He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has
made rational animals for the sake of one another, to help one another
according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who
transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest
divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity;
for the universal nature is the nature of things that are; and things
that are have a relation to all things that come into existence.[A] And
further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the prime cause of
all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of
impiety, inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies
unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal
nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the
nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself
to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from
nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish
falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and
avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man
must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it
assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts,
because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess
the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their
share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of
pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will
happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues
pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety.
Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is
equally affected--for it would not have made both, unless it was equally
affected towards both--towards these they who wish to follow nature
should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect
to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honor and dishonor,
which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally
affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal
nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to
those who are produced in continuous series and to those who come after
them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence, according
to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things,
having conceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and
having determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such
like successions (vii. 75).
[A] "As there is not any action or natural event, which we are
acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a
respect to some other actions and events, so possibly each of
them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote,
natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the
compass of this present world." Again: "Things seemingly the
most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be
necessary conditions to other things of the greatest
importance, so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we
know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any
other."--Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. Some
critics take [Greek: ta hyparchonta] in this passage of
Antoninus to be the same as [Greek: ta honta]: but if that were
so he might have said [Greek: pros allêla] instead of [Greek:
pros ta hyparchonta]. Perhaps the meaning of [Greek: pros ta
hyparchonta] may be "to all prior things." If so, the
translation is still correct. See vi. 38.
2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without
having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride.
However, to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these
things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined
to abide with vice, and hast not experience yet induced thee to fly from
this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a
pestilence, much more, indeed, than any such corruption and change of
this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence
of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of
men so far as they are men.
3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is
one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young
and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have
teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to
bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of
thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with
the character of a reflecting man--to be neither careless nor impatient
nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the
operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child
shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy
soul shall fall out of this envelope.[A] But if thou requirest also a
vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made
best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou art
going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no
longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but
it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to
remember that thy departure will not be from men who have the same
principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any,
which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life,--to be
permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves.
But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance
of those who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O death,
lest perchance I, too, should forget myself.
[A] Note 1 of the Philosophy, p. 76.
4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly
acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.
5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he
who does a certain thing.
6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct
directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with
everything which happens+--that is enough.
7. Wipe out imagination; check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the
ruling faculty in its own power.
8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but
among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as
there is one earth of all things which are of an earthly nature, and we
see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty
of vision and all that have life.
9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all,
move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything
which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid
flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the
same, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the
application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the
elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the
fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry is
easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is a
hindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which
participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner
towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more.
For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in
the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused
with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of
reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of
young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are
souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert itself
in a superior degree, and in such a way as never has been observed in
plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there are
political communities and friendships, and families and meetings of
people; and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the things which
are still superior, even though they are separated from one another,
unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher
degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are
separated. See, then, what now takes place; for only intelligent animals
have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone
the property of flowing together is not seen. But still, though men
strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by it, for their
nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou
only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything earthy which comes
in contact with no earthy thing, than a man altogether separated from
other men.
10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper
seasons each produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these
terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces
fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other
things of the same kind as reason itself.
11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if
thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this
purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some
purposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind
they are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?
12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied
or admired; but direct thy will to one thing only--to put thyself in
motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.
13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all
trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.
14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in
time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in
the time of those whom we have buried.
15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither
knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it,
then, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.
16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the
rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in
passivity but in activity.[A]
[A] Virtutis omnis laus in actione consistit.--_Cicero_, De
Off., 1. 6.
17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,
nor indeed any good to have been carried up (viii. 20).
18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see
what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of
themselves.
19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation
and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too.
20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it is
(vii. 29; ix. 38).
21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and
in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the
consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood,
thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this
anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy
grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under
thy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and
terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner,
then, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole
life a thing to be afraid of.
[Illustration: THE FORUM]
22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe
and that of thy neighbor: thy own, that thou mayst make it just: and
that of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part;
and that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted
ignorantly or with knowledge, and thou mayst also consider that his
ruling faculty is akin to thine.
