SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Makes One Suitable for Counsel?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for

counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a

hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion

disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason.

Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and

deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all

thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest.

Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but

hinders it.

Obj. 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to

avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas

fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be

obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope

is.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear

makes men of counsel."

_I answer that,_ A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First,

from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear

makes men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,

3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust

ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but

have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel,

and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q.

42, A. 2). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are

afraid.

Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good

counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of

counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to

him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he

loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more

dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every

passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good

counsel.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is

it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is

intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are

so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be

slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely

disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take

good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the

Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he

despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in _Ethic._

iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope

is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is

of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the

aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of

difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take

counsel, as stated above.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 299 / 746 题