Whether It Was Useful for Laws to Be Framed by Men?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be
framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made
good thereby, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.
Obj. 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted
to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Obj. 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1,
2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite
in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot
be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that
in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread
of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these
things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that
human laws should be made.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 94, A. 3), man has
a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be
acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe
that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in
food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature,
viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as
other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing
and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for
himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are
more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive
this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of
virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of
virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by
the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions.
But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not
easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained
from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might
desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they
themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do
willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous.
Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment,
is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have
peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals
if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be
severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason
to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which
other animals are unable to do.
Reply Obj. 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue
by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly
disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better
that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by
judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to
find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be
pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what
is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by
considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in
the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment
judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love,
hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is
perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every
man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary,
whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for
very few matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply Obj. 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the
law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher
says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that
has happened or not happened," and the like.
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