FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 1]

Whether a Man May Merit Anything from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For

no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all

the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet

more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14).

Hence it is written (Luke 17:10): "When you have done all these

things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we

have done that which we ought to do." Therefore a man can merit

nothing from God.

Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by

what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting

well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is

written (Job 35:7): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or

what shall He receive of thy hand." Hence a man can merit nothing

from God.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his

debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's

debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to

Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit

anything from God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for

thy work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit.

Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.

_I answer that,_ Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward

means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price

for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for

anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to

make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as

is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is

simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no

absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice,

but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a

father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says.

And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of

merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only

relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively,

in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child

merits something from his father and the slave from his lord.

Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest

inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from

God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man

and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate

after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is

in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the

presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from

God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of

operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and

operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God;

differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act

by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which

is not so in other creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his

free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a

debt would not be meritorious.

Reply Obj. 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e.

the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in

His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by

our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works

anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.

Reply Obj. 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on

the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow

that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it

is right that His will should be carried out.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 737 / 746 题