Whether Sin Is Fittingly Defined As a Word, Deed, or Desire Contrary
to the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying:
"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law."
Because "word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every
sin implies an act, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore this definition
does not include every sin.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the
will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised
under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite.
Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the
eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed."
Obj. 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from
the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to
the end as explained above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6; Q. 20, AA.
2, 3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference
to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to neglect
eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he says
(Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using
what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use." Now the
definition in question contains no mention of aversion from our due
end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.
Obj. 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is
contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being
forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore
sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.
Obj. 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained
above (A. 1). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say
that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the
eternal law.
_On the contrary,_ the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27).
_I answer that,_ As was shown above (A. 1), sin is nothing else than
a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being
voluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), whether it be voluntary, as
being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being
commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or
operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with
its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a
rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now
there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and
homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz.
the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the
definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act,
and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word,
deed, or desire"; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and
which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the
eternal law."
Reply Obj. 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus:
e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the
genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6, 7): and so
"word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said,
what is done and what is not done.
Reply Obj. 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands
all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it
is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will
alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin,
through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in
defining sin to include something referring to external action.
Reply Obj. 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his
end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to
things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary
to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other
forms of inordinateness.
Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil through
being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive
law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law,
which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in
the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through
being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely
because it is inordinate.
Reply Obj. 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense
against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to
reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being
"contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to
its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs
us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.
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