SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]

Whether a Mortal Sin Can Become Venial?

Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial.

Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is

from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A.

5). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.

Obj. 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,

that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he

who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen

that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a

creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that

simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God,

commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love

of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he

was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial

sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.

Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 5, Obj. 3), good is more distant

from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in

itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice,

as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a

mortal sin become venial.

_On the contrary,_ An eternal thing can never become temporal. But

mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves

temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.

_I answer that,_ Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in

the genus of sin, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Now the imperfect can

become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial

sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining

to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the

purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become

imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by

the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin,

for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to

utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional

deformity.

Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by

reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not

completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a

deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said

above (A. 2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of

deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from

deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the

species of the act is destroyed.

Reply Obj. 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from

perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man

and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin

altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that

commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin

either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then

the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of

the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things

whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those

things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good

end." Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise

be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4, 5), the

judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the

enemy of the common weal, are not murderers.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 574 / 746 题