Whether Any Virtue Is Caused in Us by Habituation?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent.
Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is
sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is
no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is
lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now
faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by
God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith."
Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.
Obj. 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are
incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be
continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be
caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
Obj. 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the
perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its
cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more
efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts.
Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
_I answer that,_ We have spoken above (Q. 51, AA. 2, 3) in a general
way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a
special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note
that, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), man's virtue perfects him in
relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode,
species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in
"number, weight, and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good
must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is
twofold, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4), viz. human reason and
Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to
more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by
the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined
according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:
inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule
the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which
directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human
reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is
reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence
Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the
words, "which God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm.
xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds
good.
Reply Obj. 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused
virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But
actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue;
because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated
above (Q. 49, A. 3): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of
acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly
contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin
without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered
from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in
the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.
There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without
grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological
virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however,
will be more fully explained later (Q. 109, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1), certain seeds or
principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These
principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them:
thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent
than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the
reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which
results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification
belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they
proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.
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