SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]

Whether All Sins Are Equal?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to

do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one

and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and

the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason,

which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.

Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over

a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way

from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or

less. Therefore all sins are equal.

Obj. 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are

equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): "He that

hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is

evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is

greater than another.

_I answer that,_ The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in

the book on _Paradoxes_ (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal:

from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only

hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of

hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero

the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the

side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure

from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of

more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider

the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of

privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists,

so to speak, in _being_ corrupted; thus death is privation of life,

and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit

of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence

a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the

third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already

dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be

covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single

shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another

privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite

habit; it consists in _becoming_ corrupted rather than in _being_

corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due

commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that

commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same

applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or

less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it

matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or

less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same

applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due

commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of

reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in

_Ethic._ iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the

agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of

reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one

departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we

must say that sins are not all equal.

Reply Obj. 1: To commit sin is unlawful on account of some

inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater

inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure

privation.

Reply Obj. 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same

subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to

its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the

same species of virtue, as stated above (Q. 66, AA. 1, 2). Moreover,

even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal,

since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 474 / 746 题