FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 1]

Whether the Subject of Virtue Is a Power of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power

of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue is

that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the

soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a

power, but in the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is

that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." But

as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the

essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power,

any more than to the essence of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But

virtue is a quality, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4): and quality

is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not

the subject of virtue.

_On the contrary,_ "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But

the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in

a power of the soul.

_I answer that,_ It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs

to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of

virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in

that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an

operative habit, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2): for all

operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the

fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the

end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an

operation proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the

soul is the subject of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is

taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it

belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of

existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for

the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live

righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.

Reply Obj. 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to the

end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the

work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred

to the work, and consequently, to the power.

Reply Obj. 3: One accident is said to be the subject of another, not

as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident

inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by

means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of

color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of

virtue.

________________________

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 362 / 746 题