Whether There Was Any Cause for the Ceremonial Precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial
precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the
commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to
the carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical
precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the
Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them
by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no
reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
Obj. 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the
law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save
that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
viii, 6, 13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life.
Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the
purpose of testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves.
Obj. 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they
proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the
ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts.
It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial
precepts: for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the
Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial
precepts are commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and
yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore
the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause.
_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2),
it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those
things which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well
ordered, as the Apostle states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two
conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they
be ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole
order in matters of action: since those things that happen by chance
outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but
for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in
view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it
follows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken
from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken
from cutting, which is its end, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 9. Now it is
evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of
the Law, were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written
(Deut. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of
nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts
were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can
be gathered.
Reply Obj. 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances
of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very
nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be
made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in
relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was
signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the
New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are
reasonable from the very nature of the act.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of
knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil:
and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something
else, in as much as it signified something. And so also the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of
their relation to something else.
Reply Obj. 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable
causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not
steal." But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their
relation to something else, as stated above.
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