Whether a Circumstance Can Make a Venial Sin to Be Mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis,
serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness
be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are
not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be
mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D, 24) that
delectation, if morose [*See Q. 74, A. 6], is a mortal sin, but that
if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a
circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be
mortal.
Obj. 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal
sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a
good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much
more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
_On the contrary,_ Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act
be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason
of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 72,
A. 5, ad 1; Q. 87, A. 5, ad 1).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 7, A. 1; Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4; AA.
10, 11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as
such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may
happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and
then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species
of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the
deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another
woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity;
but if this other be another man's wife, there is an additional
deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs
to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new
species of sin known as adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For
it has been stated above (A. 1) that the deformity of a venial sin
consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,
whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about
the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot
make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance,
but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes,
as it were, the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply Obj. 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin
to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by
something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a
new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance
something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its
species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger
is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if
the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically,
such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin
generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the
imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the
sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its
generic nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other hand,
the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically
venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish
to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the
anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps
accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal
or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the
mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he
is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly
contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of
ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of
the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of
getting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him
as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk
frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his
will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to
refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its
specific nature.
Reply Obj. 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those
matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the
delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection
of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because
anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account
of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply Obj. 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil,
unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above
(Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4).
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