Whether It Is Possible to Assign a Distinct Division of the Judicial
Precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct
division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which
need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man
and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to
division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not
possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Obj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral
matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division,
except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial
precepts.
Obj. 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the
ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing
some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains
no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it
seems that they have no distinct division.
_On the contrary,_ Wherever there is order there must needs be
division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the
judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore
it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.
_I answer that,_ Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or
ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct
division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a
distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless
by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the
Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another,
are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is
directed.
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the
people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among
themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of
members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his
son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and
according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of
judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down
concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his
office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the
judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a
man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling,
judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial
precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to
foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and
about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third
part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given
relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and
children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.
Reply Obj. 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between
one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are
reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different
relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in
the moral order, as stated above (Q. 100, A. 3): and consequently it
is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in
relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a
different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from
their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for
distinguishing them.
Reply Obj. 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial
precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the
judicial precepts of the Law.
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