Whether the Cardinal Virtues Are Fittingly Divided into Social
Virtues, Perfecting, Perfect, and Exemplar Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues,
and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Obj. 2: Further, the _perfect_ virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above
(Q. 59, A. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions.
Therefore there is no such thing as _perfect_ virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human
affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it
seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that
it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that
he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore
there are no "perfecting" virtues.
Obj. 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of
their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal
justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are
social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes
purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there
are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean
soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf.
Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The
gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his
good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and
peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives
for the common weal."]
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul
needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this
something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright."
Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in
God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly
virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we
speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself
may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze
on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to
reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the
observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf.
Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him
according to the condition of his nature, are called "social"
virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well
in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have
been speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in _Ethic._ x, 7, and
as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect,
as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48), we must needs place
some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar
virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a
difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who
are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these
are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the
things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs
all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as
nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the
soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly
things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted
consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the
virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude:
these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought
else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires;
fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the
Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as
the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who
are at the summit of perfection.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according
as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying
and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in
this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply Obj. 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living
together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of
those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence
Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social
virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative
mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them";
"the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is
impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth
kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is
speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is
wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier:
"Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their
exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to
those who have retired from public life on account of failing health,
or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to
others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a
hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays
this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and
contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be
taken up under the pressure of charity."
Reply Obj. 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly:
but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the
service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,
1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but
also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household,
or even towards one individual.
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