Whether Habit Is a Quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine
says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the
verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also
to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having"
quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a
quality.
Obj. 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may
be clearly seen in the _Book on the Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). But
one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is
not a quality.
Obj. 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the
_Book of the Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
order of that which has parts," as stated in _Metaph._ v, text. 24.
But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not
a quality.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
_I answer that,_ This word _habitus_ (habit) is derived from _habere_
(to have). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in
another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation (_se
habet_) either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in
regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various
predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the
"post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various
predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and
such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this
distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between
the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no
medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are
some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for
instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And,
further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an
action or passion, but something after the manner of action or
passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and
something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an
action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the
case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore
these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under
the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v,
text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is
clothed."
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in
regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a
quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and
of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a
disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill,
and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus
health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now.
Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for
thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we
understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is
had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that
which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher
goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to
place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as
Simplicius observes in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ "he
includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to
place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the
order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes
all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet
arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue:
"and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions,
which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
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