23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let
every act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of
thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social
end, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and
it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a
man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.
24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits
carrying about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is
exhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead[A] strikes
our eyes more clearly.
[A] [Greek: to tês Nekuias] may be, as Gataker conjectures, a
dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schultz
supposes that it may be also a reference to the [Greek: Nekuia]
of the Odyssey (lib. xi.).
25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it
altogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then
determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is
naturally made to endure.
26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with
thy ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted by
nature to do. But enough + [of this].
27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee
anything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and see
what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to
take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about
thee. However, thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature
they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by
signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they set a value.+
28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down
from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in
motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content
with that which is the result of its activity; or it puts itself in
motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence[A] in a
manner; or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.--In a
word, if there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou
also be governed by it (vi. 44; vii. 75).
[A] The words which immediately follow [Greek: kat'
epakolouthêsin] are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly
doubtful. (Compare vii. 75.)
Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and
the things also which result from change will continue to change
forever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes
and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and
their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable (xii.
21).
29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything
along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are
engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the
philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now
requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look
about thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato's
Republic:[A] but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and
consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men's
opinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the
slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell
me of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves
shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature required, and
trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes,
no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the work
of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and pride.
[A] Those who wish to know what Plato's Republic is may now
study it in the accurate translation of Davies and Vaughan.
30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their
countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and
calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live together,
and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden time, and
the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among
barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and how many
will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising thee will
very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is of any
value, nor reputation, nor anything else.
31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things
which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the
things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be
movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is
according to thy nature.
32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those
which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt
then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe in
thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing the
rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from birth to
dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as the
equally boundless time after dissolution!
33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been
spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who dies
at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with
him who died prematurely.
34. What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of
things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and
honor? Imagine that thou seest their pool souls laid bare. When they
think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an
idea!
35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights
in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and
from eternity have been in like form, and will be such to time without
end. What, then, dost thou say,--that all things have been and all
things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in so
many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned to
be bound in never ceasing evil (iv. 45, vii. 18)?
36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything!
water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of
the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits
of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same kind.
And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the
same kind, changing from this to that.
37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art
thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is it
the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But
besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become at
last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these
things for a hundred years or three.
38. If a man has done wrong the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not
done wrong.
39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come
together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what
is done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and
nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed?
Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou
playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and feed
with the rest?[A]
[A] There is some corruption at the end of this section, but I
think that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning.
Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a man
must not be disturbed. He must use the power that he has and be
tranquil.
40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they
have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why
dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any
of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things
which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray
that any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if
they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes.
But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed them in thy power. Well,
then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than
to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who
has told thee that the gods do not aid us, even in the things which are
in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see.
One man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou
pray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus:
How shall I be released from this? Pray thou: How shall I not desire to
be released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little son? Thou
thus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers
this way, and see what comes.
41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my
bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those
who visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as
before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating in
such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from
perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the
physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were
doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do, then,
the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any
other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that
may befall us, nor to hold trifling talks either with an ignorant man or
with one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools of
philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing and
on the instrument by which thou doest it.
42. When thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately
ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in
the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible.
For this man also is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be
in the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind in the
case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does
wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind thyself
that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt
become more kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful
to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, what virtue
nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has
given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and
against another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is
possible for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray; for
every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides,
wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find that no one among
those against whom thou art irritated has done anything by which thy
mind could be made worse; but that which is evil to thee and harmful has
its foundation only in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there
strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an
uninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame
thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way.
For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was
likely that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and
art amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as
faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly
thy own, whether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition
would keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not
confer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy
very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast
done a man a service? art thou not content that thou hast done something
conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as
if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking.
For as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working
according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own;[A] so
also as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done
anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common
interest, he has acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what
is his own.
[A] [Greek: Apechei to idion]. This sense of [Greek: apechein]
occurs in xi. 1, and iv. 49; also in St. Matthew, vi. 2,
[Greek: apechousi ton misthon], and in Epictetus.