Whether Every Sin Includes an Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as
merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now
there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can
there be sin without action.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera
Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,
unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be
voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin
implies an act.
Obj. 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a
man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never
does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he
ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this
is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who
knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to
do" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.
_I answer that,_ The reason for urging this question has reference to
the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions.
For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either
interior or exterior--interior, as when a man wills _not to go to
church,_ when he is bound to go--exterior, as when a man, at the very
hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies
himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in
a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one
thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to
go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him,
that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is
bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence.
On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not
necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one
is bound to do is a sin.
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of
omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin
consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act,
as when a man wills _not to go to church:_ while sometimes it will be
without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man,
at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going
or not going to church.
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or
occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity
include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit
what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what
we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion,
either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be
not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone
omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or
occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such
cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some
act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears
directly on the omission, as when a man wills _not to go to church,_
because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its
very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin
whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is
essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears
directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he
ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as
when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church--or,
precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night,
the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In
this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the
omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that
which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii,
text. 49, 50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission
has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that
this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is
proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently
it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the
circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual
sins.
Reply Obj. 1: More things are required for good than for evil, since
"good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results
from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that
sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing
what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly
what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act,
whereas there can be sin without act.
Reply Obj. 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on
which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which
we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5.
Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has
it in his power to will, and not to will.
Reply Obj. 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative
precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to
act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept
binds him to act.
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