Whether the Species of Anger Are Suitably Assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16)
unsuitably assigns three species of anger--"wrath," "ill-will" and
"rancor." For no genus derives its specific differences from
accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident:
because "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath
(_cholos_), if anger continue it is called ill-will (_menis_); while
rancor (_kotos_) is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance."
Therefore these are not different species of anger.
Obj. 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that
"_excandescentia_ (irascibility) is what the Greeks call _thymosis_,
and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently";
while according to Damascene _thymosis_, is the same as _kotos_
(rancor). Therefore _kotos_ does not bide its time for taking
vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of
anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and
anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees
mentioned by Our Lord (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his
brother" (thus implying "anger without utterance"), and then,
"whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" (implying anger with
utterance yet without full expression), and lastly, "whosoever shall
say 'Thou fool'" (where we have "perfection of speech"). Therefore
Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of
utterance.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].
_I answer that,_ The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory
of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger.
This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement
itself, and he calls this kind of anger _cholos_ (bile) because it
quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes
anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to
_menis_ (ill-will) which is derived from _menein_ (to dwell).
Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz.
vengeance; and this pertains to _kotos_ (rancor) which never rests
until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness and anger and
indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons _akrocholoi_ (choleric),
because they are easily angered; some he calls _pikroi_ (bitter),
because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls
_chalepoi_ (ill-tempered), because they never rest until they have
retaliated [*Cf. II-II, Q. 158, A. 5].
Reply Obj. 1: All those things which give anger some kind of
perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply Obj. 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain
to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness
of temper, rather than to rancor (_furor_). And there is no reason
why the Greek _thymosis_, which is denoted by the Latin _furor,_
should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose
in being avenged.
Reply Obj. 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various
effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the
very movement of anger.
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