Whether Daring Ensues from Hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.
Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in _Ethic._
iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1).
Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order.
Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
Obj. 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact,
despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5).
Therefore daring does not result from hope.
Obj. 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory.
But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.
Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not
result from it.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those
are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring
ensues from hope.
_I answer that,_ As we have often stated (Q. 22, A. 2; Q. 35, A. 1;
Q. 41, A. 1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now
every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of
pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something
either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason
of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of
avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of
pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the
object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that
which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason
of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and
avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things
belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope,
avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to
daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore,
that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming
the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But
despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is
because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope
for.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not
co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good,
since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit;
consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which
pursues good.
Reply Obj. 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil,
yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit
of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope
precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not
always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not
always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in
the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined;
yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In
like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away
from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly
speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as
despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too,
daring cannot be a principal passion.
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