, Gen. Gabriel J., 167.
Raum, Gen., 343.
Ripley, Gen. R. S., 167.
Ritchey, Thomas, 135.
Roberts, Col. Geo. W., 150.
Rosecrans, Gen. William S., 67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 82, 83, 120, 135,
147, 148, 149, 151, 173, 198, 231, 252, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263,
264, 265, 266, 267, 273, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295,
296, 324.
Ross, Capt. James R., 119.
Rousseau, Gen. Lovell H., 52, 55, 71, 137, 149, 176, 242, 251, 252,
257, 299, 307, 318, 322.
Rousseau, recollections of, 195-241.
Rousseau, Miss Mary, 257.
Russell, Capt. William C., 275.
Saunders, Miss N., 273.
Schaeffer, Col., 150.
Schoepff, Gen. Alvin, 252.
Schofield, Gen. John M., 138, 324.
Schurtz, Gen. Carl, 183, 319.
Scott, Gen. Winfield, 181, 182, 183, 236, 318.
Scribner, Col. Benj. F., 70, 71.
Seward, William H., 221.
Sheridan, Gen. Philip H., 40, 51, 77, 125, 126, 165, 166, 170, 176,
195, 196, 197, 233, 242, 251, 307, 322, 325.
Sheridan as a cavalryman, 128-193.
Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., 36.
Sherman, Gen. William T., 58, 61, 62, 63, 75, 76, 81, 84, 85, 86,
87, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 115, 116, 117,
118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 137,
138, 139, 147, 154, 155, 162, 177, 181, 185, 186, 188, 229, 230,
231, 236, 240, 242, 247, 249, 253, 258, 272, 273, 302, 303, 304,
309, 310, 311, 314, 322, 324, 328, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 344.
Sherman as a strategist, 17-57.
Sickles, Gen. Daniel, 197.
Sidell, Major William H., 254, 300, 301, 302.
Sill, Gen. Joshua W., 136, 137, 150.
Smith, Gen. Gustavus W., 179.
Smith, Gen. Preston, 292.
Smith, Gen. W. F., 98, 107, 110, 289.
Smith, Gen. W. S., 138.
Speed, James S., 201, 216, 217, 223.
Speed, Joshua, 216, 217.
Stanley, Gen. David S., 151, 295.
Stanton, Edwin M., 41, 42.
Steedman, Gen. James B., 36, 64, 69, 83, 86, 251, 268, 271, 275, 276,
279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 294, 318, 322.
Stephens, Alexander H., 97.
Stevens, Isaac J., 246.
Stokes, Capt. James J., 250.
Stolbrand, Major C. J., 312, 313, 314.
Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., 144, 328.
Swayne, Gen. Wager, 331.
Talbot, John, 134, 135.
Terrill, Gen. William, 136, 137, 146.
Tilghman, Gen. Lloyd, 209.
Tillson, Gen. Davis, 331.
Thomas, Gen. George H., 18, 44, 48, 51, 91, 92, 97, 100, 101, 103,
106, 107, 109, 110, 117, 118, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132,
133, 149, 153, 160, 161, 176, 188, 195, 230, 232, 237, 242, 245,
246, 248, 249, 252, 256, 257, 261, 262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 271,
274, 276, 284, 285, 287, 291, 292, 293, 299, 300, 311, 314, 321.
Thomas as a tactician, 57, 97.
Thomas, Gen. Lorenzo, 32.
Trabue, James, 222.
Turchin, Gen. John B., 119.
Tyler, Gen. R. O., 138.
Vallandigham, C. L., 262.
Vance, Morgan, 217.
Van Cleve, Gen. Horatio P., 292.
Van Pelt, Capt., 82.
Walker, Gen. H. H., 138.
Ward, Gen. John H., 217.
Webster, Gen. Joseph D., 22.
Wendell, Cornelius, 284.
Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, 231, 287, 328.
Whitaker, Gen. Walter, 173, 184.
Whiting, Gen. W. H. C., 246.
Williamson, Lieut. R. S., 139.
Wilson, Gen. James H., 125.
Wolfe, Nathaniel, 223.
Wood, Gen. Thomas J., 68, 69, 83, 148, 149, 154, 174, 271, 289, 294,
295, 296.
Worth, Gen. William J., 181.
Wright, Col., 24.
Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K., 66, 82.
THE END.
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| Transcriber's Note: |
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| Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. |
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| Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. |
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| Mid-paragraph illustrations have been moved between paragraphs |
| and some illustrations have been moved closer to the text that |
| references them. The paginations in the list of Illustrations |
| were corrected accordingly. |
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| Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters, |
| _like this_. |
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