FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 4]

Whether a Good or a Wicked Angel Can Sin Venially?

Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.

Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul

which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix

in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." But man

can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an

angel can commit a venial sin also.

Obj. 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could

love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally.

Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately,

by sinning venially.

Obj. 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial

sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like

frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a

mortal sin to be venial as stated above (A. 3), unless there is a

special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an

angel can sin venially.

_On the contrary,_ The perfection of an angel is greater than that of

man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the

primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.

_I answer that,_ An angel's intellect, as stated above in the First

Part (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A. 8), is not discursive, i.e. it does not

proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both

separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect

considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its

principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q.

8, A. 2; Q. 10, A. 1; Q. 72, A. 5), ends are like principles, while

the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not

directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the

end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no

inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they

have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal

sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in

subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts

are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the

other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in

subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they

sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does

not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we

have stated to be in them (I, Q. 63, A. 4; Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5).

Reply Obj. 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or

intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated

above.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God,

without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last

end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem

venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to

mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on

account of the end they have in view.

________________________

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 579 / 746 题