Whether Sorrow Is Compatible with Moral Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7:
"She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no
bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is
incompatible with virtue also.
Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is
incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with
virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc.
Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,
which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to
virtue and is incompatible with it.
_On the contrary,_ Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow
in Him, for He said (Matt. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto
death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics
held that in the mind of the wise man there are three _eupatheiai_,
i.e. "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz.
instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead
of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to
sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now
they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought
that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good
to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous
man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and
body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some
good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it.
Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise
man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous
man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live
without committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say
that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because
a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been
so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin,
according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The sorrow that is according to God
worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may
praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is
compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions
are when moderated by reason.
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about
evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is
about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the
enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one
possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the
mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary
to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the
virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by
reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection
by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason
dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be
conformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Wherefore
moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a
mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6, 7).
Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good
is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more
undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue
is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the
other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no
matter how.
Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made
sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.
Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom
there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it
helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
Reply Obj. 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but
moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to
the present state of life.
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