SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 2]

Whether Vice Is Contrary to Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature.

Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now

virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as

stated above (Q. 63, AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore vice is not contrary to

nature.

Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which

is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to

upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to

vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Obj. 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the

greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is

found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Matt. 7:13):

"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who

go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Obj. 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated

above (A. 1). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire,

contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii,

27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that

vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every

vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), vice is contrary to virtue.

Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a

manner befitting its nature, as stated above (A. 1). Hence the vice

of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting

its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated," which

word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii,

14).

But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the

form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his

species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary

to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature

of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord

with the nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord

with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius

states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man

good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much

as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's

nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as

regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which

accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says

(De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason,

like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to

be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary

to nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being

against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to

"being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is

contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense

virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they

incline us to that which is suitable to nature.

Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and

the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his

senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who

follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the

order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than

achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is

owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive

nature against the order of his reason.

Reply Obj. 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to

the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to

the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it

amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human

reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence

Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such, is

from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the

Divine art whereby it was made."

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 457 / 746 题