Whether Venial Sin Can Be in the Higher Reason As Such?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher
reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a
power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed
with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the
eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without
mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason
as such.
Obj. 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can
be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate
movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal
sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
Obj. 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us
unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher
good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when
the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act,
considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more
grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is
contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse
to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement
that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the
subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false.
Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
_On the contrary,_ A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But
it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a
venial sin in the higher reason as such.
_I answer that,_ The higher reason regards its own object otherwise
than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher
reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers,
except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it
does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate
consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin;
and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts
of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple
_intuition,_ and _deliberation,_ in respect of which it again
consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of
simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine
things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And
although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden
movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin
unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one
of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly
under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God,
is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance,
when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as
impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus
apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider
that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine
law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this
deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the
higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even
if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving
a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers,
it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their
genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.
Reply Obj. 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be
mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the
incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the
principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason,
as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it
belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
Reply Obj. 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of different
considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the
existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by
the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which
is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the
higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is
reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that
which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal
sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of
a higher consideration, as was explained above.
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