Whether the Four Cardinal Virtues Differ from One Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not
diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii,
1): "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and
brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no
sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real
justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." But this would
not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since
the different species of one genus do not qualify one another.
Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Obj. 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function
of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance
is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi):
"Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is
not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says
(De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that
these virtues are not distinct from one another.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should
have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a
particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act
with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to
belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done;
the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man,
holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from
choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end,
implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice;
while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to
fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison
to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there
are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and
he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the
same four virtues are distinct from one another.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found
in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice,
a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in
any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any
passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and
fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that
which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions,
or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four
virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and
fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that
every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a _habit,_ should be
accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its
contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover,
inasmuch as it is a _virtue,_ it is directed to good which involves
the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to
justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a _moral virtue_
partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things,
and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to
temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we
ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the
other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason;
whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a
kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According
to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the
other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both
habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues,
according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its
own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general
condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A.
3). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct
habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first
sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the
rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what
is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the
pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very
hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his
daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much
easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. Again,
temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing
into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened
by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very
great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught
of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be
inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by
cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing
himself to be unconquered by toil."
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent
by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues
are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the
sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply Obj. 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the
Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
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