Whether the Gravity of Sins Varies According to Their Objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary
according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to
its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin.
Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their
various objects.
Obj. 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice.
Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it
turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which
it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary
according to their various objects.
Obj. 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different
kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one
another, as is proved in _Phys._ vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one
sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.
_On the contrary,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as was
shown above (Q. 72, A. 1). But some sins are graver than others in
respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore
the gravity of sins varies according to their objects.
_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 71, A. 5),
the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver
than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain
commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so
the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human
act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the
higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the
humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on
the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or
from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must
needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle
which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the
reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher
the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now
the object of an act is its end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3, ad 2);
and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their
objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as
their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore
a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is
graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and
graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief,
blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin
will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or
lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their
objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects
is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is
concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the
intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3,
ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown
above (Q. 72, A. 6; Q. 18, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some
mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good,
which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various
degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those
things to which man turns.
Reply Obj. 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one
another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far
as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all
sins from being compared with one another.
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