Whether the Object of Anger Is Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For
Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is
"the sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails
whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has
the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
Obj. 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each
seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its
object, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 1). Therefore anger does also.
Obj. 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the
object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves
for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something
good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger
is good.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of
hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of
anger.
_I answer that,_ The movement of the appetitive power follows an act
of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a
thing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we
understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as
when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each
of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by
way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply
follows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements
are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex
object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil
being in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling
from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love
someone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate
someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same
with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on
someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to
vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good,
wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks
vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the
character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect,
between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The
first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas
love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is
said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second
difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the
lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself:
while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the
man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable
to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil,
viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently
it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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