Whether Virtue Is Suitably Defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of
virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the
mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use,
which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness,
since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not
seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore
unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality."
Obj. 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since
it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than
quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should
not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.
Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come
across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field,
it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even
of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10).
Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."
Obj. 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the
righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is
therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue,
when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously."
Obj. 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it.
But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that
"pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is
untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue."
Obj. 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting
on John 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract.
xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: "He who created thee
without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore
unsuitable to say that "God works virtue in us, without us."
_On the contrary,_ We have the authority of Augustine from whose
words this definition is gathered, and principally in _De Libero
Arbitrio_ ii, 19.
_I answer that,_ This definition comprises perfectly the whole
essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of
anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition
comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue,
as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it
is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue,
and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable
if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has
any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned,
and matter "in which" it exists, namely, the subject. The matter
about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be
included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue
to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue
in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is
mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But
it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to
evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good,
sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true
and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred
to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are
always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live
righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are
sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of
which no one makes bad use."
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this
definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God
works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the
definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or
infused.
Reply Obj. 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being:
wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and
consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and
that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness.
But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and
health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the
notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as
accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they
themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are
they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness,
but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue
called good, because by it something is good.
Reply Obj. 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not
good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends
further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to
which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to
be in accord with reason."
Reply Obj. 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul,
except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13).
And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Reply Obj. 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts
those outward things right which come into human use, and are the
proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q. 60, A. 2;
II-II, Q. 58, A. 8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a
due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will,
as stated above (Q. 19, A. 4), is common to all virtues.
Reply Obj. 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for
instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it,
or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as
principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
Reply Obj. 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any
action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of
the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things
which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action
on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
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