Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of
its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent
to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its
goodness or malice, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 5). Therefore a sin is
not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
Obj. 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.
Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what
shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that
is like thee." If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing
more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more
grievous than sins against God or oneself.
Obj. 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him
of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because
the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man
ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace.
Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit
fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into
mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its
causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely
speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently
untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its
causing a greater harm.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice
is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it
diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the
integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
it does more harm.
_I answer that,_ Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because
sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as
when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a
murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the
sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when
a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to
do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the
quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in
so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to
sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to
another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however,
the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is
connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin
directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that
might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his
action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow
directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor
intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is
directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very
species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious
fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although
such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet
it aggravates his sin directly.
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner
himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the
sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate
a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for
instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If,
on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful
act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then
greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a
graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an
unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would
suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of
theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither
intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a
believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that
he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to
sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of
sin.
Reply Obj. 1: As we have already stated (Q. 20, A. 5), in treating of
the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action
if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not
follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is
inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm
itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be
inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are
the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found
in sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits
against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do
God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things
concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things,
which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and
freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though
this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery
from some anxiety.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first,
because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors;
whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but
pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause
of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient
cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually
except by sinning of his own will.
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