Whether Vice Is Contrary to Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For
one thing has one contrary, as proved in _Metaph._ x, text. 17. Now
sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary
to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members
or of any things whatever.
Obj. 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But
vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is
not contrary to virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is
the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is
opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice
is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a
quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above (Q. 55, AA.
3, 4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in virtue--the essence
of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of
virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider
something consequently. Virtue implies _directly_ a disposition
whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its
nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
"virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best;
and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its
nature." That which virtue implies _consequently_ is that it is a
kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its
being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to
which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (Q. 56,
A. 3).
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of
these is _sin,_ which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to
which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an
inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act:
in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is
a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is _malice_: while in
respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its
contrary is _vice_: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in
its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural
perfection may be called a vice."
Reply Obj. 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in
the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the
latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a
kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
Reply Obj. 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the
principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The
reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in
act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a
good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and
sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body he calls
it disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with
fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended
with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well
compacted together." And although at times there may be disease in
the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden
complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted
occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things are
indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is
ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is
rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is
known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according to Matt. 12:33.
But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a
habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with
itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease
and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion.
Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even
as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is
reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is
reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or
disease.
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