Whether a Man May Merit Restoration After a Fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he
may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than
to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super
Ps. lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do
not Thou forsake me." Hence a man may merit to be restored after a
fall.
Obj. 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now
a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a
fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Obj. 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above (A. 2; Q.
109, A. 5). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man
turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his
justices which he hath done shall not be remembered." Therefore his
previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can
merit for himself restoration after a fall.
_I answer that,_ No one can merit for himself restoration after a
future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for
himself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the
motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the
subsequent sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from
God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit--the motion of
the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit,
whereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from
having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for
whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such
merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him
for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And
therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall.
Reply Obj. 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall
is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is
besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it
depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Reply Obj. 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his first
grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him
who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after
the merit of grace.
Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that no one _absolutely_ merits life
everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only
_conditionally,_ i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say
this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less
meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of
illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits
eternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an
impediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its
effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a
supervening impediment.
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