Whether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue
is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are
passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, AA. 1,
2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
Obj. 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which
is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i,
13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above
(Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.
Obj. 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue:
and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are
about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 6, 10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
_On the contrary,_ Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the
passions; as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, seqq.
_I answer that,_ Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the
soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as
defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason.
Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are
subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not
only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations
of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject
of a passion, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore not all the
moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some
about operations.
Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and
sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something
resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in
acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher,
after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and
passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or
sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,"
viz. as about something that results from virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of
the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where
there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but
some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.
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