Whether Habit Is a Distinct Species of Quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of
quality. Because, as we have said (A. 1), habit, in so far as it is a
quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed
well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing
happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in
like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such
things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the _Book of the
Predicaments_ (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or
habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition
is not distinct from the other species of quality.
Obj. 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging
to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion.
Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of
another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," as the
Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit
is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a distinct
species of quality.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the _Book of the
Predicaments_ (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit
and disposition."
_I answer that,_ The Philosopher in the _Book of Predicaments_
(Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of
quality. Now Simplicius, in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_
explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that
some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its
nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused
from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those
which are adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in
the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural
qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state
of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality:
while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply
rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the
third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth
species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an
animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems
unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities,
which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many
dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health,
beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the
species, since that which is the more natural is always first.
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions
and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking,
implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore
it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure.
Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material
potentiality (_potentia materiae_) is determined to its substantial
being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the
substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the
subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an
accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear
from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).
Now the mode o[r] determination of the subject to accidental being
may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in
regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles,
which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take
the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we
shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity,
considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the
notion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of
quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or
slowly transitory.
But the mode o[r] determination of the subject, in regard to action
or passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality.
And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done
with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in
them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or
evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end,
whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in
regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of
quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says
(Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the
body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by
perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature."
And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and
the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the
first species we consider both evil and good, and also
changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain
nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher
(Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone
is disposed, well or ill"; and in _Ethic._ ii, 4, he says that by
"habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions."
For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the
aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil.
And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything,
for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.
Reply Obj. 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some
quality except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or
ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must
consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So
in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or
ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a
thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently
even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are
considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing,
belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according to
their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat
and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing,
concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the
Philosopher, in the first species of quality.
Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some
give another solution, as Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the
Predicaments._
Reply Obj. 3: This difference, "difficult to change," does not
distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from
disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as
the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of
habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is
divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be
divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect
within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining
the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily
lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not
to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a
boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse
species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions,
those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very
nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g.
sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by
reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they
have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this
sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation
seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for in order
to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking,
according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature,
easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly
changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in
regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly
changeable: for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as
to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that
science, rather than that he has the science. From this it is clear
that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word
"disposition" does not.
Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are
specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion
and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences,
though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate
differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same
way, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of
substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential
principles are designated.
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