THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 3]

Whether Sin Has an External Cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is

a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are

within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no

external cause.

Obj. 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will.

Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal

cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption

of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can

arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no

external cause.

Obj. 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is

multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external

inducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed

to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they,

that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and

made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore

something external can be a cause of sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the internal cause of sin is

both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as

lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin.

Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways,

either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the

reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q.

9, A. 6; Q. 10, A. 4), none can move the will inwardly save God

alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q.

79, A. 1). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of

sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to

sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external

sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the

reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed

externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps

it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive

appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore

something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be

a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient

completive cause of sin being accomplished.

Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that the external motive causes of

sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that

it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not

prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause

of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied,

the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful

act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the

character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being

voluntary and in our power.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 497 / 746 题