Whether One Virtue Can Be in Several Powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers.
For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various
way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as
directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as
executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three
things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to
work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to
will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right
reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the
will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi,
12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.
_On the contrary,_ The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But
the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue
cannot be in several powers of the soul.
_I answer that,_ It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected
in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way
it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity
of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while
diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so
wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits;
but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two
or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus
one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one
chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way
of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one
power receives from another.
Reply Obj. 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in
the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in
various degrees.
Reply Obj. 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue,
inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral
virtue is essentially in the appetite.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it
presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall
see further on (A. 3; Q. 57, A. 4).
________________________