Whether There Are Habits in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels.
For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is
not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual)
powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the
manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in
a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every
habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy
dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself (_per se_) is
prior to and more powerful than that which is by another (_per
aliud_). Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves
unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And
this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same
passage adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would
not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible
deified of itself."
Obj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which
has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems
that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels
of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and
Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of
their habits."
_I answer that,_ Some have thought that there are no habits in the
angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially.
Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their
dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential,
through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same
in his _Commentary on the Predicaments:_ "Wisdom which is in the soul
is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance.
For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is
manifest from what we have said (Q. 49, A. 4) that only a being in
potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned
commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and
that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account,
excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though
there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some
potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone),
therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may
habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and
the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.
Whence, Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the Predicaments_ that:
"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits
here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images
which it contains in itself."
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in
the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all
intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all
sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it
needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure
potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not
indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an
admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less
potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the First Part (Q.
55, A. 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of
habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its
proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence
it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things
according to the mode of its substance, as stated in _De Causis:_ and
the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to
God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits,
being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are
"godlike," that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not
in angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material
habits and accidents.
Reply Obj. 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence,
they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of
themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness,
therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without,
so far do they need to have habits.
Reply Obj. 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but
there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected
by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to
several things.
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