Whether Hope Remains After Death, in the State of Glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the
state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more
excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain
after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much
more then does hope remain.
Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this
life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever--in the
lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can
remain.
Obj. 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in
the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of
the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine
declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul,
according to Ecclus. 24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and
they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and 1 Pet. 1:12: "On Whom the
angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that there can be hope in
the Blessed after this life is past.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth,
why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object
of hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), that which, in its very
nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the
opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement
of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is
"the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so
that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement
ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it
is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not
possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion
of hope (Q. 40, AA. 1, 2). Therefore when we possess that which we
hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to
have hope.
Reply Obj. 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object,
which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible
with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except
perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not
remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect
of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is
in our actual possession.
Reply Obj. 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state
further on (II-II, Q. 19, A. 2). Servile fear regards punishment, and
will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer
be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an
act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the
other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards
this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the
nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to
Prov. 1:33: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils."
Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 1), and therefore the fear which will
remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear
of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in
the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the
notion of something future remains there, which is the object of
fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its
being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither
past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking,
neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q. 42, A.
2), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no
such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except
speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future
evil is called fear.
Reply Obj. 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in
the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the
reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in
them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said
to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can
be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly
speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is
God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification.
Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above
(Q. 40, A. 1): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess,
is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money
is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once.
In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly
speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire
it.
________________________